Allahabad High Court
DEV MANI PANDEYversusSTATE OF U.P.
- Decided
- Bench
- JAI PRAKASH TIWARI
Holding
The High Court held that where a genuine compromise has been effected and the prosecution evidence does not substantiate the alleged offences, the criminal proceedings under Sections 376 and 506 IPC may be quashed under its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.
Summary
The applicant, Dev Mani Pandey, filed an application under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking to quash the charge‑sheet dated 19‑03‑2018 and related proceedings for offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC. The applicant and the opposite party, who are living as husband and wife, executed a compromise deed which was verified by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate‑III, Basti. The State opposed the quash but the Additional Government Advocate agreed that continuation of the case would serve no useful purpose. Relying on precedents that allow quashing where the compromise is genuine and the prosecution lacks a case, the Court held that the offences could be dismissed. Consequently, the charge‑sheet, cognizance order and the entire criminal proceeding were quashed, and the application was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the criminal proceedings for offences under Sections 376 and 506 IPC can be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the parties.
- Whether the nature and gravity of the alleged offences preclude the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 320, 482
- Indian Penal Code — s. 376, 506
Subjects
- Section 482 CrPC
- quash of criminal proceedings
- compromise deed
- rape (Section 376 IPC)
- criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC)
- inherent jurisdiction
- abuse of process
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 32750 of 2018
Dev Mani Pandey
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Opposite
Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, Shyam Lal,
Utsav Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Brijesh Chandra Naik, G.A.
Court No. - 84
HON'BLE JAI PRAKASH TIWARI, J.
Heard Sri Rakesh Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri
Brijesh Chandra Naik, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, as
well as the learned AGA for the State and perused the record.
This application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed w0ith the prayer to quash
the charge-sheet dated 19.03.2018, cognizance order dated 18.08.2018, as
well as entire proceedings of Case No. 2363 of 2018 (State vs. Dev Muni
Pandey), arising out of Case Crime No. 62 of 2018, under Sections 376,
506 IPC, Police Station Kalwari, District Basti, pending in the court of
learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Basti, on the basis of compromise, so far it
relates to the present applicant.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant and opposite
party no. 2 are living together as husband and wife. He further submits
that in compliance of the order dated 8.5.2024 passed by this Court, the
parties filed compromise deed before the court of learned Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, Court No. 11, Basti, and the concerned
court vide its order dated 30.05.2024 verified the said compromise in the
presence of the applicant and opposite party no.2, copy of which is on
record alongwith the verification order.
Learned Additional Government Advocate have submitted that since the
parties have entered into compromise, which has also been verified by the
trial court, therefore, no useful purpose would be served if the
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proceedings of the aforesaid case go on further.
Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2, is also present. He has no
objection to the statement, made above.
Considering the fact that applicant and opposite party no.2, both are major
and willingly married and are living as husband and wife. This Court in
the case of Application U/S 482 No.41580 of 2022 (Fakre Alam @
Shozil Alam Vs. State of U.P. and 3 others) observed that even if the
offence like rape, cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise but if
from perusal of record, no case is made out under Section 376 I.P.C. even
if the charge sheet is filed under Section 376 I.P.C., the proceedings, on
the basis of compromise can be quashed.
The Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab &
Another (2012) 10 SCC 303 observed in paragraph no. 61 as under:-
"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the
power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in
accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the
criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and
victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot
be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have
settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on
society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for
any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different
footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the
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3
offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where
the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim,
the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case
would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement
and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider
whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to
abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal
case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the
High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi
Narayan AIR 2019 SC 1296 observed in paragraph no.13.4 as under:-
"iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the
society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings
for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious
impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of
the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst
themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there
is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation
of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC.
For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body,
nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be
permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge
sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in
paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh
(supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
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circumstances stated hereinabove;"
Therefore, in such peculiar facts and circumstances, it would be unfair
and contrary to interest of justice to continue with impugned criminal
proceeding.
In view of the above facts and legal position as well as law laid down by
the Apex Court in the judgment of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab &
Another (supra), and State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (supra),
the he charge-sheet dated 19.03.2018, cognizance order dated 18.08.2018,
as well as entire proceedings of Case No. 2363 of 2018 (State vs. Dev
Muni Pandey), arising out of Case Crime No. 62 of 2018, under Sections
376, 506 IPC, Police Station Kalwari, District Basti, pending in the court
of learned Judicial Magistrate-II, Basti, is hereby quashed.
In view of the aforesaid observations, the application is allowed.
(Jai Prakash Tiwari,J.)
April 20, 2026
Brijesh
Digitally signed by :-
BRIJESH KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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