SAMIRUDDINversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                  CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 12073 of 2025

Samiruddin
                                                             .....Appellant(s)
                                   Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                           .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)              :   Anjum Haq, Shailesh Kumar
Counsel for Respondent(s)             :   G.A.

Court No. - 51
                  HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J.

   1. Heard Ms. Anjum Haq learned counsel for the appellant, learned
     A.G.A. for the State, and perused the entire record. Despite service of
     notice, none has appeared on behalf of the opposite party no.2.

   2. This Criminal Appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the Scheduled Castes
     and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been
     preferred to quash the summoning order dated 24.04.2025 as well as
     the entire proceedings of S.S.T. No. 147 of 2025, arising out of Case
     Crime No. 0311 of 2024, under Sections 115(2), 352, 351(3), 329(4)
     BNS and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
     Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Police Station Sarpataha, District
     Jaunpur.

   3. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised a solitary submission that
     no offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act is made out
     against the appellant. It is submitted that the said provision has been
     invoked only because Section 351(3) BNS, corresponding to erstwhile
     Section 506 IPC, finds place in the Schedule appended to the SC/ST
     Act.

   4. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that even the basic
     ingredients of Section 351(3) BNS are absent from the allegations
     made in the FIR as well as from the material collected during
     investigation. It is submitted that there is no allegation indicating any
     intention on the part of the appellant to cause alarm to the complainant,
     which is the sine qua non for constituting the offence of criminal
     intimidation.

   5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that the appellant has
     falsely been implicated in the present case due to a long-standing land
     dispute between the parties. It is contended that the opposite party no.2
     wanted to grab the land allotted in favour of Somari and, since the
     appellant had intervened in the village panchayat to settle the dispute,
     he has been maliciously implicated in the present matter. It is further
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  submitted that the First Information Report was lodged after an
  inordinate and unexplained delay of about one month and twenty-four
  days from the alleged date of incident. During investigation, several
  independent witnesses namely Somari, Maghu, Badri, Ayyub Khan,
  Mohd. Hasan Khan, Mohd. Sabi Khan and Suresh stated that
  construction work was going on over the disputed land and the
  opposite party no.2 herself came there and created disturbance, and
  also threw mud and bricks upon the appellant. It is also pointed out
  that Jagdish, who was shown in the First Information Report as an eye-
  witness, subsequently stated that he was not present at the place of
  occurrence at the relevant time. Learned counsel further submits that
  even the medical evidence discloses only simple injuries which were
  about eight days old. Learned counsel further submits that the
  Investigating Officer, ignoring the material collected during
  investigation, submitted charge-sheet only against the appellant while
  exonerating the other named accused persons namely Rukmuddin,
  Shabrin Bano and Qayyum. It is argued that no offence under Sections
  115(2), 352, 351(3), 329(4) BNS and Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST
  Act is made out from the allegations contained in the First Information
  Report as no caste-related abusive words have been alleged against the
  appellant.

6. Learned counsel further submits that the allegations regarding use of
  weapons are wholly bald and omnibus in nature and no material has
  been brought on record to demonstrate any overt act on the part of the
  appellant so as to create an apprehension of imminent danger or alarm
  in the mind of the complainant.

7. It is thus submitted that once Section 351(3) BNS itself is not attracted,
  the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, which is
  dependent upon commission of a scheduled offence, also cannot
  survive.

8. Per contra, learned A.G.A. vehemently opposed the appeal and
  submitted that from a bare perusal of the FIR and material collected
  during investigation, it cannot be said that no cognizable offence is
  made out against the appellant. It is submitted that the impugned
  summoning order has been passed after due consideration of the police
  report and material available on record and does not suffer from any
  illegality warranting interference by this Court in exercise of appellate
  jurisdiction.

9. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
  parties and have perused the record.

10. From a perusal of the FIR and the statements recorded during
  investigation, it transpires that no specific allegation of caste-related
  abuse has been levelled against the appellant. There is no averment
  that any caste-indicative words were uttered by the appellant against
  the informant or that the alleged occurrence took place on account of
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                                 3


   the caste identity of the complainant. There is also no material to
   indicate that the appellant was aware that the opposite party no.2
   belonged to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community.

11. So far as the offence under Section 351(3) BNS is concerned, this
   Court finds that the essential ingredient of “intention to cause alarm” is
   conspicuously absent from the allegations. Mere use of threatening
   language or general allegations made during the course of an
   altercation would not ipso facto constitute the offence of criminal
   intimidation unless the threat is of such a nature as is intended to create
   alarm in the mind of the complainant.

12. In the present case, despite allegations that the appellant abused and
   assaulted the complainant, there is no specific assertion either in the
   FIR or in the statements recorded during investigation that the
   appellant extended any definite threat to the life, reputation or property
   of the complainant with the intention to cause alarm to her.

13. The material on record does not disclose any specific overt act,
   particular threat or conduct attributable to the appellant from which it
   may reasonably be inferred that the alleged acts were intended to
   create fear or alarm in the mind of the complainant. The allegations
   remain vague and omnibus in nature. Moreover, the alleged occurrence
   is stated to have taken place in the presence of several persons and in
   the backdrop of an admitted land dispute and, in such circumstances,
   the allegation of criminal intimidation does not appear to satisfy the
   ingredients of Section 351(3) BNS.

14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka
   2015(7) SCC 423 has held that mere expression of words without any
   intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring the case
   within the ambit of criminal intimidation.

15. Similar view has recently been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
   Court in Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba Vs. State of West Bengal,
   2015 (7) SCC 423, wherein the Court held as under:
   “Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation
   punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person
   charged threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or
   property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is
   interested, with intent to cause alarm. Except for the bald allegation that
   the appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her
   photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about the
   manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her
   person or her property. The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are
   not mentioned in the FIR. Consequently, even if the allegations in the FIR
   are taken at face value, the ingredients of the offence of criminal
   intimidation are not attracted.”

16. The aforesaid judgments clearly lay down that unless there are specific
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                                             allegations disclosing a threat with intent to cause alarm, the offence of
                                             criminal intimidation would not be made out merely on the basis of
                                             vague and omnibus allegations.

                                          17. Once this Court finds that the offence under Section 351(3) BNS is not
                                             prima facie made out, the very foundation for invoking Section
                                             3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act disappears, inasmuch as the said provision
                                             is attracted only when an offence specified in the Schedule is
                                             committed against a person on the ground that such person belongs to
                                             a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community.

                                          18. Accordingly, the present appeal deserves to be partly allowed.

                                          19. The appeal is partly allowed.

                                          20. The summoning order dated 24.04.2025 and the entire proceedings of
                                             S.S.T. No. 147 of 2025, arising out of Case Crime No. 0311 of 2024,
                                             are hereby quashed only to the extent of offences under Section 351(3)
                                             BNS and Section 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
                                             Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

                                          21. However, the proceedings in respect of the remaining offences shall
                                             continue in accordance with law.



                                                                                               (Madan Pal Singh,J.)
                                    May 15, 2026
                                    pks




Digitally signed by :-
PANKAJ KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad