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Allahabad High Court

AMRESH PANDITversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

Decided

Holding

The court held that the "public view" requirement was not met, so the provisions of Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act cannot be applied and the summoning order for those offences is set aside.

Summary

The appellant was charged under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and several IPC offences for allegedly assaulting and abusing a Scheduled Caste woman in an agricultural field at night. The appellant contended that the "public view" element required by Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act was not satisfied because no independent public witnesses were present. The court examined precedents interpreting "public view" and held that the presence of members of the public at the time of the alleged abuse is a sine qua non for invoking the SC/ST provisions. It found that the FIR and the victim’s statements did not establish that the caste‑based insults were made in the presence of any public persons. Consequently, the summoning order for the SC/ST offences was set aside and those proceedings were quashed, while the IPC charges were allowed to proceed. The appeal was therefore partly allowed.

Issues considered

  • Whether the essential ingredient of "public view" under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is satisfied in the present facts
  • Whether the summoning order passed by the Special Judge under the SC/ST Act is legally sustainable

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • SC/ST Act
  • public view
  • caste based abuse
  • criminal appeal
  • quash of proceedings
  • IPC offences
  • summoning order

Judgment

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                   CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 5307 of 2025

Amresh Pandit
                                                              .....Appellant(s)
                                   Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                            .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Appellant(s)        : Arvind Kumar Pandey, Giri Ram
                                  Rawat, Indra Deo Mishra, Sangam
                                  Kumar, Sangeeta Yadav, Shri Ram
                                  (Rawat), Vivekanand Rai
Counsel for Respondent(s)       : Hanuman Prasad Kushwaha, G.A.

Court No. - 51
                  HON'BLE MADAN PAL SINGH, J.

   1. Heard Sri Giri Ram Rawat, learned counsel for the applicant, learned
     A.G.A. for the State, and learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and
     perused the record.

   2. The present appeal under Section 14A(1) of the Scheduled Castes and
     Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been
     preferred against the summoning order dated 19.12.2024 passed by the
     learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Agra, as well as the entire
     proceedings arising out of Case Crime No. 122 of 2024, under
     Sections 354A, 294, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha),
     3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, P.S. Khergarh, district Agra.

   3. As per the prosecution case, the complainant, who belongs to a
     Scheduled Caste community, alleged in the FIR that on 19.05.2024 at
     about 9:00 P.M., when she had gone to an agricultural field outside the
     village for nature's call, the appellant caught hold of her and attempted
     to outrage her modesty. Upon her raising alarm, her husband and
     certain villagers reached the spot, whereupon the appellant fled away.
     It has also been alleged that caste-related abusive words were used and
     threats were extended.

   4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned order is
     illegal and has been passed without proper application of mind. It is
     contended that there are material contradictions in the statements of the
     victim recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. It is further
     submitted that the alleged incident took place at night in an agricultural
     field and there were no independent public witnesses present at the
     time of the alleged occurrence. Thus, the essential ingredient of
     “public view” as required under the SC/ST Act is not satisfied. It is
     also argued that there is no medical evidence and the prosecution has
     been initiated due to ulterior motive.
                                                             CRLA No. 5307 of 2025
                                 2


 5. Per contra, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 as well as learned
   A.G.A. submit that the FIR and the statement under Section 164
   Cr.P.C. disclose commission of cognizable offences and at this stage,
   detailed appreciation of evidence is not warranted. It is argued that the
   learned trial court has rightly taken cognizance.

 6. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the
   record.

 7. The principal issue which arises for consideration is whether the
   essential ingredient of “public view” as required under Section 3(1)(s)
   of the SC/ST Act is made out in the present case.

 8. Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act reads as follows:

   “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—(1) Whoever, not being
   a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,—
   (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by
   caste name in any place within public view;”

 9. In Mahesh Sakharam Patole V.The State of Maharashtra 2010 (1)
   RCR it has been held that
   " The expression 'within public view' will have to be read to mean that the
   offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, 1989 should take place in view
   of the public". If no member of the public has either seen the incident or heard
   the remarks, then even if the place is a "public place" or a place "visible to the
   public", it would not attract the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(x)
   of Act.

10. In K. Venugopal Reddy and Others V. The Deputy Superintendent of
   Police and others 2016 (1) ALT (cri) 177 (A.P.), it has been held that
   in order to launch prosecution under Section 3(1)(x) of Act, two
   necessary and indispensable ingredients must exist. Victim should
   belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and there must be
   humiliation of such person in public view.

11. In Daya Bhatnagar Vs. State of Delhi 2004 (109) DLT 915, the
   expression within 'public view' occurring in Section 3(1) (x) of the Act
   means within the view which includes hearing, knowledge or
   accessibility also, of a group of people of the place/locality/village as
   distinct from few who are not private and are as good as strangers and
   not linked with the complainant through any close relationship or any
   business, commercial or any other vested interest and who are not
   participating members with him in any way. If such group of people
   comprise anyone of these, it would not satisfy the requirement of
   'public view' within the meaning of the expression used.

12. The expression “any place within public view” has been interpreted by
   the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand,
   (2020) 10 SCC 710 and reiterated in subsequent decisions including
                                                        CRLA No. 5307 of 2025
                               3


   Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of
   Police, Lalgudi, Trichy and Others, 2025 INSC 132, wherein it has
   been held that

         “... It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within
         public view’, the place should be open where the
         members of the public can witness or hear the
         utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the
         alleged offence takes place where members of the
         public are not present, then it cannot be said that it
         has taken place at a place within public view.”

13. Thus, the presence of public persons at the time of the alleged incident
   is a sine qua non for attracting the provisions of the SC/ST Act.

14. From the aforesaid judgments, the following legal principles emerge:
   firstly, the expression “public view” is distinct from a “public place”;
   secondly, even a private place may fall within public view if members
   of the public are actually present and capable of witnessing or hearing
   the incident; and thirdly, mere allegation of use of caste-related words
   is not sufficient unless it is shown that such words were uttered in the
   presence of public persons.

15. Applying the aforesaid legal position to the facts of the present case, it
   is evident that the alleged occurrence is stated to have taken place in an
   agricultural field at about 9:00 P.M. during night hours. The FIR as
   well as the statements of the victim do not clearly indicate that any
   independent member of the public was present at the time when the
   alleged caste-based abuses were made.

16. Though it has been stated that the husband and certain villagers
   reached the spot after hearing alarm, there is no categorical assertion
   that the alleged abusive words were uttered in their presence.

17. The timing and place of occurrence are also important factor to
   consider. An agricultural field outside the village during night hours
   cannot, by itself, be presumed to be a place within public view in
   absence of specific material showing actual presence of public persons.
   The requirement of “public view” is not a matter of presumption but
   must be supported by factual foundation.

18. In the absence of any clear and specific material indicating that the
   alleged caste-based insult was made in the presence of members of the
   public, this Court is of the considered opinion that the foundational
   requirement for attracting the provisions of Sections 3(1)(da),
   3(1)(dha) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.

19. However, so far as the allegations relating to offences under Sections
   354A, 294, 504 and 506 IPC are concerned, the same cannot be said to
   be inherently improbable or absurd at this stage. The FIR and the
                                                                                                 CRLA No. 5307 of 2025
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                                             statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. disclose a prima facie case, and
                                             the veracity of such allegations is a matter for trial.

                                          20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the summoning order dated
                                             19.12.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Agra, in
                                             so far as it relates to offences under Sections 3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha) and
                                             3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, is not sustainable in law and is liable to be
                                             set aside.

                                          21. Accordingly, the proceedings against the appellant under Sections
                                             3(1)(da), 3(1)(dha) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act are hereby quashed.
                                             However, the proceedings under Sections 354A, 294 504 and 506 IPC
                                             shall continue in accordance with law.

                                          22. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.




                                                                                               (Madan Pal Singh,J.)
                                    April 27, 2026
                                    pks




Digitally signed by :-
PANKAJ KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad


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