Allahabad High Court
ANEESH OJHAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER
- Decided
- Bench
- SANTOSH RAI
Holding
At the charge‑framing stage, the material on record disclosed a prima facie case and grave suspicion, justifying the framing of charges under IPC 420, 406, 506, 120‑B and SC/ST Act, and the appeal is dismissed.
Summary
The appellant, Aneesh Ojha, was charged under IPC sections 420, 406, 506, 120‑B and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act for allegedly cheating a complainant by taking possession of his vehicle, misusing cheques and threatening him with caste‑related abuse. The appellant contended that the FIR was a retaliatory measure in a monetary dispute, that there was a one‑year delay in filing the complaint, and that the offences under sections 420 and 406 could not be invoked on the same facts, relying on the Delhi Race Club case. The State argued that the FIR was filed under a valid Section 156(3) CrPC application, that the investigation yielded material supporting the charges, and that any factual disputes should be decided at trial. The High Court examined the material on record, held that a prima facie case and grave suspicion existed, and reiterated that at the charge‑framing stage only a prima facie case is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the charge‑framing order and directing the appellant to seek bail if not already granted.
Issues considered
- Whether the charge‑framing order under IPC sections 420, 406, 506, 120‑B and SC/ST Act can be quashed on the ground of lack of evidence and delay.
- Whether sections 420 and 406 IPC can be invoked together on the same set of facts.
- Whether the material on record discloses a prima facie case sufficient to justify framing of charges.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 156(3), 161, 227, 228
- Indian Penal Code — s. 120-B, 406, 420, 506
- Negotiable Instruments Act — s. 138
- SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act — s. 3(2)(va)
Subjects
- criminal law
- cheating
- criminal breach of trust
- criminal intimidation
- SC/ST Act
- charge framing
- prima facie case
- Section 156(3) CrPC
- Section 227 CrPC
- Section 228 CrPC
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 6634 of 2026
Aneesh Ojha
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Deepak Kumar Tripathi
Counsel for Respondent(s) : G.A., Prince Kumar
Court No. - 93
HON'BLE SANTOSH RAI, J.
1. Heard Shri Dinesh Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant, Shri
Prince Kumar, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and learned AGA for the
State.
2. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant to set aside/quash the
entire proceedings as well as the chargesheet dated 14.07.2023 and the
cognizance/summoning order dated 05.08.2023 passed by Special Judge,
SC/ST Act, Sant Kabir Nagar in Sessions Case No.575 of 2023 arising
out of Case Crime No.183 of 2023 under Sections 420, 406 and 506 and
120-B IPC and Sections 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
P.S.- Mahuli, District- Sant Kabir Nagar.
3. In the FIR, the accused persons, namely Vishal Manji, Aneesh Ojha,
the appellant herein, and Nitesh Singh, have been named. The FIR was
registered under Sections 420, 406 and 506 IPC and Section 3(2)(va) of
the SC/ST Act. The allegation against the accused persons, in brief, is that
they induced the complainant to hand over his vehicle on the pretext of
hiring it for transporting goods, promising rent and payment of expenses.
Thereafter, Aneesh Ojha allegedly took possession of the vehicle and its
documents and obtained/used signed cheques and a sum of about Rs.4
lakh, while Nitesh Singh allegedly presented one of the cheques and
raised a false monetary demand of Rs.10 lakh. It is further alleged that the
accused, acting in collusion, neither returned the vehicle nor paid the
agreed amount and threatened the complainant, including with caste-
related abuses.
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4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has been
falsely implicated in the present case due to a monetary dispute between
the parties. It is submitted that the informant had taken a sum of
Rs.4,50,000/- from the appellant and, when repayment was demanded,
issued a cheque for the said amount, which was dishonoured for
insufficiency of funds, whereafter the appellant instituted proceedings
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is argued that the present FIR was
subsequently lodged as a counterblast to the said proceedings. Learned
counsel further submits that the allegations of cheating, criminal breach of
trust, criminal intimidation and the offence under the SC/ST Act are false
and unsupported by any independent evidence and no caste-related words
were allegedly used by the appellant. It is also contended that there was
an unexplained delay of about one year in lodging the
complaint/application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that the
investigating officer has filed the charge-sheet without collecting credible
evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant has further placed reliance
upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd.
and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2024) 10 SCC
690, and submitted that the offences under Sections 420 and 406 IPC
cannot be invoked on the same set of facts. On these grounds, it is
submitted that the order taking cognizance dated 05.08.2023 and the
consequential proceedings are liable to be quashed.
5. Per contra, learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for O.P. No.2 submit
that the FIR was registered pursuant to the order passed on the application
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and, after investigation, the investigating
officer collected material against the appellant and other accused and
submitted the charge-sheet under Sections 420, 406, 506, 120-B IPC and
Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act. The statements of the informant and
other witnesses recorded during investigation support the prosecution
version. It is further submitted that the defence regarding the alleged loan
transaction, dishonoured cheque and the proceedings under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act raises disputed questions of fact, which cannot appropriately
be adjudicated in proceedings seeking quashing of the criminal case. The
allegations made in the FIR and the material collected during
investigation prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences;
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therefore, the order taking cognizance does not call for interference at this
stage.
6. On the basis of the allegations contained in the FIR, the statement of
the victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the material available
in the case diary, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet,
whereafter cognizance was taken and the appellant was summoned. The
present appeal has been preferred against the cognizance/summoning
order 05.08.2023. Thereafter, charges were framed on 19.07.2024 and,
during the course of trial, the statement of PW-1, the complainant Vijay
Kumar, has been recorded. However, the defence has not yet concluded
the cross-examination of the said witness before the trial court. It is an
admitted fact that some financial/monetary dispute is pending between the
parties. The allegations in the FIR, coupled with the material collected
during investigation, prima facie disclose the commission of the offences
alleged against the appellants, including criminal intimidation, and are
sufficient to warrant their prosecution. The disputed questions relating to
the nature of the financial transaction and the rival claims of the parties
are matters for consideration by the trial court on the basis of evidence.
7. Considering the allegations contained in the FIR, the statement of the
victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the material available in
the case diary and the financial/monetary dispute pending between the
parties, this Court is of the opinion that a prima facie case is made out
against the accused-appellant. It is also undisputed that the charge has
already been framed against the accused-appellant on 19.07.2024.
8. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge, even a strong
suspicion is sufficient to proceed against the accused, and the correctness
or sufficiency of the evidence is not to be meticulously examined. At the
stage of consideration of discharge or framing of charge, the Court is
required to evaluate the material placed on record by the prosecution, if
the material available on record is strong regarding the commission of the
offence by the accused, the charge is liable to be framed.
9. In Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as
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under:-
"………. While framing charges, court is required to evaluate
materials and documents on record to decide whether facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose
existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At
this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the
probative value of materials on record. It needs to evaluate
whether there is a ground for presuming that accused had
committed offence. But it should not evaluate sufficiency of
evidence to convict accused. Even if there is a grave
suspicion against the accused and it is not properly explained
or court feels that accused might have committed offence,
then framing of charges against the accused is justified. It is
only for conviction of accused that materials must indicate
that accused had committed offence but for framing of
charges if materials indicate that accused might have
committed offence, then framing of charge is proper.
Materials brought on by prosecution must be believed to be
true and their probative value cannot be decided at this
stage. The accused entitled to urge his contentions only on
materials submitted by prosecution. He is not entitled to
produce any material at this stage and the court is not
required to consider any such material, if submitted. Whether
the prima facic case made out depends upon facts and
circumstances of each case. If two views are possible and
materials indicate mere suspicion, not being grave suspicion,
against accused then he may be discharged. The court has to
consider broad probabilities of case, total effect of evidence
and documents produced before it. The court should not act
as mouthpiece of prosecution and it is impermissible to have
roving enquiry at the stage of framing of charge."
10. In Rajbir Singh v. State of U.P. and Another, (2006) 4 SCC 51, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held, by quoting the decision in State of Bihar
vs. Ramesh Singh, (1977) SCC (Cri) 533, as under:-
CRLA No. 6634 of 2026
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"Reading [Ss. 227 and 228] together in juxtaposition, as they
have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the
initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the
evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to
be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to
the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for
the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail
and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved,
would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or
not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally
applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or
otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the
stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section
228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether
there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or
whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong
suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the
region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt
at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is
a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is
ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the
evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove
the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence
evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the
offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for
proceeding with the trial."
11. In Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohammad Maqbool Magrey and
Others, (2022) 12 SCC 657, the Apex Court held as under:-
"21. This Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal,
(1979) 3 SCC 4, considered the scope of enquiry a Judge is
required to make while considering the question of framing
of charges. After an exhaustive survey of the case law on the
CRLA No. 6634 of 2026
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point, this Court, in para 10 of the judgment, laid down the
following principles:
"10. ... (1) That the Judge while considering the
question of framing the charges under Section
227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift
and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose
of finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained the Court
will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case
would naturally depend upon the facts of each
case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of
universal application. By and large however if
two views are equally possible and the Judge is
satisfied that the evidence produced before him
while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave
suspicion against the accused, he will be fully
within his right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under
Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under
the present Code is a senior and experienced
Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the
total effect of the evidence and the documents
produced before the Court, any basic infirmities
appearing in the case and so on. This however
does not mean that the Judge should make a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the
matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
CRLA No. 6634 of 2026
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conducting a trial."
23. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, this Court
had an occasion to consider the scope of Sections 227 and
228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have
been taken note of in para 21 as under:
"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding
out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused
has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case
would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing
a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and
the documents produced before the court, any basic
infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a
roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could
form an opinion that the accused might have committed
offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the
conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into but before
CRLA No. 6634 of 2026
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framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on
the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken
at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift
the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage
to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even
if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of
the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the
trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and
at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in
conviction or acquittal."
12. Thus, having considered the entire facts and circumstances of the
case, the material and evidence available on record, the submissions
advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and the law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court as discussed herein above, I am of the
considered opinion that the learned trial court has rightly framed charges
against the accused-appellant under Sections 420, 406 and 506 and 120-B
IPC and Sections 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The
impugned order framing charges is well reasoned and does not suffer
from any illegality, perversity or infirmity warranting interference by this
Court.
13. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the appellant with
regard to Sections 420 and 406 IPC, in the light of the judgment of the
Apex Court in the Delhi Race Course case, is concerned, it is pertinent to
note that the said judgment was not in existence at the time of taking
cognizance or during the relevant proceedings before the court concerned.
Therefore, the applicability and effect of the said judgment on the facts
CRLA No. 6634 of 2026
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and circumstances of the present case may appropriately be considered by
the learned trial court during the course of trial in the light of the evidence
available on record.
14. Accordingly, the present appeal stands dismissed.
15. In case the appellant is not enlarged on bail, he is directed to appear
before the court concerned and move bail application, within two weeks
from today. It is made clear that no application seeking extension of the
aforesaid period shall be entertained by this court.
16. In case, the appellant moves bail application before the court
concerned, the same shall be considered and decided by the trial court
expeditiously and preferably on the same day, in light of principles laid
down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court regarding surrender and
bail.
17. In case, the appellant fails to appear before the court concerned within
the stipulated period, the trial court will be at liberty to adopt appropriate
coercive proceedings, in accordance with law, for securing the presence
of the appellant.
18. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to communicate the instant order to
the court concerned through District and Sessions Judge, Sant Kabir
Nagar by e-mail/FAX within 48 hours.
(Santosh Rai,J.)
September 29, 2026
Ankit.
Digitally signed by :-
ANKIT VISHWAKARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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