JATINDRA DHIMANversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

              HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

                     CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 1389 of 2026

Jatindra Dhiman
                                                                      .....Revisionist(s)
                                         Versus
State of U.P. and Another
                                                                  .....Opposite Party(s)

Counsel for Revisionist(s)                 :    Prateek Mishra, Siddhartha Baghel
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)              :    G.A.

Court No. - 87
                            HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the revisionist.

2. The present criminal revision has been filed against the impugned order dated
12.12.2025 passed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Chhata, Mathura, in discharge
application filed after submission of charge sheet against the revisionist dated
10.06.2024 arising out of Case Crime No. 414 of 2023, under sections 406, 420 I.P.C.,
Police Station Kosikalan, District Mathura.

3. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the charge sheet has been filed in
great haste and the discharge application has been rejected in a cursory manner
without appreciating the settled principles of law governing discharge.

4. Learned counsel for the revisionist has submitted that the impugned order dated
12.12.2025 is non-speaking and unreasoned order having been passed without
assigning any cogent reason. Learned counsel for the revisionist has further submitted
that the proceeding under sections 420 and 406 I.P.C. cannot run simultaneously in
view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd.
Versus State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine, SC 2248. The law laid down on the point
of discharge is as follows:

5. The Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Rai Vs. State of U.P. and another; 2022
(5) SCC 720 by Three Judges Bench,(Authored by Hon. Surya Kant, J) held as
under:-

      "12. At the outset, we may note that the High Court has dismissed the
      Criminal Revision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction under section 397
      of Cr.P.C. The High Court did not examine the issue in detail to find out
      whether the continuation of proceedings will amount to abuse of process
      of law in this case. The impugned order cites the decision of this Court in
      Asian Resurfacing (supra) wherein it was noted as under:
      "Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely
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                              2

an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is
not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397
or 482 Cr.P.C.or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said
jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to
ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any
manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge
should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent
error of jurisdiction and not to re- appreciate the matter."
13. It appears to us that while limiting the scope of a criminal revision to
jurisdictional errors alone, the High Court apparently underappreciated
the Judgment in Asian Resurfacing (supra). We say so at least for two
reasons. First, the material facts in the abovecited case dealt with a
challenge to the charges framed under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 ("POCA"). The cited judgment itself enlightens that not only is
POCA a special legislation, but also contains a specific bar under Section
19 against routine exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Second, This Court
in Asian Resurfacing (Supra) while expressing concern regarding the
need to tackle rampant pendency and delays in our criminal law system,
followed the ratio laid down in an earlier decision in Madhu Limaye V.
State of Maharashtra as can be seen from the following extract: "
27. Thus, even though in dealing with different situations, seemingly
conflicting observations may have been made while holding that the order
framing charge was interlocutory order and was not liable to be
interfered with under Section 397(2) or even under Section 482 CrPC, the
principle laid down in Madhu Limaye [Madhu Limaye V. State of
Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10] still holds the field.
Order framing charge may not be held to be purely an interlocutory order
and can in a given situation be interfered with under Section 397(2)
CrPC or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution which is a
constitutional provision but the power of the High Court to interfere with
an order framing charge and to grant stay is to be exercised only in a
exceptional situation."
14. In Madhu Limaye (supra), this Court authoritatively held:-
"9... Sometimes the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has also
been resorted to for the same kind of relief by challenging the order
taking cognizance or issuing processes or framing charge on the grounds
that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance and proceed with
the trial, that the issuance of process was wholly illegal or void, or that
no charge could be framed as no offence was made out on the allegations
made or the evidence adduced in Court.
10. ....Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so,
that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing
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                                   3

     processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that
     inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercises for stopping the
     criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the
     accused up to the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not
     operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure
     the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is
     immaterial.
     15. The correct position of law as laid down in Madhu Limaye (supra),
     thus, is that orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither
     interlocutory nor final in nature and are therefore not affected by the bar
     of Section 397 (2) of CrPC. That apart, this Court in the abovecited cases
     has unequivocally acknowledged that the High Court is imbued with
     inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process or to secure ends of
     justice having regard to the facts and circumstance of individual cases.
     As a caveat it may be stated that the High Court, while exercising its
     aforestated jurisdiction ought to be circumspect. The discretion vested in
     the High Court is to be invoked carefully and judiciously for effective and
     timely administration of criminal justice system. This Court, nonetheless,
     does not recommend a complete hands off approach. Albeit, there should
     be interference, may be, in exceptional cases, failing which there is
     likelihood of serious prejudice to the rights of a citizen. For example,
     when the contents of a complaint or the other purported material on
     record is a brazen attempt to persecute an innocent person, it becomes
     imperative upon the Court to prevent the abuse of process of law.
     16. Further, it is well settled that the trial court while considering the
     discharge application is not to act as a mere post office. The Court has to
     sift through the evidence in order to find out whether there are sufficient
     grounds to try the suspect. The court has to consider the broad
     probabilities, total effect of evidence and documents produced and the
     basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. [ Union of India V.
     Prafulla Kumar Samal].Likewise, the Court has sufficient discretion to
     order further investigation in appropriate cases, if need be. It is also held
     that discharge is a valuable right provided to the accused."

6. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Anand Rai Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh and another; 2026 INSC 141. In paragraph no. 21 it held as under:-

     "Before parting with the matter, it is observed that at the stage of framing
     of charge or considering discharge, the Court is not dealing with an
     abstract legal exercise. It is dealing with real people, real anxieties, and
     the real weight of criminal prosecution. Judicial responsibility at this
     stage calls for care, balance, and an honest engagement with the facts on
     record. The power to frame a charge is not meant to be exercise by
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                                          default or out of caution alone. When the material placed before the
                                          Court, take at the face value, does not disclose the ingredients of an
                                          offence, the law expects the Court to have the clarity and courage to say
                                          so and to keep such a case aside."

                                    7. In view of all these facts and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
                                    Court, the impugned order dated 12.12.2025 is liable to be set aside and the same is
                                    hereby set aside. Learned trial court is directed to reconsider the application for
                                    discharge afresh in accordance with law by a reasoned and speaking order and modify
                                    the charge if already framed.

                                    8. With these observation, the present criminal revision is finally disposed of.



                                    February 24, 2026
                                    K.K. Maurya
                                                                                                         (Abdul Shahid,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad