GEETA DEVIversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 10 OTHERS

   HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

          CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 6556 of 2024

Geeta Devi
                                                 .....Revisionist(s)
                              Versus
State Of U.P. And 10 Others
                                                     .....Opposite
                                                           Party(s)

Counsel for Revisionist(s)    : Anupam Shyam Dwivedi,
                                Smt. Richa Dixita, Sudhir
                                Dixit
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A., Gorakh Nath Shukla,
                                Nitin Raj Singh

Court No. - 45
         HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Mr. Sudhir Dixit, learned Senior Advocate assisted by
Mr. Anupam Shyam Dwivedi, learned counsel for revisionist, the
learned A.G.A. appearing on behalf of the State and Mr. Gorakh
Nath Shukla, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite
party no. 2.

2. Smt. Geeta Devi, the revisionist has approached this Court by
means of present Criminal Revision assailing the order dated
21.10.2024 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Iglas, Aligarh
(hereinafter referred to as "the Jurisdictional Magistrate") in
Misc. Case No. 148/11/2024, Geeta Devi v. Bhola and others,
under Section 175(3) B.N.S.S., Police Station Kotwali Iglas,
District Aligarh, whereby the Jurisdictional Magistrate has
rejected the application of the applicant-revisionist holding that
the matter is purely civil in nature and the application has been
moved to give criminal color to a civil matter.

3. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present Criminal
Revision has been preferred by the revisionist on the grounds that
the impugned order is illegal, perverse, and has been passed
without application of judicial mind. It is contended that the
Jurisdictional Magistrate has committed a manifest error of law
while passing the impugned order, rendering the same
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unsustainable in the eyes of law. It is further contended that the
impugned order has been passed in a mechanical manner, without
considering the material available on record. In view of above, it
is prayed that the impugned order be set aside by this Court in
the instant Criminal Revision.

4. Elaborating upon his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the revisionist submitted that although the
application under Section 175(3) B.N.S.S. contains a detailed
narration of incident, the same has not been considered by the
learned Jurisdictional Magistrate. Attention of the Court has been
drawn to paragraph 3 of the supplementary affidavit dated
07.11.2025, which contains the pedigree of applicant-revisionist.

5. It is contended that the present case involves two distinct
individuals bearing the same name, namely, Atar Singh. One is
Atar Singh son of Badan Singh and the other is Atar Singh son of
Bhawan Singh. According to the pedigree, the forefather of
revisionist was Bhawan Singh alias Bhagwan Singh, who had two
sons, namely, Ramji Lal and Atar Singh alias Shiv Charan. The
said Atar Singh (son of Bhawan Singh) died issueless on
26.09.2013, whereas Ramji Lal was survived by his daughter-in-
law (the revisionist) being the widow of his deceased son
Niranjan Lal alias Niranjan Singh and her two sons Biresh and
Rajendra. Ramji Lal also had another son, Banwari Lal, who
expired on 24.08.2016.

6. It is further submitted that taking undue advantage of the
similarity in names and also the death of Atar Singh son of Badan
Singh on 22.12.2007, the opposite party nos. 2,3&4 got their
names mutated not only in place of Atar Singh son of Badan
Singh but also in respect of Gata No. 1603, admeasuring 0.639
hectare belonged to Atar Singh son of Bhawan Singh, the brother
& father-in-law of the revisionist. When Atar Singh son of
Bhawan Singh died issueles on 26.09.2013, his legal heirs,
namely, the revisionist and her two sons, sought mutation through
Form Pa Ka -11, whereupon they came to know that even prior to
the death of Atar Singh son of Bhawan Singh, the opposite
parties, by taking advantage of the death of Atar Singh son of
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Badan Singh, had fraudulently secured mutation in respect of the
property of a living person, i.e., Atar Singh son of Bhawan Singh.
It is further submitted that the said mutation order was stayed by
the Tehsildar vide order dated 09.12.2013 which is still in force.
However, concealing these facts opposite party nos. 2,3 and 4
executed a sale deed, wherein opposite party nos. 5 to 11 are
either vendees or marginal witnesses. The said sale deed has been
brought on record as Annexure 7 to the revision.

7. It is further contended that though opposite party nos. 2,3 and 4
had no right, title or interest in the property in question and they
were well-versed about the order dated 09.12.2013, they executed
a sale deed. Therefore, their actions cannot be said to be merely
of a civil nature; rather, the same clearly fall within the ambit of
criminal offence, having been committed with the intent to
deprive the revisionist of her lawful rights. However, this
important aspect has not been considered by the Jurisdictional
Magistrate.

8. To buttress his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the revisionist placed reliance upon
paragraphs 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of the judgement of
Supreme Court in Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. The State of
karnataka and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2334, which are
reproduced hereinbelow:

     "37. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer to the
     position of law enunciated in Madhao v. State of
     Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141,
     wherein it was held that:
         '18. When a Magistrate receives a complaint he is not
         bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the
         complaint disclose the commission of an offence. The
         Magistrate has discretion in the matter. If on a reading of
         the complaint, he finds that the allegations therein
         disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the
         complaint to the police for investigation under Section
         156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable
         time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring
         into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police
         to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course
         as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence
                                                    CRLR No. 6556 of 2024
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   itself. As said earlier, in the case of a complaint
   regarding the commission of cognizable offence, the
   power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the
   Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence
   under Section 190(1)(a). However, if he once takes such
   cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in
   Chapter XV, he is not competent to revert back to the pre-
   cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3).'
                                          (emphasis supplied)
38. In the background of the factual position, the JMFC's
Order dated 18.01.2018 cannot be faulted. Enough material
is available to justify a full-fledged investigation by the
police. The JMFC, to our mind, had rightly referred the
matter for investigation to the police since a prima facie case
stood made out against the accused, in view of the material
that was available with the JMFC. In Ramdev Food Products
Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439 :
(2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 192, three learned Judges of this Court
opined:
   '13. We may first deal with the question as to whether the
   Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3)
   or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and
   what are the parameters for exercise of power under the
   two provisions.
   xxx
   22. Thus, we answer the first question by holding that:
   22.1. The direction under Section 156(3) is to be issued,
   only after application of mind by the Magistrate. When
   the Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not
   find it necessary to postpone the issuance of process and
   finds a case made out to proceed forthwith, direction
   under the said provision is issued. In other words, where
   on account of credibility of information available, or
   weighing the interest of justice it is considered
   appropriate to straightaway direct investigation, such a
   direction is issued.
   22.2. The cases where Magistrate takes cognizance and
   postpones issuance of process are cases where the
   Magistrate has yet to determine "existence of sufficient
   ground to proceed". Category of cases falling under para
   120.6 in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.,
   (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] may fall under
   Section 202.
   22.3. Subject to these broad guidelines available from the
   scheme of the Code, exercise of discretion by the
   Magistrate is guided by interest of justice from case to
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   case.
   xxx
   38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V.
   Narayana Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252 : 1976 SCC (Cri)
   380], National Bank of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [
   (2013) 2 SCC 488 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v.
   State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC 615 : (2013) 4 SCC
   (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao Hedau v. State of
   Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 801],
   the scheme of Sections 156(3) and 202 has been
   discussed. It was observed that power under Section
   156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking
   cognizance and was in the nature of pre-emptory
   reminder or intimation to the police to exercise its
   plenary power of investigation beginning with Section
   156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under
   Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at
   post-cognizance stage and the direction for investigation
   was for the purpose of deciding whether there was
   sufficient ground to proceed.'
                                         (emphasis supplied)
39. Ramdev (supra) was noticed in Cardinal Mar George
Alencherry v. State of Kerala, (2023) 18 SCC 730. The High
Court, especially vide the First Impugned Order, seems to
have been unduly swayed by the usage of the term 'further' by
the JMFC. The relevant extract from the First Impugned
Order has already been quoted hereinabove. It would be in
the fitness of things to note the JMFC's Order dated
18.01.2018:
   '…
   On perusal of the private complaint, it is noticed that the
   aforesaid case needs to be further investigated by the
   police. Hence, this Court feels that the aforesaid case
   needs to be referred under Sec. 156(3) of Cr.P.C. Hence,
   the above matter is referred to Khade Bazar P.S. for
   investigation under Sec. 156(3) of Cr.P.C.
   …'
                                         (emphasis supplied)
40. The afore-extract leaves no room of doubt that the JMFC
had referred the matter to police under Section 156(3) of the
Code, and the usage of 'further' was not in the context of
Section 173(8) of the Code, which fine distinction the First
Impugned Order has glossed over. The case(s) at hand, in
our considered view, demonstrate material showing the
commission of cognizable offence(s), on the face of it, which
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                        6

would merit police investigation. Therefore, interdiction of
the Impugned Orders is necessitated.
41. This Court in a composition of three learned Judges
observed in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. (supra) as
follows:
   '16. In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of
   process of law by converting a civil dispute into a
   criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurise the
   accused. Similarly, in a given case the complaint itself on
   the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The
   allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose
   the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases
   and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High
   Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the
   same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the
   police/investigating     agency     has     a    statutory
   obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable
   offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between
   the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs
   disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the
   statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to
   investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand
   and those innocent persons against whom the criminal
   proceedings are initiated which may be in a given case
   abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the
   facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the
   High Court would be circumspect in exercising such
   powers and the High Court must permit the investigating
   agency to proceed further with the investigation in
   exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the
   Code. Even in such a case the High Court has to
   give/assign brief reasons why at this stage the further
   investigation is required to be stayed. The High Court
   must appreciate that speedy investigation is the
   requirement in the criminal administration of justice.'
42. It was further highlighted:
   '33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by
   the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the
   power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider
   whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the
   commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is
   not required to consider on merits whether or not the
   merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence
   and the court has to permit the investigating
   agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.'
                                        (emphasis supplied)"
                                                     CRLR No. 6556 of 2024
                           7


9. In view of above, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the revisionist contended that the impugned order is
illegal, perverse and has been passed without considering the
material evidence available on record. It is, therefore, liable to be
set aside by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
opposite party no. 2 vehemently opposed the revision and
submitted that page 14 of the short counter affidavit is a copy of
the family register, which indicates that the head of the family
was Atar Singh son of Late Bhaman Singh and Ramwati alias
Dharmwati Devi wife of Atar Singh along with Bhola and
Shivlahri, sons of Atar Singh are recorded as family members.

11. It is further submitted that page 16 of the short counter
affidavit contains a copy of the order dated 11.07.2024 passed by
the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Iglas, Aligarh in Original Suit
No. 85 of 2024, Veerendra Devi and others v. Geeta Devi and
others, whereby application 6C2 was allowed ex parte,
restraining the revisionist not to interfere with the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs of that case. It is thus contended that
the Civil Court has prima facie recognized the entitlement of the
plaintiffs over the property in dispute. Accordingly, it is argued
that the dispute is purely civil in nature and does not warrant
interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.

12. In reply to the above contentions, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the revisionist urged that the pedigree
presented by the revisionist in her supplementary affidavit dated
07.11.2025 has not been specifically denied by opposite party no.
2, even in his short counter affidavit, filed after the
supplementary affidavit. It is urged that in the absence of specific
denial, the said facts must be deemed to have been admitted. It is
a settled principle of law that in absence of pleadings, no
evidence can be looked into.

13. Having heard the rival submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for parties and upon consideration of the material
available on record, particularly, the specific non denial of the
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                                        pedigree, mentioned in paragraph 3 of the supplementary
                                        affidavit, the existence of a stay order on mutation passed against
                                        opposite party nos. 2,3 and 4 and in favour of the revisionist, as
                                        well as the settled legal position that disputes relating to
                                        agricultural land and rights therein are primarily determinable by
                                        the Revenue Court, this Court is of the view that the present case
                                        discloses a prima facie instance of unauthorized sale of property
                                        knowingly. Such an act cannot be confined merely to a civil
                                        wrong but also attracts criminal liability.

                                        14. In view of above discussion, the impugned order is not
                                        sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside.

                                        15. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. The impugned order
                                        dated 21.10.2024 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Iglas,
                                        Aligarh in Misc. Case No. 148/11/2024, Geeta Devi v. Bhola and
                                        others, under Section 175(3) B.N.S.S., Police Station Kotwali
                                        Iglas, District Aligarh is hereby set aside. The Jurisdictional
                                        Magistrate concerned is directed to pass a fresh order on the
                                        matter in accordance with law and after affording due opportunity
                                        of hearing to the learned counsel for parties.

                                        16. Let this order be communicated to the Jurisdictional
                                        Magistrate concerned by the Registrar (Compliance)

                                        April 21, 2026
                                        Brijesh Maurya
                                                                              (Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
BRIJESH KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad