Allahabad High Court
SUSHIL YADAVversusUNIVERSAL SOMPO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED AND 2 OTHERS
- Decided
- Bench
- ABDUL SHAHID
Holding
The Court held that the 1,619‑day delay was inordinate and without sufficient cause, so the condonation of delay was denied and the appeal dismissed.
Summary
The appellant, Sushil Yadav, filed an appeal seeking enhancement of a motor accident compensation award of Rs 7,87,057 that had already been paid, but did so after a delay of 1,619 days. He claimed that permanent disability and loss of income prevented timely filing and that he could not afford the costs. The court examined the appellant’s affidavit, noted that the full award had already been received, and found no evidence of ongoing medical expenses or financial incapacity. Relying on Supreme Court precedents concerning just compensation and the strict approach to condoning delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the court held that the delay was inordinate and unsupported by sufficient cause. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay was rejected and the appeal for enhancement dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether a delay of 1,619 days in filing an appeal for enhancement of a motor accident compensation award can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to an enhancement of the award after having received the full compensation awarded by the tribunal.
- Whether the appellant’s claim of financial hardship and permanent disability constitutes a sufficient cause for the delay.
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1963 — s. 5
- Motor Vehicles Act — s. 168
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- section 5 limitation act
- motor accident claim
- just compensation
- enhancement of award
- appeal
- injury compensation
Judgment
A.F.R.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER DEFECTIVE No. - 641 of 2026
Sushil Yadav
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
Universal Sompo General Insurance Company
Limited And 2 Others .....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Mangal Rai, Praveen Kumar Chaubey
Counsel for Respondent(s) :
Court No. - 39
HON'BLE ABDUL SHAHID, J.
(Order on Delay Condonation Application No. 01 of 2026)
1. Heard learned counsel for the claimant/appellant.
2. The present appeal has been filed for the enhancement of the award with
the delay of 1619 days. The appellant/Sushil Yadav has filed the
enhancement appeal against the impugned award dated 24.08.2021 passed
by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Firozabad in M.A.C.P. No. 14 of
2019 (Sushil Yadav Versus Universal Sompo General Insurance Company
Limited and others).
3. The claim petition was allowed for an amount of Rs. 7,87,057 alongwith
interest at the rate of 6% from the date of petition. After receiving the entire
amount of compensation the present appeal has been preferred before this
Court with a delay of 1619 days by the claimant himself who is having the
every knowledge of his claim petition which was decided on merits on
24.08.2021.
4. The appellant/claimant has filed the supporting affidavit to delay the
condonation. In para 3 of the affidavit it is submitted that in the accident in
question, the claimant/appellant had suffered a permanent disability of 50%
in his lower limb and as such the mobility of the claimant/appellant has been
adversely affected for life. Due to the above mentioned permanent disability
FAFOD No. 641 of 2026
2
the claimant-appellant has no permanent source of income and his income
potential from dairy and agriculture has also been affected and therefor huge
financial loss has been suffered by the claimant-appellant. A huge sum of
money has been spent in the treatment of claimant-appellant for the injuries
sustained in the accident in question, therefore, the financial condition of the
family of claimant-appellant has become worst.
5. Hence, in the above mentioned circumstances, the claimant-appellant
could not immediately arrange for necessary expenses for filing the present
appeal before this Hon'ble Court. As soon after arranging for necessary
expenses and documents for filing the above mentioned appeal before, the
claimant immediately came to Allahabad in March, 2026 and handed over
the documents to the undersigned counsels who, after perusing the file,
asked the claimant-appellant to bring certified copy of the formal order also
which is necessary for filing the appeal.
6. On hearing this, the claimant-appellant went back to Firozabad and
applied for a certified copy of the formal order on 26.3.2026, which was
delivered to him on 4.4.2026 and he sent the same to the undersigned
counsel through post, which was received by the undersigned counsels on
20.4.2026. Thereafter, the counsel prepared the appeal and filed before this
Court without any delay.
7. The claimant/appellant has received the entire award amount in
compliance with the award dated 24.08.2021. Hence, the plea of financial
constraint for filing the appeal, or lack of awareness, does not appear to be
reasonable. No details of medical treatment during the relevant period have
been filed by the claimant/appellant.
8. It is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. Para 55 is quoted hereinbelow:
"55. Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of “just compensation”
and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness,
reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such
determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be
perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to
arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an
FAFOD No. 641 of 2026
3
individual case. The conception of “just compensation” has to be viewed
through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non- violation of the
principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants
cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted
cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though
the discretion vested in the tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on
the part of the tribunal to be guided by the expression, that is, “just
compensation..."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and another Versus
Jasbir Kaur and others, (2003) 3 TAC 509 (SC) has held
that compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of
profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have
a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of
compensation. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for
measuring the value of human life or a limb.
10. It is also relied upon by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in New India
Assurance Company Limited Versus Urmila Shukla and others, (2021)
20 SCC 800. It is also held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Helen C.
Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road transport Corporation (AIR 1998
SC 3191) that the compensation be just, equal and not arbitrary and cannot
be bonanza.
11. It has been held by the Supreme Court in D. Gopinathan Pillai versus
State of Kerala, (2007) 2 SCC 322, that in matters relating to arbitration
awards, an application for setting aside the award filed with a delay of 3320
days, without any sufficient and satisfactory explanation for such delay, is
not sustainable. The delay cannot be condoned in the absence of sufficient
and reasonable cause.
12. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. vs. Gujarat Industrial
Development Corporation and another, (2010) 79 ALL LR 647, that
where there is a delay of more than four years in filing an appeal and an
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is filed for
condonation of delay, the same cannot be allowed in the absence of
sufficient cause. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had committed
FAFOD No. 641 of 2026
4
a serious error in condoning such inordinate delay by ignoring the judicially
accepted parameters governing the exercise of discretion under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963.
13. It is held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sitaram Ramcharan Etc. vs
M.N. Nagarshana And Ors, AIR 1960 SC 260, that it cannot be disputed
that in dealing which the question of condoning delay under s. 5 of the
Limitation Act the party has to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause
for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed
time, and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has
to cover the whole of the period of delay.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao
Patil Versus Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, 2001 (44) ALR 577,
made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay;- “In exercising discretion
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the Courts should adopt a pragmatic
approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is
inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the
former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a
relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach."
15. It is held by this Court in paras 5 and 6 of the decision in Sita Ram
Versus Sri Dhar, 2006 (24) LCD 1239, that:- "5....the application given for
condonation of delay, 15 days after expiry of the period of limitation, it was
not mentioned as to what specific work kept the appellant engaged for which
reason he could not apply for restoration of appeal. A mere cursory
statement that the appellant remained busy in this school work cannot be
considered sufficient reason for condonation of delay it cannot, therefore, be
said that the Presiding Officer was wrong in dismissing the appellant's
application. 6. Previously Courts did show lenience and latitude in dealing
with applications for adjournments and condonation of delay. It is high time
a changed perspective and attitude is adopted, since the Courts are already
overburdened with cases resulting in inordinate delay in disposal of cases.
Those days of condonation of dalliance and delay should now be over and in
cases where no sufficient and proper reason is assigned for delay. the Court
must adopt the stern attitude and refuse relief. That will also help in
transmitting a message that the Court will no more be indulgent and parties
FAFOD No. 641 of 2026
5
beware."
16. Whereas in the said matter, where the claimant/appellant has got all the
award and just compensation which has been awarded to him vide award
dated 24.08.2021 hence he is having complete knowledge and information as
well as money in his hand. The amount in Motor Accident Claim Petition is
neither a bonanza nor windfall as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Urmila Shukla (supra), Pranay Sethi (supra), Jasbir Kaur (supra) and
Helen C. Rebello (supra).
17. The award has to be passed so that just compensation may be granted.
The same has already been granted by the Tribunal to the claimant/appellant.
The appeal for enhancement has been preferred before this Court after a
delay of 1619 days, without showing any due diligence or any reasonable
and sufficient cause. This is an inordinate delay.
18. Considering the entire circumstances of the claim petition, the award,
and the fact that just compensation, which is the soul of a Motor Accident
Claim Petition, has already been awarded, no sufficient ground exists for
condonation of delay.
19. The compensation awarded is neither a windfall, nor a bonanza, nor a
source of profit for all time to come in the hands of the claimant. There is
neither any sufficient nor reasonable cause explaining the huge and
inordinate delay of 1619 days. The explanation furnished is neither
reasonable nor plausible.
20. Accordingly, the delay condonation application is liable to be rejected
and is hereby rejected.
(Order on Appeal)
21. The delay condonation application is rejected. Consequently, the appeal
is also hereby rejected.
(Abdul Shahid,J.)
May 6, 2026
K.K. Maurya
Digitally signed by :-
KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Checking your session…