BABLOOversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 6 OTHERS

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION U/S 419 BNSS DEFECTIVE No. - 159 of
                           2025

Babloo
                                                             .....Applicant(s)
                                    Versus

State Of U.P. And 6 Others
                                                                   .....Opposite
                                                                         Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)      : Hanuman Kinkar, Lalit Ojha, Vinay
                                Kumar
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Daya Shanker Yadav, G.A., Mahendra
                                Kumar

Court No. - 91
                    HON'BLE RAJ BEER SINGH, J.

Order on Criminal Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 01 of

2025


1. Rejoinder affidavit filed in court today, is taken on record.


2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant / complainant, learned counsel

for the private opposite parties and learned AGA for the State.


3. This application has been filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act for

condonation of delay, which took place in filing of the present appeal.

There is delay of 777 days in filing of the present criminal appeal.


4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the delay in filing of

the present appeal was not deliberate and there was sufficient cause for

not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. It was submitted that

the appellant is complainant of the case and the opposite party Nos. 2 to 7

/ accused persons were acquitted by the trial court vide order dated

26.06.2023. Due to wrong legal advice, the appellant has filed a criminal

appeal before the Session court, which was later on dismissed as not
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                               2


maintainable. It is further submitted that after that sufficient time was

consumed in obtaining certified copy of the order of Session court and in

collection of other related documents and thereafter this appeal was filed

on 07.10.2025. It was stated that in view of aforesaid facts, the delay in

filing the appeal may be condoned in the interest of justice.


5. Learned AGA and learned counsel for the private opposite parties have

opposed the application and submitted that appellant has lodged a

complaint against the private opposite parties in the year 2011 for the

offence under Sections 323/34, 427, 504, 506 IPC. After trial the private

opposite parties were acquitted by the trial court vide judgement and

order dated 26.06.2023. Despite knowing well that the appeal against the

said judgement was not maintainable before the Session court, the

appellant / complainant has filed an appeal before the Session court,

which was dismissed vide order dated 11.07.2024, holding that in such

matters appeal can only be filed before the High Court. Despite that the

present criminal appeal was filed before this Court after about 15 month.

Learned counsel submitted that there is absolutely no sufficient cause for

such long delay. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that no

case for condonation of delay is made out.


6. I have considered rival submissions and perused the record.

7. Section 5 Limitation Act provides that an appeal or application may be

admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant satisfies

the Court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or

making the application within such period. Generally the words 'sufficient

cause' must be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial

justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is
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                                    3


imputable to the petitioner. In N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy [1998

(7) SCC 123], the Court held:

     "It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the
     court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion
     can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay
     is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion.
     Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a
     want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a
     very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
     satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the
     result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court
     should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction,
     unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or
     arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court
     refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be
     free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such
     superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the
     conclusion of the lower court. The primary function of a court is to
     adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial
     justice?... Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties.
     They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek
     their remedy promptly. A court knows that refusal to condone delay
     would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is
     no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate.
     This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of
     the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance
     substantial justice. It must be remembered that in every case of delay,
     there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is
     not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the
     explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a
     dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor.
     But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was
     occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should
     lean against acceptance of the explanation."


8. In case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of

Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others (2013) 12 SCC 649,

Hon'ble Apex Court after referring to various authorities broadly culled

out the following principles :-

     "i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice oriented, non- pedantic
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                               4


approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for
the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.

ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to
the obtaining fact- situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but,
gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note
of.

v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is
a significant and relevant fact.

vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect
public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to
be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.

vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of
reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short
duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction
or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as
the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud,
misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities
of law of limitation.

xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the
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                                 5


     approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
     founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

     xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective
     cause should be given some acceptable latitude."


9. In case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and

others 2010 (28) LCD 1531, it has been held that while considering an

application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed

to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made

out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be

weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and

behaves. In case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr.,

AIR 1998 SC 2276, the Apex Court while considering a case of

condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a
reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been
given, held that Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but

it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and

the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable

grounds.


10. Considering the aforesaid legal provisions, in the instant matter it may

be seen that appellant is complainant of the case and said complaint was

filed in the year 2011. After trial the opposite party Nos. 2 to 7 / accused

persons were acquitted by the trial court vide judgement and order dated

26.06.2023. Against that order, the appellant has preferred an appeal

before the Session court, which was dismissed vide order dated

11.07.2024, with observation that in case of acquittal in a complaint case,

appeal can only be filed before the High Court under Section 378(4)

Cr.P.C. From that order it is apparent that the appellant has full

knowledge about the remedy of appeal before this Court but despite that
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                                                                   6


                                    the present appeal was filed before this Court on 07.10.2025. Regarding

                                    delay of about 15 months after the order of Session court, merely general

                                    and vague averments have been made that sufficient time has been

                                    consumed in obtaining certified copy and in collection of other related

                                    documents. From perusal of record it does not appear that so much period

                                    has been consumed in obtaining certified copy and in collection of other

                                    related documents. Having considered the entire facts, it appears that no

                                    sufficient cause has been shown for condonation of long delay of more

                                    than one year. No sufficient cause could be shown for not filing the

                                    appeal within the period of limitation and thus, no case for condonation of

                                    delay is made out. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is

                                    liable to be rejected.


                                    11. The application under section 5 Limitation Act is hereby rejected.



                                                                                           (Raj Beer Singh,J.)
                                    March 18, 2026
                                    Anand




Digitally signed by :-
ANAND VERMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad