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Allahabad High Court

ANAND PRATAPversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

Decided

Holding

The complaint is maintainable and the summons cannot be quashed at the pre‑trial stage; the application is dismissed.

Summary

The applicant filed a Section 528 B.N.S.S. application seeking to quash the summons dated 15.01.2024 and the criminal proceedings in Complaint No.1064 of 2023 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, alleging that the cheque was issued to settle a debt and that the complaint was filed with delay. The court examined the timeline of the cheque dishonour, statutory notice, and filing of the complaint and found the complaint to be within the period prescribed by the Act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sri Om Sales v. Abhay Kumar (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897) and other precedents, the court held that the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act creates a prima facie case that can only be rebutted at trial, and that a pre‑trial quash of the complaint under Section 482 CrPC is unwarranted. Consequently, the court dismissed the application to quash, leaving the summons and proceedings intact.

Issues considered

  • The complaint under Section 138 NI Act is maintainable despite the alleged delay.
  • Whether a pre‑trial application under Section 528/Section 482 CrPC can quash a criminal complaint when the presumption under Section 139 is applicable.
  • Whether the presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of a debt can be examined at the trial stage rather than at the pre‑trial stage.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • Section 138 NI Act
  • Cheque bounce
  • Presumption under Section 139
  • Quash of criminal complaint
  • Pre‑trial interference
  • Section 482 CrPC
  • B.N.S.S. application
  • Criminal procedure

Judgment

               HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 16521 of 2026

Anand Pratap
                                                                         .....Applicant(s)
                                        Versus
State of U.P. and Another
                                                                    .....Opposite Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                         :   Arif Ikbal, Raees Ahamad
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)                    :   G.A.

Court No. - 74
                         HON'BLE DEEPAK VERMA, J.

1. Heard counsel for the applicant and learned AGA for the State.


2. The present 528 B.N.S.S. application has been filed to quash the impugned
summoning order dated 15.01.2024 as well as entire proceedings in Complaint Case
No.1064 of 2023 (Sanjesh Kumar vs. Anand Pratap), under Section 138 N.I.Act,
Police Station Indirapuram, District Ghaziabad.

3. It is alleged in the complaint that the applicant and opposite party no.2 are having
good relation and the applicant is engaged in business of manufacturing furniture.
Opposite party no.2 had given order of manufacturing furniture to the applicant and
opposite party no.2 paid Rs.7,50,000/- to the applicant but applicant had not
manufactured furniture. Then opposite party no.2 asked the applicant several times to
return the above mentioned amount, then applicant gave complainant a Cheque
No.266454 of Canara Bank Branch Etawah of Rs.7,50,000/- dated 23.05.2023.
Opposite party no.2 submitted cheque in the Bank and same was dishnoured on
24.05.2023. Opposite party no.2 informed the applicant in regard to dishonour of
cheque, then applicant requested the opposite party no.2 to put the cheque after
sometime to the Bank and same will be encashed. Again opposite party no.2 submitted
cheque before the Bank and same was dishonoured on 06.07.2023. Thereafter,
opposite party no.2 issued notice on 31.07.2023 to the applicant but applicant did not
return the amount, then opposite party no.2 filed present complaint against the
applicant. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant is innocent and has
been falsely implicated in the present case. The present complaint is not maintainable,
as it is lodged with much delay and trial court has not considered these facts and
issued summon against the applicant. On perusal of complaint and other material
evidence, complaint is defective and no prosecution can take place.

4. Per contra, learned A.G.A. opposed the submission raised by learned counsel for
the applicants and submitted that argument raised by learned counsel for the applicant
are disputed questions of fact.
                                                                NA528 No. 16521 of 2026
                                     2



5. Considered the argument raised by learned counsel for the applicant and perused
the record. From the record, it is apparent that the applicant issued cheque in favour of
opposite party no.2 for discharge of legal liability. Same was presented before Bank
by the opposite party no.2 and the cheque was dishonoured on 24.05.2023. Thereafter
on request of applicant, cheque was again presented before the Bank and same was
dishonoured on 06.07.2023. Opposite party no.2 issued statutory notice to the
applicant on 31.07.2023, thereafter, on 16.09.2023 lodged present complaint.
Considering the period provided under N.I.Act, present complaint is very much in
time and cognizance and summoning by learned magistrate is based upon facts and
documents produced by the complainant. Complaint lodged by opposite party no.2 is
very much maintainable in the eye of law and summoning by learned Magistrate does
not require any interference. On perusal of documents and order-sheet, it is apparent
that before the trial court case is posted for statement of the accused-witnesses, the
proceeding is going on before the trial court and case is being examined. Applicant
will have remedy to raise objection before trial court.

6. The Hon. Apex Court in Sri Om Sales Vs. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay Patel and
Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897 has considered following
judgments:

"14. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others, this Court held that a
presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the
nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge of any debt or other liability unless
the contrary is proved and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in entertaining
and accepting the plea of the accused at the initial stage of the proceedings and quash
the complaint.


15. Likewise, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, it was held that the presumption mandated
by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. It was observed that such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused must
raise its defense in the trial.


16. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the High
Court should not quash the criminal complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act by going
into disputed questions of fact regarding the cheque in question being issued for the
discharge of debt or liability. Moreso, when Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a
statutory presumption as regards the cheque being issued for discharge of debt or
liability.


17. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court held that
when there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, it would not be
judicious to carry out a detailed enquiry on a disputed question of fact at a pre-trial
                                                                  NA528 No. 16521 of 2026
                                      3

stage to quash the complaint. The relevant observations in the judgment are extracted
below:


"17. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the court
should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the
factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly because of the legal
presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defense without
having to adduce any evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to
altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.


18. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage can be grave
and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality
without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence
then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial court is ousted from weighing the material
evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the
criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the
signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is
in favor of the complainant / prosecution, as the accused will have the opportunity to
adduce defense evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

19. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order,
when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court
will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element
of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial
court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the criminal
process is not merited.""

7. The Hon. Apex Court while deciding aforementioned case, in paragraphs 13 and 18
has observed that:


"13. However, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482, proceeded to test
whether the cheque was issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
other liability. In our view, such an exercise was unwarranted because, under Section
139 of the N.I. Act, there is a presumption that the holder of a cheque received the
cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part,
of any debt or other liability. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence led in
trial. A fortiori, the said issue can appropriately be decided either at the trial, or later,
upon conclusion of trial, by the appellate/ revisional court."


"18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this Court as also the provisions of
Section 139 of the N.I. Act, we are of the considered view that the High Court
committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at the pre-trial stage, as regards
the cheque being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our
                                                                                                   NA528 No. 16521 of 2026
                                                                        4

                                    view, was not merited in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code more so
                                    when the complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge of
                                    liability. As fulfillment of the necessary ingredients of Section 138 N.I. Act are prima
                                    facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view, neither the summoning
                                    order nor the complaint could have been quashed by the High Court at the pre-trial
                                    stage."


                                    8. In view of the Apex Court's Judgment, no interference is warranted by this Court.
                                    The present application is, accordingly, dismissed.

                                    April 23, 2026
                                    SKD
                                                                                                       (Deepak Verma,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
SURJIT KUMAR DEY
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad


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