SHAKUNTALAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

             APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 18590 of 2026

Shakuntala
                                                              .....Applicant(s)
                                   Versus
State of U.P. and Another
                                                                  .....Opposite
                                                                        Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                        :   Jay Singh Yadav
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)                   :   G.A.

Court No. - 77
                 HON'BLE SAURABH SRIVASTAVA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for applicant and learned AGA for the State.

2. Present application has been preferred with the prayer to quash the
chargesheet dated 07.09.2025 and cognizance/summoning order dated
01.11.2025 along with further proceedings of Criminal Case No.7783 of
2025 (State Vs. Lavkush) arising out of Case Crime no. 74 of 2025, under
Sections 316(2), 318(4), 351(3), 352 BNS, P.S.- Shivnagar Didai, District
Siddharth Nagar, pending in the court of learned Additional Civil Judge
(J.D.), Court No.2, Bansi, Siddharth Nagar.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicant has challenged the
impugned chargesheet along with cognizance/summoning order precisely on
the ground that Sections 316(2), 318(4) BNS (406 and 420 in IPC) cannot go
together in the same breath as per the proposition of law settled by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2024 10 SCC 690. The
relevant portion of the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow:-

     "38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell
     out any of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only
     say, with a view to clear a serious misconception of law in the
     mind of the police as well as the courts below, that if it is a case
     of the complainant that offence of criminal breach of trust as
     defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable under Section 406
     IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same breath it
     cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence of
     cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 IPC, punishable
     under Section 420 IPC.
                                                         NA528 No. 18590 of 2026
                                 2

     41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the
     offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In
     case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of
     inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a
     subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not
     the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a
     criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
     intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e.
     the time when the offence is said to have been committed.
     Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.

     43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and
     cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time
     of making a false or misleading representation i.e. since
     inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment
     is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the
     offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he
     dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of
     cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a
     person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a
     situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.

     55. It is high time that the police officers across the country are
     imparted proper training in law so as to understand the fine
     distinction between the offence of cheating vis-vis criminal
     breach of trust. Both offences are independent and distinct. The
     two offences cannot coexist simultaneously in the same set of
     facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two provisions of
     IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive
     without each other."

4. Since the arguments as advanced on behalf of learned counsel for
applicant, are based on legal issue, no notice is required to be issued to
opposite party no.2.

5. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the prayer
sought through the instant application but unable to dispute the settled
proposition of law as relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for
applicant.

6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record
of the case and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the
case of Delhi Race Club (Supra), it is crystal clear that both the sections i.e.
                                                                                           NA528 No. 18590 of 2026
                                                                    3

                                    Sections 316(2), 318(4) BNS (406 and 420 in IPC) cannot go in the same
                                    breath and as such, cognizance/summoning order dated 01.11.2025 passed in
                                    Criminal Case No.7783 of 2025 (State Vs. Lavkush) arising out of Case
                                    Crime no. 74 of 2025, under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 351(3), 352 BNS, P.S.-
                                    Shivnagar Didai, District Siddharth Nagar, pending in the court of learned
                                    Additional Civil Judge (J.D.), Court No.2, Bansi, Siddharth Nagar, is
                                    quashed. Matter is hereby remitted back to learned court concerned for
                                    passing fresh order of taking cognizance of offence, if required, in light of
                                    the proposition of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi
                                    Race Club (supra).

                                    7. Accordingly, the instant application stands allowed in part.

                                    May 6, 2026
                                    Vivek Kr.
                                                                                        (Saurabh Srivastava,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
VIVEK KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad