RAHUL JINDAL @ RAHUL AGARWALversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 18628 of 2026

Rahul Jindal @ Rahul Agarwal
                                                            .....Applicant(s)
                                    Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                                .....Opposite
                                                                      Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                     :   Rahul Kumar Sharma
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)                :   G.A.

Court No. - 74
                      HON'BLE DEEPAK VERMA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant; learned A.G.A for the State as
also perused the record.

2. Instant application has been filed to quash the summoning order dated
09.04.2026 as well as entire criminal proceedings of Complaint Case No.
537 of 2025 (M/s Shri Dauji Vardhana Bhandar Vs M/s Mahashay Ji and
Sons), under section 138 N.I. Act, Police Station Kwarsi, District-Aligarh,
pending before the Court of learned Presiding Officer, Additional Court,
Aligarh.

3. It is alleged in the complaint that the applicant purchased the goods and
issued cheque No.068186 of Rs. 41,61,047/- and the same was deposited
on 03.02.2025 by the opposite party no.2 before the bank. The bank
returned the cheque on 04.02.2025 due to insufficient fund in account.
Thereafter, the opposite party no. 2 filed complaint and summons were
issued against the applicant. The applicant challenged the cognizance and
summoning order by filing Application under Section 528 BNSS No.
28528 of 2025 on the ground that applicant was not issued notice before
taking cognizance as per Proviso to Clause 1 of Section 223 of BNSS and
the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 24.09.2025, set aside
the order dated 26.05.2025 and the matter was remitted back to pass a
fresh order. Thereafter, the applicant filed objection before the learned
Magistrate and the leaned Magistrate after considering the objection of
the applicant, issued summons against the applicants. The applicant has
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challenged the proceedings on the ground that complaint filed by the
opposite party no. 2 discloses that applicant resides in different district.
On perusal of complaint, it is apparent that complainant and applicant
reside in Hathras but present complaint has been lodged in Aligarh. It is
next submitted that cognizance and summoning by the learned Magistrate
is without application of judicial mind and proceedings against the
applicant are liable to be quashed.

4. Learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing the
proceedings of the aforesaid case and has submitted that the order
impugned do not suffer from any illegality or infirmity.

5. Considered the argument of counsel for the parties and perused the
record. The applicant earlier filed Application under Section 528 BNSS
No.28528 of 2025 challenging the cognizance and summoning order
issued against the applicant. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide
order dated 24.09.2025, set aside the order impugned and remanded the
matter back before the learned court and learned court after considering
the objection of the applicant, issued summons. From perusal of the
impugned order, it is apparent that the learned Magistrate has passed the
said order after perusing the material evidence on record. The order
impugned is just and proper and impugned order does not suffer from any
illegality and infirmity. The cognizance and summoning by the court
concerned is based upon material evidence available on record. The
submission raised by counsel for the applicant cannot be examined at this
stage. The objection of the applicant that Magistrate had no jurisdiction to
entertain the proceedings on account of territorial jurisdiction as applicant
resides in different district, cannot be sustained that the complainant's
account open or run in district Aligarh, would be territorial jurisdiction, to
entertain the application. No interference is warranted, at this stage.

6. The Hon. Apex Court in Sri Om Sales Vs. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay
Patel and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897 has
considered following judgments:

"14. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others, this Court held that a
presumption must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the
nature referred to in Section 138, for the discharge of any debt or other liability
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unless the contrary is proved and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in
entertaining and accepting the plea of the accused at the initial stage of the
proceedings and quash the complaint.

15. Likewise, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, it was held that the presumption mandated
by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. It was observed that such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused must
raise its defense in the trial.

16. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the High Court
should not quash the criminal complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act by going into
disputed questions of fact regarding the cheque in question being issued for the
discharge of debt or liability. Moreso, when Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a
statutory presumption as regards the cheque being issued for discharge of debt or
liability.

17. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court held that
when there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, it would not be
judicious to carry out a detailed enquiry on a disputed question of fact at a pre-trial
stage to quash the complaint. The relevant observations in the judgment are extracted
below:

"17. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the court
should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when
the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly because of the legal
presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defense without
having to adduce any evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to
altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.

18. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage can be grave
and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality
without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the
consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial court is ousted from weighing
the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited
advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the
cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of
convenience at this stage is in favor of the complainant / prosecution, as the accused
will have the opportunity to adduce defense evidence during the trial, to rebut the
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                                    presumption.

                                    19. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order,
                                    when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court
                                    will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element
                                    of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the
                                    trial court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the
                                    criminal process is not merited.""

                                    7. The Hon. Apex Court while deciding aforementioned case, in paragraphs
                                    13 and 18 has observed that:

                                    "13. However, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482, proceeded to test
                                    whether the cheque was issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
                                    other liability. In our view, such an exercise was unwarranted because, under Section
                                    139 of the N.I. Act, there is a presumption that the holder of a cheque received the
                                    cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part,
                                    of any debt or other liability. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence led in
                                    trial. A fortiori, the said issue can appropriately be decided either at the trial, or later,
                                    upon conclusion of trial, by the appellate/ revisional court."

                                    "18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this Court as also the provisions of
                                    Section 139 of the N.I. Act, we are of the considered view that the High Court
                                    committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at the pre-trial stage, as regards
                                    the cheque being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our
                                    view, was not merited in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code more so
                                    when the complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge of
                                    liability. As fulfillment of the necessary ingredients of Section 138 N.I. Act are prima
                                    facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view, neither the summoning
                                    order nor the complaint could have been quashed by the High Court at the pre-trial
                                    stage."

                                    8. In view of the Apex Court's Judgment, no interference is warranted by this
                                    Court. The present application is, accordingly, dismissed.



                                                                                                        (Deepak Verma,J.)
                                    May 6, 2026
                                    Meenu Singh




Digitally signed by :-
MEENU SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad