ANIL KAPOORversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 18846 of 2026

Anil Kapoor
                                                            .....Applicant(s)
                                    Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                                .....Opposite
                                                                      Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                :    Manvendra Narain Pathak
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)           :    G.A.

Court No. - 74
                      HON'BLE DEEPAK VERMA, J.

1. Heard Sri Manvendra Narain Pathak, learned counsel for the applicant
and Sri P. P. Pandey, learned AGA for the State.

2. The present 528 BNSS application has been filed to quash the entire
proceeding as well as impugned Summoning Order dated 02.04.2025
passed by the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C.-II,/J.M. Gautam Buddha
Nagar in Complaint Case No. 7763/2024, titled as R. R. Industries vs.
Dish Division through proprietor Anil Kapoor, under Section 138 N.I.
Act, whereby the Applicant Anil Kapoor, Proprietor of Dish Division, has
been summoned to face trial under section 138 N. I. Act.

3. Counsel for the applicant submits that it is alleged in the complaint that
applicant purchased optical fiber cable from complainant, for which
applicant issued cheque in favour of opposite party No.2 of Allahabad
Bank, which was merged three years before with other bank and when
complainant presented the cheque before Bank the same got dishonored,
thereafter, notice was served to the applicant but applicant did not pay the
amount, then instant complaint has been lodged against the applicant. He
further submits that applicant has been falsely implicated in the present
case due to mala fide intention. Applicant had not issued cheque in favour
of opposite party no.2, moreover, Allahabad High Court had already
merged in another Bank and there is no occasion to issue cheque in favour
of opposite party No.2. Cognizance and summoning by learned
Magistrate is without application of judicial mind. Complaint is lodged by
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limitation and without considering this fact, learned Magistrate issued
summon.

4. Per contra, learned A.G.A. opposed the submission raised by
applicant's counsel.

5. Considering the argument raised by applicant's counsel, the submission
raised by applicant's counsel is disputed question of facts which cannot be
examined at this stage. From the complaint, it is apparent that applicant
issued cheque of Allahabad Bank, bearing No.156966 of Rs.3 lacs dated
23.11.2023 and made signature over the cheque and when the cheque was
presented before the Bank, the same got dishonoured. The act of the
applicant appears to be mischievous as applicant intentionally issued the
cheque of Allahabad Bank in favour of opposite party No.2. The
allegation alleged in the complaint shall be considered against the
applicant in view of Section 139 of N.I. Act. Prima facie, offence is made
out against the applicant. The order dated 02.04.2025 passed by the Court
of Civil Judge (J.D.)/F.T.C.-II,/J.M. Gautam Buddha Nagar in Complaint
Case No. 7763/2024, under Section 138 N.I. Act, is just and proper. No
interference is warranted.

6. The Hon. Apex Court in Sri Om Sales Vs. Abhay Kumar @ Abhay
Patel and Another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2897 has
considered following judgments:

"14. In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Narender and others, this Court held that a presumption
must be drawn that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of the nature referred
to in Section 138, for the discharge of any debt or other liability unless the contrary is
proved and, therefore, the High Court was not justified in entertaining and accepting
the plea of the accused at the initial stage of the proceedings and quash the complaint.

15. Likewise, in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, it was held that the presumption mandated
by Section 139 of the N.I. Act includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. It was observed that such a presumption is rebuttable, and the accused must
raise its defense in the trial.

16. In Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the High Court
should not quash the criminal complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act by going into
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disputed questions of fact regarding the cheque in question being issued for the
discharge of debt or liability. Moreso, when Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a
statutory presumption as regards the cheque being issued for discharge of debt or
liability."

7. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court
held that when there is a legal presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act,
it would not be judicious to carry out a detailed enquiry on a disputed
question of fact at a pre-trial stage to quash the complaint. The relevant
observations in the judgment are extracted below:

"17. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the court
should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when
the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly because of the legal
presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defense without
having to adduce any evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to
altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.

18. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage can be grave
and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality
without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the
consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial court is ousted from weighing
the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited
advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the
cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of
convenience at this stage is in favor of the complainant / prosecution, as the accused
will have the opportunity to adduce defense evidence during the trial, to rebut the
presumption.

19. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order,
when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court
will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element
of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the
trial court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, scuttling of the
criminal process is not merited."

8. The Hon. Apex Court while deciding aforementioned case, in
paragraphs 13 and 18 has observed that:
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                                    "13. However, the High Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 482, proceeded to test
                                    whether the cheque was issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
                                    other liability. In our view, such an exercise was unwarranted because, under Section
                                    139 of the N.I. Act, there is a presumption that the holder of a cheque received the
                                    cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part,
                                    of any debt or other liability. This presumption can be rebutted by evidence led in
                                    trial. A fortiori, the said issue can appropriately be decided either at the trial, or later,
                                    upon conclusion of trial, by the appellate/ revisional court."

                                    "18. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions of this Court as also the provisions of
                                    Section 139 of the N.I. Act, we are of the considered view that the High Court
                                    committed an error by conducting a roving enquiry, at the pre-trial stage, as regards
                                    the cheque being issued for the discharge of debt or liability. Such an exercise, in our
                                    view, was not merited in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code more so
                                    when the complaint allegations disclosed that the cheque was issued for discharge of
                                    liability. As fulfillment of the necessary ingredients of Section 138 N.I. Act are prima
                                    facie made out from the complaint allegations, in our view, neither the summoning
                                    order nor the complaint could have been quashed by the High Court at the pre-trial
                                    stage."

                                    9. In view of the Apex Court's Judgment, no interference is warranted by
                                    this Court. The present application is, accordingly, dismissed.



                                                                                                        (Deepak Verma,J.)
                                    May 7, 2026
                                    Nitin Verma




Digitally signed by :-
NITIN KUMAR VERMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad