VIKASH PRASHANT LAL AND ANOTHERversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 36005 of 2026

Vikash Prashant Lal And Another
                                                                   .....Applicant(s)
                                      Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                                       .....Opposite
                                                                             Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                                :    Sanjay Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)                           :    G.A.

Court No. - 79
                  HON'BLE SAURABH SRIVASTAVA, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants and learned AGA for the State.

2. The present application has been preferred for seeking quashing of entire
proceeding of Case no. 226 of 2023 (State vs. Vikash Prashant Lal and
another) arising out of Case Crime no. 38 of 2022 under sections 420, 406,
504 IPC, PS- Kemari, District Rampur and set aside the cognizance order
dated 12.01.2023 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Rampur and charge
sheet dated 23.10.2022.

3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicant has challenged the
impugned charge sheet along with cognizance/summoning order and entire
proceedings of the present case precisely on the ground that Sections 420
and 406 IPC cannot go together in the same breath as per the proposition of
law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Race Club
(1940) Ltd. and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported
in 2024 10 SCC 690. The relevant portion of the said judgment is being
reproduced hereinbelow:-

     "38. In our view, the plain reading of the complaint fails to spell out any
     of the aforesaid ingredients noted above. We may only say, with a view to
     clear a serious misconception of law in the mind of the police as well as
     the courts below, that if it is a case of the complainant that offence of
     criminal breach of trust as defined under Section 405 IPC, punishable
     under Section 406 IPC, is committed by the accused, then in the same
     breath it cannot be said that the accused has also committed the offence
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     of cheating as defined and explained in Section 415 IPC, punishable
     under Section 420 IPC.

     41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of
     criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating,
     the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked
     into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the
     subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot
     give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
     dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction
     i.e. the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it
     is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.

     43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating.
     For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false
     or misleading representation i.e. since inception. In criminal breach of
     trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal
     breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and
     he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating,
     the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving
     him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot
     co-exist simultaneously.

     55. It is high time that the police officers across the country are imparted
     proper training in law so as to understand the fine distinction between the
     offence of cheating vis-vis criminal breach of trust. Both offences are
     independent and distinct. The two offences cannot coexist simultaneously
     in the same set of facts. They are antithetical to each other. The two
     provisions of IPC (now BNS, 2023) are not twins that they cannot survive
     without each other."

4. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. has vehemently opposed the prayer
sought through the instant application but unable to dispute the settled
proposition of law as relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for
applicants.

5. Since, only legal argument has been raised at the behest of applicant,
process to issue notice to opposite party no. 2 is hereby dispensed with.
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                                    6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going through the record
                                    of the case and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the
                                    case of Delhi Race Club (Supra), it is crystal clear that both the sections i.e.
                                    Sections 420 and 406 IPC cannot go in the same breath and as such,
                                    cognizance/summoning order dated 12.01.2023 is liable to be set aside.
                                    Although judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Delhi
                                    Race Club (Supra) has been passed on 23.08.2024 and cognizance of
                                    offence in the present case, has been taken on dated 12.01.2023 and as per
                                    the judgment rendered by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Kanishk
                                    Sinha and another Vs. The State of West Bengal and another [2025 SCC
                                    Online SC 443], the judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court will always be
                                    retrospective in nature unless the judgment itself specifically states that the
                                    judgment will operate prospectively.

                                    7. In view thereof, cognizance/summoning order dated 12.01.2023 passed in
                                    Case no. 226 of 2023 (State vs. Vikash Prashant Lal and another) arising out
                                    of Case Crime no. 38 of 2022 under sections 420, 406, 504 IPC, PS- Kemari,
                                    District Rampur is quashed only in respect of applicant(s) herein. Matter is
                                    hereby remitted back to learned court concerned for passing fresh order of
                                    taking cognizance of offence, if required, in light of the proposition of law
                                    settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Race Club (supra).

                                    8. Accordingly, the instant application stands allowed in part.



                                                                                         (Saurabh Srivastava,J.)
                                    September 8, 2026
                                    Shaswat




Digitally signed by :-
SHASWAT SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad