PAWAN KUMARversusSTATE OF U.P. AND ANOTHER

                                                                          A.F.R.

                                                        Reserved on 20.07.2026

                                                        Delivered on 23.09.2026
         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL MISC. ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION U/S 482 BNSS No.
                        - 7094 of 2026

Pawan Kumar
                                                               .....Applicant(s)
                                     Versus

State of U.P. and Another
                                                                   .....Opposite
                                                                         Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)                :     Shams Tabrez Alam Ansari
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)           :     G.A.

Court No. - 67
                 HON'BLE JITENDRA KUMAR SINHA, J.

1. Heard Shri Shams Tabrez Alam Ansari, learned counsel for the applicant
and Shri Anoop Trivedi, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by
Shri Paritosh Malviya, learned AGA-Ist for the State.

2. At the very outset, learned Additional Advocate General submits that the
applicant was granted anticipatory bail by this Court till submission of police
report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. / 193(3) BNSS passed in Criminal
Misc.Anticipatory Bail Application Under Section 482 BNSS No. 10927 of
2025. It is further submitted by him that charge sheet in this case has already
been submitted and the applicant has no apprehension of arrest and
therefore, the present application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable.

3. Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on a recent
judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pukar Yadav
and another Vs. The State of Bihar and another, passed in Special Leave
to Appeal (Crl) No.11260 of 2026, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that once cognizance has been taken and summons have been issued
then the applicant has no apprehension of arrest and he is simply required to
appear before the learned Court concerned and seek regular bail.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the anticipatory
bail application is maintainable after submission of the charge sheet and he
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                                       2


has placed reliance upon the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Bharat Chaudhary and another Vs. State of Bihar and another
(2003) 8 SCC 77, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that Section 438 Cr.P.C. (now Section 482 BNSS) does not bar the grant of
anticipatory bail, even if such relief is sought for by accused after
cognizance has been taken and summons have been issued in the matter.

5. Before considering the merits of the case, it is essential to examine
whether an application for anticipatory bail is maintainable after the charge
sheet has been submitted?

6. Learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on the
judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Pukar Yadav and
another Vs. The State of Bihar and another, passed in SLP (Crl)
No.11260 of 2026, in which, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
in paragraph 3, which is quoted as under:

             "3. This Court has already held in SLP (Crl.) No.16221 of 2015 that in a complaint case
             the police has hardly any role to play. Relevant portion of the order passed in SLP (Crl.)
             No.16221 of 2025 reads as under:

            "7. We have noticed that there is a serious problem in two States, viz. The State of Bihar
            and State of Jharkhand, respectively. We fail to understand that in a private complaint
            how does the police involve itself or is concerned, in any manner. What was the basis for
            the accused to express apprehension that the police would arrest him.

            8. In a private complaint when cognizance is taken and process is issued all that the
            court would do is to issue summons. We have explained many times in the past the
            purport of Section 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.


7. In Bharat Chaudhary & another Vs. State of Bihar & another, 2003
(8) SCC 77, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the Court has power to
grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. even when cognizance is
taken or charge sheet has been filed as held in paragraph nos. 5,6, 7 and 9,
which are quoted as under:

            "5. If the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent – State is to be accepted
            then in each and every case, where a complaint is made of a non bailable offence and
            cognizance is taken by the competent court then every court under the code including
            this Court would be denuded of its power to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438 of
            the Cr.P.C.

            6. We do not think that was the intention of the legislature when it incorporated Section
            438 in the Cr.P.C. which reads thus:
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                                              3

                  " 438(1): When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an
                  accusation of having committed a non bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court
                  or the Court of Session for direction under this Section; and that court may, if it thinks
                  fit, direct that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail."

                  7. From the perusal of this part of Section 438 of the Cr.P.C., we find no restriction in
                  regard to exercise of this power in a suitable case either by the Court of Session, High
                  Court or this Court even when cognizance is taken or charge sheet is filed. The object of
                  Section 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pretrial taken
                  cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a chargesheet, would
                  not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the concerned Courts from granting anticipatory
                  bail in appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important factor to be taken
                  into consideration while granting such anticipatory bail so also the need for custodial
                  interrogation, but these are only factors that must be borne in mind by the concerned
                  courts while entertaining a petition for grant of anticipatory bail and the fact of taking
                  cognizance or filing of charge sheet cannot by themselves be construed as a prohibition
                  against the grant of anticipatory bail. In our opinion, the Courts i.e. the court of Session,
                  High Court or this Court has the necessary power vested in them to grant anticipatory
                  bail in non-bailable offences under Section 438 Cr.P.C. even when cognizance is taken
                  or charge sheet is filed provided the facts of the case require the Court to do so.

                  9. From a careful reading of the said judgement we do not find any restriction or
                  absolute bar on the concerned court granting anticipatory bail even in cases where
                  either cognizance has been taken or a charge sheet has been filed. This judgement only
                  lays down a guideline that while considering the prima facie case against an accused the
                  factum of cognizance having been taken and the laying of charge sheet would be of some
                  assistance for coming to the conclusion whether the claimant for an anticipatory bail is
                  entitled for such bail or not. This is clear from the following observations of the Court in
                  the above cases:

                  "It is, therefore, necessary that such anticipatory bail orders should be of limited
                  duration only and ordinarily on the expiry of the duration or extended duration, Court,
                  granting anticipatory bail, should leave it to the regular court to deal with the matter on
                  an appreciation of evidence placed before it after the investigation has been progress or
                  charge sheet is submitted."


8. The Section 438 Cr.P.C. now Section 482 BNSS lays down the provisions
for grant of anticipatory bail that a person, who is apprehending his arrest in
non bailable offence can seek anticipatory bail and the said provision does
not provide any restrictions that the apprehension of arrest must be by the
police as the apprehension of arrest has been mentioned.

Section 482 BNSS, reads as under :-

(1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed

a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this

section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest, he shall be released on

bail.
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(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include

such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit,

including-(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer

as and when required;(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any

inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him

from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;(iii) a condition that the person shall not

leave India without the previous permission of the Court;(iv) such other condition as may be imposed

under sub-section (3) of section 480, as if the bail were granted under that section.


(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such

accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer

to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides

that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant

in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1).


(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of

having committed an offence under section 65 and sub-section (2) of section 70 of the Bharatiya Nyaya

Sanhita, 2023.


9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna Vs.
State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 16 Supreme Court Cases 623
has held in paragraph 16 of the judgement, which is quoted below:-

                  16. It appears to us from the above analysis that custody, detention and arrest are
                  sequentially cognate concepts. On the occurrence of a crime, the police is likely to carry
                  out the investigative interrogation of a person, in the course of which the liberty of that
                  individual is not impaired, suspects are then preferred by the police to undergo
                  custodial interrogation during which their liberty is impeded and encroached upon. If
                  grave suspicion against a suspect emerges, he may be detained in which event his
                  liberty is seriously impaired. Where the investigative agency is of the opinion that the
                  detainee or person in custody is guilty of the commission of a crime, he is charged of it
                  and thereupon arrested. In Roshan Beevi, the Full Bench of the High Court of Madras,
                  speaking through S. Ratnavel Pandian J, held that the terms custody and arrest are not
                  synonymous even though in every arrest there is a deprivation of liberty is custody but
                  not vice versa. This thesis is reiterated by Pandian J in Deepak Mahajan by deriving
                  support from Niranjan Singh vs Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote (1980) 2 SCC 559. The
                  following passages from Deepak Mahajan are worthy of extraction:-

                  48. Thus the Code gives power of arrest not only to a police officer and a Magistrate but
                  also under certain circumstances or given situations to private persons. Further, when
                  an accused person appears before a Magistrate or surrenders voluntarily, the
                  Magistrate is empowered to take that accused person into custody and deal with him
                  according to law. Needless to emphasize that the arrest of a person is a condition
                  precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To put it differently, the taking of
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                                        5

              the person into judicial custody is followed after the arrest of the person concerned by
              the Magistrate on appearance or surrender. It will be appropriate, at this stage, to note
              that in every arrest, there is custody but not vice versa and that both the words custody
              and arrest are not synonymous terms. Though custody may amount to an arrest in
              certain circumstances but not under all circumstances. If these two terms are
              interpreted as synonymous, it is nothing but an ultra legalist interpretation which if
              under all circumstances accepted and adopted, would lead to a startling anomaly
              resulting in serious consequences, vide Roshan Beevi."


10. From the above judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is evidently
clear that the arrest cannot be interpreted in a restrictive sense since that the
arrest can be made by the police but even if a person surrenders before the
Magistrate / Sessions Court for seeking regular bail, he submits himself to
the custody of the Court then it cannot be said that he has not been arrested
as is evident from the wording of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Sundeep Kumar Bafna. Needless to emphasize that the arrest of a person is a
condition precedent for taking him into judicial custody thereof. To put it
differently, the taking of the person into judicial custody is followed after the
arrest of the person concerned by the magistrate on appearance or surrender.

11. On bare reading of the said provision of Section 482 BNSS, it appears
that a person may apprehend arrest due to the commission of a non-bailable
offence; the phrase 'apprehension of arrest' is not limited merely to the fear
of arrest by the police but also encompasses the apprehension of arrest even
if the person surrenders and submits to the jurisdiction of the concerned
court.

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushila Aggarwal v. State
(NCT of Delhi) (2020) 5 SCC 1 has settled that anticipatory bail can not be
of limited duration and need not end on charge-sheet filing.

13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the State of U.P. and others Vs. Ajay
Kumar Sharma and another (2016) 15 Supreme Court Cases 289 has
settled the law that a judgment previously delivered by a Bench of the
Supreme Court of equal strength is binding and a subsequent Bench of the
Supreme Court of equal strength cannot overrule it. In paragraphs 13, 14,
and 15 of the judgment, which are quoted below:—

          "13 Time and again this Court has emphatically restated the essentials and principles of
          'Precedent' and of Stare Decisis which are a cardinal feature of the hierarchical character
          of all Common Law judicial systems. The doctrine of Precedent mandates that an exposition
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                                6

of law must be followed and applied even by coordinate or co-equal Benches and certainly
by all smaller Benches and subordinate courts. That is to say that a smaller and a later
Bench has no freedom other than to apply the law laid down by the earlier and larger
Bench; that is the law which is said to hold the field. Apart from Article 141, it is a policy of
the courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point. The purpose of precedents
is to bestow predictability on judicial decisions and it is beyond cavil that certainty in law is
an essential ingredient of rule of law. A departure may only be made when a coordinate or
co-equal Bench finds the previous decision to be of doubtful logic or efficacy and
consequentially, its judicial conscience is so perturbed and aroused that it finds it
impossible to follow the existing ratio. The Bench must then comply with the discipline of
requesting the Hon'ble Chief Justice to constitute a larger Bench.

14. If binding precedents even of co-ordinate strength are not followed, the roots of
continuity and certainty of law which should be nurtured, strengthened perpetuated and
proliferated will instead be deracinated. Although spoken in a totally different context, we
are reminded of the opening stanza of the poem 'The Second Coming' authored by William
Butler Yeats. The lines obviously do not advert to the principle of precedent but they are
apposite in bringing out the wisdom of this ancient and venerable principle.

"Turning and turning in the widening gyre The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

15. In the context of interminably citing all decisions delivered by this Court, the
Constitutional Bench in Union of India V. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 has made the
following enunciation of law:

"25. It is not necessary to refer to all the cases on the point. The broad guidelines are easily
deducible from what has gone before. The possibility of further defining these guiding
principles can be envisaged with further juridical experience, and when common
jurisprudential values linking different national systems of law may make a consensual
pattern possible. But that lies in the future.

26. There was some debate on the question whether a Division Bench of Judges is obliged to
follow the law laid down by a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges. Doubt has
arisen on the point because of certain observations made by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Javed
Ahmed Abdul Hamid Pawala V. State of Maharashtra. Earlier, a Division Bench of two
Judges, of whom he was one, had expressed the view in T.V. Vatheeswaran V. State of Tamil
Nadu that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be
considered sufficient to entitle a person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 of the
Constitution and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. This would be so, he
observed, even if the delay in the execution was occasioned by the time necessary for filing
an appeal or for considering the reprieve of the accused or some other cause for which the
accused himself may be responsible. This view was found unacceptable by a Bench of three-
Judges in Sher Singh V. State of Punjab, where the learned Judges observed that no hard
and fast rule could be laid down in the matter. In direct disagreement with the view in T.V.
Vatheeswaran, the learned Judges said that account had to be taken of the time occupied by
proceedings in the High Court and in the Supreme Court and before the executive
authorities, and it was relevant to consider whether the delay was attributable to the
conduct of the accused. As a member of another Bench of two Judges, in Javed Ahmed
Abdul Hamid Pawala Chinnapa Reddy, J.
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                                        7


14. Similarly, constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National
Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others (2017) 16
Supreme Court Cases 680 has held in paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of
the judgement, which are quoted below :-

         "16. In State of Bihar V. Kalika Kuer alias Kalika Singh and others19, it has been held:-

         "10. … an earlier decision may seem to be incorrect to a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction
         considering the question later, on the ground that a possible aspect of the matter was not
         considered or not raised before the court or more aspects should have been gone into by the
         court deciding the matter earlier but it would not be a reason to say that the (2003) 5 SCC
         448 decision was rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored. The earlier judgment may
         seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on the later Bench of coordinate
         jurisdiction. …" The Court has further ruled:-

         "10. … Easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not
         permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways — either to follow the
         earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it is felt
         that earlier decision is not correct on merits."

         17. In G.L. Batra V. State of Haryana and others 20, the Court has accepted the said
         principle on the basis of judgments of this Court rendered in Union of India Vs. Godfrey
         Philips India Ltd. 21, Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhatija V. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra 22 and
         Tribhovandas Purshottamdas Thakkar V. Ratilal Motilal Patel 23. It may be noted here that
         the Constitution Bench in Madras Bar Association V. Union of India and another 24 has
         clearly stated that the prior Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India V. Madras Bar
         Association 25 is a binding precedent. Be it clarified, the issues (2014) 13 SCC 759 (1985) 4
         SCC 369 (1989) 3 SCC 396 AIR 1968 SC 372 (2015) 8 SCC 583 (2010) 11 SCC 1 that were
         put to rest in the earlier Constitution Bench judgment were treated as precedents by latter
         Constitution Bench.

         18. In this regard, we may refer to a passage from Jaisri Sahu Vs. Rajdewan Dubey 26:-

         "10. Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by
         reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of difference of
         opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled. It sometimes happens that an earlier
         decision given by a Bench is not brought to the notice of a Bench hearing the same question,
         and a contrary decision is given without reference to the earlier decision. The question has
         also been discussed as to the correct procedure to be followed when two such conflicting
         decisions are placed before a later Bench. The practice in the Patna High Court appears to
         be that in those cases, the earlier decision is followed and not the later. In England the
         practice is, as noticed in the judgment in Seshamma v. Venkata Narasimharao that the
         decision of a court of appeal is considered as a general rule to be binding on it. There are
         exceptions to it, and one of them is thus stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol.
         22, para 1687, pp. 799-800:

         "The court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is
         given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own
         or of a Court of a co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has
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                                           8

          acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide
          which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords."
          AIR 1962 SC 83 In Virayya V. Venkata Subbaya it has been held by the Andhra High Court
          that under the circumstances aforesaid the Bench is free to adopt that view which is in
          accordance with justice and legal principles after taking into consideration the views
          expressed in the two conflicting Benches, vide also the decision of the Nagpur High Court in
          Bilimoria v. Central Bank of India. The better course would be for the Bench hearing the
          case to refer the matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflicting authorities without taking
          upon itself to decide whether it should follow the one Bench decision or the other. We have
          no doubt that when such situations arise, the Bench hearing cases would refer the matter for
          the decision of a Full Court."

          19. Though the aforesaid was articulated in the context of the High Court, yet this Court has
          been following the same as is revealed from the aforestated pronouncements including that
          of the Constitution Bench and, therefore, we entirely agree with the said view because it is
          the precise warrant of respecting a precedent which is the fundamental norm of judicial
          discipline.

          20. In the context, we may fruitfully note what has been stated in Pradip Chandra Parija and
          others V. Pramod Chandra Patnaik and others27. In the said case, the Constitution Bench
          was dealing with a situation where the two-Judge Bench disagreeing with the three-Judge
          Bench decision directed the (2002) 1 SCC 1 matter to be placed before a larger Bench of
          five Judges of this Court. In that scenario, the Constitution Bench stated:-

          "6. … In our view, judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned
          Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two
          learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very
          incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to
          refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting out, as has been done
          here, the reasons why it could not agree with the earlier judgment. …"


15. The learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case Ram Pukar Yadav's case (supra),
but the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bharat
Chaudhary's case (supra) is of equal bench strength and earlier in time,
therefore, relying upon the judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
U.P. Vs. Ajay Kumar Sharma and another and National Insurance Company
Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and others (supra), the earlier judgement of equal
bench strength holds the field. Thus, relying upon the judgement of Bharat
Chaudhary's case (supra), an application for anticipatory bail is maintainable
even after submission of the charge sheet.

Merits of the case

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sushila Aggarwal and others
Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another (2020) 5 SCC 1, the Hon'ble
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                                    Supreme Court has held that normally the anticipatory bail should continue
                                    till conclusion of the trial, however, under certain circumstances, the accused
                                    can be granted anticipatory bail for a limited duration.

                                    17. The applicant was granted anticipatory bail till submission of police
                                    report under Section under Sections 173(2) Cr.P.C. / 193(3) BNSS, now the
                                    charge sheet has already been submitted and the applicant has been
                                    summoned to face trial and no investigation remains to be done.

                                    18. The prosecution has not put forward any reason why the applicant should
                                    not be granted anticipatory bail till conclusion of the trial especially, when
                                    the charge sheet has been submitted and custodial interrogation of the
                                    applicant is not required. The State has only raised an objection regarding
                                    maintainability of the bail of the applicant, which has already been answered
                                    in the earlier part of the judgement.

                                    19. In view of the foregoing, the applicant is entitled to be released on
                                    anticipatory bail till conclusion of trial on the same terms and conditions, on
                                    which, the applicant was granted anticipatory bail by this Court vide order
                                    dated 07.01.2026 passed in Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application
                                    U/s 482 BNSS No.10927 of 2025.

                                    20. Accordingly, the present anticipatory bail application is ALLOWED.



                                                                                      (Jitendra Kumar Sinha,J.)
                                    September 23, 2026
                                    RKM




Digitally signed by :-
RAJESH KUMAR MAURYA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad