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Allahabad High Court

VEERESHversusSTATE OF U.P.

Decided

Holding

The Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application, holding that the applicant is not entitled to such relief.

Summary

The applicant, Veeresh, was named in an FIR dated 07.05.2026 under several sections of the B.N.S. and sought anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC, claiming innocence and false implication. The prosecution opposed, arguing a prima facie case based on the injury report, FIR, and witness statements indicating the applicant's participation in the alleged offence. The Court examined the extraordinary nature of anticipatory bail, citing Supreme Court precedents that it should be granted only in exceptional circumstances and not where serious allegations exist. It noted that the material before the Court established a reasonable basis for the accusations and that the investigation was at a preliminary stage requiring custodial interrogation. Consequently, the Court held that the applicant was not entitled to anticipatory bail. The application for anticipatory bail was therefore dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether anticipatory bail should be granted to the applicant under the extraordinary power of Section 438 CrPC in view of the prima facie case against him

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • anticipatory bail
  • extraordinary power
  • prima facie case
  • Section 438 CrPC
  • Section 482 CrPC
  • criminal procedure
  • bail jurisprudence
  • investigation

Judgment

          HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

 CRIMINAL MISC. ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION U/S 482
                  BNSS No. - 9646 of 2026

Veeresh
                                                                .....Applicant(s)
                                    Versus
State of U.P.
                                                                    .....Opposite
                                                                          Party(s)

Counsel for Applicant(s)      : Ambrish Chandra              Pandey,     Pramod
                                Kumar Tripathi
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A.

Court No. - 72
                  HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A for the State and
perused the record.

2. The present application has been filed on behalf of the applicant in Case
Crime No.0099 of 2026, under Sections 191(2), 191(3), 190, 115(2), 352,
351(3), 109(1) B.N.S., Police Station Chandaus, District Aligarh, with a
prayer to grant him anticipatory bail.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is absolutely
innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. He has nothing
to do with the alleged offence; in spite of that, the police are trying to arrest
him. The alleged incident is said to have taken place on 04.05.2026 at 17:00
hours, whereas the FIR was lodged on 07.05.2026 at 17:30 hours. The delay
in lodging the FIR has not been properly explained by the prosecution. In
fact, this is a cross-case, and from the side of the applicant, an FIR was
lodged on 05.05.2026. The applicant also sustained injuries in the incident.
In the FIR dated 07.05.2026, general and vague allegations have been
levelled against the applicant and other co-accused. It is alleged that three
persons sustained injuries, including injured Suresh. The injuries of the other
two injured persons are simple in nature, and as per the injury report of
injured Suresh, a displaced fracture of the squamous part of the left temporal
bone was noticed. In fact, the applicant has not caused the injury, and it is
not alleged that the applicant was the author of that injury. The applicant has
no criminal history to his credit. Learned counsel for the applicant further
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submits that the applicant undertakes to cooperate during investigation and
trial and shall appear as and when required by the Investigating Agency or
the Court concerned. It has also been stated that, in case the applicant is
granted anticipatory bail, he shall not misuse the liberty of bail, shall
cooperate with the investigation, and shall abide by all the conditions that
may be imposed by the Court.

4. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. has opposed the application for
anticipatory bail. It is submitted that admittedly, it is a cross-case and both
sides received injuries. A prima facie case is made out against the applicant
from the injury report, FIR, as well as the statements of the witnesses.
Injured Suresh sustained a fracture of his temporal bone. Anticipatory bail is
an extraordinary remedy, which cannot be granted considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case.

5. I have heard the rival submissions of both sides and perused the record.

6. The applicant is nominated in the FIR dated 07.05.2026. Three persons
sustained injuries from the side of the informant. The injury report of injured
Suresh suggests that he sustained a fracture of his left temporal bone. It
cannot be said that no prima facie offence is made out against the present
applicant. The witnesses stated that the applicant participated in the alleged
offence. It has been held in various judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
that bail is a rule but jail is an exception, but so far as anticipatory bail is
concerned, it ought to have been granted in exceptional cases since it is an
extraordinary power.

7. In the case of Srikant Upadhyay and Others vs. State of Bihar and
Another, (2024) 12 SCC 382, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
power to grant anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power. While called
upon to exercise the said power, the Court has to be very cautious as the
grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may
lead to miscarriage of justice. When warrant of arrest or proclamation is
issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoking extraordinary power. The
relevant paragraph no. 30 of Srikant Upadhyay (supra) is quoted as under:

     "30. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is an
     extraordinary power. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said
     to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said that
     anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule and the question of its
                                                              NABAIL No. 9646 of 2026
                                    3

     grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion by the Court
     depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon
     to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious
     as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious
     cases may lead to miscarriage of justice and may hamper the
     investigation to a great extent as it may sometimes lead to tampering or
     distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that
     the Court shall not pass an interim protection pending consideration of
     such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an
     individual against unwarranted arrest and we say that such orders shall
     be passed in eminently fit cases. At any rate, when warrant of arrest or
     proclamation is issued, the applicant is not entitled to invoke the
     extraordinary power. Certainly, this will not deprive the power of the
     Court to grant pre-arrest bail in extreme, exceptional cases in the interest
     of justice. But then, person(s) continuously, defying orders and keep
     absconding is not entitled to such grant."

8. In the case of P. Chidambaram vs. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019)
9 SCC 24, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that arrest is a part of procedure
of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but
several other purposes. The power under Section 438 of Cr.P.C./482 of
B.N.S.S. has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of the pre-arrest bail
should be granted only in exceptional cases. The relevant paragraph no. 69
of P. Chidambaram (supra) is reproduced as under:

     "69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of procedure of the investigation to
     secure not only the presence of the accused but several other purposes.
     Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power and the same
     has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of the pre-arrest bail should
     be granted only in exceptional cases. The judicial discretion conferred
     upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as
     to the nature and gravity of the accusation; possibility of the applicant
     fleeing justice and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for grant
     of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in
     the sphere of investigation of an offence and hence, the court must be
     circumspect while exercising such power for grant of anticipatory bail.
     Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and it has to be
     granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances
     exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy. "

9. It would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court titled as Kishor Vishwasrao Patil vs. Deepak Yashwant Patil and
                                                                  NABAIL No. 9646 of 2026
                                       4


another, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2528, relevant paragraph nos.14 and 15
whereof read as under:

     "14....................

             74. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of the
             investigation intended to secure several purposes. There may
             be circumstances in which the accused may provide
             information leading to discovery of material facts and
             relevant information. Grant of anticipatory bail may hamper
             the investigation, Pre-arrest bail is to strike a balance
             between the individual's right to personal freedom and the
             right of the investigating agency to interrogate the accused
             as to the material so far collected and to collect more
             information which may lead to recovery of relevant
             information........

                      6...........

             75. Observing that the arrest is a part of the investigation
             intended to secure several purposes, in Adri Dharan Das v.
             State of W.B. [Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B., (2005) 4
             SCC 303: 2005 SCC (Cri) 933], it was held as under: (SCC
             p. 313, para 19)

                      "19. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of
                      investigation intended to secure several
                      purposes. The accused may have to be
                      questioned in detail regarding various facets of
                      motive, preparation, commission and aftermath
                      of the crime and the connection of other persons,
                      if any, in the crime. There may be circumstances
                      in which the accused may provide information
                      leading to discovery of material facts. It may be
                      necessary to curtail his freedom in order to
                      enable the investigation to proceed without
                      hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons
                      connected with the victim of the crime, to prevent
                      his disappearance, to maintain law and order in
                      the locality. For these or other reasons, arrest
                      may become an inevitable part of the process of
                      investigation. The legality of the proposed arrest
                      cannot be gone into in an application under
                      Section 438 of the Code. The role of the
                                                  NABAIL No. 9646 of 2026
                       5

      investigator is well defined and the jurisdictional
      scope of interference by the court in the process
      of investigation is limited. The court ordinarily
      will not interfere with the investigation of a
      crime or with the arrest of the accused in a
      cognizable offence. An interim order restraining
      arrest, if passed while dealing with an
      application under Section 438 of the Code will
      amount to interference in the investigation,
      which cannot, at any rate, be done under Section
      438 of the Code."

76. In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 694: (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 514], the Supreme Court laid down the factors and
parameters to be considered while dealing with anticipatory
bail. It was held that the nature and the gravity of the
accusation and the exact role of the accused must be
properly comprehended before arrest is made and that the
court must evaluate the available material against the
accused very carefully. It was also held that the court should
also consider whether the accusations have been made only
with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by
arresting him or her.

77. After referring to Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre
[Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 1 SCC 694: (2011) 1 SCC (Crl) 514] and other
judgments and observing that anticipatory bail can be
granted only in exceptional circumstances, in Jai Prakash
Singh v. State of Bihar [Jai Prakash Singh v. State of
Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 468], the
Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 386, para 19)

      "19. Parameters for grant of anticipatory bail in
      a serious offence are required to be satisfied and
      further while granting such relief, the court must
      record the reasons therefor. Anticipatory bail
      can be granted only in exceptional
      circumstances where the court is prima facie of
      the view that the applicant has falsely been
      enroped in the crime and would not misuse his
      liberty. (See D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T.
                                                           NABAIL No. 9646 of 2026
                                  6

                 Manokaran [D.K. Ganesh Babu v. P.T.
                 Manokaran, (2007) 4 SCC 434 :(2007) 2 SCC
                 (Cri) 345], State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid
                 Husain Mohd. S. Husain [State of
                 Maharashtra v. Mohd. Sajid Husain Mohd. S.
                 Husain, (2008) 1 SCC 213: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri)
                 176] and Union of India v. Padam Narain
                 Aggarwal [Union of India v. Padam Narain
                 Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305: (2009) 1 SCC
                 (Cri) 1].)"

                 Economic offences

           78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary
           remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of
           economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different
           class as they affect the economic fabric of the society. In
           Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain
           [Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2
           SCC 105: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic
           offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail."

     15. In Sushila Agrawal and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another
     reported in (2020) 5 SCC 1, Constitution Bench of this Court held that
     while considering an application for grant of pre-arrest bail the Court
     has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the
     likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation, or tampering
     with evidence or likelihood of fleeing justice. The Court held:-

           "92.4. Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations
           such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role
           attributed to the applicant, and the facts of the case, while
           considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it.
           Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally
           whether and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be
           imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case,
           and subject to the discretion of the court."

10. As per the allegations put forth in the FIR, serious allegations have been
levelled against the applicant. The investigation is at a preliminary stage, and
the custodial interrogation of the applicant is necessary to unearth the truth.
Learned counsel for the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the case
registered against him is false. At this stage, there is no material on record to
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                                                                    7


                                    hold that a prima facie case is not made out against the applicant. The
                                    material that has come on record and the preliminary investigation, appear to
                                    establish a reasonable basis for the accusations.

                                    11. In view of this Court, the parameters of granting regular bail and
                                    anticipatory bail are different and it is not necessary that the grounds which
                                    are sufficient to enlarge an accused on regular bail must also be sufficient to
                                    enlarge him on anticipatory bail. Further, the Constitution Bench of the
                                    Apex Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others Vs. State of
                                    Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 also observed that the power to grant
                                    anticipatory bail is an extraordinary power and therefore in view of this
                                    Court being extraordinary power it cannot be used in routine manner.

                                    12. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case discussed
                                    above, in my view, applicant is not entitled to be released on anticipatory
                                    bail.

                                    13. Accordingly, the instant anticipatory bail application stands dismissed.



                                                                                        (Vivek Kumar Singh,J.)

                                    September 16, 2026
                                    Radhika




Digitally signed by :-
RADHIKA VISHWAKARMA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad


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