Allahabad High Court
ARJUNversusBHAGIRATH
- Decided
Holding
The High Court held that no substantial question of law was raised, the first appellate court's findings were not perverse, and therefore the second appeal must be dismissed.
Summary
The appellant Arjun challenged a decree of injunction granted by the first appellate court in a land dispute where the plaintiff's title was alleged to be clouded by an oral family settlement. The appellant argued that the first appellate court erred by not requiring proof of the oral settlement, by misreading the 1970 sale deed, and by reaching perverse findings. The High Court examined whether any substantial question of law existed for a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, considered the necessity of framing points for determination, and reviewed the maintainability of an injunction simpliciter suit under the Specific Relief Act. Relying on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court held that the issues were matters of fact, no substantial question of law arose, and the first appellate court's findings were not perverse. Consequently, the second appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether an injunction suit can be decreed by the first appellate court without a declaration when the plaintiff's title is clouded by an alleged oral settlement.
- Whether the oral settlement must be proved before the first appellate court can decree the suit.
- Whether the sale deed dated 06-06-1970 was misinterpreted, leading to an erroneous finding of an oral partition.
- Whether the findings of the first appellate court are perverse or based on a mis‑appreciation of evidence.
- Whether the second appeal raises a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC.
- Whether the first appellate court was required to frame specific points for determination under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC.
- Whether a suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable when the plaintiff's title is disputed.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 100, 96, Order 41 Rule 30, Order 41 Rule 31
- Jamiindari Khatma Act — s. 7, 9
- Specific Relief Act, 1963 — s. 34
Subjects
- injunction
- oral settlement
- partition
- second appeal
- substantial question of law
- CPC Section 100
- declaration suit
- land dispute
- evidence appraisal
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
SECOND APPEAL No. - 556 of 1982
Arjun
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
Bhagirath
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Amit Verma, G.n. Verma,
Kamleshwar Prasad, Nipun Singh,
Pramod Kumar Jain, Seema
Agarwal
Counsel for Respondent(s) : A.n. Bhargawa, B.p.singh, J. Verma,
Manoj Kumar Singh, R. Shome,
Rajesh Kumar Singh, Ranjeet
Sharne, Siddhartha Verma, Sushil
Kumar Pandey, V.k. Rathi, Yogesh
Tiwari
Court No. - 36
HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.
1. This Second Appeal is of the year 1982.
2. This Second Appeal was admitted on 17.02.1982 that grounds
mentioned in the memo of appeal appears to be substantial questions of
law in the present case.
3. Sri Nipun Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Hemant
Tyagi, learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted that no question
of law was mentioned in the memo of present second appeal. The
grounds mentioned in memo of appeal are not substantial questions of
2
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
law. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that substantial questions of law,
which arose for consideration are as follows:-
“i. Whether the injunction suit could be decreed by the first
appellate court without there being any relief of declaration
particularly when the title of the plaintiff was under cloud, based
on alleged oral settlement?
ii. Whether without proving the oral settlement, as alleged claimed
by the plaintiff in the plaint, which is the basis of the suit, first
appellate is justified in decreeing the suit?
iii. Whether the first appellate court has completely misread and
wrongly interpreted the sale deed dated 06.06.1970 in order to
reach to an erroneous conclusion of having any oral partition taken
place between the parties?
iv. Whether the findings returned by the lower appellate court
regarding the oral family partition are perverse, erroneous and
based on complete mis-appreciation of evidence and the same
would vitiate the judgment of first appellate court ?”
4. The law in regard to framing of question of law for adjudication in a
Second Appeal is being reiterated by Supreme Court in Nek Pal & Ors.
Vs. Nagar Palika Parishad & Ors, 2024 INSC 574 . Said order in its
entirety is reproduced hereinafter:-
“1. Leave granted.
2. Our attention is invited to the impugned judgment of the High
Court in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the CPC"). Following is the relevant
part of the impugned judgment:
"Since no substantial question of law was formulated at the
time of admission of the appeal on 30.5.2003, hence having
heard the matter partially and during the course of
arguments, in the presence of learned Counsels of both the
parties, this Court confined itself to adjudicate the following
substantial questions of law:
Whether the alleged transaction of the disputed property
was void ab initio being the violation of Section 7 of Hindu
Public Religious Institution (Prevention of Dissipation of
Properties) Act, 1962.
Whether the property was owned by Dera Baba Dargah
Singh and was of the religious charitable nature. If it is so,
3
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
whether it could have been transferred by the self claimed
manager Jaswinder Singh in the nature and manner it was
transferred?
Whether both the lower courts have rightly decreed the suit
on the basis of Khasra, Khatauni and 'Kisan Bahi' which
were issued by the revenue officials in favour of the lease
holders."
3. The aforesaid paragraph indicates that at the time of admitting
the second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, substantial
questions of law were not formulated. Unless substantial questions
of law are formulated at the time of admission of the appeal or any
time subsequent thereto, a second appeal cannot be finally heard.
The reason is that a second appeal can be finally heard only on a
substantial question of law formulated earlier. In fact, the act of
finally hearing a second appeal without framing any substantial
question of law is itself illegal. There is nothing on record to show
that the High Court formulated the substantial questions of law
and gave an opportunity to the parties to argue on the basis of
those substantial questions of law. All that the High Court says is
the Court has confined itself to three substantial questions of law.
The High Court did not put the rival Advocates to the notice
before the commencement of hearing that it was proposing to hear
the appeal on specific substantial questions of law. The High Court
could have framed substantial questions of law and heard the
appeal after few days so that the Advocates had a notice that the
appeal will be heard on specific substantial questions of law.
4. Therefore, the procedure followed by the High Court is
completely illegal and contrary to Section 100 of the CPC. Only
on this ground, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 13th
November, 2017 and restore Second Appeal Nos.34/2003 and
48/2003 to the file of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.
All contentions of the parties on merits of the Second Appeals are
kept open.
5. A copy of this order shall by forwarded by the Registry to the
Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Uttarakhand. The
Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court shall list the restored Second
Appeals before the roster Bench on 27th August, 2024. The
parties, who are appearing today, shall be under an obligation to
appear before the High Court on that date. The High Court need
not issue a notice to those parties.
6. If the High Court wants to frame substantial questions of law as
indicated in the impugned judgment or if the High Court desires to
frame additional substantial questions of law, it is open for the
High Court to do so. After completing the said exercise, the High
4
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
Court shall fix a date for hearing of the Second Appeals taking
into consideration the fact that the Second Appeals are 21 years
old.
7. We also clarify that till the date of the impugned judgment if
any interim relief was operative in the restored Second Appeals,
the same shall continue to operate.
8. The Civil Appeals are partly allowed on the above terms.
9. Pending applications, including the application for
impleadment, stand disposed of accordingly.”
5. In the above background of position of law, Court heard learned
counsel for the parties in order to ascertain as to whether there is any
question of law involved in the present second appeal or not and if
answer is in affirmative, questions of law(s) has to be framed and
thereafter granting opportunity of hearing to both parties, the second
appeal will be heard finally and in case answer remains in negative, fate
of second appeal would be dismissal, therefore, present second appeal is
listed today under the heading of ‘For Orders’.
6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of appellant has referred
a copy of plaint annexed along with Miscellaneous Application filed on
22.11.2013, that plaintiffs/respondents have filed a suit for injunction
simpliciter despite their title was disputed, therefore, the suit was not
maintainable.
7. Learner Senior Counsel further submitted that Learned Trial Court has
framed following 9 issues:-
“1- क्या वाद ग्रस्त भूमि ए.1 ए.2 एच ई के स्वामी शीशराम व छज्जू थे?
2- क्या वादग्रस्त भूमि बी ई एफ डी वादीगण को पारिवारिक विभाजन (फैमिली
सेटिलमेन्ट में मिली) और वादीगण उसके स्वामी व काबिज हो गये?
3- क्या वाद ग्रस्त भूमि प्रतिवादीगण 1 ता 3 के पूर्व ज रूढा में अन्तर्गत धारा 9
जमींदारा खात्मा अधिनियम में निहित हो चुकी है?
4- क्या प्रतिवादीगण 1 ता 3 के पूर्व ज रूढा को वादग्रस्त भूमि पर धारा 7 ए ए
जमींदारा खात्मा अधिनियम के अन्तर्गत अधिकार प्राप्त हो गये हैं?
5
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
5- क्या वाद का मूल्यांकन कम किया गया है और न्याय शुल्क का भुगतान
अपर्याप्त है?
6- क्या वाद अवधि से बाहर है?
7- क्या वाद पत्र का मानचित्र गलत है?
8- क्या वाद में धारा 38 ता 41 विनिर्दिष्ट अनुतोष अधिनियम बाधक है?
9- अनुतोष?”
8. The plaintiffs/respondents have claimed that predecessor in interest of
Sri Sheeshram and predecessor in interest of appellants/defendants
belongs to same generation and they remained in possession on part of
land in dispute and subsequently in pursuance of an oral family
settlement they took possession of all three parts. However, when
allegedly appellants/defendants tried to disturb their possession, present
suit was filed.
9. Learned Trial Court after considering the materials on record decided
issue nos.1 and 4 against the respondents/plaintiffs and in favour of
appellants/defendants and claim of family settlement was rejected.
10. The decision on issue numbers 1 and 4 being relevant are reproduced
hereinafter:
“ विवेचना
वाद बिन्द ु 1 ता 4:—
वाद बिन्द ु 1 ता 4 आपस में एक दस
ू रे से संबंधित है। अतः इनको निर्धारण हेतु
एक साथ लिया गया है।
वादीगण ने ईश्वर दयाल को वादी साक्षी 1, खजान सिंह को वादी साक्षी–2 के
रूप में प्रस्तुत किया है। प्रतिवादीगण ने प्रतिवादी साक्षी–1 अर्जुन एवं प्रतिवादी
साक्षी–2 रिडकू को प्रस्तुत किया है।
वादीगण विवादित सम्पत्ति ए.1 ए.2 एच 0 ई 0 दोनों पक्षों के वारिसान शीशराम
व छज्जू को होना अभिकथन करते हैं। वादी साक्षी–1 ईश्वर दयाल ने अपने
प्रतिपरीक्षण में स्वीकार किया है कि उसको विवादित सम्पत्ति का खसरा नं0
नहीं मालूम और उनमें बड़ों ने कोई लिखित में इजाजत नामा नहीं लिखा रखा
और उसने न कोई माल के कागजात देखे है। इस साक्षी ने आगे प्रतिपरीक्षण में
स्वीकार किया है कि वह लोग छज्जू हर से 25–30 साल से अलग–अलग है,
6
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
परन्तु कोल्हू इकट्ठा है। और इनदोनों का बंटवारा हो चुका था और केवल
विवादित सम्पत्ति मुश्तरका रह गई थी। यदि शीशराम व छज्जू के वादी साक्षी–1
के अनुसार बंटवारा काफी समय पहले हो चुका था तो इस सम्पत्ति मुश्तरका
छोड़ने का प्रश्न नहीं उठता और इन परिस्थितियों में वाद में आं शिक विभाजन
का सिद्धान्त लागू हो जाता है।
वादी ने इन सम्पत्ति को मौखिक बंटवारा का होना 8–9 साल पहले होना
अभिकथित किया है। परन्तु मौखिक बंटवारा का कोई गवाह प्रस्तुत नहीं किया
गया है। वादी साक्षी–2 खजान सिंह के समय कोई बंटवारा नहीं हुआ और न
बंटवारा का कोई दस्तावेज लिखा गया। वादीगण ने ए 1, ए 3 सी1 व सी2 भूमि
प्रतिवादीगण के पूर्व ज रूठा से 6–6–1970 को विक्रय पत्र (प्रदर्श –1) द्वारा
खरीदी थी। इस विक्रय पत्र में भी मौखिक बंटवारा का कोई उल्लेख नहीं है। इस
विक्रय पत्र में तिहाई हिस्सा बेचने का उल्लेख किया गया है। इस विक्रय पत्र की
तफसील में कुल प्लाट जिसकी तिहाई हिस्सा बेचा गया है दी गयी है यदि दोनों
पक्षों में बंटवारा हो गया होता तो इस विक्रय पत्र में बंटवारा का उल्लेख होता और
चौहददी में वादीगण की सम्पत्ति जिसको वह अपनी बताते हैं लेने का उल्लेख
होता। यह परिस्थिति यह दर्शाती है कि वादीगण और उसके पूर्व जों का इस
सम्पत्ति में कोई स्वामित्व व धारण नहीं था।
इसके अतिरिक्त वादीगण ने सम्पत्ति ए 3, ए 2 बी3 व बी2 को दर्गा
ु व रिडकू के
हिस्से में आनाबताया है और उसको विवादित सम्पत्ति का मालिक एवं काबिज
बताया है। परन्तु प्रतिवादी साक्षी–2 रिडकू ने अपने साक्ष्य में अपना कोई वास्ता
और ताल्लक
ु इस सम्पत्ति ए 3 ए 2 बी2 व बी3 से नहीं बतलाया और पूरी सम्पत्ति
प्रतिवादीगण 1 ता 3 की बताई है। कोई भी व्यक्ति अपना अधिकार आज के युग
में सम्पत्ति से छोड़ना नहीं चाहता है। प्रतिवादी साक्षी–2 का ए 3, ए 2 बी3 व बी2
सम्पत्ति को अपनी न बताना और इसका पूर्ण मालिक प्रतिवादीगण को बताना
यह दर्शाता है कि इस सम्पत्ति पर वादीगण या उसके पूर्व जों का कोई ताल्लक
ु
और वास्ता नहीं था।
वाद पत्र के मानचित्र में स्पष्ट होता है कि ए 1 ए 3 बी1 व सी2 पर मकानात
वादीगण 1 व 2 है। जो कि उन्होंने प्रतिवादीगण से 1970 में खरीदी है। वादीगण
बी बी1 डी बी3 को अपनी जगह बंटवारे से पहले होना बताते हैं। परन्तु इस
स्थान पर कोई तामीरात न होना तथा बी डी दिवार में कोई दरवाजा, रोशनदान
खिड़की आदि न होना यह दर्शाता है कि वादीगण का बी बी1 डी बी3 पर कभी
कोई कब्जा धारण व स्वामित्व नहीं रहा है। अन्यथा वादीगण इस स्थान पर कोई
न कोई तामीरात अवश्य रखते।
7
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
प्रतिवादीगण ने विवादित स्थान के लैन्ड एक्वीजशन की कार्यवाही के कागजात
(प्रदर्श 1) पर दाखिल किया है। जिसमें रूडा की आपत्तियां सही मानी गयी और
भूमि एक्वायर नहीं की गयी। यह आदेश 1–5–1975 का प्रदर्श ए–1 पर है। लैन्ड
एक्वीजीशन की कार्यवाही में वादीगण या उसके पूर्व जों द्वारा कोई कार्यवाही न
करना यह दर्शाता है कि वादीगण का इसी भूमि पर कोई स्वामित्व व धारण नहीं
था और प्रतिवादीगण के पास उनके धारण में विवादित भूमि थी।
प्रतिवादी साक्षी–1 अर्जुन एवं प्रतिवादी साक्षी–2 रिडकू के बयान से स्पष्ट होता
है कि जमींदारा खात्मा के वक्त प्रतिवादीगण के पूर्व जों का विवादित भूमि पर
धारण था और विवादित भूमि धारा 9 एवं धारा 7 ए में उनमें निहित हो चुकी थी।
अतः उपरोक्त विवेचना से तथा दोनों पक्षों के विद्वान अधिवक्ताओं के तर्कों को
ध्यान पूर्व क सुनने के पश्चात मैं इस निष्कर्ष पर आता हूँ कि विवादित भूमि ए 1,
ए 2 एच ई के स्वामी शीशराम व छज्जू नहीं थे और बी ई एस डी भूमि मौखिक
विभाजन में वादीगण को नहीं मिली और न वह मालिक एवं काबिज हुए। वाद
बिन्द ु 1 व 2 तदनुसार वादीगण के विपरीत नकारात्मक रूप से निर्धारित किये
जाते हैं। विवादित भूमि प्रतिवादीगण 1 ता 3 के पूर्व ज रूढा के अन्तर्गत धारा 9
जमींदारा खात्मा अधिनियम में निहित हो चुकी है और उनको धारा 7 ए के
अधिकार प्राप्त हो चुके हैं। वाद बिन्द ु 3 व 4 तदनुसार प्रतिवादीगण के पक्ष में
स्वीकारात्मक रूप में निर्धारित किये जाते हैं।
वाद बिन्द ु सं० –5:— इस वाद बिन्द ु का निर्धारण मेरे विद्वान पूर्वाधिकारी द्वारा
नकारात्मक रूप में 20.05.1978 को किया जा चुका है। वह निर्णय का भाग
बनेगा।
वाद बिन्द ु सं०–6:— प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता का तर्क था कि वादीगण
का विवादित भूमि पर 12 साल से पहले से कब्जा नहीं है। और वाद कालावधि
से बाधित है। वाद बिन्द ु 1 व 2 के निर्धारण में वादीगण का कब्जा नहीं माना गया
है। अतः वाद कालावधि से बाधित है। वाद बिन्द ु 5 तदनुसार स्वीकारात्मक रूप
में निर्धारित किया जाता ह।
वाद बिन्द ु सं०–7:— प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता का तर्क था कि वाद पत्र
का मानचित्र गलत है। परन्तु उन्होंने इस विषय पर कोई शहादत नहीं दी है और
न कोई कमीशन ही जारी कराया है। अतः इन परिस्थितियों में वाद पत्र का
मानचित्र गलत नहीं माना जा सकता है। वाद बिन्द ु 6 नकारात्मक रूप में
निर्धारित किया जाता है।
वाद बिन्द ु सं० –8:— प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता का तर्क था कि
वादीगण विवादित भूमि पर कब्जा नहीं है। वाद बिन्द ु 1 व 2 के निर्धारण में
8
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
वादीगण का कब्जा विवादित भूमि पर नहीं माना गया है। अतः वाद विनिर्दिष्ट
अधिनियम की धारा 38 ता 41 से बाधित है। वाद बिन्द ु 8 तदनुसार
स्वीकारात्मक रूप में निर्धारित किया जाता है।
वाद बिन्द ु सं० –9:— वाद बिन्द ु 1 व 2 में वादीगण के विपरीत निर्धारण होने के
कारण वादीगण कोई अनुतोष पाने के अधिकारी नहीं हैं और वाद खर्चे सहित
खारिज होने योग्य हैं। मैं तदनुसार आदेश देता है।
आदेश
वादीगण का आज्ञापक व्यादेश का वाद खर्चे सहित प्रतिवादीगण के विरूद्ध
खारिज किया जाता है।"
11. Accordingly the suit was dismissed vide a judgment dated
13.10.1978.
12. The respondents/plaintiffs, filed an appeal before the 1st Civil Judge,
Muzaffar Nagar which was allowed vide a judgment dated 3.2.1982, and
the suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was allowed.
13. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that 1st Appellate Court did not
frame points for determination and without setting-aside findings
returned by learned Trial Court, took a different view, thus impugned
order suffers from multiple illegalities.
14. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that 1st Appellate Court decided
issue which was not even being framed by learned Trial Court as to
whether the disputed land in suit was solely acquired by the defendants
or its co—sharer, still considering the materials on record, the 1 st
Appellate Court has placed reliance on a ‘Bainama’ executed by Rudha,
predecessor in interest of appellants/defendants in favour of
plaintiffs/respondents herein that 1/3rd share of entire land was sold in
favour of plaintiffs.
15. Much reliance was placed on the contents of ‘Bainama’ and it was
held that said document was sufficient evidence to support the claim of
9
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
plaintiffs/respondents herein. In the later part of the order, it was held
that land in dispute was divided in three equal parts, therefore, it was
held that partition took place and that claim of plaintiffs/respondents was
accept to that they were owners of the land in dispute. For reference,
decision of said issue is reproduced hereinafter:
“इस वाद में यह देखना है कि क्या पूरी विवादित भूमि प्रतिवादीगण के बड़ों की
तन्हा थी अथवा क्या इसमें तीन हिस्सेदार थे। जहाँ वादीगण के अनुसार भूमि
के 3 हिस्से थे वहीं प्रतिवादीगण के अनुसार यह पूरी भूमि इसके बड़ों की तन्हा
थी यह बात ध्यान देने की है कि उपरोक्त दोनों में से किसी बात के समर्थन में
कोई प्रत्यक्ष दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य उपलब्ध नहीं है जिससे यह पता लगे कि भूमि का
स्वामित्व किसके पास था। जो दस्तावेजी साक्ष्य इस सम्बन्ध में उपलब्ध है वह
भूमि के स्वामित्व के अप्रत्यक्ष साक्ष्य के रूप में है। उनमें मुख्य रूढा द्वारा
वादीगण के पक्ष में लिखा गया बैनामा प्रदर्श सं0 1 है। उभयपक्ष इस बैनामें को
स्वीकार करते हैं और यह मानते हैं कि इस बैनामें द्वारा पूरी भूमि का 1/3 हिस्सा
रूढा ने वादीगण के पक्ष में बेंचा था। मैने इस बैनामें का ध्यान से अवलोकन
किया है। यद्यपि इसमें पूरी भूमि के स्वामित्व के बारे में कोई स्पष्ट बात नहीं है
लेकिन इस बैनामें से 2 3 महत्वपूर्ण बातें सामने आती हैं। पहली बात यह है कि
रूढ़ा बैनामें में बेंची जाने वाली भूमि को तिहाई हिस्से के रूप में माना है। दस
ू री
महत्वपूर्ण बात यह है कि जो भूतिम बैनामा द्वारा बेंची गई, उसकी उत्तर की
चौहददी में स्कूल बताया गया है और किसी रास्ते का कोई जिक्र नहीं है। तीसरी
महत्वपूर्ण बात यह है कि बेंची जाने वाली भूमि का क्षेत्रफल 21 गज लम्बा और 7
गज चौड़ा बताया गया है। इन्हीं मुद्दों से यह देखना होगा कि बेंची जाने वाली
भूमि की उस वक्त क्या नवैयत थी। प्रदर्श सं0 1 में रूढा ने यह स्पष्ट लिखा है कि
जो तिहाई हिस्सा वह बेंच रहा है वह एक प्लाट के रूप में है और रूढा उसका
मालिक और काबिज है। प्रदर्श सं0 1 में यह बात कहीं नहीं आयी है कि रूढा
पूरी भूमि का मालिक था। यह भी ध्यान देने की बात है कि संयोग से बेची गयी
हिस्से का क्षेत्रफल पूरी भूमि का लगभग 1/3 ही आता है जैसा कि यह
प्रतिवादीगण भी स्वीकार करते हैं और जो कमीशन की रिपोर्ट 11/ग से स्पष्ट है।
इस प्रकार प्रदर्श सं0 1 में लिखी गयी उपरोक्त बातें इस बात की ओर इशारा
करती प्रतीत होती हैं कि बेंची गयी भूमि ........ रूढा का स्वामित्व के व 1/3 भाग
पर ही था और यह भाग एक ........ रूप में था। यह परीक्षित प्रतिवादीगण से
ज्यादा वादीगण के पक्ष में समर्थन करती है क्योंकि यदि रूढा पूरी भूमि का
मालिक होता तो वह इस प्रकार 1/3 भाग को एक प्लाट के रूप में कभी न
बताता और न ही इस प्रकार पूरी भूमि से 1/3 हिस्सा निकालना सम्भव होता।
यदि रूढा पूरी भूमि का मालिक होता तो 1/3 लिखने की भी कोई आवश्यकता
नहीं थी बल्कि स्वामित्व के रूप से बेचे जाने वाली भूमि की चौहददी और
क्षेत्रफल ही लिख दिया जाता। इसके अतिरिक्त बेंची जाने वाली भूमि की स्थिति
भी यही दर्शित करती है कि विक्रेता रूढा पूरी भूमि के केवल उतनी हिस्से पर
काबिज था जो उसने बेंची अन्यथा एक कोने में 1/3 हिस्सा अलग करता ........
साधारण रूप में स्वाभाविक नहीं प्रतीत होता। यदि रूढ़ा पूरी भूमि का मालिक
होता तो बेंची गयी भूमि किसीभी एक तरफ से निकाली नहीं जाती, इसके लिए
एक विशेष कोने को 1/3 हिस्से के रूप में चुनना और उसे प्लाट बताना किसी
भी रूप में स्वाभाविक नहीं होता। इस प्रकार मेरी राय में विक्रय पत्र प्रदर्श सं0 1
वादी का कथन का समर्थन करता है।
मेरे उपरोक्त कथन का समर्थन इस तरह से भी हो जाता है कि इस विक्रय पत्र में
लिखी गयी चौहददी में उत्तर की ओर स्कूल दिखाया गया है। प्रतिवादीगण ने
अपने बयान तहरीरी में स्वीकार किया है कि उत्तर की ओर एक रास्ता चलता
10
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
है। वकील कमीश्नर के रिपोर्ट 11/ग में भी इस रास्ते को दिखाया गया है और
उसकी चौड़ाई लगभग 9 फिट दिखायी गयी है। यह रास्ता पूरब के आम रास्ते
से होकर पश्चिम में इस भूमि के भीतर पीछे के हिस्से में गया है तथा इसका कोई
सम्बन्ध किसी अन्य भूखण्ड से नहीं प्रतीत होता। कमीश्नर का उपरोक्त नक्शा
यह दर्शित करता है कि इस ........ द्वारा विवादित भूमि का पश्चिमी भूखण्ड आम
रास्ते से जोड़ा गया है। यदि यह पूरी भूमि एक ही व्यक्ति की स्वामित्व में होती तो
निश्चित रूप से इस प्रकार का कोई रास्ता छोड़ने की आवश्यकता नहीं थी।
विक्रय पत्र में वर्णित उपरोक्त चौहददी से यह सिद्ध होता है कि विक्रय पत्र लिखते
समय यह रास्ता मौजूद नहीं था। यदि यह रास्ता मौजूद होता तो उसका हवाला
अवश्य दिया जाता और रास्ते की भूमि छोड़कर ही वादीगण को भूमि बेंची
जाती। स्वयं प्रतिवादीगण को भी यही कहना है कि रास्ते की भूमि छोड़ कर ही
भूमि प्रतिवादीगण को बेंची गयी है। लेकिन विक्रय पत्र में लिखी चौहददी
प्रतिवादीगण के इस कथन को झूठा कर देती हैं। उपरोक्त चौहददी यह स्पष्ट
करती है कि बेंची जाने वाली भूमि में वर्तमान रास्ता भी शामिल था। वादीगण ने
अपने वाद पत्र में यह कहा है कि पहले यह रास्ता वादीगण की ओर से चलता था
लेकिन यह भूमि खरीदने के बाद उन्होंने दक्षिण का रास्ता अपनी भूमि में चला
लिया और दर्गा ु व रिडकू की सहमति से इतना ही रास्ता उत्तर की ओर इस भूमि
में छोड़ दिया। इस बात का स्पष्ट विरोध प्रतिवादपत्र में नहीं किया गया है।
वादीगण की ओर से इस कथन से इन्कार अवश्य किया गया है। वादीगण का
उपरोक्त कथन मेरी राय में स्वयं प्रतिवादीगण के प्रतिवाद पत्र से ही सिद्ध हो
जाता है। प्रतिवाद पत्र के पैरा 9 में प्रतिवादीगण ने ए.बी.सी.डी. भूमि पर वादी
का स्वामित्व स्वीकार किया है। यह ध्यान देने की बात है कि यह पूरी भूमि
ए.बी.सी.डी. रास्ते की भूमि 9 फिट छोड़ने के बाद की है। यह भी ध्यान देने की
बात है कि इस ए.बी.सी.डी. भूमि में वादीगण द्वारा वर्णित दक्षिण भूखण्ड की
लगभग 9 फिट भाग शामिल है क्योंकि ए.बी. की लम्बाई 21 फिट ए स्थान से
शुरू होती है। यदि वादीगण दक्षिणी हिस्से के मालिक होते तो उत्तर की ओर
रास्ता ए.1-ए.3 फिट छोड़ने के बाद वादीगण के पास केवल 12 फिट भूमि
बचती चाहिए थी लेकिन स्वयं प्रतिवादीगण ने यह माना है कि वादीगण के पास
21 फिट भूमि है। यह परिस्थितियाँ दर्शित करती हैं कि वादीगण ने शेष 9 फिट
दक्षिणी हिस्से से मिलाकर भूमि पूरी कर ली है और यह तब सम्भव हो सकता है
जब दक्षिणी हिस्सा वादीगण के ही स्वामित्व में हो। इस प्रकार दक्षिणी हिस्से की
भूमि जो इस वाद में विवादित भूमि है, वादीगण के स्वामित्व का आभास मिलता
है।
यह परिस्थिति भी कि पूरा भूखण्ड में बराबर के तीन हिस्से बनाये गये हैं, यही
स्पष्ट करता है कि यह भूखण्ड तीन लोगों में बांट दिया गया था और प्रतिवादीगण
उसके केवल 1/3 भाग के ही मालिक थे अन्यथा इस प्रकार स्पष्ट तीन हिस्से में
भूमि का बंटना स्वाभाविक नहीं प्रतीत होता।
प्रतिवादीगण की ओरसे भूमि अधिग्रहण कार्यवाही के दौरान अपने पूर्व जों द्वारा
दाखिल की गयी आपत्ति (प्रपत्र सं0 38/क तथा उस पर हुए आदेश पत्र सं0
39/ग का हवाला दिया है और कहा गया है कि इससे यह स्पष्ट होता है कि यह
पूरी भूमि प्रतिवादीगण के बड़ों की थी। मैने इन प्रपत्रों का भी अवलोकन किया
लेकिन मुझे उनमें ऐसी कोई बात नहीं मिली जिससे प्रतिवादी का उपरोक्त कथन
सिद्ध हो। यह प्रपत्र लगभग 30 वर्ष पुराना है जब वादीगण के अनुसार सभी
पक्षकार एक साथ रहते थे इन परिस्थितियों में यदि किसी एक व्यक्ति ने अपनी
पूरी भूमि के बारे में आपत्ति की हो तो उसके आधार पर यह माना जाना सम्भव
नहीं है कि केवल वही उसका स्वामी था।
जहाँ तक मौखिक साक्ष्य का ............ है वह भी वादीगण का समर्थन करती हैं।
वादीगण ने अपने उपरोक्त कथन के समर्थन में वादी ईश्वर दयाल के अतिरिक्त
उसी गाँव के एक अन्य व्यक्ति खजान को उपस्थित किया है जो विवादित भूमि
के सटे दक्षिण में रहता है। खजान ने वादीगण के कथन का समर्थन किया है।
11
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
इसके विरुद्ध प्रतिवादीगण की ओर से कोई स्वतंत्र साक्षी नहीं आया है।
प्रतिवादीगण के गवाह के रूप में रिडकू आया है जो उनका सगा चचेरा भाई है।
रिडकू के बयान में कई विसंगतियां हैं जो उसे पूरी तरह से अविश्वसनीय बना
देती हैं। इस बात का कोई महत्व नहीं है कि रिडकू ने पश्चिम वाले अपने हिस्से
को अपना होना स्वीकार नहीं किया है क्योंकि यह माना जा सकता है कि ऐसा
करके उसने अपने पट्टीदार की मदद की है, जबकि उसकी स्वयं की कोई हानि
नहीं हुई।
प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता ने अपनी बहस में यह कहा है कि यदि वादीगण
की बंटवारे की बात मानी भी जाय तो वादीगण तथा प्रतिवादीगण का विवादित
भूमि पर आधा-आधा हिस्सा होना चाहिए 1/3 हिस्सा होने का कोई प्रश्न ही नहीं
उठता। मेरी राय में हिस्से की असमानता के आधार पर यह नहीं कहा जा
सकता कि पक्षकारों का हिस्सा ही नहीं बनता। प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान
अधिवक्ता ने यह भी कहा है कि वादीगण विवादित भूमि को जहरिया के .........
की नहीं बताते और न ही सम्पत्ति का अन्य प्रमाण बताते हैं। उनके अनुसार यह
पूरी भूमि जमींदारी विनाश अधिनियम की धारा 9 में उनके पिता दयाराम में
निहित हो गयी थी अतः वे लोग अकेले इसके स्वामी हुए। मेरी राय में उनका यह
कथन भी अविश्वसनीय है क्योंकि वाद पत्र में यह स्पष्ट लिखा है कि यह भूमि
टाउन एरिया सीमाक्षेत्र में आती है और इस बात से प्रतिवादीगण ने भी इन्कार
नहीं किया है। यह परिस्थिति यह स्पष्ट करती है कि धारा 9 में निहित होने का
कोई प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता ने अपने बयान में दो
अन्य बातों का भी उल्लेख किया है लेकिन मेरी राय में यह बातें भी महत्वहीन हैं।
उनके अनुसार हिन्द ू परिवार में एक बार बंटवारा होने पर यही मान्यता होती है
कि सारी सम्पत्तियां बंट गयी हैं। अतः उनके अनुसार जब वे 30 साल पूर्व
बंटवारा होना कहते हैं तो विवादित भूमि बंटवारे से अलग मानना उचित नहीं
होगा। मेरी राय में इस मान्यता के बारे में उनका यह कथन सही है लेकिन यह
मान्यता अन्तिम रूप से नहीं होता कि वादी ने अपने बयान मे यह बात सशपथ
कही है कि दोनों बंटवारे उसके सामने हुए थे और विवादित भूमि पहले बंटवारे
के समय संयक्त ु छोड़ी गयी थी। अतः अब उपरोक्त मान्यता का महत्व नहीं रह
जाता। प्रतिवादीगण के विद्वान अधिवक्ता ने यह भी कहा है कि वादीगण के
मकान की कोई खिड़की या दरवाजा दक्षिण की ओर विवादित भूमि पर नहीं
खुलता जिससे यह प्रमाणित होता है कि दक्षिण वाली विवादित भूमि से वादीगण
का कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं रहा है। विद्वान मुन्सिफ ने भी इस बात को मानते हुए
विवादित भूमि पर वादी का स्वामित्व मानने से इन्कार कर दिया है। मेरी राय में
केवल यह परिस्थिति भूमि के स्वामित्व के निर्धारण के लिए किसी भी रूप में
पर्याप्त नहीं हो सकती। जैसा कि ऊपर कहा है वादी को अन्य साक्ष्य स्पष्ट रूप
से विवादित भूमि पर वादी का स्वामित्व सिद्ध करती है। अतः इस परिस्थिति
का महत्व नहीं रह जाता है।
मेरे समक्ष अन्य कोई मुद्दा नहीं उठाया गया है। मेरे उपरोक्त निष्कर्षों के आधार
पर यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि वादीगण विवादित भूमि के स्वामी हैं अतः उनका
इस भूमि पर व्यादेश सम्बन्धी वाद डिग्री होने योग्य है।
आदेश
अपील सव्यय स्वीकार की जाती है। वादीगण का वाद सव्यय डिग्री किया जाता
है तथा प्रश्नगत निर्णय खण्डित किया जाता है।"
16. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that oral settlement was not even
proved by evidence, therefore, 1st Appellate Court has erred in accepting
sale deed dated 6.6.1970 to be a sufficient piece of evidence that oral
partition has taken place and was effected also.
12
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
17. Learned Senior Counsel lastly submitted that finding returned by 1 st
Appellate Court were perverse, therefore, present Second Appeal
involves above referred questions of law.
18. Learned Senior Counsel has place reliance on a judgment passed by
Supreme Court in Dilbagrai Punjabi Vs. Sharad Chandra, 1988 (Supp)
SCC 710 and relevant part thereof is reproduced hereinafter:
“5. xxx
It is true that the High Court while hearing the appeal under
Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no jurisdiction to
reappraise the evidence and reverse the conclusion reached by the
first appellate court, but at the same time its power to interfere
with the finding cannot be denied if when the lower appellate
court decides an issue of fact a substantial question of law arises.
The court is under a duty to examine the entire relevant evidence
on record and if it refuses to consider important evidence having
direct bearing on the disputed issue and the error which arises is of
a magnitude that it gives birth to a substantial question of law, the
High Court is fully authorised to set aside the finding. This is the
situation in the present case. We, therefore, do not discover any
defect in the judgment of the High Court, and the appeal is
accordingly dismissed with costs.“
19. Per Contra, Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for contesting
respondents has supported the impugned order and submitted that 1st
Appellate Court was completely justified to reverse the finding returned
by the learned Trial Court since it can independently re-evaluate and re-
appreciate all oral as well as documentary evidence to decide issues.
20. The finding returned by first Appellate Court was based on correct
appreciation of evidence which records a sale deed between Rudha,
predecessor-in-interest of appellant/defendants and plaintiffs/respondents
which was an important piece of evidence and since it's content
specifically discloses that 1/3rd part of entire land was sold, but it does
not state that out of entire land, only 1/3rd of it was sold, therefore, it
was a clear case that upon the partition 1/3rd part of entire land was
given to Rudha.
13
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
21. The evidence that there was an oral partition and its effect also was
supported by the said sale deed as well as it was supported by the
boundaries of the land in dispute.
22. Learned counsel for contesting respondents also submitted that it was
not necessary to frame points for determination if the First Appellate
Court has crystallized the issue for consideration, since in the impugned
order it was specifically noted that “इस वाद में यह देखना है कि क्या पूरी
विवादित भूमि प्रतिवादीगण के बड़ों की तन्हा थी अथवा क्या इसमें तीन हिस्सेदार थे। "
"इन्हीं मुद्दों से यह देखना होगा कि बेंची जाने वाली भूमि की उस वक्त क्या नवैयत थी।"
23. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents refers following
finding of first Appellate Court:
“ यह परिस्थिति भी कि पूरा भूखण्ड में बराबर के तीन हिस्से बनाये गये हैं, यही
स्पष्ट करता है कि यह भूखण्ड तीन लोगों में बांट दिया गया था और प्रतिवादीगण
उसके केवल 1/3 भाग के ही मालिक थे अन्यथा इस प्रकार स्पष्ट तीन हिस्से में
भूमि का बंटना स्वाभाविक नहीं प्रतीत होता।"
24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
25. As referred above, this Court has to decide firstly as to whether this
Second Appeal involves any substantial questions of law and if any
substantial question of law exists, this Court has to formulate the same.
26. Court takes note of a recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in
Rabindranath Panigrahi Vs. Surendra Sahu, 2025 INSC 333 and its
relevant paragraphs being 6 and 7 are reproduced hereinafter:
“6. The principles governing the scope of Second Appeal under
Section 100 CPC are well-settled. To state that, under Section 100
C.P.C a High Court is not to disturb findings of fact, would be
now like stating the obvious. [See: Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179; Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC
546; State Bank of India v. S.N. Goyal (2008) 8 SCC 9215; and
Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar,
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 1210.] Yet recently, this Court lamented
that despite numerous judgments spelling out the scope of this
power, the High Court repeatedly falls in error. [See: Jaichand v.
14
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864] The present is another such
case.
7. In the present case, the questions as framed by the High Court,
in our view, do not meet the criteria to be substantial questions of
law. For a question to be substantial, reference can be made to the
discussion made in, amongst a host of other judgments, Hero
Vinoth v. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545, wherein it was held as
under:
“21. ...“[W]hen a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is
room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it
necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss
alternative views, then the question would be a substantial
question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically
covered by the decision of the highest Court or if the general
principles to be applied in determining the question are well
settled and the only question was of applying those principles to
the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question
of law."
This Court laid down the following test as proper test, for
determining whether a question of law raised in the case is
substantial : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR
1962 SC 1314] , SCR pp. 557-58)
"The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised
in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of
general public importance or whether it directly and substantially
affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an
open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court
or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from
difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the
question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to
be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is
a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised
is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question
of law." ”
In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala (2020) 19 SCC 57, it was
observed that:-
“28. To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not
previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent,
and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case
and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.”
[See: P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar 2023 SCC OnLine
SC1483; and Ramachandra Reddy v. Ramulu Ammal, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3301]”
27. Now in above background of rival submissions and judgment passed
by learned Trial Court and First Appellate Court and discussion on law,
Court proceeds to consider as to whether present second appeal has any
15
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
substantial questions of law which can be formulated under Section 100
C.P.C.
28. This first issue is as to whether it was mandatory for the First
Appellate Court to frame points for determination or not and for that the
Court takes note of a judgment passed by this Court in Smt. Qamrunnisa
And Others Vs. Smt. Tamizan And Others, 2026:AHC:79265 and its
relevant paragraph nos. 6,7,8 and 9 are reproduced hereinafter:
“6. Learned counsel for appellants vehemently pressed the first
purported question of law, i.e., whether First Appellate Court was
justified in dismissing first appeal without framing points for
determination and has placed reliance on a judgment passed by
Supreme Court in the case of Nafees Ahmad and another vs.
Soinuddin and others, 2025 INSC 520, however, the Court finds
that said judgment is in fact against the submission of counsel for
appellants.
7. In Nafees Ahmad (supra) the High Court while considering a
second appeal has formulated a similar nature of question of law
and held that since First Appellate Court has not framed points for
determination, therefore, appeal was returned back for fresh
consideration. However, a challenge to it before Supreme Court
was allowed and it was held that it is not always mandatory to
frame points for determination and it would depend how the
judgment was written. For reference entire judgment passed by
Supreme Court in Nafees Ahmad (supra) is quoted hereinafter:
“1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 4-9-
2017 in Second Appeal No.69/2008, by which the Second Appeal
filed by the respondents – herein came to be partly allowed and
the matter was remitted to the First Appellate Court on the ground
that the First Appellate Court failed to comply with the provisions
of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
3. The High Court, while deciding the Second Appeal, formulated
the following substantial question of law:-
“Whether it is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to frame the
point of determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31
CPC while deciding the first appeal or not?”
4. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC reads thus:
16
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
“Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.─
The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall
state ─
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief
to which the appellant is entitled,and shall at the time that it is
pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges
concurring therein.”
5. It appears that the High Court relying upon few decisions took
the view that Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is mandatory and the failure
on the part of the Appellate Court to frame the points for
determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC
would vitiate the entire judgment and make it wholly void.
6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, we are in complete
disagreement with the view taken by the High Court.
7. We propose to follow the dictum as laid by this Court in the
case of “G. Amalorpavam And Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai
And Others” reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court
observed that whether in a particular case, there has been
substantial compliance, with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31
CPC should be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered
in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may
not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be
ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it.
8. We may elaborate the issue a little further from a different
angle.
9. The Privy Council observed in “Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi
Izarus” reported in AIR 1921 PC 55, at p. 56, as under:
“In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show
reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there
must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances
are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands.
Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been
discharged.”
10. The Privy Council decision referred to above was looked into
by a three-Judge Bench in the case of “Thakur Sukhpal Singh v.
Thakur Kalyan Singh and Anr.” reported in (1963) 2 SCR 733,
wherein this Court observed as under:
17
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
“With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the
appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for
certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that
the appellate court would call upon the respondent to reply to the
contention. It is only then that the judgment of the appellate court
can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Ruel 31,
Order 41.”
11. This Court observed in “Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya” reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1, at page 8:
“Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is
procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its
ends: ... Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room
for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be
guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both
sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice
be used to frustrate it.”
12. The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably
construed and should be held to require the various particulars to
be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually
raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and
not when no such points are raised.
13. We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41
for the purpose of fortifying our interpretation of Rule 31. Order
41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus:
“30. Judgment when and where pronounced.─ (1) The Appellate
Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to
any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the court
from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may
be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court,
either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given
to the parties or their pleaders.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall be
sufficient if the points for determination, the decision thereon and
the final order passed in the appeal are read out and it shall not be
necessary for the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy
of the whole judgment shall be made available for the perusal of
the parties or their pleaders immediately after the judgment in
pronounced.”
14. Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate
Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the court from
whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can
refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of
these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is
in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the proceedings.
18
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the
parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration.
It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its
consideration, the Appellate Court can decide the appeal without
any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and, in doing
so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything
which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under
appeal were wrong. [See : “Thakur Sukhpal Singh” (supra)]
15. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we allow this appeal.
16. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set
aside.
17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.”
8. In order to consider above submissions including a submission
that Trial Court has returned a perverse finding and has not
appreciated the evidence on record, Court also takes note of
judgment passed by First Appellate Court which has considered
the order passed in suit whereby it was decreed and has rejected
all grounds, as such, it was a judgment where there was no
necessity to frame points for determination since it were not
involved.
9. In above background Court also takes note of a judgment
passed by Supreme Court in Malluru Mallappa (D) Thru. Lrs. vs.
Kuruvathappa and others, 2020 INSC 173 that if First Appellate
Court has display conscious application of mind and record
findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions, the
object of Section 96 CPC got satisfied.”
29. As already noted in earlier part of this judgment that First Appellate
Court has not framed specific points for determination, but has
crystallized the issues for consideration after taking note of all the
materials on record as well as respective stand of the parties that “इस वाद
में यह देखना है कि क्या पूरी विवादित भूमि प्रतिवादीगण के बड़ों की तन्हा थी अथवा
क्या इसमें तीन हिस्सेदार थे।" "इन्हीं मुद्दों से यह देखना होगा कि बेंची जाने वाली भूमि
की उस वक्त क्या नवैयत थी। "
30. The First Appellate Court has made a specific consideration on map
and boundaries mentioned in the sale deed, therefore, it was not a case
that despite no point of determination was made, first Appellate Court
has even failed to apply his mind rather it was a case where issues were
19
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
crystallized, specific consideration was made and reasons were assigned
that why an order of reversal can be passed, therefore, this second appeal
does not involve question of law that whether due to non-determination
of point of determination, the judgment passed by the First Appellate
Court renders to be absolutely illegal.
31. Now the Court proceeds to consider as to whether in given set of
circumstances a suit simpliciter injunction can be filed or not by the
respondents/plaintiff and whether it is a question of law to be framed in
present Second Appeal.
32. Plaintiffs have specifically claimed that parties to the suit belongs to
same pedigree. There was an oral settlement which was executed and the
entire land was divided into three equal parts and accordingly they were
in possession. Subsequently, Rudha has sold 1/3rd of the disputed land,
being owner of it after parition and since sale deed was on record
therefore, plaintiffs have claimed their ownership on disputed plot and
only on a ground that there was denial in written statement filed by the
appellants/defendants, would not mean that plaintiff cannot file a suit of
injunction simpliciter, therefore, in the given set of circumstances, this
argument is also not sustainable and there is no question of law that in
given circumstances a suit for injunction simpliciter was not
maintainable.
33. This Court takes note of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the
case of Ranjeet Alias Bhaiyu Mohite Vs. Nandita Singh & Ors., Civil
Appeal No. 3252 of 2025, decided on 25.02.2025 and for reference
relevant paragraph no.18 of it is reproduced hereinafter:-
“18. We are of the considered view that the High Court erred in
rejecting the plaint in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC merely because the Appellant had not, at the outset, sought
the relief of possession for the small portion allegedly occupied by
the Respondents. A plain reading of Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) makes it evident that:
'Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as
to any property, may institute a suit against any person
20
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or
right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not
in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration
where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a
mere declaration of title, omits to do so.'
This provision empowers a person in possession of property
to file a suit for declaration and protect that possession
through an injunction. The requirement to seek "further
relief" applies where a plaintiff, already "able to seek"
possession or another substantive remedy, omits doing so.
Consequently, where the plaintiff is in possession of the
bulk of the suit property and only a minor portion is out of
his immediate control, a simple omission to claim
possession from the start does not, in itself, mandate
outright rejection of the entire plaint. Instead, as long as the
plaintiff pleads possession of most of the property and seeks
declaratory relief along with an injunction to protect that
possession, the proviso to Section 34 is not violated. In such
a situation, any partial lapse, like failing to claim possession
over a small portion, may be cured by a suitable
amendment, especially when the suit is at a preliminary
stage. As the appellant has sought the consequential relief of
injunction therefore the plaint is not barred by section 34
which principle has been thoroughly expounded by this
Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4
SCC 594 in the following extract:
'21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for
prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as
under:
(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he
does not have possession, a suit for declaration and
possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is
the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or
under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for
possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is
merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession
or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an
injunction simpliciter.
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only
with possession, normally the issue of title will not be
directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction
will be decided with reference to the finding on possession.
But in cases where de jure possession has to be established
on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant
sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise
for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be
possible to decide the issue of possession.
21
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
(c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for
injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and
appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied
as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v.
Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments
regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no
issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or
examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit
for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings
and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of
fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the
parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for
declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for
mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and
appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead
evidence, if the matter involved is simple and
straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue
regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases,
are the exception to the normal rule that question of title
will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons
having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should
not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy
of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler
vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to
encroach upon his property. The court should use its
discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire
into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a
more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the
facts of the case.”
34. Now this Court proceeds to consider the third issue that whether first
Appellate Court has completely misread contents of sale deed dated
6.6.1970 or that a finding returned that oral partition took place was
erroneous and perverse. The Court finds that in the order under
challenge, First Appellate Court has carefully perused contents of sale
deed and returned a finding that since Rudha has sold 1/3rd part of entire
land and without any disclosure of any other land, therefore, it was held
that there was a prior partition as well as boundaries of the disputed land
also confirms that partition has taken place, therefore, it was finding of
fact and not on law, therefore, an argument that question of law arose in
regard to misrepresentation of sale deed does not hold good and is
accordingly rejected.
22
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
35. Now the last issue is regarding finding of oral family partition that
whether it was palpably perverse so much as that it involves
interpretation of law.
36. In this regard Court takes note of a judgment passed by this Court in
Sheikh Mohd.Murtuza Vs. Sheikh Wajid Ali, 2025:AHC:208350. Its
relevant paragraph no. 14 is reproduced hereinafter:-
“१४. 'विधि के सारवान् प्रश्न' की व्याख्या सिविल प्रक्रिया संहिता की धारा
१०० में नहीं की गयी है। इसकी व्याख्या उच्चतम न्यायालय द्वारा कई निर्णयों में
की गई है। ऐसा ही एक निर्णय चन्द्रभान (मृत) द्वारा विधिक प्रतिनिधी व अऩ्य
बनाम सरस्वती व अन्य, २ 0 २२ एस.सी.सी. आनलाईन एस.सी. १२७३ है,
जहाँ उच्चतम न्यायालय के द्वारा पूर्व में पारित चुन्नी लाल वी मेहता ऐ ंड सन्स लि.
प्रति द सेनच्युरी स्पिनंग एण्ड मैन्यूफैक्चरिंग कम्पनी लिं., १९६२ एस.सी.सी.
आनलाईन एस.सी. ५७ व हीरो विनोथ (अवयस्क) प्रति शेषामल, (२ 00 ६)५
एस.सी.सी. ५४५ के प्रकरणों में पारित निर्णयों को संदर्भित किया और
अनुसरण भी किया। उक्त के महत्वपूर्ण अंश को हिन्दी अनुवाद सहित निम्न
उल्लेखित किया जा रहै हैः-
“28. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta and Sons (supra), this Court
agreed with and approved a Full Bench judgment of the
Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony
Veeraju and Ors.5 which laid down the principles for
deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial
question of law.
29. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, this Court followed Sir
Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons (supra) and other judgments and
summarized the tests to find out whether a given set of
questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial
questions of law.
30. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in
Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out herein below:
"21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as
occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not
defined in the Code. The word substantial, as
qualifying "question of law", means of having
substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important
or considerable. It is to be understood
contradistinction with technical, of no substance or
consequence, or as something in academic merely.
However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not
to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law"
by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has
been done in many other provisions such as Section
109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the
23
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
Constitution. The substantial question of law on
which a second appeal shall be heard need not
necessarily be a substantial question of law of general
importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta 551A 235:
AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase "substantial question of
law" as it was employed in the last clause of the then
existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the
Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration
and their Lordships held that it did not mean a
substantial question of general importance but a
substantial question of law which was involved in the
case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549:
AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed
agreement with the following view taken by a Full
Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi
Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [AIR 1951 Mad 969:
(1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)]: (Sir Chunilal case [1962
Supp (3) SCR 549: AIR 1962 SC 1314], SCR p. 557)
"When a question of law is fairly arguable, where
there is room for difference of opinion on it or where
the Court thought it necessary to deal with that
question at some length and discuss alternative views,
then the question would be a substantial question of
law. On the other hand if the question was practically
covered by the decision of the highest court or if the
general principles to be applied in determining the
question are well settled and the only question was of
applying those principles to the particular fact of the
case it would not be a substantial question of law."
The proper test for determining whether a question of law
raised in the case is substantial would be, whether it is of
general public importance or whether it directly and
substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so,
whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is
not finally settled by this Court. If the question is settled by
the highest court or the general principles to be applied in
determining the question are well settled and there is a mere
question of applying those principles or the question raised
is palpably absurd, the question would not be a substantial
question of law.
उपरोक्त का हिन्दी अनुवाद निम्न हैः-
"२८. सर चुन्नीलाल बनाम मेहता एं ड संस (पूर्व में उल्लेखित) के मामले
में, यह न्यायालय रिम्मलपुडी सुब्बा राव बनाम नूनी वीरजू एवं अन्य में
मद्रास उच्च न्यायालय की पूर्ण पीठ के निर्णय से सहमत हुआ और उसे
अनुमोदित किया, जिसमें यह निर्णय करने के सिद्धांत निर्धारित किए गए
थे कि कब 'विधि का प्रश्न' एक 'विधि का सारवान प्रश्न' बन जाता है।
24
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
२९. हीरो विनोथ बनाम शेषम्मल के प्रकरण में, इस न्यायालय ने सर
चुन्नीलाल बनाम मेहता एं ड संस (पूर्व में उल्लेखित) और अन्य निर्णयों का
अनुसरण किया और सूत्रों को संक्षेपित किया कि क्या संदर्भित विधि के
प्रश्न मात्र विधि के प्रश्न थे या विधि के सारवान प्रश्न थे।
३०. हीरो विनोद (पूर्व में उल्लेखित) मामले में इस न्यायालय के निर्णय के
प्रासंगिक प्रस्तर निम्न हैं:
"२१. संशोधित धारा १०० सीपीसी में प्रयुक्त वाक्यांश "विधि
का सारवान प्रश्न" को संहिता में परिभाषित नहीं किया गया है।
"विधि के प्रश्न" को योग्य बनाने के लिए सारवान शब्द का अर्थ है
सारभूत, आवश्यक, वास्तविक, उचित मूल्यवान, महत्वपूर्ण या
विचारणीय। इसे तकनीकी, सारहीन या परिणामहीन, या मात्र
शैक्षणिक के विपरीत समझा जाना चाहिए। हालाँकि, यह स्पष्ट है
कि विधायिका ने "सामान्य महत्व के" शब्दों को जोड़कर "विधि
के सारवान प्रश्न" के दायरे को परिभाषित नहीं करने का विकल्प
चुना है, जैसा कि संहिता की धारा १०९ या संविधान के
अनुच्छे द १३३(१)(क) जैसे कई अन्य प्रावधानों में किया गया
है। जिस विधि के सारवान प्रश्न पर द्वितीय अपील की सुनवाई की
जाएगी, वह आवश्यक रूप से सामान्य महत्व विधि का सारवान
प्रश्न नहीं होना चाहिए। गुरन दित्ता बनाम राम दित्ता ५५ IA
२३५: AIR १९२८ PC १७२] में, " विधि का सारवान प्रश्न"
वाक्यांश, जैसा कि तत्कालीन विद्यमान धारा १०० सी.पी.सी.
(जिसे बाद में संशोधन अधिनियम, १९७३ द्वारा हटा दिया गया)
के अंतिम खंड में प्रयुक्त किया गया था, जिस पर विचार हुआ
और माननीयों ने माना कि इसका अर्थ सामान्य महत्व का
सारवान प्रश्न नहीं, बल्कि एक सारवान विधि का प्रश्न था जो
प्रकरण से संबंधित था। सर चुन्नीलाल के प्रकरण में [१९६२ सप
(३) एससीआर ५४९: एआईआर १९६२ एससी १३१४]
संविधान पीठ ने रिम्मलपुडी सुब्बा राव बनाम नूनी वीरराजू
[एआईआर १९५१ मैड ९६९: (१९५१) २ एमएलजे २२२
(एफबी)] में मद्रास उच्च न्यायालय की पूर्ण पीठ द्वारा लिए गए
निम्नलिखित दृष्टिकोण से सहमति व्यक्त की: (सर चुन्नीलाल
मामला [१९६२ सप (३) एससीआर ५४९ एआईआर १९६२
एससी १३१४], एससीआर पृष्ठ ५५७)
"जब कोई विधि का प्रश्न उचित रूप से तर्क -योग्य हो, जहाँ उस
पर मतभेद की संभावना हो या जहाँ न्यायालय ने उस प्रश्न पर
विस्तार से विचार करना और वैकल्पिक विचारों पर चर्चा करना
आवश्यक समझा हो, तब वह प्रश्न, विधि का सारवान प्रश्न होगा।
दस ू री ओर, यदि वह प्रश्न, व्यावहारिक रूप से सर्वोच्च न्यायालय
के निर्णय से आच्छादित हो या यदि प्रश्न के निर्धारण में लागू किए
जाने वाले सामान्य सिद्धांत अच्छी तरह से स्थापित हों और
केवल उन सिद्धांतों को प्रकरण के विशेष तथ्य पर लागू करने का
प्रश्न हो, तो वह विधि का सारवान प्रश्न नहीं होगा।"
३१. किसी प्रकरण में संदर्भित प्रश्न, एक विधि का सारवान प्रश्न है या
नहीं, यह निर्धारित करने का उचित परीक्षण यह होगा कि क्या यह
सर्वसाधारण के लिए महत्वपूर्ण है या वह पक्षकारों के अधिकारों को
प्रत्यक्ष और मूलतः प्रभावित करता है, और यदि ऐसा है, तो क्या यह इस
अर्थ में एक अनिर्णीत प्रश्न है कि इस न्यायालय द्वारा इसका अंतिम रूप
से निपटारा नहीं किया गया है। यदि प्रश्न उच्चतम न्यायालय द्वारा
25
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
निर्धारित किया जा चुका हो या प्रश्न के निर्धारण में लागू किए जाने वाले
सामान्य सिद्धांत सुस्थापित हैं और उन सिद्धांतों को लागू करने का मात्र
प्रश्न है या संदर्भित प्रश्न स्पष्टतः बेतुका है, तो वह प्रश्न विधि का सारवान
प्रश्न नहीं होगा।”
(हिन्दी अनुवाद न्यायालय द्वारा किया गया है)”
37. The claim of the plaintiffs is based on an oral partition and that it was
acted upon. There was a simple denial on behalf of defendants i.e.
appellants, therefore, it has to be considered that on basis of
documentary as well as oral evidence, whether any such oral partition
took place or not and whether it was acted upon or not.
38. Learned Trial Court has rejected evidence of sale deed only on a
ground that no such oral partition was mentioned in the sale deed as well
as contents of sale deed does not give a basis that there was an oral
partition, whereas the First Appellate Court has considered contents of
sale deed and its effect thereof in detail.
39. The Boundaries of the land in dispute mentioned in the sale deed as
well as effect of oral evidence also makes clear that an oral partition took
place, therefore, it was a case whether on basis of evidence, the view
taken by the First Appellate Court was a possible view or not. The
possible view was based on correct appreciation of oral as well as
documentary evidence, therefore, in light of a judgment passed in
Dilbagrai Punjabi (supra), on which learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant has placed reliance has failed to show any error on such
magnitude which could give rise to a substantial question of law in
present case of reversal.
40. The judgment passed by the First Appellate Court cannot be said to
be manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law. It was
also not a case where dealing with evidence was patently, illegal or
settled legal provisions were absolutely ignored as well as it was not a
case where finding returned by the First Appellate Court was based on
no evidence i.e. no perversity was shown. In this regard Court takes note
26
SAPL No. - 556 of 1982
of Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi & Ors, 2016 (3) SCC 78 and its relevant
paragraphs nos.8,9 and 10 are reproduced hereinafter:
“ 8. "Perversity" has been the subject-matter of umpteen number
of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several
decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section
96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts
unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse.
9. In Krishnan v. Backiam, (2007) 12 SCC 190, it has been held at
para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93)
"11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under
Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in
second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section
96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court
can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said
findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that
case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the
High Court to that effect."
10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, (2010) 15 SCC 530, at para
10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532)
"It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the
finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the
final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This
being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not
justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first
appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default
committed by the latter in payment of rent."
41. Outcome of above discussion is that question of law proposed by
learned Senior Counsel does not pass the test of it being a substantial
question of law for the purpose of Section 100 C.P.C., accordingly,
present Second Appeal is dismissed.
(Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.)
September 14, 2026
SB
Digitally signed by :-
SANDEEP BHATTACHARYA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Checking your session…