SURESH SHAH SISODIYAversusJAI PRAKASH YADAV

                                                                        AFR

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                    S.C.C. REVISION No. - 16 of 2026

Suresh Shah Sisodiya
                                                        …..Revisionist(s)

                                Versus

Jai Prakash Yadav
                                                    …..Opposite Party(s)


Counsel for Revisionist(s)        : Devendra Dahma
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)     : Shishir Kumar Tiwari


Court No. - 35


            HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.


      Heard Sri Devendra Dahma, learned counsel for the revisionist
and Sri Shishir Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the opposite party.

2.    The present S.C.C. Revision under Section 25 of the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 has been preferred by the revisionist–
plaintiff assailing the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2025 passed by
the Judge, Small Cause Court/Additional District Judge, Court No.1,
Etah in S.C.C. Suit No.11 of 2010, whereby the suit instituted for
ejectment, arrears of rent, possession and damages has been dismissed.
                                       2
                                                      SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

3.    Briefly stated, the case of the revisionist–plaintiff is that he
became owner/landlord of the disputed tenanted premises on 07.11.2008
by virtue of a registered lease deed executed by the managers of the
temple property, namely Shri Raj Rajeshwar Maharaj Mahadev Ji
Maharaj Virajman Mandir. It is asserted that the opposite party was
already occupying the premises as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.3,500
and, upon execution of the said lease deed, the revisionist stepped into
the shoes of the erstwhile landlord.

4.    It is further pleaded that the tenant committed default in payment
of rent, whereafter notices terminating the tenancy were duly issued.
Despite service thereof, the tenant failed to vacate the premises or clear
the arrears, compelling the revisionist to institute S.C.C. Suit No. 11 of
2010 seeking eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use
and occupation.

5.    The defendant–tenant contested the suit by specifically denying
the existence of any relationship of landlord and tenant with the
revisionist. He set up an independent and competing chain of title
through one Shishupal Singh, supported by registered sale deeds tracing
back to earlier transactions, and asserted that he continued to be tenant
under the said Shishupal Singh and not under the plaintiff.

6.    The trial court, upon appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, recorded findings to the effect that the plaintiff
failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, that two rival
chains of title had been set up by the parties, and that the dispute
regarding title was serious, substantial and bona fide in nature. However,
despite recording such findings, the trial court did not exercise
jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
1887 for return of the plaint, and instead proceeded to dismiss the suit on
merits.

7.    Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the trial court has
committed a manifest error of jurisdiction in dismissing the suit on
merits despite having itself recorded a categorical finding that a serious
                                      3
                                                       SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

and bona fide dispute regarding title exists between the parties. It is
contended that once the trial court found two rival and competing chains
of title requiring adjudication upon detailed evidence, the jurisdiction of
the Small Cause Court stood circumscribed by Section 23 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, and the only course open to it
in law was to return the plaint for presentation before a court of
competent regular jurisdiction.

8.    It is further urged that Section 23 does not contemplate dismissal
of the suit in such circumstances, but is specifically designed to prevent
summary adjudication of complex title disputes by a court lacking
jurisdiction to finally determine the same. The trial court, by proceeding
to    decide      the    matter      on     merits,     has     failed     to
exercise jurisdiction vested in it and has caused serious prejudice to the
revisionist. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment is
legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside with a direction for return
of the plaint in accordance with law.

9.    Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, while not
admitting the stand taken by the revisionist in its entirety, has not
disputed the legal position with regard to the scope and ambit of Section
23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887. It has also not been
controverted on behalf of the respondents that where the Court of Small
Causes forms an opinion that adjudication of the dispute would
necessarily involve determination of complex and substantial questions
relating to title, the proper course in law would be to return the plaint for
presentation before a court of competent jurisdiction rather than to
proceed to decide the suit finally on merits.

10.   Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The
principal question which arises for consideration in the present revision
is whether, after having recorded a finding that the controversy between
the parties involved a serious, substantial and bona fide question of title
so as to attract Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
1887, the court below was justified in proceeding to dismiss the suit on
                                       4
                                                         SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

merits, or whether the only course open to it in law was to return the
plaint for presentation before a court of competent jurisdiction.

11.    In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be apposite to
notice Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, which
reads as under:

      “23. Return of plaints in suits involving questions of title.—(1)
      Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing portion of this Act,
      when the right of a plaintiff and the relief claimed by him in a
      Court of Small Causes depend upon the proof or disproof of a title
      to immovable property or other title which such a Court cannot
      finally determine, the court may at any stage of the proceedings
      return the plaint to be presented to a Court having jurisdiction to
      determine the title.

      (2) When a Court returns a plaint under sub-section (1), it shall
      comply with the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 57
      of the Code of Civil Procedure and make such order with respect to
      costs as it deems just, and the Court shall, for the purposes of the
      Limitation Act, 1877 be deemed to have been unable to entertain
      the suit by reason of a cause of a nature like to that of defect of
      jurisdiction.”

12.    The scope of Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act,
1887 assumes significance in determining whether a suit instituted
before a Court of Small Causes ought to be tried on merits or returned
for presentation before a regular Civil Court. The provision embodies a
jurisdictional limitation on the summary powers of the Small Cause
Court and operates as a mechanism to ensure that disputes requiring final
adjudication of title are not decided in a forum not competent to
conclusively determine such issues. It thus preserves the distinction
between the summary jurisdiction exercised in rent and eviction matters
and the plenary jurisdiction vested in ordinary Civil Courts for
adjudication of complex proprietary disputes. In essence, it reserves
substantial questions of title and proprietary rights for courts of regular
civil jurisdiction equipped to undertake a full-fledged trial.
                                       5
                                                         SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

13.     A careful reading of the provision shows that though it employs
the expression “may”, return of plaint is not to be understood as an
unguided discretion. The discretion conferred is judicial in nature and
has to be exercised upon examination of the real controversy between
the parties. Only where the plaintiff’s right to relief is substantially
dependent upon proof or disproof of title incapable of final
determination by the Small Cause Court does the occasion arise for
invoking Section 23.

14.     It is equally well settled that a mere denial of title by the defendant
does not ipso facto attract Section 23. In suits for eviction and arrears of
rent, the principal issue ordinarily is the existence of the jural
relationship of landlord and tenant and not adjudication of absolute title.
For deciding such relationship, the Small Cause Court is competent to
incidentally examine questions of title to a limited extent. Such
incidental scrutiny does not amount to a final declaration of ownership.

15.     In Shamim Akhtar v. Iqbal Ahmad1, the Supreme Court has
clarified that a Court of Small Causes can incidentally examine
questions of title for the limited purpose of determining the existence of
landlord–tenant relationship, and that such incidental findings do not
amount to final adjudication. It was further held that the power under
Section 23 is to be exercised only where the relief claimed is inseparably
dependent upon final determination of title, and that a tenant cannot
avoid eviction proceedings merely by denying the landlord’s title or
raising collateral disputes.

16.     Section 23 embodies the principle that jurisdiction is determined
not by the ingenuity of pleadings, but by the true nature of the relief
claimed. A defendant cannot, by merely raising a plea of title, convert a
summary eviction proceeding into a regular title suit. The provision
must, therefore, be construed in a manner that prevents procedural
subversion while at the same time preserving the legislative object of
providing a speedy remedy in landlord–tenant disputes.
1   (2000) 8 SCC 123
                                     6
                                                       SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

17.     Thus, a tenant cannot be permitted to frustrate summary
proceedings by setting up a bald, illusory or superficial dispute of title.
Equally, where the controversy is genuine, substantial and supported by
material disclosing competing claims of ownership going to the very
root of the landlord–tenant relationship, the Court must recognise the
limits of its summary jurisdiction and adopt the course contemplated by
law.

18.     The jurisprudence underlying Section 23 is intended to maintain a
balance between the expeditious disposal of tenancy disputes and the full
adjudication of serious civil rights before a competent forum. The law
permits incidental examination of title so as to avoid delay in summary
proceedings, yet simultaneously recognises that complex and bona fide
disputes involving competing proprietary claims ought to be adjudicated
by a competent civil court. The distinction between incidental
examination of title and final adjudication of title is, therefore, crucial.
While the former is permissible to the limited extent necessary for
determining whether a landlord–tenant relationship exists, the latter lies
outside the normal province of the Court of Small Causes.

19.     The discretionary nature of Section 23 is rooted in the principle
that such discretion must be exercised judicially. Where the dispute of
title is real, substantial and goes to the root of the matter, and is
incapable of being decided in a summary manner, the Court must decline
to adjudicate the suit on merits. As explained by the Supreme Court in
Budhu Mal v. Mahabir Prasad2, the power to return the plaint is to be
exercised in those cases where doing so is necessary to ensure complete
justice between the parties and to avoid prejudice arising from
adjudication by an inappropriate forum.

20.     The legal position governing Section 23 of the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887 is well settled. A mere plea of title raised by the
defendant does not, by itself, oust the jurisdiction of the Court of Small
Causes, which may proceed where such plea is unsubstantial or lacking
2   (1988) 4 SCC 194
                                     7
                                                      SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

bona fides. However, where the dispute of title is real, substantial,
supported by material on record, and goes to the root of the landlord–
tenant relationship, the Court must examine whether the controversy can
be satisfactorily decided within the limits of its summary jurisdiction. If
adjudication of the plaintiff’s right and relief necessarily depends upon
determination of a substantial and intricate question of title, the proper
and judicious course would be to return the plaint for presentation before
the competent civil court.

21.   A Court of Small Causes is intended to adjudicate suits of a
comparatively simple nature. Therefore, where determination of the
rights of parties involves an intricate and substantial question of title,
such disputes are more appropriately tried by a regular Civil Court.
Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is specifically
designed to meet such situations by empowering the Court to return the
plaint where adjudication of the plaintiff’s right depends upon proof or
disproof of title which cannot be satisfactorily decided in summary
proceedings. The object of the provision is to ensure that disputes
involving serious questions of title, requiring full-fledged evidence and
carrying consequences of finality, are determined by a competent court
of ordinary civil jurisdiction.

22.   Once such a conclusion is reached, the Court is required to refrain
from deciding the suit on merits and to adopt the course statutorily
prescribed, namely, return of the plaint for presentation before a
competent civil court. Section 23 does not contemplate dismissal of the
suit in such circumstances, for that would defeat the very purpose of the
provision and may seriously prejudice the rights of the parties by
foreclosing adjudication before the proper forum.

23.   While Section 23 is couched in discretionary terms and does not
render return of the plaint mandatory in every case, such discretion must
be exercised judiciously and upon sound principles. Where the dispute of
title is bona fide, substantial and incapable of summary adjudication, it
would be a proper and prudent exercise of jurisdiction for the Court of
                                                                       8
                                                                                        SCCR No. - 16 of 2026

                            Small Causes to return the plaint for presentation before the competent
                            civil court rather than proceed to determine the controversy within the
                            confines of its limited summary jurisdiction.

                            24.         In the present case, the trial court has itself recorded a categorical
                            finding that there exist two competing chains of title and that the dispute
                            is serious, substantial and bona fide in nature. Having reached such a
                            conclusion, it ought to have exercised jurisdiction under Section 23 of
                            the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 by returning the plaint for
                            presentation before the competent civil court.

                            25.         The dismissal of the suit on merits, despite such findings, amounts
                            to a jurisdictional error, inasmuch as the court below has failed to
                            exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law and, at the same time,
                            assumed jurisdiction to decide issues falling beyond the permissible
                            scope of its summary powers.

                            26.         In the result, the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2025 passed by
                            the Judge, Small Cause Court/Additional District Judge, Court No. 1,
                            Etah in S.C.C. Suit No.11 of 2010 are hereby set aside. The Judge, Small
                            Causes is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation
                            before the appropriate court, as contemplated under Section 23 of the
                            Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.

                            27.         The revision is, accordingly, allowed.


                                                                     (Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)

                            May 05, 2026
                            Neetu-RKK/-




Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad