LALIT CHATURVEDIversusSANTOSHI LAL CHATURVEDI ADOPTED AND 4 OTHERS

        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                   S.C.C. REVISION No. - 57 of 2026

Lalit Chaturvedi
                                                          …..Revisionist(s)

                                Versus

Santoshi Lal Chaturvedi Adopted and 4 others
                                                      …..Opposite Party(s)


Counsel for Revisionist(s)         : Rama Goel Bansal, Shalini Goel
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)      :


AFR
Court No. - 35

            HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

      Heard Ms Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the
revisionist and perused the record.

2.    The present revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887, calls in question the order dated 02.05.2026
passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court in J.S.C.C. Suit No.3
of 2016, whereby Application No. 59-C, filed by the applicant under
Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been rejected.

3.    The facts of the case, in brief, as reflected from the material placed
on record, are set out hereinbelow.

4.    The aforesaid suit has been instituted by Santosh Lal against
Sumit Chaturvedi on the basis of an asserted relationship of landlord and
tenant in respect of the property in dispute. The defendant, in his written
statement, has disputed the plaintiff’s status as landlord and has, in
substance, asserted that the property belongs to Thakur Mahadev Ji
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Hanuman Ji. The applicant was not impleaded as a party to the suit. He
subsequently moved Application No. 59-C under Order I Rule 10 CPC,
seeking his impleadment on the ground that he is the present
Shebait/Mohatmim of the aforesaid deities and, in such representative
capacity, is entitled to represent their interest in the property in dispute.

5.     The applicant does not claim the property in his personal or
individual capacity. His case, as subsequently clarified, is that the
property belongs to the deity and that he claims only in a representative
capacity as the person presently entrusted with the management and
affairs of the deity and its property. In support of the status asserted by
him,    reliance     has    been     placed,     inter    alia,   upon      the
Shebaitnama/Supurdginama dated 30.11.2015, certain rent receipts and
the judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No. 110 of 1985.
According to the applicant, these documents evidence the existence of
the religious endowment, the connection asserted between the property
and the deity, and the basis of his claimed representative capacity and,
therefore, demonstrate the necessity of his presence for the complete and
effective adjudication of the pending suit.

6.     The learned Trial Court, however, rejected the application. It was
of the view that impleadment of the applicant would bring into
consideration questions relating to the ownership and character of the
property and, more particularly, the applicant’s authority to represent the
deity, whereas the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes is confined
to matters falling within its limited statutory jurisdiction. The learned
Trial Court further concluded that the applicant was neither a necessary
nor a proper party to the dispute pending between the plaintiff and the
defendant.

7.     Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the learned Trial
Court has proceeded on an erroneous understanding of the nature of the
claim set up by the applicant. It is contended that the applicant does not
assert any personal or proprietary title in the suit property and that the
entire basis of the application is the assertion that the property belongs to
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the deity and that the applicant is its present Shebait/Mohatmin and,
consequently, the person competent to represent it. It is urged that a
Hindu deity is a juristic person capable of holding property and that
where property belonging to a deity forms the subject matter of
litigation, the person lawfully representing the deity cannot be excluded
merely because the proceedings are pending before a Court of limited
jurisdiction.
8.     Learned       counsel       further      submits          that   the
Shebaitnama/Supurdginama dated 30.11.2015, the rent receipts and the
judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No. 110 of 1985 constitute
sufficient material, at least for the limited purpose of considering an
application under Order I Rule 10 CPC, to establish the applicant’s
connection with the deity and its property. It is urged that, while
considering impleadment, the Court is not required to finally determine
either the title of the deity or the ultimate rights of the applicant. The
enquiry, according to learned counsel, is confined to the question
whether the presence of the applicant would assist the Court in
effectually and completely adjudicating upon the controversy involved in
the suit.
9.     Reliance has also been placed upon the clarification contained in
the supplementary affidavit that the applicant claims no personal or
proprietary interest in the suit property and asserts rights only in a
representative capacity on behalf of the deity. It is submitted that the
application has, therefore, been erroneously understood as one founded
upon an independent claim of ownership, whereas the real controversy
concerns property asserted to belong to the deity and the right of its
representative to participate in proceedings relating thereto.
10.    It has further been submitted that the applicant’s status as
Shebait/Mohatmin is not in dispute. In support of the said submission,
learned counsel has referred to the relevant revenue records, wherein the
applicant’s connection with and representative capacity in respect of the
deity is stated to be reflected. Reliance has also been placed upon the
written statement of the defendant, particularly the averment that the
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defendant is a tenant under the deity. According to learned counsel, the
said assertion assumes significance, inasmuch as the defendant himself
traces the tenancy to the deity and does not dispute the deity as the
landlord.
11.   Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the proceedings in
Original Suit No. 1074 of 2017, brought on record by way of a
supplementary affidavit. It is submitted that the said suit, instituted
between Abhishek Chaturvedi as Shebait, and Lalit Chaturvedi, was
ultimately disposed of in terms of a compromise entered into between
them. According to learned counsel, the said proceedings and the
compromise decree, read together with the Supurdginama dated
30.11.2015 and the other documents relied upon by the applicant,
demonstrate the continuity of management and representative authority
concerning the deity and support the applicant’s assertion that he is the
present Shebait/Mohatmin. It is submitted that the subsequent material
has been placed on record only to clarify and substantiate the chain of
authority relied upon by the applicant and ought to be taken into
consideration while examining the prayer for impleadment.
12.   Learned counsel has, therefore, submitted that the material placed
on record, including the Shebaitnama/Supurdginama, rent receipts,
revenue records, the judgment and decree in Original Suit No. 110 of
1985 and, as subsequently brought on record, the proceedings and
compromise decree in Original Suit No. 1074 of 2017, establishes a
sufficient nexus between the applicant, the deity and the property in
dispute. It is urged that the applicant does not seek impleadment on the
basis of any independent or rival claim to ownership, but only in his
capacity as the person representing the deity, whose property is asserted
to be the subject matter of the tenancy and the present proceedings.
13.   Learned counsel has accordingly submitted that once the property
is asserted to belong to the deity, the applicant’s representative capacity
as Shebait/Mohatmin is supported by the material brought on record and
the defendant himself claims to be a tenant under the deity, the presence
of the applicant becomes necessary for the effective and complete
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adjudication of the controversy. It is urged that the application under
Order I Rule 10 CPC ought to have been examined from the standpoint
of the applicant’s representative capacity and not as an application
founded upon a claim of personal ownership over the suit property.
14.   The submissions advanced on behalf of the applicant give rise to
certain questions which require determination before the prayer for
impleadment can be considered. The issue is not merely whether the
applicant has produced material indicating his association with the deity
or the property in dispute. The questions that arise concern, principally,
the scope and application of Order I Rule 10 CPC in a proceeding before
a Court of Small Causes; the extent to which the said provision can
operate within the limited statutory jurisdiction of such Court; and
whether a person claiming to represent a deity can be impleaded without
the Court being required to undertake an adjudication of substantive
questions concerning his representative authority, where such questions
do not form part of the controversy otherwise requiring determination in
the pending suit.
15.   The following questions arise for consideration and are answered
in the subsequent part of this judgment:

      (i) Whether the power conferred by Order I Rule 10 CPC, though
      intended to facilitate the effective and complete adjudication of the
      controversy before the Court, can be exercised so as to introduce
      or require determination of a substantive controversy which lies
      beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by the governing
      statute, or whether the exercise of such procedural power is
      necessarily subject to the limits of that jurisdiction;

      (ii) What is the test for determining whether a person is a
      necessary or proper party to a suit, and whether an asserted
      interest in the subject-matter of the suit, by itself, is sufficient to
      warrant impleadment where the controversy already before the
      Court can be effectively and completely adjudicated in the absence
      of such person;
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(iii) What is the extent to which a Court of Small Causes may
notice or incidentally consider a question relating to title or other
matters outside its ordinary field of adjudication for the purpose of
deciding the dispute within its limited jurisdiction, and whether
Order I Rule 10 CPC can be invoked in a manner which requires
such Court to undertake a substantive adjudication of title,
dedication, vesting, succession or representative authority, when
such adjudication is not necessary for determination of the
landlord-tenant controversy;

(iv) Whether the juristic personality of a deity and the assertion
that the property in dispute belongs to the deity are, by
themselves, sufficient to establish the authority of an individual
seeking impleadment to represent the deity, or whether the
entitlement of such individual to act as Shebait, Mohatmin or
other representative is a distinct legal question requiring
independent determination;

(v) Where a person claiming representative capacity relies upon
documents such as a Shebaitnama or Supurdginama, rent receipts,
revenue records or judgments and decrees of civil courts, whether
such material can be treated as sufficient, for the limited purpose
of impleadment, without requiring the Small Cause Court to
determine antecedent questions relating to the source, continuity,
succession or validity of the authority under which such person
claims to represent the deity; and

(vi) Whether, having regard to the nature of the relief sought in the
pending suit and the controversy within the jurisdiction of the
Small Cause Court, the presence of the person seeking
impleadment is indispensable for the passing of an effective
decree or materially necessary for the complete adjudication of the
controversy, and whether rejection of such application, in the
absence of such necessity, operates to prejudice or determine any
substantive right of the claimant or of the deity.
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16.   The aforesaid questions are interrelated, yet distinct, and are best
considered in a sequential manner. The Court shall first examine the
scope and object of Order I Rule 10 CPC and the principles governing
the distinction between a necessary and a proper party. It shall then
consider the extent to which that procedural provision operates within
the limited statutory jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes and the
extent, if any, to which questions falling outside that jurisdiction may be
noticed incidentally. The principles so determined shall thereafter be
applied to the representative status asserted by the applicant and to the
documents relied upon in support thereof, so as to determine whether his
presence is necessary or proper for adjudication of the controversy in the
pending suit. The matter shall accordingly be considered in the aforesaid
sequence.

17.   Order I Rule 10 CPC is essentially a procedural and facilitative
provision. It enables the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike
out a party improperly joined or to add a person who ought to have been
joined, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary, in order to
enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle
all the questions involved in the suit. The object of the provision is to
secure effective adjudication of the controversy before the Court, to
avoid multiplicity of proceedings where the requirements of the rule are
otherwise satisfied, and to ensure that the decree ultimately passed is
effective in relation to the questions which the Court is competent to
determine.
18.   The provision does not, however, confer upon every person
asserting an interest in the subject-matter of the suit a substantive right to
insist upon his impleadment. The expressions “necessary party” and
“proper party” have a definite legal content. A person does not become a
necessary or proper party merely because he asserts an interest in the
property which is the subject-matter of the suit. The Court is required to
examine the nature of the controversy, the relief claimed, the questions
which arise for determination and whether the presence of the proposed
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party is indispensable or otherwise materially necessary for the effective
and complete adjudication of those questions.
19.     A necessary party is one without whom no effective decree can be
passed. A proper party, though not indispensable in that strict sense, is
one whose presence enables the Court to effectually and completely
adjudicate upon and settle the questions already involved in the suit. The
distinction is significant. The power under Order I Rule 10 CPC is
directed towards the effective adjudication of the controversy which is
before the Court. It is not intended to provide a procedural route by
which a person may introduce an independent substantive controversy
merely because that controversy relates to the same property.
20.     The Supreme Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal1, while examining
the principles governing necessary and proper parties, emphasised that
the question has to be determined with reference to the controversy
involved in the suit and the relief claimed therein. In Mumbai
International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels
Pvt. Ltd.2, the Supreme Court reiterated that the power under Order I
Rule 10 CPC is discretionary and is to be exercised to secure complete
and effective adjudication of the questions involved in the suit. The
principle was reiterated in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das3, wherein
the Supreme Court made it clear that a person cannot claim impleadment
merely by asserting an interest in the subject-matter unless his presence
satisfies the statutory test of a necessary or proper party.
21.     The principle assumes particular significance           where    the
proceeding is pending before a Court of limited jurisdiction. Order I
Rule 10 CPC is a procedural provision; it is not a source of jurisdiction.
It neither confers substantive jurisdiction upon a Court nor enlarges the
jurisdiction otherwise vested in it by statute. Consequently, the power to
add a party must necessarily operate within the substantive and statutory
limits of the jurisdiction of the forum. If the impleadment of a proposed
party would necessarily require the Court to adjudicate a substantive
controversy which the Court itself is not competent to determine, Order I
1   (2005) 6 SCC 733
2   (2010) 7 SCC 417
3   (2018) 2 SCC 352
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Rule 10 CPC cannot be invoked as a means of conferring such
jurisdiction indirectly.
22.   The proposition becomes particularly relevant in proceedings
before a Court of Small Causes. The jurisdiction of such Court is defined
and limited by the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 and the
statutory scheme governing the matters cognisable by it. The Court does
not possess the general jurisdiction of a Civil Court over every civil
dispute merely because a question arising in the suit may incidentally
touch upon title to the property. The nature and extent of the enquiry
which the Court may undertake must, therefore, be determined with
reference to the controversy falling within its statutory jurisdiction.
23.   At the same time, it would be incorrect to state, in absolute terms,
that a Court of Small Causes is precluded from noticing or considering
every question which may incidentally touch upon title. A question of
title may arise incidentally in a proceeding otherwise cognisable by such
Court and may, to the extent necessary, be considered for the purpose of
deciding the dispute within its jurisdiction. What the Court cannot do is
convert such incidental consideration into a substantive and conclusive
adjudication of complicated questions of title, dedication, vesting,
succession or representative authority where those questions do not
themselves fall for determination within the jurisdiction of the Court.
24.   Section 23 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 is also
relevant in this context. It contemplates a situation where the relief
claimed in a suit cognisable by the Court of Small Causes substantially
depends upon a question of title or upon another question of a nature
which the Small Cause Court ought not finally determine. The provision
thus reflects the legislative scheme that the limited jurisdiction of the
Small Cause Court is not to be transformed into the general jurisdiction
of a civil court merely because an issue touching title arises in the course
of the proceedings. Its significance, therefore, is not that it creates an
independent prohibition against impleadment, but that it reinforces the
statutory boundaries within which the Court is required to exercise its
jurisdiction.
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25.     Order I Rule 10 CPC must consequently be applied in the present
case within the jurisdictional framework of the Provincial Small Cause
Courts Act. The relevant enquiry is not merely whether the applicant can
demonstrate some connection between himself, the deity and the
property. The question is whether his presence is necessary or proper for
determination of the landlord-tenant controversy which is already before
the Court and whether he can be impleaded without requiring the Small
Cause Court to adjudicate a separate and substantive controversy
concerning his authority to represent the deity.
26.     The principle has also been recognised in the recent decision of
this Court in Murti Markandeshwar Ji Maharaj Gopal Ki Bagiya City
Jhansi v. Smt. Jyoti Gangwani and Another4. The decision proceeds on
the principle that where a statutory forum is constituted to determine a
defined category of disputes arising from the landlord-tenant
relationship, its jurisdiction cannot be enlarged, through an application
for impleadment, so as to enable adjudication of an independent
substantive controversy concerning ownership or title which the
statutory scheme does not entrust to it. The mere assertion by a proposed
party of an interest in the property does not, by itself, make such party
necessary or proper for the adjudication of the dispute within the
jurisdiction of the statutory forum.
27.     The principle is of general application to the exercise of power
under Order I Rule 10 CPC. Impleadment is intended to bring before the
Court persons whose presence is necessary or proper for determining the
controversy which the Court is otherwise competent to adjudicate. It
cannot be employed to enlarge the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
forum. Nor can a proposed party, by asserting an independent
substantive right in the property or a representative capacity founded
upon disputed questions of law and fact, compel the Court to undertake
an adjudication which lies outside the statutory limits of its jurisdiction.
The procedural power to add parties follows the jurisdiction of the
Court; it does not precede or enlarge it.


4   2026 SCC Online All 22417
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28.     The decision in Manish Bansal v. Jagdish Prasad Mittal and 7
Others5, is also instructive in the context of proceedings before the Court
of Small Causes. The principle emerging from the decision is that a mere
assertion of interest in the subject-matter, including an assertion founded
upon an independent claim concerning the property, does not by itself
make the claimant a necessary or proper party. The decisive
consideration remains whether the controversy already before the Small
Cause Court can be effectively and completely adjudicated in his
absence and whether his presence is required for the effective decree
which that Court is competent to pass.
29.     The aforesaid principles, when applied to the present case, require
a distinction between the alleged interest of the deity in the property and
the authority of the applicant to represent the deity. The two questions
cannot be conflated. Whether the property belongs to the deity and
whether the applicant is legally entitled to represent the deity are distinct
questions. Material which may raise a prima facie claim concerning the
former cannot, without more, establish the latter.
30.     The juristic status of a Hindu deity is well recognised. But
recognition of the deity as a juristic person capable of holding property
does not automatically identify every person who claims to act on its
behalf as its lawful representative. The existence of the juristic person
and the legal authority of a particular individual to represent that juristic
person are conceptually and legally distinct. For the purpose of Order I
Rule 10 CPC, therefore, it is not sufficient for the applicant merely to
assert that the property belongs to the deity. He must, for purposes of the
application, demonstrate a representative capacity upon which the Court
can act without requiring it to determine an independent and disputed
substantive controversy.
31.     The difficulty in the applicant’s case is not merely that his
representative status is denied by the plaintiff. The material placed on
record itself does not furnish an undisputed or self-evident source of the
authority claimed by the applicant. The applicant traces his status
through persons stated to have managed or represented the endowment,
5   2026 SCC Online All 25952
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whereas the material relating to Original Suit No. 110 of 1985 describes
Navneet Lal Chaturvedi as President of the Bhainseshwar Vyayam
Mandal Devatra Sampatti Prabandh Mandal, Maholi. The suit
proceedings also refer to Rajendra Nath Chaturvedi in that representative
capacity. On the other hand, the Shebaitnama dated 30.11.2015 proceeds
upon a description of Navneet Lal Chaturvedi in a different capacity
from that reflected in earlier proceedings.
32.       These circumstances are not being noticed for the purpose of
deciding, in the present proceedings, whether Navneet Lal Chaturvedi,
Rajendra Nath Chaturvedi or any other person was in law entitled to
manage or represent the endowment. Their relevance is confined to
demonstrating that the source of the applicant’s asserted representative
authority is neither admitted nor self-proving. The applicant traces his
status through a chain of authority which itself requires explanation and
legal validation. The question whether the person from whom the
applicant claims to derive his representative status possessed the
requisite authority, and whether that authority could validly devolve
upon or be transmitted to the applicant through the asserted chain, is a
substantive question requiring adjudication.
33.       That enquiry cannot be avoided merely by describing the applicant
as a Shebait. The description is the conclusion which the applicant asks
the Court to accept; it is not, by itself, the legal source from which the
representative authority flows. Where the very source, continuity or
succession of the office is disputed or requires examination, the Court
cannot treat the asserted representative capacity as an established fact
merely for the purpose of bringing the applicant on record and thereafter
permit the impleadment to become the vehicle for adjudicating that very
status.
34.       The Shebaitnama dated 30.11.2015 has also to be considered in
this context. The document is materially different from a document of
conveyance. On the applicant’s own case, it does not transfer ownership
of the property to him. It records or evidences an asserted arrangement
concerning       management,    seva-puja, administration and matters
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connected with the property claimed to belong to the deity. Its execution
may, therefore, be relied upon as evidence of an asserted arrangement for
management or service, but it cannot, by its own force, establish either
the title of the deity or the applicant’s succession to the office of Shebait.
35.   The legal efficacy of the document for the purpose asserted by the
applicant necessarily depends upon questions anterior to and
independent of the document itself. Those questions may include the
existence and nature of the dedication, the vesting of the property, the
legal source of the office of Shebait, the authority of the person who
executed or originated the arrangement, and the manner in which the
applicant is said to have acquired or succeeded to the asserted
representative status. The document may constitute evidence relevant to
those questions in an appropriate proceeding, but its existence cannot
itself dispense with their adjudication.
36.   The rent receipts likewise do not materially alter the position. At
the highest, they may constitute material relied upon to demonstrate an
assertion of management or receipt of rent on behalf of the deity. They
may be relevant evidence of the manner in which the property was being
dealt with or rent was being collected. They do not, however, without
adjudication of the underlying legal relationship, establish the applicant’s
status as Shebait or his authority to represent the deity in the pending
proceedings.
37.   Nor can the decree passed in Original Suit No. 110 of 1985,
merely by being produced before the Court, be treated as conclusively
establishing the applicant’s present representative status. The pleadings
and material relating to the said suit show that it was instituted for
injunction and proceeded on the assertion that the property in question
belonged to Shri Thakur Mahadev Ji Maharaj and that its management
was being undertaken by Shri Bhaisheshwar Vyayam Mandal Samiti.
The said suit may, therefore, indicate the manner in which the property
and its management were described in those proceedings, but it does not,
by itself, adjudicate who was legally entitled to hold the office of Shebait
or how that office was to devolve upon the applicant. In particular, the
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material does not disclose any adjudication recognising a third person as
Shebait from whom the applicant could derive a legally established right
of succession.
38.   The same distinction is material while considering Original Suit
No. 1074 of 2017, which was subsequently disposed of in terms of a
compromise entered into between Abhishek Chaturvedi, who claimed
himself to be the Shebait, and Lalit Chaturvedi. The compromise itself is
founded upon the alleged Shebaitnama stated to have been executed by
Abhishek Chaturvedi in favour of Lalit Chaturvedi. The fact that the suit
culminated in a compromise between the parties cannot, by itself, be
treated as establishing the applicant’s present status as Shebait. The
compromise records an arrangement between the persons who were
parties to that proceeding; it does not, by itself, amount to an
adjudication of the applicant’s present entitlement to the office of
Shebait or establish the source, continuity and legal efficacy of the
succession through which such entitlement is claimed. Those are distinct
questions, which cannot be treated as conclusively established merely on
the basis of the compromise.
39.   Significantly, neither Original Suit No. 110 of 1985 nor Original
Suit No. 1074 of 2017 furnishes an adjudication which conclusively
establishes the chain through which the applicant claims to have
acquired the office of Shebait. The former proceeds upon the assertion of
the deity’s ownership and the management of its affairs by the Samiti,
while the latter records a compromise between Abhishek Chaturvedi and
Lalit Chaturvedi. Neither proceeding, on the material placed before the
Court, determines the legal entitlement of a third person to succeed to or
hold the office of Shebait, nor does either proceeding adjudicate the
precise devolution of such office up to the applicant.
40.   This aspect is important because the applicant’s claim is not
merely that the deity owns the property; his case is that he possesses the
legal authority to represent the deity in the present proceedings. For that
purpose, it is necessary to distinguish between the existence of the
endowment and succession to its representative office. The former may
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be reflected in the proceedings in Original Suit No. 110 of 1985, but the
latter requires the source of the office, the entitlement of the persons
through whom the applicant traces his authority, and the manner in
which that authority is said to have devolved upon him to be established.
41.   The compromise decree in Original Suit No. 1074 of 2017 does
not materially remove that difficulty. A decree passed in terms of a
compromise records the consensual arrangement arrived at by the parties
and cannot, merely by reason of its existence, be treated as a judicial
determination of a question which was neither directly nor conclusively
adjudicated in that proceeding. The compromise may constitute material
relevant to the applicant’s asserted chain of authority, but it does not,
without adjudication of the underlying right to the office, convert that
asserted chain into an undisputed and self-proving Shebaitship.
42.   The position, therefore, is not that the proceedings in the aforesaid
suits are irrelevant. They may constitute pieces of evidence relied upon
by the applicant in support of the history of management of the
endowment. The limited question at this stage, however, is whether those
proceedings make the applicant’s representative status so clear and
undisputed that the Small Causes Court can act upon it without entering
into an independent enquiry. They do not. The material still leaves open
the source of the Shebaitship, the continuity of the office, the entitlement
of the intervening persons through whom the applicant traces his
authority, and the manner in which that office is said to have ultimately
devolved upon him.
43.   In other words, the existence of proceedings concerning the deity
or its property cannot be equated with an adjudication of the applicant’s
Shebaitship. A suit in which the property is described as belonging to
Shri Thakur Mahadev Ji Maharaj and its management is attributed to a
particular Samiti does not, without a specific adjudication to that effect,
establish succession to the office of Shebait. Equally, a compromise
between two individuals does not, in the absence of an adjudicated
determination of the underlying representative right, establish that a
subsequent claimant has acquired an indefeasible right to represent the
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deity. The chain of representative authority, therefore, continues to
remain a matter requiring examination and cannot be treated as an
admitted or self-evident fact for purposes of Order I Rule 10 CPC.
44.   It is, accordingly, unnecessary at this stage to pronounce upon the
ultimate validity of the applicant’s claim to Shebaitship. The limited
finding is that neither Original Suit No. 110 of 1985 nor Original Suit
No. 1074 of 2017 supplies an adjudicated and undisputed foundation for
that claim. The applicant may rely upon those proceedings, along with
the other documents produced by him, in an appropriate proceeding
where the source and succession of the office are directly in issue; but
those materials do not compel the Court, while considering the
application for impleadment, to accept the applicant’s present
representative status as an established legal fact.
45.   The clarification made by the applicant in the supplementary
affidavit that he does not assert any personal or proprietary interest in the
suit property but claims only in a representative capacity on behalf of the
deity may certainly be accepted for the limited purpose of understanding
the nature of his claim. That clarification, however, does not establish
the representative authority itself. The question is not whether the
applicant describes his claim as personal or representative; the question
is whether the representative capacity asserted by him is an existing and
legally recognisable status upon which the Small Causes Court can act
without undertaking an adjudication of disputed questions of dedication,
vesting, succession and authority. On the material placed before the
Court, including the compromise decree relied upon by the applicant,
that proposition cannot be accepted as an established premise for
impleadment.
46.   It is, therefore, important not to confuse the applicant’s assertion
that the deity owns the property with the applicant’s entitlement to
represent the deity. The former may constitute a substantive claim
concerning the property; the latter concerns the legal basis upon which a
particular person claims authority to represent the endowment. The
existence of the former does not automatically establish the latter.
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                                                         SCCR No. - 57 of 2026

47.   The argument that the deity itself is a necessary party must
consequently be tested against the statutory standard under Order I Rule
10 CPC. The relevant question is not merely whether the deity may have
an interest in the property. It is whether, in the suit as framed and in the
controversy which the Small Causes Court is competent to determine, an
effective decree can be passed without adjudicating the deity’s title and
whether the presence of the deity through a legally established
representative is indispensable for determining the rights and liabilities
which arise for consideration in the suit.
48.   If the suit can be effectively decreed or dismissed by determining
the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant concerning the
asserted landlord-tenant relationship, without finally determining the
title of the deity or the validity of the applicant’s claim to represent it, the
deity does not become a necessary party merely because a third person
asserts that the property belongs to it. The test under Order I Rule 10
CPC is not whether the proposed party can identify a possible interest in
the subject property; the test is whether the Court can effectively
adjudicate the controversy before it without that party.
49.   The position is reinforced by the limited nature of the decree
which the Small Causes Court is competent to pass. The Court is
concerned with the rights and liabilities arising within the controversy
falling under its jurisdiction. The adjudication of that controversy does
not, by itself, constitute a final determination of title against a stranger
who is not a party, particularly where such title is not required to be
finally adjudicated for granting or refusing the relief within the Court’s
jurisdiction. The possibility that a decree may have practical
consequences for a person claiming an interest in the property cannot,
without more, convert that person into a necessary party.
50.   The principle of dominus litis also operates in this context, though
it is not absolute. Ordinarily, a plaintiff is entitled to choose the persons
against whom relief is sought. That principle yields where the statutory
requirements relating to a necessary or proper party are satisfied. But the
exception cannot be transformed into a means of compelling a plaintiff
                                      18
                                                       SCCR No. - 57 of 2026

to litigate an independent substantive controversy against a person who
is not indispensable to the relief sought and whose asserted
representative status itself requires adjudication.
51.      The present case is materially different from a situation where the
representative capacity of the proposed party is admitted, conclusively
established, or otherwise forms an undisputed part of the existing
controversy. Here, recognition of the applicant as the person competent
to represent the deity would itself require an enquiry into the source,
continuity and legal validity of the authority asserted by him. The Court
would necessarily have to examine questions concerning the
endowment, the persons through whom the applicant traces his authority,
the capacity in which those persons acted, the legal efficacy of the
instrument relied upon for tracing that authority, and the effect of the
subsequent compromise decree. Such an enquiry would not merely
facilitate adjudication of the existing dispute; it would introduce a new
substantive field of adjudication.
52.      Order I Rule 10 CPC cannot be used in that manner. The
procedural power to add a party is intended to facilitate the adjudication
of the controversy; it cannot be invoked where the proposed
impleadment would first require the Court to determine whether the
proposed party possesses the legal status on the basis of which he seeks
to be impleaded, and that determination itself lies beyond the nature and
jurisdiction of the pending proceeding.
53.      The aforesaid principles may, therefore, be stated in the following
terms:

         (i) Order I Rule 10 CPC is a procedural and facilitative provision.
         It enables the Court to add a necessary or proper party for the
         effective and complete adjudication of the controversy before it,
         but it does not create an independent substantive right of
         impleadment and cannot enlarge the jurisdiction vested in the
         Court by the governing statute.

         (ii) The determination whether a person is a necessary or proper
         party is to be made with reference to the controversy actually
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                                                SCCR No. - 57 of 2026

involved in the suit and the relief which the Court is competent to
grant. A mere interest in the subject property does not, by itself,
make a person a necessary or proper party to the controversy, nor
does such an asserted interest, by itself, satisfy the requirements of
Order I Rule 10 CPC.

(iii) Where the proceeding is before a Court of Small Causes, the
power under Order I Rule 10 CPC must operate within the limited
statutory jurisdiction of that Court. The provision cannot be
employed to introduce a substantive controversy concerning title,
dedication, vesting, succession or representative authority which is
not necessary for determining the matter falling within the Court’s
jurisdiction. The fact that a question touching title may arise
incidentally does not authorise the Court to undertake its
substantive and conclusive adjudication where such adjudication
lies outside its jurisdiction.

(iv) The juristic personality of a deity and the legal authority of an
individual to represent that deity are distinct questions. The
assertion that the property belongs to a deity does not, by itself,
establish that the person seeking impleadment is the lawful
Shebait, Mohatmin or representative of that deity.

(v) Where the representative capacity asserted by a proposed party
itself depends upon adjudication of the existence of an
endowment, the nature of dedication, vesting of the property,
succession to the office, source of appointment or authority of the
person from whom the proposed party claims to derive his status,
such questions cannot ordinarily be introduced into a proceeding
of limited jurisdiction through an application under Order I Rule
10 CPC merely by describing the proposed party as a
representative of the deity.

(vi) A Shebaitnama, rent receipts or an earlier decree may
constitute material relevant to an independent substantive claim,
but their production does not, by itself, establish the present
                                     20
                                                      SCCR No. - 57 of 2026

      representative authority of the person seeking impleadment where
      the legal efficacy and source of that authority themselves require
      adjudication.

      (vii) The fact that a deity may have an interest in the property does
      not make the deity a necessary party in every proceeding
      concerning that property. The decisive consideration remains
      whether the relief sought can be effectively adjudicated without
      finally determining the deity’s title and whether the presence of
      the deity through the proposed representative is indispensable for
      the decree which the Court is competent to pass.

      (viii) The power of impleadment cannot be utilised to convert a
      proceeding confined to a landlord-tenant or other limited statutory
      controversy into a forum for adjudication of an independent
      substantive dispute concerning ownership, dedication, succession
      or representative authority.

      (ix) Rejection of an application for impleadment on these grounds
      does not amount to adjudication or extinguishment of the
      substantive rights claimed by the proposed party or the deity.
      Questions of title, dedication, management, succession and
      representative authority remain open to determination before the
      competent forum in appropriate proceedings.

54.   Tested on the aforesaid principles, the applicant has not
demonstrated that his presence is either indispensable or materially
necessary for the effective and complete adjudication of the controversy
pending before the learned Small Cause Court. The existing suit can be
decided by determining the controversy between the plaintiff and the
defendant within the jurisdiction vested in the Court. The applicant’s
presence would become necessary only if the Court were first required to
recognise his asserted representative status and thereafter adjudicate the
substantive questions underlying that status. Those are not questions
which the Court is required to determine for deciding the existing
landlord-tenant controversy.
                                       21
                                                      SCCR No. - 57 of 2026

55.   The conclusion is not founded upon a finding that the deity has no
interest in the property, nor upon a finding that the applicant is not the
Shebait. It is founded upon the more limited proposition that the
applicant’s asserted representative authority is itself not an admitted or
self-evident fact and that recognition of such authority would require an
adjudication of substantive questions which cannot be introduced into
the present Small Cause proceeding merely through an application under
Order I Rule 10 CPC.
56.   It is equally important that the rejection of the applicant’s prayer
for impleadment does not prejudice any substantive remedy otherwise
available to him or to the deity. If the applicant claims that the property
is dedicated to the deity, that the deity possesses a particular title or
interest therein, or that he is lawfully entitled to act as its Shebait,
Mohatmin or manager, such rights and claims may be asserted before the
competent forum in accordance with law. The present order merely
declines to bring those questions into a proceeding in which their
adjudication is neither necessary nor within the proper scope of the
jurisdiction exercised by the Court.
57.   The learned Trial Court, therefore, cannot be said to have
committed any error in law or material irregularity in rejecting
Application No. 59-C. Its conclusion that the applicant was not required
to be impleaded for the effective and complete adjudication of the
landlord-tenant controversy is consistent with the statutory scheme and
the principles governing Order I Rule 10 CPC. No infirmity warranting
interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of
the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 has been demonstrated.
58.   The scope of interference under Section 25 of the Provincial Small
Cause Courts Act, 1887 is limited. The revisional jurisdiction is not an
appellate jurisdiction permitting this Court to substitute its own view
merely because another view on the material may be conceivable.
Interference is justified where the Court of Small Causes has exercised
jurisdiction not vested in it by law, failed to exercise jurisdiction so
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                            vested, or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material
                            irregularity. The impugned order discloses none of these infirmities.
                            59.         For the reasons recorded above, the revision lacks merit and is,
                            accordingly, dismissed.
                            60.         It is, however, made clear that the observations contained in this
                            judgment are confined to the question of impleadment in the present
                            proceedings. Nothing contained herein shall be construed as a final
                            adjudication regarding the ownership of the suit property, the existence,
                            validity or nature of any dedication or endowment, the legal or
                            evidentiary effect of the judgment and decree passed in Original Suit No.
                            110 of 1985, the legal or evidentiary effect of the Shebaitnama dated
                            30.11.2015 or the rent receipts, or the applicant’s ultimate entitlement, if
                            any, to hold or succeed to the office of Shebait, Mohatmin or
                            representative of the deity. All such substantive questions are expressly
                            left open for determination, if raised, before the competent forum in
                            accordance with law.


                                                                   (Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

                            September 21, 2026
                            RKK/-




Digitally signed by :-
RAJ KUMAR KANNAUJIA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad