Allahabad High Court
STATE OF UP AND 3 OTHERSversusCOMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, SAROJ-VIDYA SHANKER SARASWATI AND 2 OTHERS
- Decided
Holding
The application for condonation of delay is rejected and the special appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.
Summary
The State of Uttar Pradesh and three others filed a special appeal against a single judge's order granting aid to certain educational institutions, but the appeal was filed 499 days after the limitation period expired. The appellants sought condonation of delay, citing extensive inter‑departmental communications and delays in obtaining approvals. The respondents opposed, arguing that such bureaucratic delays do not constitute sufficient cause. The Court examined Supreme Court precedents on condonation of delay, emphasizing that negligence or lack of bona‑fide effort cannot justify a belated filing, even for government entities. It held that the appellants failed to provide a cogent explanation for the delay. Consequently, the application for condonation was rejected and the special appeal dismissed as barred by limitation.
Issues considered
- Whether a delay of 499 days in filing a special appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether intra‑/inter‑departmental communications and administrative approvals constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
- Whether the order granting grant‑in‑aid should be set aside on the merits (not decided due to dismissal).
Legislation cited
- Limitation Act, 1963 — s. 5
Subjects
- condonation of delay
- limitation period
- special appeal
- grant-in-aid
- government liability
- negligence
- Supreme Court precedent
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
SPECIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 476 of 2026
State of UP and 3 others
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
Committee of Management, Saroj-Vidya Shanker Saraswati and 2 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Anoop Trivedi, (A.A.G.), Anubhav
Chandra (S.C.)
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Ashok Khare (Sr. Advocate),
Parashar Pandey, Narendra Kumar,
Siddharth Khare
Chief Justice's Court
HON'BLE ARUN BHANSALI, CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.
1. Heard Shri Anoop Trivedi, learned Additional Advocate General,
assisted by Shri Anubhav Chandra, Advocate for the appellants and Shri
Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Parashar Pandey,
Advocate for respondents no. 1 and 2.
2. The present special appeal is directed against order dated
10.12.2024, whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed Writ-C No.
58956 of 2017 filed by respondents no. 1 and 2, setting aside the order
dated 18.10.2017, impugned therein and has issued a direction to the
Principal Secretary, Samaj Kalyan, Anubhag-2, Government of U.P.,
Lucknow to take the respondent-institution on grant-in-aid from the date
the other similarly situated institutions, namely, Shivaji Social Welfare
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Children School, Deoria and Uma Maheshwar Prathmik Pathsala,
Gorakhpur have been taken on grant-in-aid.
3. The appeal is reported to be beyond time by 499 days.
4. An application seeking condonation of delay has been filed, which
is accompanied by affidavit of District Social Welfare Officer, Jaunpur
annexing 36 letters in the shape of inter/intra-departmental
communications and prayer has been made to condone delay taking plea
that filing of appeal was delayed on account of belated
permission/approval granted to the appellants for the said purpose.
5. Counter affidavit has been filed against the application denying
the grounds seeking condonation of delay and in rejoinder affidavit filed
against the counter affidavit, stand that since time was consumed in
obtaining administrative approvals and in completing other formalities,
the delay has occurred for bonafide reasons, has been reiterated by the
appellants.
6. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the
appellants, by referring to various communications on record, has made
submissions that since the appeal could not be filed unless requisite
approvals were received for which purpose appropriate steps were taken,
whatever delay has occurred, is on account of said reasons and since
day-to-day delay has been explained in the affidavit, application may be
allowed taking a liberal view of the matter.
7. Further submissions have been made that, initially, the appellants
were inclined to comply with the order passed by the learned Single
Judge but, later on, in view of a judgment of co-ordinate Bench of this
Court passed in a bunch of special appeals, leading appeal being Special
Appeal No. 213 of 2025 (State of U.P. and 3 others Vs. Ramesh
Kumar Singh and 13 others) decided on 05.01.2026, decision to file
special appeal was taken inasmuch as, in the said judgment, right to
claim grant-in-aid has been held to be not a fundamental right and,
therefore, the order of the learned Single Judge, whereby directions have
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been issued to take the respondent-institution on grant-in-aid, is liable to
be set aside.
8. Shri Khare, learned Senior Counsel, has opposed the prayer for
condonation of delay taking aid of the stand taken in counter affidavit,
wherein lapses on the part of the appellants in allegedly seeking
approvals at inter/intra-departmental level has been pointed out and by
placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in Special Appeal
(Defective) No. 261 of 2025 (State of U.P. and others vs Committee of
Management, Pratibha Shishu Shiksha Bihar Gagra), decided on
14.08.2025, submission has been made that the grounds raised for
condonation of delay have no substance and, therefore, the application is
liable to be rejected.
9. We have considered the submissions made and have perused the
material available on record.
10. A perusal of the affidavit supporting the application seeking
condonation of delay reveals that exchange of communications in
between Directorate, Legal Cell, Yojana Adhikari, Shiksha Anubhag-B,
State Government, Directorate of Education, District Social Welfare
Officer, Jaunpur, State Law Officer, High Court, Allahabad, Office of
Chief Standing Counsel of High Court, Additional Chief Secretary of the
Government, Law Department of the Government and Deputy Director,
Samaj Kalyan, Varanasi dated 15.01.2025, 21.01.2025, 04.02.2025,
05.02.2025, 10.02.2025, 11.02.2025, 29.03.2025, 03.04.2025,
08.04.2025, 25.04.2025, 28.04.2025, 02.05.2025, 08.05.2025,
13.05.2025, 16.05.2025, 27.06.2025, 30.06.2025, 06.08.2025,
20.08.2025, 25.08.2025, 01.09.2025, 04.09.2025, 03.10.2025,
27.10.2025, 30.10.2025, 31.10.2025, 06.11.2025, 03.12.2025,
08.12.2025, 01.01.2026, 07.01.2026, 22.01.2026, 13.02.2026,
20.03.2026, 30.04.2026 and 04.05.2026, has been taken as a ground
seeking condonation of delay.
11. The aforesaid communications are in the nature of seeking legal
opinion, sending reminders, one after another by one officer to other,
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taking steps to file appeal etc. etc.; however, the fact remains that the
very first communication itself was made on 15.01.2025, i.e. after expiry
of the period of limitation for filing the special appeal. Over a period of
about 470 days thereafter, the aforesaid officials continued to exchange
letters amongst themselves and it is apparent that when the judgment of
this Court in Ramesh Kumar Singh (supra) came in existence, the
appellants decided to challenge the order passed by the learned Single
Judge, impugned in this appeal taking aid of the said judgment and even
then the appeal was filed in May, 2026, i.e. four months after passing of
the said judgment.
12. Since, presently, we are dealing with the application seeking
condonation of delay in filing the instant special appeal, unless we are
satisfied with the plea of sufficient cause behind approaching the Court
with delay, we cannot make any observation regarding merits of the
order impugned before us, as sought to be argued on behalf of the
appellants based upon the decision in Ramesh Kumar Singh (supra).
13. It is now well settled that intra/inter-departmental
communications, exchange of letters etc. regarding opinion to file
appeal, cannot and do not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of
delay as negligent acts and lack of due diligence cannot favour the
person seeking condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the
case of Basawaraj Vs. Land Acquisition Officer: (2013) 14 SCC 81,
has held as under:-
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court
within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of
bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found
to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature."
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SPLAD No. - 476 of 2026
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Government of
Maharashtra Vs. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors
Pvt. Ltd.: AIR Online 2021 SC 152, has considered the situation where
Government seeks condonation of delay and by placing reliance upon its
previous decision in Postmaster General Vs. Living M Ltd.: (2012) 3
SCC 563, it was held as under:-
Likewise, merely because the government is involved, a different
yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was
felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.,
as follows:
(2012) 3 SCC 563 ["Postmaster General"],
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim
that they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons familiar
with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay
is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government
or a wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage
of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was
bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that
the file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
The government departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should
not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light
and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."
(emphasis supplied by us)
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs Vs.
Karnataka Housing Board: Civil Appeal No. 11794 of 2025, decided
on 12.09.2025, has elaborately dealt with the matter of condonation of
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SPLAD No. - 476 of 2026
delay and while dealing with the said issue in great detail in a case where
Government authorities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay,
the view taken in the case of Postmaster General (supra) has been
reiterated and reaffirmed. Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are
reproduced as under:-
"190. From the aforesaid, it is manifest that prior to the decision of
this Court in Postmaster General (supra), the approach was
characterised by judicial sympathy towards the State and its
instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the
peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also
existed contrary views such as Administrator, Howrah
Municipality (supra) and Lanka Venkateswarlu (supra) which held
that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a
private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly,
and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same.
191. Even in the decisions of Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok
AO (supra) where this Court recognized the necessity for drawing a
demarcation between a State or any of its instrumentalities, on the one
hand and a private individual, on the other, for the purpose of Section
5 of the Limitation Act, this Court simultaneously observed that such
differential treatment cannot continue for all times to come. We say
so, because this Court, in the latter parts of the aforesaid decisions,
conveyed an emphatic message to all the States and its
instrumentalities to constitute legal cells for the timely scrutiny of its
cases, to explore the possibility of settlement instead of pursuing
belated claims, wherever possible and to ensure that filing of appeals
or application as the case may be, is undertaken expeditiously, and the
officer responsible for pursuing such action is made personally liable
for lapses, if any.
ii. Shift in jurisprudence on Condonation of Delay after the
decision of Postmaster General.
192. However, despite the aforementioned exhortations of this Court
in Chandra Mani (supra) and Lipok AO (supra), the same largely
remained unheeded as the State and its instrumentalities continued to
approach the courts after significant delays under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act as though it were a license for indolence and
institutional lethargy.
193. It was in this backdrop, particularly, the persistent disregard to
the laws of limitation by the States and its instrumentalities that
compelled this Court in Postmaster General (supra) to deviate from
the earlier practice of extending unwarranted leniency governmental
agencies, and to emphasize that the law of limitation binds the State
no less than the ordinary litigant. The said decision is in three parts: -
(i) First, This Court held that claims of the Government and its
functionaries being an impersonal machinery and inherited with
bureaucratic methodology can no longer be accepted to excuse
delays under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues involved
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SPLAD No. - 476 of 2026
including the prescribed period of limitation for taking
up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in
this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate
period of limitation when the Department was possessed
with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is
to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence
or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice,
we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The law
of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including
the Government.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(ii) Secondly, this Court in Postmaster General (supra) held
that it was high time that the practice of condoning delay merely
because the litigant is a government entity was done away with,
and that delay should be condoned only where there is a
reasonable and acceptable explanation for such delay and was
accompanied by a bona fide effort. It further observed that the
usual explanation of bureaucratic inefficiency and of procedural
red tapism can no longer be accepted.
The relevant observations read as under: -
“29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that
unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to
accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process.” (Emphasis supplied)
(iii) Lastly, as regards the earlier line of thought that if
meritorious causes advanced by the State or any of its
instrumentalities are dismissed on the ground of delay, the
resultant hardship would ultimately fall upon the public
exchequer and thereby the public at large, was emphatically
rejected by this Court. It held that condonation of delay is a
matter of exception and cannot be treated as an anticipated
privilege accruing to governmental bodies by reason of their
hierarchical structure or bureaucratic methodology. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few. Thus, the plea of public interest cannot by
any stretch be used as a carte blanche for official inaction. It
observed that Government departments, far from being entitled to
presumptive indulgence, are in fact under a higher obligation to
discharge their functions with diligence, vigilance, and scrupulous
regard to limitation. The relevant observations read as under: -
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SPLAD No. - 476 of 2026
“29. [...] The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
the government departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a
few.” (Emphasis supplied)
194. In Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of West Bengal reported
in (2013) 4 SCC 52 this Court held that although a liberal
approach is to be adopted in matters of condonation of delay,
such indulgence cannot be extended in cases where the delay is
attributable to serious laches or negligence on the part of the
State. Delays as a result of the official business of the government
requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. It
held that delay should not be condoned mechanically in the
absence of “sufficient cause” merely because the party happens to
be the State.
(emphasis supplied by us)
16. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion
that the appellants have utterly failed to offer cogent explanation for
approaching this Court with a delay of 499 days in filing the present
appeal. The cause shown in the affidavit cannot be said to be sufficient.
17. The application seeking condonation of delay is hereby rejected.
Consequently, the special appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Kshitij Shailendra,J.) (Arun Bhansali,CJ.)
October 01, 2026
AKShukla/-
Digitally signed by :-
ANIL KUMAR SHUKLA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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