BHUPAL SINGHversusState of UP AND 3 OTHERS

                                                     Reserved on: 26.04.2026
                                                     Delivered on: 12.05.2026
                                                                       A.F.R.
        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                       WRIT - A No. - 18069 of 2024

Bhupal Singh
                                                            …..Petitioner(s)

                                 Versus

State of UP and 3 others
                                                          …..Respondent(s)


Counsel for Petitioner(s)           : Siddharth Khare, Sr. Advocate
Counsel for Respondent(s)           : Arun Kumar Sharma, C.S.C.

Court No. - 52

             HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.
1. Heard Mr. Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.
Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Arun Kumar
Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent no.4 and Mr. Shailendra
Singh and Mr. Manoj Srivastava, learned Standing Counsels for the
State-respondents.

2. The present writ petition raises questions of considerable legal nuance
touching upon the interplay between accrued rights in a selection
process, subsequent statutory and executive interventions, and the
temporal applicability of recruitment norms. The petitioner seeks
quashing of the order dated 28.10.2024 passed by the Basic Shiksha
Adhikari, Bijnor, whereby approval to his selection on the post of
Headmaster has been declined.

3. The essential facts, shorn of unnecessary detail, are that the institution
in question is a recognized and aided Junior High School governed by
the statutory framework of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 and the
Rules of 1978.
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4. A vacancy having arisen on the post of Headmaster, an advertisement
was issued on 15.07.2016. The petitioner, being eligible, participated in
the selection process and was recommended by the Selection Committee
on 29.07.2016. The papers were forwarded on 30.07.2016 for approval
to the Basic Shiksha Adhikari.

5. The approval, however, was declined on 17.08.2016 on the ground
that the selection process was not completed within the timeline
prescribed in the Government Order dated 03.06.2016, which mandated
completion by 31.07.2016.

6. The petitioner’s representations failed, and multiple rounds of
litigation ensued, culminating in a remand by the Division Bench
directing reconsideration. Upon such reconsideration, the impugned
order dated 28.10.2024 has again rejected the claim.

7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned
order primarily on the following grounds:-

        i. The selection process commenced prior to any subsequent
        amendment or Government Order, and therefore must be governed
        by the rules prevailing on the date of advertisement.

        ii. The Government Order dated 03.06.2016 is directory and not
        mandatory in nature.

        iii. Subsequent amendments, including the Seventh Amendment
        Rules, 2019, and later Government Orders, cannot operate
        retrospectively.

        iv. The petitioner had acquired a vested or at least a crystallized
        right upon being selected.

        v. Reliance has been placed upon authoritative precedents
        including P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka1, Santosh
        Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P. and others 2, Ratan Pal Yadav
        vs. State of U.P. and others3, and recent pronouncements


1   (1990) 1 SCC 411
2   2017: AHC: 9909 (DB)
3   2017 SCC OnLine All 4201
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      reiterating that the “rules of the game” cannot be altered
      midstream.

8. Conversely, learned Standing Counsel has contended:-

      i. The Government Order dated 03.06.2016 imposed a mandatory
      outer limit for completion of the selection.

      ii. The recommendation itself was forwarded after the cut-off date.

      iii. Subsequent statutory amendments and policy decisions
      fundamentally altered the recruitment regime.

      iv. No indefeasible right accrues merely upon participation or even
      recommendation.

9. The controversy which arises for consideration in the present case lies
within a narrow yet intricate compass of service jurisprudence, and may
be delineated into the following core issues: firstly, as to whether the
Government Order dated 03.06.2016, prescribing a timeline for
completion of the selection process, possesses binding legal force and is
sustainable in law; secondly, whether the petitioner, upon being
recommended by the Selection Committee, acquired any enforceable or
vested right to appointment; thirdly, whether subsequent statutory
amendments and executive instructions, brought into force after
initiation of the selection process, are applicable to the petitioner’s case;
and lastly, whether the impugned order suffers from arbitrariness,
unreasonableness, or any other legal infirmity so as to warrant
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

10. The Government Order dated 03.06.2016 came to be issued with the
avowed objective of streamlining and expediting the recruitment process
by prescribing a definite and non-derogable timeline, namely, that the
entire selection exercise be concluded on or before 31.07.2016. It is a
settled canon of administrative law that where a time prescription is
engrafted in furtherance of public administration and is coupled with
consequences     affecting   the   efficacy   and    uniformity    of   such
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administration, the same ordinarily assumes a mandatory character. The
said Government Order cannot, therefore, be construed as a mere
procedural guideline; rather, it embodies a policy imperative intended to
obviate delays, ensure uniformity, and prevent the mischief of protracted
and inconclusive selection processes.

11. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the recommendation of the
Selection Committee was forwarded beyond the stipulated cut-off date.
The inevitable sequitur is that the selection process cannot be said to
have culminated within the time frame mandated by the Government
Order dated 03.06.2016. The breach of such a mandatory timeline
vitiates the claim of the petitioner at its very inception.

12. The submission of the petitioner that he acquired a vested or
enforceable right upon being recommended by the Selection Committee
does not commend acceptance. The law in this regard is no longer res
integra. It is trite that mere inclusion in a select list or even
recommendation by a Selection Committee does not confer an
indefeasible right to appointment. The distinction between a mere
expectation and a legally enforceable right has been consistently
underscored in service jurisprudence. The Constitution Bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India4,
authoritatively held that a candidate does not acquire any vested right to
appointment merely by virtue of being selected. At best, the petitioner
could be said to have had a legitimate expectation; however, such
expectation remains subservient to statutory provisions, executive policy,
and overarching considerations of public interest.

13. Equally untenable is the petitioner’s reliance on the doctrine that the
“rules of the game” cannot be altered midstream. While the said
principle has been recognized as a salutary safeguard against
arbitrariness, it is by no means absolute and admits of well-defined
exceptions. The recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in


4   (1991) 3 SCC 47
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Tej Prakash Pathak and others v. Rajasthan High Court and others 5
has lucidly clarified that procedural modifications may be introduced
even after the commencement of the selection process, and in
appropriate cases, even substantive changes may operate, provided no
vested right has crystallized in favour of a candidate.

14. In fact, the mere forwarding of the petitioner’s papers for approval
on 30.07.2016, received in the office of the District Basic Education
Officer on 02.08.2016, did not confer any vested right upon the
petitioner. The same was in clear contravention of the Government Order
dated 03.06.2016, which governed the selection process and mandated
completion of the proceedings by 31.07.2016. Consequently, the
petitioner was not entitled to appointment under the prevailing
Government Orders.

15. Further, in State of U.P. v. Rachna Hills 6, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has unequivocally held that the governing rules are those which
prevail on the date of consideration of the claim, and not necessarily
those which were in force on the date of advertisement. The said
exposition of law marks a significant evolution in service jurisprudence
and squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Consequently, the
petitioner’s reliance on earlier authorities must yield to the contemporary
legal position as expounded by the Apex Court.

16.    The    statutory       framework       itself   underwent   a   substantial
transformation with the promulgation of the Seventh Amendment Rules,
2019, followed by further policy interventions in the year 2023,
including the establishment of a centralized recruitment mechanism
through a Commission. These changes were neither cosmetic nor merely
procedural; rather, they effectuated a paradigm shift from a
decentralized, management-driven selection process to a centralized and
regulated system of recruitment.



5   2024 SCC OnLine SC 3184
6   2023 4 SCR 969
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17. In this backdrop, the Government Orders dated 06.06.2023 and
19.06.2023 assume critical significance, as they unequivocally mandate
that all incomplete or inchoate selection processes shall stand annulled.
The petitioner’s selection, having never attained finality in the absence
of approval by the competent authority, unmistakably falls within the
category of an incomplete process. It is a well-settled principle that
where a statutory or policy intervention occurs prior to the culmination
of a selection process, such process must necessarily conform to the new
regime, unless expressly saved. No such saving clause is discernible in
the present case.

18. The plea of arbitrariness, as sought to be advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, is equally devoid of substance. The impugned order reflects
due and conscious consideration of the relevant statutory provisions,
applicable Government Orders, and binding judicial precedents.
Administrative action, when taken in consonance with the prevailing
legal framework, cannot be branded as arbitrary merely because it
operates to the detriment of an individual claimant.

19. Upon a holistic and anxious consideration of the facts of the case and
the governing legal principles, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the Government Order dated 03.06.2016 was binding in nature, and
the selection process in question having not been completed within the
stipulated period, no vested or enforceable right accrued in favour of the
petitioner. This Court further holds that the subsequent statutory
amendments and Government Orders validly apply to the present case.
The impugned order, therefore, does not suffer from any illegality,
irrationality, or procedural impropriety so as to warrant interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

20. The order dated 17.08.2016 passed by the District Basic Education
Officer, Bijnor—impugned in the earlier writ petition—records that the
papers relating to approval of the selection were received in the office of
the District Basic Education Officer on 02.08.2016, i.e., beyond
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31.07.2016, the cut-off date prescribed under the Government Order
dated 03.06.2016.

21. It is submitted that the stipulation of 31.07.2016 for completion of
the selection process is mandatory in nature. The Government Order was
issued with the specific object of ensuring expeditious completion of
long-pending recruitment and to maintain uniformity across the State.
The prescription of a definite timeline, coupled with the administrative
consequences of delay, indicates a clear legislative intent to treat the
schedule as binding rather than merely directory.

22. In the present case, the recommendation papers themselves were
received after the expiry of the prescribed period. Thus, the process had
not culminated within the mandated time-frame. Any action taken
subsequent to 31.07.2016, including consideration or approval of such
belated recommendations, stands vitiated being in contravention of the
Government Order.

23. It is a settled principle that where a statute or executive instruction
prescribes that a particular act is to be done within a specified time and
such prescription is intended to achieve a public purpose, the same
ordinarily assumes a mandatory character, especially when non-
compliance would defeat the very object sought to be achieved.

24. Accordingly, the delayed submission of papers on 02.08.2016
renders the entire selection process liable to be declared invalid.

25. Accordingly, the selection process must be deemed to have come to
an end on 31.07.2016, irrespective of whether it had actually been
completed, in view of the mandatory timeline prescribed under the
Government     Order    dated   03.06.2016. The       said   position   was
subsequently put to challenge in Writ Petition No. 14979 of 2018;
however, no interim order was granted therein. Thus, the legal
consequence that follows is that the selection proceedings initiated
pursuant to the earlier notification stood concluded by 31.07.2016.
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26. In such circumstances, once the prescribed period had lapsed, no
further steps could have been validly undertaken in continuation of the
said selection process. Consequently, after the issuance of subsequent
Government Orders and the amendment notified on 04.12.2019, any
fresh selection was required to be undertaken strictly in accordance with
the law as prevailing on the date of initiation of such selection process.

27. It is a settled principle of law that where a selection process stands
concluded or lapses due to efflux of time or operation of law, any further
action must conform to the rules and statutory provisions in force at the
relevant time. Therefore, any attempt to revive or continue the earlier
selection     proceedings   beyond        31.07.2016     would    be    legally
unsustainable.

28. After the issuance of the subsequent Government Orders, a
requisition for filling up the vacant post was also submitted. The said
requisition was challenged in Writ Petition No. 8305 of 2021, which
ultimately came to be dismissed by              judgment and order dated
05.03.2024.

29. This Court further notes that the petitioner had earlier filed Writ
Petition No. 14979 of 2018, challenging the order dated 17.08.2016
whereby his approval was rejected, as well as Writ-A No. 8305 of 2021,
questioning the validity of the requisition sent in respect of vacant posts
of Assistant Teachers. Both writ petitions were dismissed by a common
order dated 05.03.2024. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Special
Appeal No. 674 of 2024, contending that the issue involved was no
longer res integra in view of the law already settled in Committee of
Management, Nehru Kisaan Vidyalaya Junior High School vs. State
of U.P. and others7, and further that the judgment rendered in Ratan
Pal Yadav vs. State of U.P. and others 8, could not be brought to the
notice of the learned Single Judge.



7   2017:AHC:15228
8   2017:AHC:154503
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30. The Special Appeal was accordingly allowed, and the matter was
remitted to the District Basic Education Officer to take a fresh decision
in accordance with law,which, in so many words meant that all relevant
aspects of the case were required to be considered by the District Basic
Education Officer, particularly in light of the judgments in Committee
of Management, Nehru Kisan Vidyalaya Junior High School (supra)
and Ratan Pal Yadav (supra), before passing an appropriate order.

31. The submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner do not merit
acceptance. The contention that the selection process, having been
initiated prior to the issuance of subsequent Government Orders and
amendments, ought to be governed by the unamended provisions, is
misconceived in the facts of the present case. It is not a case where the
“rules of the game” have been altered midstream; rather, the
foundational requirement itself, as prescribed under the Government
Order dated 03.06.2016, namely completion of the entire selection
process by 31.07.2016, was not fulfilled. In absence of such completion
within the stipulated time, no vested or accrued right can be said to have
crystallized in favour of the petitioner.

32. The reliance placed on the principle that a selection process is
governed by the rules prevailing on the date of advertisement is also
misplaced, inasmuch as the said principle operates only where the
process is validly continued in accordance with law. In the present case,
the process itself stood vitiated upon failure to adhere to the mandatory
timeline. The law laid down in Committee of Management, Nehru
Kisan Vidyalaya Junior High School (supra) clearly holds that the
Government Order dated 03.06.2016 is binding and mandatory, and any
selection not concluded within the prescribed date cannot be approved.
Similarly, in Ratan Pal Yadav (supra), it has been reiterated that mere
participation in a selection process or recommendation by the Selection
Committee does not confer any indefeasible right to appointment,
particularly when the process itself suffers from legal infirmities.
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                            32. The further submission that subsequent Government Orders or
                            amendments cannot be applied retrospectively is also of no avail to the
                            petitioner, as the rejection of approval is not founded upon retrospective
                            application of later policies, but on the admitted failure of the selection
                            to meet the mandatory cut-off date prescribed under the Government
                            Order dated 03.06.2016. Thus, the very substratum of the petitioner’s
                            claim stands eroded.

                            33. Even the plea that the petitioner had acquired a vested right upon
                            recommendation by the Selection Committee cannot be sustained in law,
                            as it is well settled that recommendation does not ipso facto confer a
                            right to appointment unless approval is granted by the competent
                            authority in accordance with the governing provisions.

                            34. In view of the above, the contentions raised by the petitioner, as
                            reiterated in the present writ petition, being devoid of substance and
                            contrary to the settled legal position, are liable to be rejected.

                            35. This writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order
                            as to costs.



                                                                       (Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.)

                            May 12, 2026
                            Jitendra/-




Digitally signed by :-
JITENDRA KUMAR YADAV
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad