Allahabad High Court
KUNWAR PAL SINGHversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 3 OTHERS
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed off/Decided on merits
- Bench
- ANISH KUMAR GUPTA
Holding
An ex‑parte disciplinary inquiry is valid, the placement of the punishment recommendation in the inquiry report does not invalidate the inquiry, and an acquittal in criminal court does not preclude disciplinary action where the standards of proof differ.
Summary
Kunwar Pal Singh, a constable of the Uttar Pradesh Police, was alleged to have been intoxicated while on duty in 2011 and, as a result, a bullet from his service rifle injured two civilians. A criminal FIR was lodged and he was later tried under IPC sections 286 and 338, where he was acquitted. The police department, however, initiated disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14(1) of the UP Police Officers (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991, served a charge‑sheet, and proceeded ex‑parte when the petitioner failed to appear. The inquiry officer found him guilty of intoxication and negligence and recommended removal from service, which the disciplinary authority confirmed. The petitioner appealed the removal, but the appellate and revisional authorities dismissed his pleas, and the High Court upheld those orders, holding that the ex‑parte inquiry was lawful, the recommendation in the inquiry report did not vitiate the process, and an acquittal in a criminal trial does not automatically overturn a departmental finding of misconduct because the two proceedings operate on different standards of proof and evidence. The petition was therefore dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the ex‑parte disciplinary inquiry conducted under the 1991 Rules is valid despite the petitioner’s non‑appearance.
- Whether the inclusion of the punishment recommendation within the inquiry report vitiates the disciplinary proceedings.
- Whether an acquittal in the criminal trial on identical facts bars the disciplinary authority from imposing removal from service.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code — s. 286, 307, 338
- Uttar Pradesh Police Officers (Punishment and Appeal) Rules — s. Appendix 1, Rule 14(1)
Subjects
- intoxication
- misconduct
- disciplinary inquiry
- ex‑parte proceedings
- removal from service
- acquittal
- criminal vs departmental proceedings
- standard of proof
- UP Police Rules 1991
- IPC sections 286 307 338
Judgment
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT - A No. - 4116 of 2019
Kunwar Pal Singh
.....Petitioner(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 3 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Pawan Kumar Tripathi, Vijay Gautam,
Vijay Gautam(Senior Adv.), Vinod
Kumar Mishra
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C.
Court No. - 34
A.F.R
Judgement Reserved on 30.03.2026
Judgement Delivered on 20.04.2026
HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.
1. Heard Sri Pawan Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel assisted by Sri
Deepanshu Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Gaurav Singh,
learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.
2. The briefly stated facts of the case are that the petitioner was posted as
Constable on 15.05.1982 in the U.P. Police Department. At the relevant time
in the year 2011, the petitioner was posted as Constable at Police Line,
District- Firozabad. On 14.12.2011, the petitioner was assigned duty to
present an accused at Sadar Lockup. While on such duty, allegedly the
petitioner got intoxicated and due to such intoxication consumed by the
petitioner, a gunshot fire from his service rifle took place, due to which
private persons got injured. With regard to the aforesaid incident, an F.I.R.
was lodged against the petitioner being Case Crime No. 318 of 2011 at
Police Station- Mathsena, District- Firozabad. Thereafter, a preliminary
inquiry was conducted with regard to the misconduct of the petitioner herein
by an Inquiry Officer appointed by the Department, who held the petitioner
herein guilty of the misconduct. Thereafter, on the basis of the report of the
preliminary inquiry, the departmental disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against the petitioner under Rule 14 (1) of the UP Police Officers of the
Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1991 (hereinafter
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referred to as '1991 Rules').
3. In the disciplinary proceedings, the Inquiry Officer was appointed to
conduct the inquiry against the petitioner with regard to the aforesaid
misconduct, due to which bullet was fired from his service rifle causing
injury to private persons during intoxication while on duty. Initially, the
disciplinary inquiry was handed over to Shri Asharam Yadav, the then Circle
Officer. On 30.07.2012, the charge-sheet was issued by him with the
approval of the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner, which was served
through the daughter of the petitioner as the petitioner was not found at his
given address on 17.09.2012.
4. Thereafter, the inquiry was handed over to Shishpal Singh, Circle Officer,
Firozabad, who noted that the charge-sheet had been duly served,
acknowledgement of the daughter of the petitioner is available on record.
Thereafter, he proceeded with the inquiry and called for the witnesses and
intimation with regard to the date, time, and place of the disciplinary
proceedings to be conducted was sent to the petitioner calling upon the
petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses, if he so desires but petitioner did
not appear before the Inquiry Officer in the entire inquiry proceedings. Thus,
the Inquiry Officer had no other option but to proceed with recording the
statements of witnesses in accordance with rules ex-parte. The witnesses
have categorically stated that after the incident medical examination of the
petitioner was conducted, wherein it was proved that the petitioner had
consumed alcohol. Thus, from the evidence available on record, the Inquiry
Officer concluded that the petitioner herein was guilty of intoxication while
on duty and due to his negligence a bullet was fired from his service rifle,
due to which two public persons namely, Buddhpal and Chunnilal had
sustained injuries and for the aforesaid incident, an F.I.R. was lodged by one
Rajkumar, being Case Crime No. 318 of 2011 under section 307 I.P.C.
5. In the medical examination of the petitioner, intoxication was found,
therefore, the Inquiry Officer held him guilty of the aforesaid charges and
also recommended the punishment of removal from services in his inquiry
report dated 29.06.2013. Therefore, on 03.07.2013, a show-cause notice was
issued by Superintendent of Police, Firozabad to the petitioner herein along
with the copy of the inquiry report. The petitioner had submitted his
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explanation to the aforesaid show-cause notice, stating therein that while
performing his duties to escort the accused in the Court of ACJM-II,
Firozabad and looking at sensitivity and crowed he kept the loaded rifle with
him to ensure that the accused cannot escape or assaulted by the opposite
parties. The opposite parties to the accused had crowded him in the verandah
of the ACJM-II Court and had tried to snatch the rifle from him. Thereafter,
the petitioner consciously kept the point of rifle towards the roof, however,
due to the crowd, someone had pressed the trigger, thus the fire was caused,
the bullet first touched to the roof and thereafter came back on the floor and
due to some stones from the floor hit the injured persons. Thus, he submitted
that he has not committed any misconduct deliberately and he has not been
negligent in his duties. Had he been negligent then there would have been
some mishappening. The petitioner was immediately arrested and was sent
to jail without giving any opportunity to explain his conduct. The matter was
investigated by the Investigation Officer and in the said offense, only offense
under Sections 286 and 338 I.P.C. was found to have been committed and
thereafter the petitioner was released on bail and the trial is pending.
However, with regard to the aforesaid reply/explanation submitted by the
petitioner, neither the date has been given on which date the said
explanation/reply was submitted by petitioner nor there is any
acknowledgment that the said reply/explanation was actually submitted by
him.
6. The Superintendent of Police being the Disciplinary Authority has
categorically noted that initial show-cause notice was sent to petitioner on
03.07.2013 calling upon him to submit his explanation. Thereafter, it was
submitted by the Police Line- Hathras that the petitioner is absent from his
duties from 28.06.2013. Thereafter, a copy of show-cause notice was sent
through Special Messenger to his permanent address at Village-
Khoobkhabar, P.S.- Lodha, District- Aligarh, wherein it was informed by
various persons, resident of the said village, that he is not residing in the
village and has sold his house and land and shifted to Aligarh. Thereafter,
again, the Special Messenger was sent to his address at Aligarh, wherein the
notice was duly served on the petitioner on 30.07.2013. He was expected to
submit his reply/explanation within 15 days. Since, the petitioner has failed
to submit any explanation or reply to the show-cause notice, thereafter, the
Disciplinary Authority has proceeded ex-parte and has passed the
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punishment order of removal from service on 19.08.2013. Being aggrieved
by the same, the petitioner herein has filed a statutory appeal before the
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Agra Zone, Agra, which was dismissed
by the Appellate Authority on 21.12.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner has
submitted a revision petition on 21.05.2015, though the copy of the order of
the Appellate Authority was duly served to the petitioner on 17.01.2014.
Thereafter, the Revisional Authority having found that the revision is time-
barred, the same was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid three
orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority, as well as
the Revisional Authority, the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner
herein.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner herein
has already been acquitted in the criminal case, lodged for the identical
allegations against the petitioner herein. Initially, the Case Crime No. 318 of
2011 was registered under Section 307 I.P.C, however, the charge-sheet was
filed under Sections 286 and 338 I.P.C., for which the petitioner was tried
and after trial, giving benefit of doubt to the petitioner he was acquitted.
8. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied
upon the judgment and order dated 26.09.2024 passed by the Division Bench
of this Court in Special Appeal No. 601 of 2024 (Constable No.118
Awadhes Kumar Pandey vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others).
"37. We have also carefully perused the judgment of trial
court, which is on record, and it can be safely said that the
petitioner-appellant was honorably acquitted. We find that the
disciplinary proceeding and the orders passed thereon cannot
be allowed to stand. The charges were not just the same but
identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were
all the same. Merely on the basis of two days absence, that so
due to ailment, no such major penalty can be inflicted.
Accordingly, question no.2 is answered. "
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the petitioner has
been acquitted for the identical charges in a judicial trial, therefore, the
punishment order on the basis of the identical charges cannot be sustained in
law. Thus, the petitioner is entitled for reinstatement with all consequential
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benefits. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the
Inquiry Officer has recommended the punishment in the inquiry report itself,
which is impermissible for the Inquiry Officer. Though, the Appendix 1 of
1991 Rules permits the Inquiry Officer to make the recommendation
regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged police officer,
however, such recommendations ought to have been made separately, but
not in the inquiry report and the Disciplinary Authority, without application
of his mind, has simply agreed with the recommendation made by the
Inquiry Officer and has passed the punishment order. The appeal filed by the
petitioner against the order of removal from service was rejected and the
revision has been dismissed as time-barred. Thus, learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that since the Inquiry Officer has made the
recommendations in inquiry report itself, then the entire inquiry proceedings
gets vitiated. Thus, he seeks quashing of the inquiry proceedings as well as
the termination order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and consequently
the orders passed by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority.
10. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for the State submits that on
perusal of the inquiry, it is apparent that sufficient opportunity to defend
himself was granted by the Inquiry Officer to the petitioner. The charge-
sheet was duly served. Date, time, and place for examination of witnesses
was duly intimated to the petitioner time and again, and despite that, the
petitioner has failed to cooperate with the disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the
Inquiry Officer had no other option but to proceed ex-parte against the
petitioner, and has after examination of witnesses in accordance with law,
has found petitioner guilty of the charges leveled against the petitioner. As
per Appendix 1 attached to 1991 Rules, read with Rule 14 (1) empowers the
Inquiry Officer, after conclusion of inquiry proceedings, to make the
recommendation with regard to punishment. Thus, the aforesaid
recommendation made by the Inquiry Officer were well within its powers. It
is further submitted by learned Standing Counsel for the State that merely
because the petitioner has been acquitted in a criminal trial, it would not
amount to reversal of the findings of misconduct which were arrived in a
fairly concluded disciplinary proceeding.
11. In support of the submission, learned Standing Counsel for the State has
relied upon the judgment and order dated 02.09.2022 passed by the Apex
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Court in Civil Appeal No. 5930 of 2022, State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs.
Phool Singh, and also in Maharana Pratap Singh vs. State of Bihar and
Others, 2025 SCC Online SC 890. Thus, Standing Counsel for the State
seeks dismissal of the instant case.
12. Having heard the rival submissions so made by learned counsel for the
parties, this Court has carefully gone through the records of the Case. The
facts of the case have already been noted herein above. From the perusal of
the inquiry report, it is apparent that the charge-sheet was served to the
petitioner through her daughter and despite service of the charge-sheet the
petitioner has failed to file any response to the said charge-sheet. Thereafter,
under intimation to the petitioner and by calling upon him to join the inquiry
proceedings and cross-examine the witnesses on the given date, time and
place, since the petitioner failed to cooperate in the inquiry proceedings, the
Inquiry Officer having no other option, had proceeded ex-parte against the
petitioner in accordance with the law and he had examined the witnesses and
thereupon has concluded the inquiry against the petitioner and found him
guilty of the alleged charges against the petitioner. Thus, in the considered
opinion of this Court, there is no illegality so far as the inquiry proceedings
are concerned and the petitioner was found guilty by the Inquiry Officer.
13. So far as the argument raised by counsel for the petitioner that the
Inquiry Officer had recommended the punishment in the inquiry report itself,
which vitiates the inquiry proceedings and the inquiry report, this Court has
gone through the provisions of Rule 14(1) along with Appendix 1 of 1991
Rules. The proviso to the Appendix specifically empowers the Disciplinary
Authority to make the recommendation with regard to the punishment after
conclusion of the guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer. However, it is
expected that such recommendation ought to have been made separately.
The purpose of such recommendation being made separately appears to be
that the aforesaid recommendations are in between the Inquiry Officer and
the Disciplinary Authority and the same ought not to have been
communicated to the delinquent officer that is why it is expected that such
recommendations ought to have been made separately by the inquiry officer
before any punishment order is passed. Thus, the aforesaid requirement is
just a requirement of convenience and caution, however, the same would not
vitiate the inquiry report itself, which has been otherwise based upon the
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cogent evidence recorded by the Inquiry Officer, during the inquiry
proceedings. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid
argument advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is not sustainable in
law.
14. So far as the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner that since the petitioner had been acquitted in the criminal trial for
the identical allegation against the petitioner, thus, the petitioner is
automatically entitled for reinstatement. In this regard, it is a settled position
of law that the criminal trial as well as the disciplinary proceedings for
identical allegations are two different things and operate in different spheres.
The purpose of a criminal trial is to punish the offender for the offense
committed by him and for such purpose, the allegations are required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. So far as the disciplinary proceedings are
concerned, the purpose thereof is to ascertain the misconduct, indiscipline
committed by the delinquent officer while on service and with regard to the
finding of guilt for misconduct, negligence, etc. by one's service, the degree
of proof is preponderance of probabilities and not the strict proof as in the
criminal trial.
15. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to take note of some of
the judgments of the Apex Court, which throw light on the aforesaid issue.
In Capt. M. Paul Anthony vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr : (1999) 3
SCC 679, the Apex Court has drawn the following conclusion:-
“22. The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of
this Court referred to above are:
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can
proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted
simultaneously, though separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based
on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal
case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which
involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable
to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the
criminal case.
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(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and
whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that
case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case
launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material
collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the
charge-sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered
in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has
to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be
unduly delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being
unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were
stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be
resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date,
so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be
vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get
rid of him at the earliest.”
16. According to the aforesaid judgment, the departmental proceedings as
well as the criminal trial can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar to
their being conducted simultaneously. However, it provides that where the
charges in the departmental proceedings as well as criminal case are based
on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case
against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature, which involves
complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the
departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. Whether
the criminal case involves the grave charges or whether it involves the
complicated questions of fact and law, will depend upon the nature of the
offense, nature of the case lodged against the employee on the basis of the
evidence and material collected during investigation. However, it has further
been provided in the said judgment that the Stay of departmental
proceedings cannot operate in isolation on the aforesaid principles but due
regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot
be unduly delayed and wherever the disposal of criminal case is delayed, the
disciplinary proceedings cannot be delayed.
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17. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited vs. C.
Nagaraju : 2019 10 SCC 367, the Apex Court has held as under:
“10. As the High Court set aside the order of dismissal on the basis of
the judgments of this Court in M. Paul Anthony [M. Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 810] and G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5
SCC 446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] , it is necessary to examine
whether the said judgments are applicable to the facts of this case.
Simultaneous continuance of departmental proceedings and
proceedings in a criminal case on the same set of facts was the point
considered by this Court in M. Paul Anthony case [M. Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 810] . This Court was of the opinion that departmental
proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed
simultaneously as there is no bar. However, it is desirable to stay
departmental inquiry till conclusion of the criminal case if the
departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on identical
and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the
delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated
questions of law and fact. On the facts of the said case, it was found
that the criminal case and the departmental proceedings were based
on identical set of facts and the evidence before the criminal court
and the departmental inquiry was the same. Further, in the said case
the departmental inquiry was conducted ex parte. In such
circumstances, this Court held that the ex parte departmental
proceedings cannot be permitted to stand in view of the acquittal of
the delinquent by the criminal court on the same set of facts and
evidence. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of this case.
In the present case, the prosecution witnesses turned hostile in the
criminal trial against Respondent 1. He was acquitted by the
criminal court on the ground that the prosecution could not produce
any credible evidence to prove the charge. On the other hand, the
complainant and the other witnesses appeared before the inquiry
officer and deposed against Respondent 1. The evidence available in
the departmental inquiry is completely different from that led by the
prosecution in criminal trial.
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11. Reliance was placed by the High Court on a judgment of this
Court in G.M. Tank [G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 5 SCC
446 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1121] whereby the writ petition filed by
Respondent 1 was allowed. In the said case, the delinquent officer
was charged for an offence punishable under Section 5(1)(e) read
with Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988. He was honourably acquitted
by the criminal court as the prosecution failed to prove the charge.
Thereafter, a departmental inquiry was conducted and he was
dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was upheld [G.M.
Tank v. State of Gujarat, 2003 SCC OnLine Guj 487] by the High
Court. In the appeal filed by the delinquent officer, this Court was of
the opinion that the departmental proceedings and criminal case
were based on identical and similar set of facts. The evidence before
the criminal court and the departmental proceedings being exactly
the same, this Court held that the acquittal of the employee by a
criminal court has to be given due weight by the disciplinary
authority. On the basis that the evidence in both the criminal trial and
departmental inquiry is the same, the order of dismissal of the
appellant therein was set aside. As stated earlier, the facts of this case
are entirely different. The acquittal of Respondent 1 was due to non-
availability of any evidence before the criminal court. The order of
dismissal was on the basis of a report of the inquiry officer before
whom there was ample evidence against Respondent 1.
12. In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
Sangh [Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor
Sangh, (2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067] this Court was
concerned with the validity of the termination of the services of
workmen after acquittal by the criminal court. Dealing with a
situation similar to the one in this case, where the acquittal was due
to lack of evidence before the criminal court and sufficient evidence
was available before the Labour Court, this Court was of the
opinion that the judgment in M. Paul Anthony case [M. Paul
Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 810] cannot come to the rescue of the workmen.
13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the
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appellant and Respondent 1, we are of the view that interference with
the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is
settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude a
departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer. The
disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the criminal
court if the evidence that is produced in the departmental inquiry is
different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of
a departmental inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty
of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of
determining whether he should be continued in service. The
standard of proof in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based on
the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the
evidence before the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings,
which is different from the evidence available to the criminal court,
is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.”
18. In Union of India vs. Sitaram Mishra : (2019) 20 SCC 588, the Apex
Court has observed as under:
“14. The fact that the first respondent was acquitted in the course of
the criminal trial cannot operate ipso facto as a ground for vitiating
the finding of misconduct which has been arrived at during the course
of the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, in our view, has
drawn an erroneous inference from the decision of this Court in M.
Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat
Gold Mines Ltd., (1999) 3 SCC 679: 1999 SCC (L&S) 810]. The High
Court adverted to the following principle of law laid down in the
above judgment: (SCC p. 687, para 13)
“13….While in the departmental proceedings the standard of
proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a
criminal case, the charge has to be proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt. The little exception may be where the
departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on
the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings
is common without there being a variance.”
15. It is undoubtedly correct that the charge in the criminal trial
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arose from the death of a co-employee in the course of the incident
resulting from the firing of a bullet which took place from the
weapon which was assigned to the first respondent as a member of
the Force. But the charge of misconduct is on the ground of the
negligence of the first respondent in handling his weapon and his
failure to comply with the departmental instructions in regard to the
manner in which the weapon should be handled. Consequently, the
acquittal in the criminal case was not a ground for setting aside the
penalty which was imposed in the course of the disciplinary enquiry.
Hence, having regard to the parameters that govern the exercise of
judicial review in disciplinary matters, we are of the view that the
judgment [Sitaram Mishra v. Union of India, 2007 SCC OnLine Cal
718 : (2008) 1 Cal LJ 863] of the Division Bench of the High Court
is unsustainable.”
19. In Ajit Kumar Negi vs. General Manager Indian Oil Corporation
Limited : (2005) 7 SCC 764, the Apex Court has observed as under:
“11. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a
criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power
in accordance with Rules and Regulations in force. The two
proceedings criminal and departmental - are entirely different. They
operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the
object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on
offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the
delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with
service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by
the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is
totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and
procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree
of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the
degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency.
The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings
is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the
prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of
the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt’, he cannot be convicted by a
court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty
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can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on
the basis of 'preponderance of probability'…..”
20. In State of Rajasthan vs. Heem Singh : (2020) SCC OnLine SC 886,
the Apex Court has observed as under:
“39. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are
two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The
second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint
constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The
determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies
primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge
does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the
judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by
the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the
employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service.
Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice.
But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to
judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict
standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of
probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying
approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the
spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy – deference to the
position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and
autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of
the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the
court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry
are based on no evidence or when theysuffer from perversity. A
failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law
regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an
entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has
recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court
to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to
the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in
maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which
have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest
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with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise
judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary
enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of
scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court
that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and
to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to
reappreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to
substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate.
To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined
above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense
without which the judges’ craft is in vain.”
21. In Phool Singh (Supra), the Apex Court has categorically observed as
under:
“7. The question before this Court is therefore only to see whether the
respondent can be reinstated in service for the reason that now on the
same set of charges he has been acquitted by a criminal court?
8. There should be no ambiguity in law on this subject. A
departmental proceeding is different from a criminal proceeding. The
fundamental difference between the two is that whereas in a
departmental proceeding a delinquent employee can be held guilty on
the basis of “preponderance of probabilities”, in a criminal court the
prosecution has to prove its case “beyond reasonable doubt”. In
short, the difference between the two proceedings would lie in the
nature of evidence and the degree of its scrutiny. The two forums
therefore run at different levels. For this reason, this Court has
consistently held that merely because a person has been acquitted in a
criminal trial, he cannot be ipso facto reinstated in service.
11. ...............In the above case a distinction ha also been drawn by
this Court between a "criminal offence" and "Misconduct". One has
to be proved in a criminal court, the other in a departmental
proceedings, and though both may arise from the same set of facts, yet
there is a clear distinction between the two and merely because one
has been acquitted in a criminal trial, it would not amount to a
reversal of the findings of "misconduct", which were arrived in a
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departmental proceedings......................”
22. In Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Civil Appeal no. 7935 of
2023 dated 04.12.2023), the Apex Court has observed as under:
“25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”,
used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A
court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such
terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded
that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as
21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses
examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the
acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of
the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the
judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to
examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of
expression used.”
23. In Maharana Pratap Singh vs. State of Bihar and Others : 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 890, the Apex Court has observed as under:
“47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically
entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal
from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-
established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal
proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation
assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in
the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive.
This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since
reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of
Rajasthan.
48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges,
evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and
criminal proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials
placed before the Court where such an issue arises........."
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24. In Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another vs. Mehar Singh :
2013 (7) SCC 685, the Apex Court has observed as under:
“25. The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ was considered by
this Court in S. Samuthiram. In that case this Court was
concerned with a situation where disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against a police officer. Criminal case was pending
against him under Section 509 of the IPC and under Section 4 of
the Eveteasing Act. He was acquitted in that case because of the
non-examination of key witnesses. There was a serious flaw in the
conduct of the criminal case. Two material witnesses turned
hostile. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Management of
Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal[12],
where in somewhat similar fact situation, this Court upheld a
bank’s action of refusing to reinstate an employee in service on
the ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by giving
him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an honourable
acquittal, this Court held that the High Court was not justified in
setting aside the punishment imposed in departmental
proceedings. This Court observed that the expressions
‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and ‘fully
exonerated’ are unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the
Penal Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is
difficult to define what is meant by the expression ‘honourably
acquitted’. This Court expressed that when the accused is
acquitted after full consideration of prosecution case and the
prosecution miserably fails to prove the charges leveled against
the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was
honourably acquitted.”
25. In Constable No.118 Awadhes Kumar Pandey (Supra) the Division
Bench having examined the judgement passed by the trial court concluded
that the appellant herein was acquitted and in the disciplinary proceedings he
was punished only on the basis of two days' absence that due to ailment, thus
found the penalty of punishment to be disproportionate, accordingly set-
aside the same and directed the reinstatement of the appellant with 25% back
wages along with all other consequential benefits.
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17
26. The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Anand Kumar vs. Union of India
and Another : 2025 0 AHC 188636: 2025 0 Supreme (All) 3430, having
found various cases of the Apex Court in this regard, observed as under:-
“39. A comparative study of the purpose, scope, procedure and
standards of evidence in departmental enquiries and criminal trials is
crucial for determining the feasibility or advisability of continuing the
two proceedings simultaneously in the facts of this case.
46. In case departmental proceedings are held up for prolonged
periods and delinquent officials are permitted to discharge their
duties in the face of grave charges of misconduct as if it was business
as usual, the consequences will be very grave for departmental
efficiency, image and discipline.”
27. In the aforesaid judgments, the legal position is crystal clear that the
criminal trial and the disciplinary proceedings for the identical allegations
operate in different spheres and both are not dependent on each other.
Merely because an employee is acquitted in a criminal trial, he cannot be
ipso facto reinstated in service due to such acquittal in criminal trial. In the
recent judgments, after considering the previous judgments of the Apex
Court, the Apex Court has categorically observed that merely the facts of
acquittal in a criminal trial would not amount to reversal of findings of
misconduct which were arrived at in the past proceedings. From the
aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court it can be safely concluded that
wherever charges and allegations were identical and the criminal court has
acquitted then it is the duty of the Court to examine whether it was an
honorable acquittal or benefit of doubt has been given to such employee.
Even if there is an honorable acquittal the Court is required to examine
whether the witnesses produced before the Disciplinary Authority and the
criminal trial were the same. If there were the same set of witnesses then on
the basis of the evidence led in the criminal court has acquitted then in such
cases the reinstatement can be granted by the Court. However, if the court on
scrutiny finds that the witnesses examined during the disciplinary
proceedings have supported the allegations, however the same set of
witnesses did not support the criminal trial or that there are some additional
facts which have been proved in the disciplinary proceedings and which
WRIA No. 4116 of 2019
18
were not the subject matter of trial then the court should not interfere in such
concluded disciplinary proceedings.
28. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it would be relevant to take note
of the fact, from the perusal of the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial
court it is apparent that most of the witnesses who were injured were turned
hostile and did not support the prosecution case and the petitioner has been
acquitted on the basis of his own statement, which is similar to the
explanation allegedly submitted by the petitioner to the show-cause notice
before the Disciplinary Authority and the petitioner has been acquitted as the
petitioner, who was examined as DW1 has not been cross-examined by the
prosecution.
29. From perusal of the inquiry report, there is ample evidence with regard
to intoxication of the petitioner while on duty, as immediately after incident,
the medical examination of the petitioner was conducted which has been
duly supported by the witness examined during the inquiry proceedings and
the petitioner was found intoxicated. Thus, the petitioner was found to be
guilty of misconduct and due to the negligence the bullet fired from the
service rifle of the petitioner. Having regard to the facts and record of the
criminal trial as well as disciplinary proceedings, this Court finds that the
evidence led in the disciplinary proceedings was comprehensive one and in
the criminal trial, the petitioner has been acquitted on the basis of key
witnesses turned hostile.
30. Thus, in considered opinion of this Court, it was not a clean acquittal of
the petitioner. Therefore, this Court do not find any good reason to interfere
with the impugned orders passed by Disciplinary Authority, Appellate
Authority as well as the Revisional Authority and accordingly, the instant
petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
(Anish Kumar Gupta,J.)
April 20, 2026
Shubham Arya
Digitally signed by :-
SHUBHAM ARYA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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