D.B.UPADHYAYAversusD.D.C. AND OTHERS

                                                     AFR




                                           Reserved :- March 25, 2026
                                           Delivered :- April 02, 2026


        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                 WRIT - B No. - 12565 of 1982

D.B.Upadhyaya
                                                   …..Petitioner(s)

                            Versus

D.D.C. and others
                                                 …..Respondent(s)


Counsel for Petitioner(s)     : A K Rai, R.n.singh, S.n.singh,
                                Vishnu Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s)     : Chandrajeet    Yadav,     S.C.,
                                S.l.yadav, Upendra Nath Yadav


Court No. - 32


           HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.


1.   Present writ petition, pending before this Court for last
four decades, is arising out of objections filed in consolidation
proceedings u/s 9A(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953 (for short “U.P.C.H. Act”).


2.   Contesting respondents have filed objections in regard to
plot nos. 1100, 4643, 1072, 3275, 883 in village Haraiya,
District Azamgarh. Undisputedly, said plots were recorded in
basic year in the name of Radhey Kishun Upadhyay and
Shridhar Upadhyay (predecessors of present petitioner).
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                                                    WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

3.   Basis of objections filed by contesting respondent-4 were
that he was recorded over land in suit for substantial long
time and therefore by virtue of law, he become adhivasi and
sirdar   being     recorded   in     1956-F      and    1959-F,       whereas
petitioner has opposed said objections on substantial grounds
that he is successor of Radhey Kishun Upadhyay and Shridhar
Upadhyay, the original tenure holder and name of contesting
respondents was recorded only as a ‘sikmi tenant’ with a note
Batai Nisfi as well as that said entries were later on
discontinued also and accordingly, entries were disputed being
not genuine.


4.   The     Consolidation        Officer   vide    a      judgment     dated
23.01.1971       rejected   the     objections     filed    by    contesting
respondent-4 and basis year entries which were in favour of
Radhey     Kishun     Upadhyay       and    Shridhar       Upadhyay     were
directed to be continued. For reference, relevant part of
judgment of Consolidation Officer is quoted below :-

     “In the Khata no. 188 and 73 Kharbhan has
     stated that he has been in possession of the
     five disputed plots for before the abolition
     of zamindari and that he filed a suit u/s
     229B ZA Act which was decreed in his favour
     of copy of the judgment of the learned J.O.
     is on file, the case was decided after the
     village was brought under consolidation
     scheme as the judgment is dated 20.1.69
     whereas notification u/s 41 was made in
     Aug.68.   This  judgment   and   the  decree
     therefore is of no. This case is to be
     decided on merits. Plot no. 3275/-360 is
     recorded in the name of Kharbhan s/o Ram
     Gulam as Shikmi tenant with a note ‘ Batai
     Nisfi’ plot no. 3643/- 288 is recorded in
     his name in class 19 but the disputed plot
     is 4643/-288. There is a mistake. An
     uncertified copy of Khasra 1364F is on file.
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                                        WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

     These are remarks column entry in favour of
     Kharbhan but the plots are not clear, In the
     Consolidated Khasra 1353 to 1364 F main
     column entry continued in favour of Radha
     Krishna etc. In 1356F over plot no. 1072/
     316 Kabiz Kharbhan son of Ramgulam has been
     noted. This entry in 1357 F, 1358F, 1361F,
     1362F, 1363F, and 1364F.

     In 1365 F plot no. 1072/316 is in favour
     Kharbhan. On plot no. 1100/-174 possession
     of Kharbhan is noted in 1357 F, 1359F, 1361,
     1362, 1363, 1364F. There is no such entry in
     1365F against this plot on plot no. 3275,
     possession stands from 1358 F as noted in
     the consolidated khasra, there is no such
     enry in 1363F. There is ag. Remarks col.
     Entry against this plot in 1364 F and 65
     F.I. have perused the statement of ARK who
     appeared before me with the khasra of 1365F.
     He stated that entry of remarks column in
     1365F. Khasra is made but it has been struck
     off (plot no. 1072/-316 similarly in case of
     plot no. 3275/360 Remark Col. Entry has been
     made in red ink but it has been struck of,
     extract of khasra 1365F filed by the defdt.
     Radha Krishna shows that remarks col. Entry
     made there in was struck off. However, there
     are no papers on file to show the possession
     of Kharbhan over the suit and after 1365F
     since there are no such entry in favour of
     Kharbhan   for  the   last  more   than  ten
     years(before the start of consolidation) he
     can hardly before his claim of sirdary
     rights over the same the remarks column
     entry in possession of Kharbhan in 1359F
     after do not seem to be genuine because be
     unfit to have became adhivasi cum sirdar
     1363. On the basis continuity of possession
     over the suit land is not proved from the
     records on file. The objectors Kharbhan has
     not been able to establish his claim of
     sirdari rights. Radha Krishna etc. are the
     kabiz tenure holders of the suit land, the
     issues are accordingly decided.”

4.   Aforesaid judgment was thereafter challenged by way of
three Appeals filed by contesting respondents, however, all
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                                             WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

appeals were dismissed vide a judgment dated 07.05.1971 and
findings returned by the Consolidation Officer were confirmed
with further observation that it was not a case of adverse
possession rather appellants had cultivated land in suit as
Batai Nisfi. Relevant part of said judgment is quoted below :-

     “I have heard the parties and gone through
     the evidence on file. The appellant has
     claimed possession on the disputed land
     since before the enforcement of ZA Act and
     have filed extract of khasra for 12 years to
     prove   his   possession.   The   entry   of
     possession before 1365F to 1359F in favour
     of appellant are in the remarks col. Of the
     Khasra. As held in RD 1966 page 132 such
     entries are against law and cannot be
     recognised for going sirdari rights. As the
     peirod of possession upto 1359F is of no
     avail to the appellant. The entries of
     possession for 1361 F and do not show
     adverse possession of the appellant but show
     that he cultivated all land on batai. This
     conclusion is on the basis of the extract of
     khasra for 12 years filed by the applicant.
     Thus it is not proved that the applicant has
     enttered in adverse possession after the
     enforcement of ZA Act the and the lower
     court is justified in not giving him sirdari
     right I have no reason to interfere with the
     finding of the lower court.

     The appeal has no force and is therefore
     dismissed. This will govern case no. 1025
     and 1029 also.”

5.   Contesting respondents being aggrieved by aforesaid two
judgments have filed three Revision Petitions u/s 48 of
‘U.P.C.H. Act’ before the Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Azamgarh who vide an order dated 26.10.1971 has partly
allowed the revision petitions and interfered with concurrent
findings   returned   by   the   Consolidation   Officer   and   the
Settlement Officer of Consolidation.
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                                                    WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

6.      The Deputy Director of Consolidation has held that
revisionist/contesting respondent-2 has able to prove to an
extent that he was in possession of Gata No. 1072, 1100 and
3275 in 1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F and accordingly,
held that he became firstly adhivasi and later on sirdar of
said plots and accordingly, allowed the revision petition partly
to the extent of said three plots i.e. 1072, 1100 and 3275.


7.      Thereafter, petitioners have filed a restoration/recall
application before D.D.C. concerned which was allowed vide
an order dated 03.10.1972 by D.D.C. itself. Thereafter,
contesting respondents have challenged said order before this
Court in Writ Petition No. 7615/1972. and this Court vide its
order     dated    25.08.1978     remanded      the    matter    back    to
concerned D.D.C. to pass a fresh order. Accordingly, D.D.C.
concerned had reconsidered and rejected the restoration/recall
application vide an order dated 17.09.1982. Relevant part of
Order dated 26.10.1971 passed by D.D.C. is mentioned
hereinafter:-

        “उपरोक्त से यह प्रकट होता है कि प्रार्थी का कब्जा 1072 नम्बर
        पर केवल 56 फसली में दर्ज था तथा 1072, 1100 और 3275
        नम्बर पर 59 फसली में दर्ज है। जमीन्दारी उन्मूलन अधिनियम के
        अन्तर्गत अधिवासी अधिकार 56 तथा 59 फसली के इन्द्राज के
        आधार पर ही हासिल होते हैं। अन्तर केवल यह है कि 56 फसली
        का इन्द्राज यदि नियमानुकूल है तो वह अधिवासी बनने के लिये
        पर्याप्त है। 59 फसली के इन्द्राज के लिये यह आवश्यक है कि
        काबिज व्यक्ति पूरे फसली साल में काबिज रहा हो। विपक्षी की ओर
        से यह तर्क किया गया है कि 56 और 59 फसली में किये गये
        इन्द्राज नियमानुसार नहीं हैं। प्रार्थी का कब्जा खाना कैफियत में लिया
        है जबकि उसे शिकमी के खाने में दर्ज होना चाहिए। विपक्षी की ओर
        से इस सम्बन्ध में लैण्ड रिकार्ड मैनुअल के पैरा 87 पर बहुत बल
        दिया गया है किन्तु उक्त पैरे के प्रोवाइजो में यह भी उल्लेख है कि
        शिकमी के खाने में तभी इन्द्राज किया जायेगा जबकि बटवारा को
        यह इत्तममिनान हो जाये कि सम्बन्धित काश्तकारों के बीच में कोई
        मोआहिदा (कान्ट्रैक्ट) हो गया है। यदि काबिज व्यक्ति और असल
        काश्तकार के बीच में कोई मोआहिदा (कान्ट्रैक्ट) नहीं हुआ है तो
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                                              WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

      कब्जे का इन्द्राज खाना कैफियत में किया जायेगा। इसलिये 1356
      तथा 59 फसली में किये गये इन्द्राज अनियमित नहीं कहे जा
      सकते।

      दाखिल सबूत से यह भलीभाँति साबित है कि प्रार्थी गाटा सं०
      1072, 1100, और 3275 नम्बर पर 58, 59, 61, 62
      फसली में काबिज रहा है। 1360 फसली में कागजात नहीं बने।
      अतः प्रार्थी नियुक्त तिथि पर इन तीनों नम्बरों का सीरदार हो जाता
      है। इन नम्बरों पर विपक्षीगण को मुखालिफाना कब्जे के आधार पर
      सीरदारी हक हासिल करने की अवधि समाप्त नहीं हुई है अतः
      बन्दोबस्त अधिकारी, चकबन्दी तथा चकबन्दी अधिकारी का आदेश
      आं शिक रूप से निरस्त कर यह आदेश दिया जाता है कि प्रार्थी
      गाटा सं० 1072, 1100, और 3275 का सीरदार दर्ज हो।
      मालगुजारी रास्टर रेट से लगाई जायेगी। यह आदेश उपरोक्त तीनों
      निगरानीयों पर लागू होगा।”

8.    Aforesaid both orders dated 26.10.1971 and 17.09.1982
are challenged before this Court in present writ petition.


9.    This Court has passed an interim order on 09.11.1982
that :-

      “Issue notice returnable on the early date.

      Meanwhile,    petitioners   may   not    be
      dispossessed from the land if they have not
      already been dispossessed.”

10.   Sri Durgesh Kumar Singh, learned Senior Advocate
assisted by Sri Vishnu Singh, learned counsel for petitioner
has submitted that concurrent findings on facts as well as on
law returned by two Authorities viz. C.O. and S.O.C. were
lightly interfered by D.D.C. in revisional jurisdiction.


11.   Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that
objections filed by contesting respondents so far as Gata No.
1072, 1100 and 3275 were accepted that he was recorded in
1356-F, 1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F, however, a fact
which was effectively considered by C.O. and S.O.C. that
subsequently, in 1365-F, there was no entry in favour of
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                                                      WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

contesting respondents on plot no. 3275. So far as plot no.
1072 is concerned, entry of respondent in 1365-F was made
but it was struck off. Similarly was the case of plot no. 3275.
The initial entries were recorded in remark column and
subsequent entries were with remark ‘batai nisfi’.


12.     On plot no. 1100 also, there is no entry in 1365-F in
favour of contesting respondents, therefore, nature of entries
for 1356-F, 1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F becomes
important that entries were of ‘sikmi tenant’ with a note of
Batai Nisfi. To declare respondents adhivasi and sirdar, on
basis of revenue records of 1356-F and 1359-F, ignoring above
referred facts, would not be a correct approach.


13.     Learned    Senior   Advocate         for   petitioner   has    further
submitted that in order to prove adverse possession, there
must be a clear and inequivable evidence that possession was
hostile to real owner. There must be animus of person doing
those    act     which   must    be        ascertained   from    facts     and
circumstances of the case, however, D.D.C. in a very cursory
manner     has    interfered    with       concurrent    findings     of   two
authorities. Even there is no specific finding that concerned
respondent was in hostile possession for more than 12 years.


14.     Per contra, S/Sri ChandraJeet Yadav and Upendra Nath
Yadav have vehemently opposed above submissions and placed
heavy reliance upon the judgment of Deputy Director of
Consolidation that once name of contesting respondents was
recorded for many years, obviously, it would become hostile.
Two Authorities i.e. C.O. and S.O.C. have misread revenue
                               8
                                           WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

records so much as that they have ignored possession of
contesting respondents on three plots referred above for a very
long period as well as that petitioners have never taken steps
for eviction. Respondents have become adhivasi and sirdar on
basis of revenue entry of 1356-F and 1359-F and it were
rightly considered by the D.D.C.


15.   Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the
records.


16.   It is a case where concurrent findings of two Authorities
i.e. C.O. and S.O.C. were disturbed by Revisional Authority
i.e. D.D.C. and Revisions were partly allowed qua to plot nos.
1072, 1100 and 3275 and that contesting respondent-2 has
possession over said plots in nature of adverse possession as
well as they become adhivasi and sirdar.


17.   In order to consider rival submissions, Court proceeded
to consider concurrent finding returned by the Consolidation
Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation that name of
contesting respondent was recorded on the above referred
three plots in 1356-F, 1358-F, 1359-F, 1361-F and 1362-F as
‘sikmi’ with a note of Batai Nisfi, however, their name were
not recorded in subsequent fasli years i.e. there was no entry
in favour of contesting respondent ( kharban) for last more
than 10 years before consolidation commenced and that
findings was not considered by Revisional Court, therefore, it
was not set aside, despite it has legal consequence.


18.   In view of above, one of basic ingredients to prove
adverse possession is that hostile possession be continued for
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                                             WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

more than 12 years before it was raised but on basis of
undisputed revenue record, it was absolutely missing.


19.     In above circumstances, a findings returned by the
Revisional Court on basis of revenue records of 1356-F, 1359-
F, 1362-F and 1365-F were erroneous since it would fall short
of requirement to prove adverse possession, when continuous
possession of contesting respondent was not proved on basis
of subsequent revenue entries as admittedly said respondents’
name were not recorded thereafter.


20.     In view of above, entry of ‘sikmi tenant’ with a note of
Batai Nisfi would also become relevant that it was a
permissive possession and not an adverse possession.


21.     Otherwise also, Court finds that basic ingredient to prove
adverse possession i.e. nec vi nec clam and nec precario are
absolutely missing.


22.     In this regard, Court takes note of a judgment of this
Court      in   Mata    Din   Singh    vs.   DDC     and     others,
2023:AHC:158629 and for reference, relevant paragraph is
quoted below :-

        “28. Recently the Supreme Court in Uttam
        Chand (Dead) through LRs vs. Nath Ram (Dead)
        through LRs and others, 2020 (11) SCC 263
        has   reiterated   earlier   judgments   and
        observed that -:
        “15. The matter has been examined by a
        Constitution  Bench   in  M.   Siddiq  (Ram
        Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v Suresh Das [M.
        Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v.
        Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1] wherein, it has
        been held that a plea of adverse possession
        is founded on the acceptance that ownership
                   10
                             WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

of the property vests in another, against
whom the claimant asserts possession adverse
to the title of the other. The Court held as
under: (SCC pp. 703-706, paras 1142-1143 &
1147-1150)
1142. A plea of adverse possession is
founded on the acceptance that ownership of
the property vests in another against whom
the claimant asserts a possession adverse to
the title of the other. Possession is
adverse in the sense that it is contrary to
the acknowledged title in the other person
against whom it is claimed.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse
possession must establish both possession
which is peaceful, open and continuous
possession which meets the requirement of
being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To
substantiate a plea of adverse possession,
the character of the possession must be
adequate in continuity and in the public
because the possession has to be to the
knowledge of the true owner in order for it
to be adverse. These requirements have to be
duly established first by adequate pleadings
and second by leading sufficient evidence.
Evidence, it is well settled, can only be
adduced with reference to matters which are
pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence
of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself
cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded
case. Reading Para 11(a), it becomes evident
that beyond stating that the Muslims have
been in long, exclusive and continuous
possession beginning from the time when the
Mosque   was   built   and   until   it   was
desecrated,   no  factual   basis  has   been
furnished. This is not merely a matter of
details or evidence. A plea of adverse
possession seeks to defeat the rights of the
true owner and the law is not readily
accepting of such a case unless a clear and
cogent basis has been made out in the
pleadings and established in the evidence.
***
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                               WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

1147. In Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. &
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri)
1038] , R.S. Sarkaria, J. speaking for a
three-Judge Bench of this Court noted that
the concept of possession is polymorphous
embodying both a right (the right to enjoy)
and a fact (the real intention). The learned
Judge held: (SCC p. 278, para 13)
13.   It   is   impossible    to  work   out   a
completely logical and precise definition of
possession    uniformly    applicable  to    all
situations in the contexts of all statutes.
Dias    and    Hughes   in    their   book    on
Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever
suffered from too much theorising it is that
of possession. Much of this difficulty and
confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's
Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 1966) caused by
the fact that possession is not purely a
legal concept. Possession, implies a right
and a fact; the right to enjoy annexed to
the right of property and the fact of the
real intention. It involves power of control
and intent to control. (See Dias and Hughes,
ibid.) These observations were made in the
context of possession in Section 29(b) of
the Arms Act, 1959.
1148. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi
Reddy [P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy,
1957 SCR 195 : AIR 1957 SC 314] ,
Jagannadhadas, J. speaking for a three-Judge
Bench of this Court dwelt on the classical
requirement of adverse possession: (AIR pp.
317-18, para 4)
4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement
of adverse possession is that it should be
nec vi nec clam nec precario. (See Secy. of
State for India in Council v. Debendra Lal
Khan [Secy. of State for India in Council v.
Debendra Lal Khan, 1933 SCC OnLine PC 65 :
(1933-34) 61 IA 78] IA at p. 82.) The
possession required must be adequate in
continuity, in publicity and in extent to
show that it is possession adverse to the
competitor.
                   12
                             WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

The Court cited the following extract from
U.N. Mitra's Tagore Law Lectures on the Law
of Limitation and Prescription: (AIR p. 319,
para 7)
7. An adverse holding is an actual and
exclusive appropriation of land commenced
and continued under a claim of right, either
under an openly avowed claim, or under a
constructive claim (arising from the acts
and      circumstances     attending      the
appropriation), to hold the land against him
(sic)   who  was   in  possession.   (Angell,
Sections 390 and 398). It is the intention
to claim adversely accompanied by such an
invasion of the rights of the opposite party
as gives him a cause of action which
constitutes adverse possession. [ 6th Edn.,
Vol. I, Lecture VI, at p. 159]
This Court held: (AIR p. 319, para 7)
Consonant    with    this    principle    the
commencement   of  adverse   possession,   in
favour of a person implies that the person
is in actual possession, at the time, with a
notorious hostile claim of exclusive title,
to repel which, the true owner would then be
in a position to maintain an action. It
would follow that whatever may be the animus
or intention of a person wanting to acquire
title by adverse possession his adverse
possession cannot commence until he obtains
actual possession with the requisite animus.
1149. In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of
India [Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of
India, (2004) 10 SCC 779] , S. Rajendra
Babu, J. speaking for a two-Judge Bench held
that: (SCC p. 785, para 11)
11. Physical fact of exclusive possession
and the animus possidendi to hold as owner
in exclusion to the actual owner are the
most important factors that are to be
accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of
adverse possession is not a pure question of
law but a blended one of fact and law.
Therefore, a person who claims adverse
possession should show: (a) on what date he
came into possession, (b) what was the
nature of his possession, (c) whether the
                               13
                                          WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

      factum of possession was known to the other
      party, (d) how long his possession has
      continued, and (e) his possession was open
      and undisturbed.
      The ingredients must be set up in the
      pleadings and proved in evidence. There can
      be no proof sans pleadings and pleadings
      without evidence will not establish a case
      in law.
      1150.   In   Annakili   v.   A.   Vedanayagam
      [Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam, (2007) 14 SCC
      308] , this Court emphasised that mere
      possession of land would not ripen into a
      possessory title. The possessor must have
      animus possidendi and hold the land adverse
      to the title of the true owner. Moreover, he
      must continue in that capacity for the
      period prescribed under the Limitation Act.”

23.   The D.D.C has not considered claim of the respondent
on basis of ‘adverse possession’ but on nature revenue entries
that the respondent was recorded on plot no. 1072 in 1356-F
as well as recorded on plot no. 1072, 1100 and 3275 in 1359-
F, therefore, respondent became ‘Adhivasi’ and in regard to
entry of ‘sikmis’ is concerned, the D.D.C. held that such
entries would be made only after ‘partition or any contract’,
therefore, ‘sikmi’ was a legal entry and further held that
respondent became Sirdar on basis year i.e. in 1362-F so far
as above referred three plots. The findings in regard to
‘partition’ or ‘contract’ were based on assumption and not on
records, therefore, are unsustainable.


24.   The Deputy Director of Consolidation has returned a
finding that Respondent-2 become firstly adhivasi and later on
sirdar in a very cursory manner only on basis that he was
recorded in 1356-F, 1359-F and 1362-F on three plots without
taking note nature and manner of entry, i.e., whether it was
                                  14
                                              WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

recorded in accordance with the provisions of Land Revenue
Act as well as that subsequently, i.e., in 1365 Fasli his name
was cut off. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has also
ignored the findings of two authorities on basis of record that
10 years prior to consolidation proceedings commenced, name
of Respondent-2 was not recorded. It would become more
important when Deputy Director of Consolidation has not even
considered plea of adverse possession.


25.    I have already discussed in earlier paragraphs that plea
of adverse possession raised by Respondent-2 in objection, was
not legally made out. So far as entries of 1356-F, 1359-F and
1362-F are concerned, in this regard the Court takes note of
judgments passed by Supreme Court in Bachan and another
vs. Kankar and others, (1972) 2 SCC 555 that if entries are
not genuine, it would not confer any Adivasi right and for
that the Court takes note of detail reasons assigned by
Consolidation Officer on basis of record that there was no
document to show possession of respondent over suit land
after 1365-F since there was no such entry in his favour for
last   more   than   10   years   before   start   of   consolidation
proceedings as well as that on basis of entries in remark
column in 1356-F, 1359-F it cannot be a genuine entry,
therefore, he cannot be declared Adivasi or Sirdar on basis of
such nature of entry of 1362-F. The DDC without much
deliberation on manner of entries of 1356-F, 1359-F and 1362-
F has wrongly proceeded to declare that respondents became
adhivasi and sirdar. Relevant paragraphs of above referred
judgment are quoted below :-
                   15
                             WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

“15. This Court in Sonawati v. Sri Ram [AIR
1968 SC 466(1968) 1 SCR 617 :] said that
Section 20 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1951 conferred certain
rights   upon   persons  whose   names   were
recorded in the revenue records in respect
of agricultural land. In Sonawati case this
Court found that there was strong evidence
which was relied on by the Revenue Court
that the name of Pritam Singh predecessor-
in-interest    of    the    appellants    was
surreptitiously entered in the Khasra. The
first appellate court there did not at all
consider that evidence. The surreptitious
entry in Sonawati case was held by this
Court to disentitle the appellants to any
adhivasi right under Section 20 of the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act.

16. This Court recently in Ram Das v. Deputy
Director of Consolidation, Ballia, [(1971) 1
SCC 460 : AIR 1971 SC 673] dealt with the
contention of the appellants on the one hand
who were recorded as Sir Khudkasht-holders
of the plots in dispute and the contention
of the respondents on the other who were
entered as sub-tenants in respect of those
plots in the year 1356 Fasli. Suits were
filed between the parties. A compromise was
entered into the suits. It was admitted by
the respondents that the appellants were
Bhoomidars and that the respondents had no
interest. The further admission in the
compromise was that the entry in the revenue
records in favour of the respondents was
fictitious.   The  respondents  subsequently
applied for setting aside the compromise
decrees on the ground that they had been
obtained fraudulently. During the pendency
of the suits consolidation proceedings under
the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953
commenced.   The  Consolidation  Authorities
held that the suits were not maintainable
because on the date on which the suits were
filed the respondents had become sirdars.
The appellants filed a writ petition under
Article 226 challenging the order of the
Consolidation Authorities. The High Court
held in that case relying on the earlier
decisions of that Court that even if the
                              16
                                           WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

      entry was fictitious the respondents who
      were recorded as occupants would, under
      Section   20(b)   of  the   U.P.   Zamindari
      Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 become
      adhivasi of the disputed land. This Court
      relying on the earlier decision in Sonawati
      case held that there was evidence to show
      that the entry was fictitious and the person
      whose name was entered on the record on the
      material date could not claim the right of
      an adhivasi.”

26.   The above referred case was followed in Chandrika
Prasad vs. Pullo (D) by LRs and others, (2000) 4 SCC 227 and
for reference, relevant paragraph is quoted below :-

      “22. xxxxx

      xxxxx

      xxxxx

      xxxxx

      xxxxx

      5. It was submitted by learned counsel for
      the appellants that if the entry was not
      correct, it could not be regarded as an
      entry made according to law at all and the
      right to take or retain possession of the
      land could not be determined on the basis of
      an incorrect entry. He placed reliance on
      the decision of this Court in Bachan v.
      Kankar [(1972) 2 SCC 555 : (1973) 1 SCR
      727 : AIR 1972 SC 2157] . In that judgment
      the nature of the entries in khasra or
      khatauni is discussed and it is also
      discussed as to how this entry should be
      made. This Court held that entries which are
      not genuine cannot confer adhivasi rights.
      It has been observed that an entry under
      Section 20(b) of the said Act, in order to
      enable a person to obtain adhivasi rights,
      must be an entry under the provisions of law
      and entries which are not genuine cannot
      confer adhivasi rights. In that judgment it
      has been stated that the High Court was
                              17
                                          WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

      wrong when it held that though the entry was
      incorrect, it could not be said to be
      fictitious. That observation, however, has
      to be understood in the context of what
      follows, namely, that an entry which is
      incorrectly introduced into the records by
      reason of ill-will or hostility is not only
      shorn of authenticity but also becomes
      utterly useless without any lawful basis.
      This judgment, in our view, does not lay
      down   that   all   incorrect   entries  are
      fictitious but only lays down that a wrong
      entry or incorrect entry which has been made
      by reason of ill-will or hostility cannot
      confer any right under Section 20(b) of the
      said Act. This decision is clarified by a
      subsequent judgment of this Court in Vishwa
      Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan [(1976) 3
      SCC 642 : 1976 Supp SCR 519 : AIR 1976 SC
      1485] where it has been held as follows (at
      p. 1488 of AIR): (SCC p. 645, para 14)

      ‘It is true that the entries in the revenue
      record ought, generally, to be accepted at
      their face value and courts should not
      embark upon an appellate inquiry into their
      correctness.   But    the   presumption   of
      correctness can apply only to genuine, not
      forged    or   fraudulent,    entries.   The
      distinction may be fine but it is real. The
      distinction is that one cannot challenge the
      correctness of what the entry in the revenue
      record states but the entry is open to the
      attack that it was made fraudulently or
      surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a
      document of all its legal effect and cannot
      found a claim to possessory title.’

                                    (emphasis supplied)”

27.   Above referred findings of Consolidation Officer were
upheld by Settlement Officer of Consolidation, however, it was
very lightly interfered by Deputy Director of Consolidation,
therefore, interference is legally unsustainable as well as
above discussed legal position is also against the contesting
respondents.
                                                                  18
                                                                              WRIB No. - 12565 of 1982

                            28.         Therefore, impugned judgment passed by Deputy Director
                            of Consolidation is accordingly set aside and judgments passed
                            by          Consolidation   Officer   and    Settlement     Officer    of
                            Consolidation are upheld.


                            29.         Writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.



                                                             (SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.)

                            April 02, 2026
                            [N. Sinha]




Digitally signed by :-
NIRMAL SINHA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad