RAZIA @ DULARIAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 3 OTHERS

                                                           Reserved
         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

                     WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

Razia @ Dularia                                      …..Petitioner(s)
                                   Versus
State of U.P. and 3 others                          …..Respondent(s)

Along with :

1.   Writ - C No. 17001 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
2.   Writ - C No. 14046 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
3.   Writ - C No. 17044 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
4.   Writ - C No. 14413 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
5.   Writ - C No. 6172 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                 Versus
     State of UP and 3 others
6.   Writ - C No. 13980 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
7.    Writ - C No. 14356 of 2026:
      Razia @ Dularia
                                    2
                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
8.   Writ - C No. 14042 of 2026:
     Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
     State of U.P. and 3 others
9.    Writ - C No. 14418 of 2026:
      Razia @ Dularia
                  Versus
      State of U.P. and 3 others



Counsel for Petitioner(s)         : Panchu Ram Maurya, Shashank
                                    Maurya
Counsel for Respondent(s)         : C.S.C., Pradeep Singh


Court No. - 51

                   HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.

1.    Heard Sri P. R. Maurya and Sri Shashank Maurya, learned counsel
for the petitioners, Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned Senior Advocate and
Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri Abhishek Shukla, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel & Sri Anubhav Chandra, learned
Standing Counsel, for the State respondents and Sri Pradeep Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent Gaon Sabha.

2.    All the connected writ petitions have been filed challenging
separate orders dated 22.01.2026 passed by the competent revenue
authority/Dy. Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, the respondent
no.3, in proceedings under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), whereby the
transfer of the land in favour of the petitioner, having been held at
different point of time, have been held to be in violation of the
provisions of Section 157-B, of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950/ Section 99 of the Code and consequently void, along
with the direction to vest of the land in the State Government.
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                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

3.    The facts of the case are that the petitioner, Razia @ Dularia,
resident of Village Dhorpa, Pargana and Tehsil Duddhi, District
Sonbhadra, claims to belong to the Panika Scheduled Tribe by birth. She
claims to be the daughter of Sardar, who belonged to the Panika
community, and relies upon a Scheduled Tribe certificate issued in her
favour by the Tehsildar, Duddhi on 14.12.2012. Thereafter, she
purchased the agricultural lands in dispute, situated at Village Bagharu,
Pargana and Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, by means of registered
sale deeds. According to the petitioner, her Vendors also belonged to the
Panika Scheduled Tribe and, consequently, the transaction was between
two persons belonging to the Scheduled Tribe. The petitioner asserts that
the caste status of the parties was disclosed in the sale deeds itself and
that she has remained in physical possession of the property ever since
the transaction.

4.    The registered sale deeds remained unchallenged before any
competent court for more than ten years and was never cancelled.
Revenue entries in favour of the petitioner were also made pursuant to
the sale deeds.

5.    Subsequently, proceedings were initiated by the competent
revenue authority under Sections 104 and 105 of the Code. Notice dated
12.12.2025 was issued to the petitioner, who submitted her reply on
29.12.2025. In her reply, she denied the allegations and reiterated that
she was a member of the Panika Scheduled Tribe, that the vendor was
also a member of the Scheduled Tribe and that there had been no
concealment or violation of the statutory provisions. She relied upon her
Scheduled Tribe certificate, the registered sale deeds and the revenue
records. The Deputy Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, the
respondent no.3, however, by separate orders dated 22.01.2026, held the
sale deeds, being in contravention of the provisions of section 99 of the
Code/ Section 157-B, of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, is void, and directed that the disputed land be dealt
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                                           WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

with in accordance with the statutory consequences, including vesting in
the State Government.

6.    Aggrieved by the orders of the respondent no.3, dated 22.01.2026,
the petitioner has consequently approached this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution seeking quashing of the said orders and protection of
her possession over the property.

7.    Writ-C No. 13921 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 05.03.2014,executed by Ram Baran, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.3725 hectare land in plot nos. 1485 Ka, 1486 Kha, 1487 Ga,
1514 Gha, 1516, 1517, 1522, 1523Ka and 2284Ka, total area 2.8970
hectares, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra,
has been held to be void.

8.    Writ-C No. 13980 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 19.09.2012, executed by Ram Baran, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.3370 hectare land in plot nos. 1485 Ka, 1486 Kha, 1487 Ga,
1514 Gha, 1516, 1517, 1522, 1523Ka and 2284Ka, total area 2.8970
hectares, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra,
has been held to be void.

9.    Writ-C No. 14413 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 21.06.2012, executed by Jitendra, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.3420 hectare land in plot no. 5612 area 0.4680 hectares,
situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, has been
held to be void.

10.   Writ-C No. 6172 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 07.11.2013, executed by Ram Vriksha, in favour of the petitioner,
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                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

in respect of 0.3922 hectare land in plot nos. 1485 Ka, 1486 Kha, 1487
Ga, 1514 Gha, 1516, 1517, 1522, 1523Ka and 2284Ka, total area 2.8970
hectares, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra,
has been held to be void.

11.   Writ-C No. 17001 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 07.11.2015, executed by Shiv Prasad, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.1265 hectare land in plot nos. 3602, 3603, 3600, 3596 and
3597Kha, total area 0.3795 hectare, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil
Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, has been held to be void.

12.   Writ-C No. 14046 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 05.03.2014, executed by Jafdhari, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.3725 hectare land in plot nos. 1485 Ka, 1486 Kha, 1487 Ga,
1514 Gha, 1516, 1517, 1522, 1523Ka and 2284Ka, total area 2.8970
hectares, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra,
has been held to be void.

13.   Writ-C No. 17044 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 08.02.2016, executed by Ramdhani, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.0315 hectare land in plot nos. 4021 and 4022, total area
0.1260 hectare, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District
Sonbhadra, has been held to be void.

14.   Writ-C No. 14356 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 27.12.2014, executed by Kaulesar, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 1.1510 hectare land in plot no. 5621 Kha area 1.1510 hectare,
situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, has been
held to be void.
                                     6
                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

15.   Writ-C No. 14042 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 26.11.2013, executed by Ram Baran, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.2780 hectare land in plot nos. 1485 Ka, 1486 Kha, 1487 Ga,
1514 Gha, 1516, 1517, 1522, 1523Ka and 2284Ka, total area 2.8970
hectares, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra,
has been held to be void.

16.   Writ-C No. 14418 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 04.11.2015, executed by Smt. Subaria, in favour of the petitioner,
in respect of 0.0210 hectare land in plot nos. 3177 Ka and 3178, total
area 0.0630 hectare, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District
Sonbhadra, has been held to be void.

17.   In respect of all the aforesaid writ petitions filed by Razia and
Writ-C Nos. 17043 of 2026, 17171 of 2026 and 17214 of 2026, filed by
Nanhki @ Naimunnisha, the State has filed one counter affidavit only in
Writ – C No. 13921 of 2026, bringing on record the enquiry reports in
respect of all the disputed sale deeds executed in favour of the
petitioners of all the connected petitions. Due to difference of certain
facts between the case of Razia @ Dularia and Nanhki @ Naimunnisha,
a separate order is being passed deciding the Writ- C Nos. 17043 of
2026, 17171 of 2026 and 17214 of 2026, filed by Nanhki, even though
all the connected cases were heard together.

18.   The learned counsel for the petitioner disputed the allegation of
conversion of the petitioner to Islam. It is submitted that she continues to
belong to the Panika Scheduled Tribe and has not abandoned her original
religion or tribal identity. It is contended that the mere fact that she
married Bahadur Ali according to Islamic rites, or that certain documents
describe her as Muslim, cannot conclusively establish that she ceased to
belong to the Scheduled Tribe. She continued to live in her village and
                                      7
                                              WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

follow the customs of the Scheduled Tribe and that there is no reliable
evidence demonstrating her severance from the Panika community.

19.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned
order proceeds upon an erroneous assumption that a person belonging to
a Scheduled Tribe automatically loses her tribal status upon marriage to
a man of another religion. According to learned counsel, the petitioner's
status was acquired by birth and there is no provision in the Constitution
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 analogous to paragraph 3 of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which excludes a person
from Scheduled Tribe status merely on account of change of religion,
due to marriage. It is therefore submitted that even assuming the
petitioner had adopted another religion, that circumstance could not by
itself extinguish the status acquired by birth.

20.   Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of
Gujarat, 2012 (3) SCC 400, to contend that a status acquired by birth is
not ordinarily displaced merely by marriage with a person belonging to
another community. It is submitted that marriage, by itself, does not
automatically extinguish a status acquired by birth, particularly where
the person continues to retain the characteristics and acceptance of the
concerned community.

21.   It is next submitted that the petitioner was issued a Scheduled
Tribe certificate on 14.12.2012 by the competent authority after due
inquiry and verification and that the registered sale deeds itself disclosed
the caste status of the parties. Learned counsel submits that there was,
therefore, no concealment of the petitioner's caste status and that the
State cannot, after several years, simply disregard a certificate issued by
its own competent authority. The absence of any order cancelling the
certificate has also been emphasised. It is contended that the inquiry
upon which the impugned order rests was conducted many years after
the marriage and relies substantially upon circumstances relating to
                                       8
                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

marriage and religion which, even if true, cannot conclusively establish
loss of tribal status.

22.    The petitioner has further assailed the proceedings on the ground
of delay. It is submitted that almost all the sale deeds were executed
between 2012 and 2016, whereas notice under Sections 104 and 105 was
issued only on 12.12.2025. After more than a decade, the State,
according to learned counsel, could not reopen a concluded and
registered transaction merely on the basis of a subsequently generated
inquiry, particularly when the sale deed was never cancelled and the
caste particulars of the parties were disclosed therein. It is also argued
that the petitioner has remained in possession and that the delay, in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation, renders the proceedings
arbitrary.

23.    The petitioner has also alleged non-consideration of material
evidence and violation of natural justice. It is submitted that the
Scheduled Tribe certificate, registered sale deed and revenue records
were placed before the competent authority but were not properly
considered and that the petitioner was not afforded a meaningful
opportunity to establish her status.

24.    Per contra, learned Senior Counsel/Additional Advocate General
assisted by learned counsel appearing for the State respondents has
submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the
efficacious statutory remedy available under Section 210 of the Code. It
is contended that the impugned order is revisable before the competent
revisional authority/Board of Revenue and that the petitioner ought to
have exhausted the statutory remedy rather than directly invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance has been placed upon
Paltoo Ram Yadav v. State of U.P. & Others, Neutral Citation No.
2023:AHC:166655, in support of the objection regarding availability of
the revisional remedy.
                                     9
                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

25.   On merits, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the
petitioner's Scheduled Tribe status had ceased to be available to her by
the relevant date in view of her subsequent religious and social identity.
The respondents rely upon the inquiry reports dated 19.11.2025,
18.12.2025 and 19.01.2026, the statements recorded during the inquiry,
identity documents and the family register. According to the State, the
material establishes that the petitioner, originally known as Dularia,
married Bahadur Ali in 1986 according to Islamic rites, thereafter
adopted the name Razia, lived with him for several decades and raised
children bearing Muslim names, namely Ajmat Ali, Wajid Ali and Ashraf
Ali. The family register, according to the respondents, records her
religion as Muslim. These circumstances are relied upon not as an
isolated instance of inter-religious marriage but as evidence of a
prolonged adoption of a different religious and social identity.

26.   It was further submited that the petitioner has not produced any
substantive   material   demonstrating     that,   notwithstanding   these
circumstances, she continued to follow the customs, traditions and social
practices of the Panika Scheduled Tribe, continued to participate in its
community life or continued to be recognised and accepted by the
Panika community as one of its members. Learned counsel therefore
submits that once the respondents placed before the authority material
indicating a long-standing identity inconsistent with the tribal status
claimed by the petitioner, a mere assertion in the pleadings that she
continued to be a member of the Panika tribe was insufficient.

27.   The learned Senior Counsel distinguished the case of Rameshbhai
Dabhai Naika (supra) on the ground that it concerned the status of a
child in the context of marriage and parentage and cannot be treated as
laying down that a person who has completely severed her connection
with the tribal community and adopted another religious and social
identity continues to enjoy the statutory benefits reserved for members
of the Scheduled Tribe. He submitted that the present case is
                                       10
                                                WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

distinguishable because their case is based upon a prolonged course of
conduct and social identity and not merely upon the fact of marriage.

28.   Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of Kerala v. Chandramohanan, 2004(3) SCC 429. It is
submitted that the Supreme Court recognised that a member of a tribe
may continue to remain a member notwithstanding conversion if the
person continues to possess the tribal traits and follows the customs and
traditions of the tribe. In such a situation, it has to be established that a
person who has embraced another religion is still suffering from social
disability and also following the customs and tradition of the community,
which he earlier belonged to.

29.   Reliance has also been placed upon the decision in Chinthada
Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, 2026 (3) Supreme 514, the
relevant paragraph reads as under:-

        “From the above, it becomes clear, that once a person belonging to
        a Scheduled Tribe converts to another religion, ultimately through
        the passage of time, the customs, rituals and other traits of that
        particular tribe may fall into eclipse. If so, in such circumstance, it
        is proved that the person in question has completely renounced
        himself from the customs, rituals and other traits of his tribe, and
        has assimilated into the converted religion following the practices
        and customs of that particular religion, a reasonable inference can
        be drawn that such a person shall not be considered a part of the
        tribe.”


30.   The learned Senior Counsel further argued that the petitioner
cannot derive any advantage from the Scheduled Tribe certificate dated
14.12.2012 if, as alleged, the certificate was obtained by suppression of
material facts. It is contended that the petitioner represented herself as
the daughter of Sardar and relied upon her tribal origin without
disclosing the long-standing marriage with Bahadur Ali, the subsequent
name Razia and the circumstances relating to her religious and social
                                    11
                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

identity. A certificate obtained upon a false or incomplete factual
representation, cannot become conclusive merely because it was issued
by a public authority. The competent authority was consequently
justified in examining the petitioner's actual status when the relevant
facts came to light.

31.   The respondents have also relied upon Sections 99, 104 and 105
of the Code and Section 157-B of the repealed U. P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Their submission is that the statutory
protection attaches to land belonging to a member of the Scheduled
Tribe and restricts its transfer to a person who does not possess the status
prescribed by the statute. Consequently, if the petitioner did not possess
the requisite Scheduled Tribe status on the date of transfer in her favour,
it was prohibited notwithstanding the registration of the sale deed.
Registration, payment of consideration or mutation in the revenue
records, according to the respondents, cannot validate a transaction
which the statute itself prohibits. The consequence of a prohibited
transfer, they submit, is governed by Sections 104 and 105 of the Code.
In support of their argument reliance has been placed on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Additional Commissioner, Revenue v. Akhlaq
Hussain and another, 2020 (4) SCC 507.

32.   The State has further placed reliance upon the subsequent
cancellation of the declaration under Section 80 of the Code on
30.03.2026, contending that the same also supports its case that the
petitioner's claim over the land was legally defective. The petitioner
disputes the legality of that subsequent cancellation and maintains that
she had not violated any provision of law. The respondents have also
urged that the protective provisions relating to tribal land cannot be
defeated by delay, registration of the document or other equitable
considerations.

33.   Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties and having perused the material brought on record, the
                                     12
                                                WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

first question which arises for consideration is the preliminary objection
regarding availability of an alternative statutory remedy. Learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the State has submitted that the impugned orders
are revisable under Section 210 of the Code and that the petitioner ought
to have availed the said remedy. There can be no quarrel with the general
proposition that where an efficacious statutory remedy is available, this
Court ordinarily exercises self-restraint in entertaining a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The rule, however, is one of discretion
and does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of the
constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

34.   In the present case, the controversy is not confined to a challenge
to the appreciation of evidence by the revenue authority. The
proceedings concern transfers made prior to the commencement of the
substantive provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006,
whereas the impugned orders have been passed in proceedings under
Sections 104 and 105 of the Code. The question as to the statutory
regime governing such pre-Code transactions, and the applicability of
the protective provisions relating to transfers by members of the
Scheduled Tribe, therefore, arises for consideration. The matter also
involves the legal test for determining whether a person admittedly born
in a Scheduled Tribe continued to possess that status on the respective
dates of the transactions. These questions bear upon the legality of the
very exercise undertaken by the revenue authority. In the circumstances,
and having regard to the nature of the questions arising for
determination, this Court considers it appropriate to examine the
challenge on merits rather than relegate the petitioner to another round of
proceedings. The decision of the Coordinate Bench in Qamar Abbas v.
Additional Commissioner, 2024 (1) ADJ 640, also indicates that the
existence of a statutory remedy does not result in mechanical rejection of
a writ petition in every case. The preliminary objection regarding
alternative remedy is, accordingly, rejected.
                                        13
                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

35.   The central question, on merits of the controversy, is whether the
petitioner possessed the status of a member of the Panika Scheduled
Tribe on each of the respective dates on which the disputed sale deeds
were executed. The fact that the petitioner claims to have been born in
the Panika community is not, by itself, decisive of the question which
arises in the present proceedings. What is required to be examined is
whether, notwithstanding the circumstances relied upon by the
respondents concerning her subsequent religious and social identity, she
continued to possess the tribal identity and community affiliation
necessary to constitute membership of the Scheduled Tribe on the
respective dates of the transactions.

36.   The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that mere
conversion to another religion does not, by itself, automatically
extinguish Scheduled Tribe status is well founded to that limited extent.
In Chandramohanan (supra), the Supreme Court held that there can be
no broad proposition of law that a person ceases to be a member of a
Scheduled Tribe merely by reason of change of religion. The question
whether, notwithstanding conversion, a person continues to remain a
member of the tribe is essentially a question of fact, to be determined
with reference to the tribal traits, customs, traditions and continuing
connection with the tribal community. The same principle has been
reiterated in Chinthada Anand (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has
clarified that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not
prescribe any religion-based exclusion and that the determination of
Scheduled Tribe status must turn upon whether the claimant continues to
possess and is recognised for the essential attributes of tribal identity,
including customary practices, social organisation, community life and
acceptance by the concerned tribal community. Thus, conversion,
considered in isolation, cannot be treated as an inflexible rule resulting
in extinction of Scheduled Tribe status; the issue has to be determined on
the facts and evidence of each case.
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                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

37.   The decision of the Supreme Court in Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika
(supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, does not
directly govern the controversy involved in the present case. That
decision was principally concerned with determination of the Scheduled
Tribe status of a child born from an inter-community marriage and the
relevance of upbringing, social circumstances and acceptance by the
tribal community in determining such status. It does, however, reinforce
the principle that the question of tribal identity and community affiliation
cannot be determined by applying an inflexible rule divorced from the
factual circumstances of the case. The question before this Court,
however, is different, namely, whether the petitioner, admittedly born in
the Panika community, continued to retain the attributes and community
affiliation necessary to constitute membership of the Scheduled Tribe on
the dates of the transactions in question. That question has to be
examined in the light of the principles laid down specifically with regard
to conversion and continuing tribal identity in Chandramohanan (supra)
and Chinthada Anand (supra).

38.   On this aspect, the material relied upon by the respondents
assumes significance. Their case is not confined to the fact that the
petitioner married Bahadur Ali. The material discloses a course of
circumstances extending over several decades. The petitioner, originally
known as Dularia, married Bahadur Ali in 1986 and thereafter came to
be known as Razia. She lived with him for a prolonged period; children
were born from the relationship and bear Muslim names; the family
register records her religion as Muslim; and other documents and inquiry
material have been relied upon to show the identity under which she
subsequently lived. These circumstances cannot be treated as conclusive
individually, but neither can they be ignored when the Court is required
to determine the factual question of continuing tribal identity.

39.   What is of particular importance is the absence of convincing
evidence from the petitioner showing continuity of her connection with
                                     15
                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

the Panika community. Upon consideration of the material placed before
the competent authority and the material brought on record before this
Court, the Court finds that the petitioner has not satisfactorily established
continuity of her connection with the Panika community by producing
credible    material    demonstrating     that,   notwithstanding      those
circumstances, she continued to follow the customs and traditions of the
Panika Scheduled Tribe, continued to participate in its social and
community life and continued to be recognised and accepted by that
community. The material before the Court does not satisfactorily
establish such continuity. The petitioner has principally denied
conversion and asserted that she continued to belong to the Panika tribe,
but the assertion is not supported by sufficient substantive material
showing the actual continuance of tribal customs, social relations or
community recognition.

40.   The Court is conscious that a person cannot be required to prove
tribal status by demonstrating observance of every custom of the
community throughout her life, nor can a single document describing her
religion as Muslim be treated as determinative. The conclusion reached
herein is not based upon any such rigid test. It is based upon the
cumulative effect of the circumstances brought on record and, equally
importantly, upon the absence of evidence establishing continuity of
tribal life in the face of the respondents' specific case. The relevant
question is not merely what the petitioner's status was at birth, but
whether she continued to possess the status required for the protection of
Section 99 on the date of the transaction.

41.   The Scheduled Tribe certificate dated 14.12.2012 does not compel
a contrary conclusion. The certificate is undoubtedly a relevant piece of
evidence and records the certification made by the competent authority
at the relevant time. Its existence, however, does not preclude
examination of the underlying question of continuing tribal status when
subsequent material bearing upon that status is brought on record. The
                                     16
                                             WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

respondents have specifically alleged that, while obtaining the
certificate, the petitioner relied upon her parentage and tribal origin
without disclosing the circumstances concerning her long-standing
marriage with Bahadur Ali, her subsequent name and her religious and
social identity. The material placed before this Court does not disclose a
satisfactory explanation for the alleged non-disclosure. The certificate,
therefore, cannot be treated as conclusive against an examination of
whether the petitioner continued to possess the statutory status on the
respective dates on which the disputed lands were acquired.

42.   The significance of the aforesaid circumstance is not that a
married woman is invariably required to use her husband's name or that
use of her father's name after marriage is, by itself, unlawful. No such
proposition can be accepted. The relevance lies in the particular factual
setting of the present case. The petitioner relies upon her parentage and
tribal origin to claim a status protected by law, while the material relied
upon by the respondents indicates that, for several decades, she lived
under a different name and within a different religious and social setting.
These circumstances are relevant to the factual enquiry whether she
continued to retain her tribal identity and community affiliation. The
Scheduled Tribe certificate, though relevant, cannot by itself foreclose
that enquiry.

43.   The same reasoning applies to the registered sale deeds.
Registration of an instrument establishes its registration; it does not, by
itself, validate a transaction which is prohibited by a mandatory
provision of law. The recital in a sale deed that the purchaser belongs to
the Scheduled Tribe is evidence of the representation contained in the
document, but such recital cannot itself confer a statutory status upon a
person who did not possess that status on the relevant date. Likewise,
subsequent mutation or revenue entries cannot create an independent
right contrary to a substantive statutory prohibition.
                                    17
                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

44.   The transactions in question, as noticed hereinabove, were
executed between 21.06.2012 and 08.02.2016, i.e. prior to the
commencement of the substantive provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006, i.e. 11.02.2016. Their validity must, therefore, be
examined with reference to the statutory regime governing the respective
dates of transfer. The repeal of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 did not affect the previous operation of that
enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Consequently,
the validity and legal consequences of the transfers in question fall to be
considered with reference to Section 157-B of the Uttar Pradesh
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and Sections 166 and
167 thereof. The corresponding provisions contained in Sections 99, 104
and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 may be noticed as
reflecting the continuing legislative policy, but the validity of
transactions completed prior to commencement of the relevant
provisions of the Code cannot be determined by retrospectively applying
those provisions.

45.   Section 157-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 imposed a statutory restriction upon transfer by a
bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a
person who did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. A transfer made in
contravention of the said prohibition attracted the consequences
prescribed by the Act. The material question, therefore, is whether the
petitioner possessed the status of a member of the Scheduled Tribe on
each of the respective dates of acquisition. If she did not possess such
status, the fact that the transferors themselves belonged to the Scheduled
Tribe would not, by itself, save the transactions from the statutory
prohibition.

46.   The judgment of the Supreme Court in Akhlaq Hussain (supra),
reinforces the aforesaid conclusion. The Supreme Court, while
considering the protective provisions governing transfer of land
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                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

belonging to members of Scheduled Tribes, held that a transfer made in
breach of the statutory prohibition is void and that registration of the
document, payment of stamp duty or the form in which the transaction
was entered into cannot validate a transaction prohibited by law. The
statutory consequences prescribed by the enactment follow from such
prohibited transfer. The decision also emphasises the beneficial object of
the protective legislation, namely, preservation of tribal land and the
protection of the social and economic interests of members of Scheduled
Tribes.

47.   The principle laid down in Akhlaq Hussain (supra) does not,
however, determine whether the petitioner continued to be a member of
the Panika Scheduled Tribe. That question has to be determined upon the
facts of the present case in the light of the principles laid down in
Chandramohanan (supra) and Chinthada Anand (supra). Once the
petitioner is found not to have established the requisite Scheduled Tribe
status on the respective dates of the transfers, the legal consequence
under the statutory scheme applicable to those transactions follows. A
registered instrument cannot override the statutory prohibition, and a
transfer prohibited by law cannot acquire validity merely because it has
been entered in the revenue records or acted upon for a period of time.

48.   The plea of delay must also be considered in the aforesaid context.
The disputed sale deeds were executed during the period from
21.06.2012 to 08.02.2016, whereas the proceedings were initiated in the
year 2025. The respondents have stated that the material circumstances
concerning the petitioner's marriage, subsequent name and religious and
social identity came to light subsequently, whereafter inquiry was
undertaken. Be that as it may, once a transfer is found to be void by
reason of contravention of a protective statutory prohibition, mere lapse
of time, mutation in the revenue records or continued possession cannot,
by itself, confer validity upon such transfer. The principle recognised in
Akhlaq Hussain (supra) does not permit a transaction prohibited by law
                                      19
                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

to acquire validity merely by passage of time. The Court, therefore, finds
no ground to invalidate the proceedings solely on the ground that they
were initiated after several years.

49.   The allegation that the competent authority failed to consider the
petitioner's material evidence or denied her natural justice also does not
warrant interference. The petitioner was issued notice dated 12.12.2025
and submitted her reply dated 29.12.2025. Her case regarding the
Scheduled Tribe certificate, the registered sale deeds and her claim of
continuing tribal identity was thus before the authority. The fact that the
authority did not accept her explanation or did not attach to the
documents the evidentiary value claimed by her does not, by itself,
amount to denial of opportunity. The grievance, in substance, is against
the appreciation and evaluation of the material. Upon examination of the
material referred to by the authority, this Court finds that the conclusion
cannot be characterized as unsupported or perverse merely because it is
adverse to the petitioner.

50.   The family register and the documents relied upon by the
respondents also require to be considered in their proper perspective.
The Court does not treat the entry recording the petitioner as Muslim as
independently determinative of her Scheduled Tribe status. It is one
circumstance forming part of the larger evidentiary chain. When
considered along with the marriage with Bahadur Ali, the subsequent
identity as Razia, the long association with him, the names of the
children and, most importantly, the absence of satisfactory evidence
showing continuing Panika customs, social practices and community
acceptance, the material assumes evidentiary significance. The State's
case is thus not founded upon an isolated documentary entry but upon a
prolonged course of circumstances which, cumulatively considered,
support the conclusion reached by the revenue authority.

51.   The petitioner has also disputed the alleged cancellation of the
declaration under Section 80 of the Code on 30.03.2026. Since the
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                                            WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

validity of that subsequent order is not necessary for determination of the
present writ petitions, this Court does not consider it necessary to return
any independent finding thereon. The decision in the present matter rests
upon the petitioner's status on the respective dates of execution of the
disputed sale deeds and upon the statutory consequences flowing from
the law applicable to those transactions.

52.   Upon a cumulative consideration of the material, this Court is
satisfied that the petitioner has failed to establish that she continued to
possess the status of a member of the Panika Scheduled Tribe on the
respective dates of execution of the disputed sale deeds. This conclusion
is not founded upon the mere fact of her marriage with Bahadur Ali, nor
upon the mere allegation of conversion, nor upon the isolated entry
recording her religion as Muslim. It rests upon the prolonged
circumstances brought on record by the respondents concerning her
subsequent family, religious and social identity, coupled with the
absence of convincing material establishing continued adherence to the
customs and social practices of the Panika Scheduled Tribe, continuing
participation in its community life and acceptance by the Panika
community. The principle that change of religion does not ipso facto
terminate Scheduled Tribe status is therefore accepted; however, on the
facts established in the present case, the petitioner has failed to
demonstrate the continuing tribal identity necessary to retain that status
on the relevant dates.

53.   Once the petitioner is found not to have established the requisite
Scheduled Tribe status on the respective dates of the transfers, the
statutory basis of her acquisition fails. The status of the transferors as
members of the Scheduled Tribe cannot, by itself, validate the transfers
because Section 157-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 also prohibited transfer in favour of a person
who did not belong to the Scheduled Tribe. The disputed transfers were,
consequently, hit by the statutory prohibition and were void in terms of
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                                                                              WRIT – C No. – 13921 of 2026

                            Section 166, with the consequences prescribed under Section 167 of the
                            said Act. Neither registration of the sale deeds, nor subsequent revenue
                            entries, nor possession, nor lapse of time can override the statutory
                            consequences flowing from a transfer prohibited by law.

                            54.         The Court has considered the case set up by the petitioner as well
                            as the objections and material relied upon by the respondents. No
                            jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of natural justice has been
                            established so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the
                            Constitution. Although the impugned orders dated 22.01.2026 refer to
                            proceedings under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue
                            Code, 2006, the transactions in question having been completed prior to
                            commencement of the relevant provisions of the Code, the legality of the
                            underlying transfers and their consequences have been examined in this
                            judgment with reference to the statutory regime applicable on the
                            respective dates of transfer, namely Section 157-B read with Sections
                            166 and 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
                            Reforms Act, 1950. To the extent the impugned orders give effect to the
                            same statutory prohibition and consequences, no interference is
                            warranted.

                            55.         For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petitions are dismissed.

                            56.         The impugned orders dated 22.01.2026 passed by the competent
                            revenue authority/Dy. Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, the
                            respondent no.3, are affirmed. Any interim order operating in favour of
                            the petitioner shall stand vacated. The competent authority shall be at
                            liberty to give effect to the impugned orders in accordance with law.

                            57.         There shall be no order as to costs

                                                                                           (Arun Kumar, J.)

                            September 14, 2026
                            Ranjeet Sahu




Digitally signed by :-
RANJEET SAHU
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad