NANHKI @ NAIMUNNISHAversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 3 OTHERS

                                                             Reserved
        HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
                      WRIT - C No. - 17043 of 2026

Nanhki @ Naimunnisha
                                                      …..Petitioner(s)

                               Versus

State of U.P. and 3 others
                                                     …..Respondent(s)

Along with:

1. Writ – C No. 17171 of 2026:
Nanhki @ Naimunnisha
                           Versus
State of U.P. and 3 others

2. Writ – C No. 17214 of 2026:
Nanhki @ Naimunnisha
                           Versus
State of U.P. and 3 others


Counsel for Petitioner(s)        : Panchu Ram Maurya, Shashank
                                   Maurya
Counsel for Respondent(s)        : C.S.C., Pradeep Singh


Court No. - 51

            HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.

1.    Heard Sri P. R. Maurya and Sri Shashank Maurya, learned counsel
for the petitioners, Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned Senior Advocate and
Additional Advocate General, assisted by Sri Abhishek Shukla, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel & Sri Anubhav Chandra, learned
Standing Counsel, for the State respondents and Sri Pradeep Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent Gaon Sabha.
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                                                    WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

2.       All the connected writ petitions have been filed challenging
separate orders dated 22.01.2026 passed by the competent revenue
authority/Dy. Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, the respondent
no.3, in proceedings under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), whereby the
transfer of the land in favour of the petitioner, having been held at
different point of time, have been held to be in violation of the
provisions of Section 157-B, of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950/ Section 99 of the Code and consequently void, along
with the direction to vest of the land in the State Government.

3.       The facts of the case are that the petitioner, Nanhki @
Naimunnisha, resident of Village Korchi, Pargana and Tehsil Duddhi,
District Sonbhadra, claims to belong to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe by
birth. She claims to be the daughter of Mahaveer, who belonged to the
Bhuiyan community, and relies upon a Scheduled Tribe certificate issued
in her favour by the Tehsildar, Duddhi. Thereafter, she purchased the
agricultural lands in dispute, situated at Village Bagharu, Pargana and
Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, by means of registered sale deeds.
According to the petitioner, her Vendors belonged to the Gour Scheduled
Tribe and, consequently, the transaction was between two persons
belonging to the Scheduled Tribe. The petitioner asserts that the caste
status of the parties was disclosed in the sale deeds itself and that she has
remained in physical possession of the property ever since the
transaction.

4.       The registered sale deeds remained unchallenged before any
competent court for about nine years and was never cancelled. Revenue
entries in favour of the petitioner were also made pursuant to the sale
deeds.

5.       Subsequently, proceedings were initiated by the competent
revenue authority under Sections 104 and 105 of the Code. Notice dated
12.12.2025 was issued to the petitioner, who submitted her reply on
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07.01.2026. In her reply, she denied the allegations and reiterated that
she was a member of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe, that the vendor was
also a member of the Scheduled Tribe and that there had been no
concealment or violation of the statutory provisions. She relied upon her
Scheduled Tribe certificate, the registered sale deeds and the revenue
records. The Deputy Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, the
respondent no.3, however, by separate orders dated 22.01.2026, held the
sale deeds, being in contravention of the provisions of section 99 of the
Code/ Section 157-B, of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, is void, and directed that the disputed land be dealt
with in accordance with the statutory consequences, including vesting in
the State Government.

6.      Aggrieved by the orders of the respondent no.3, dated 22.01.2026,
the petitioner has consequently approached this Court under Article 226
of the Constitution seeking quashing of the said orders and protection of
her possession over the property.

7.      Writ-C No. 17043 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 25.07.2017,executed by Bajrangi, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.0150 hectare land in plot no.4123, total area 0.1900
hectares, situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra,
has been held to be void.

8.      Writ-C No. 17171 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 04.11.2011, executed by Ramswarath, in favour of the petitioner,
in respect of 0.3905 hectare land in plot nos. 3267Ka, 3268, 3264Ka,
3266, 3314KaM and 3291M, total area 0.3905 hectares, situated in
village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, has been held to be
void.
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                                                    WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

9.    Writ-C No. 17214 of 2026, has been filed challenging the order
dated 22.01.2026, passed by the respondent no.3, by which the sale deed
dated 26.11.2018, executed by Sitakunwar, in favour of the petitioner, in
respect of 0.0084 hectare land in plot no. 3144Ka area 0.0084 hectares,
situated in village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, has been
held to be void.

10.   The learned counsel for the petitioner disputed the allegation of
conversion of the petitioner to Islam. It is submitted that she continues to
belong to the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe and has not abandoned her
original religion or tribal identity. It is contended that the mere fact that
she married Sirajuddin according to Islamic rites, or that certain
documents describe her as Muslim, cannot conclusively establish that
she ceased to belong to the Scheduled Tribe. She continued to live in her
village and follow the customs of the Scheduled Tribe and that there is
no reliable evidence demonstrating her severance from the Bhuiyan
community.

11.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned
order proceeds upon an erroneous assumption that a person belonging to
a Scheduled Tribe automatically loses her tribal status upon marriage to
a man of another religion. According to learned counsel, the petitioner's
status was acquired by birth and there is no provision in the Constitution
(Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 analogous to paragraph 3 of the
Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which excludes a person
from Scheduled Tribe status merely on account of change of religion,
due to marriage. It is therefore submitted that even assuming the
petitioner had adopted another religion, that circumstance could not by
itself extinguish the status acquired by birth.

12.   Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of
Gujarat, 2012 (3) SCC 400, to contend that a status acquired by birth is
not ordinarily displaced merely by marriage with a person belonging to
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                                                    WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

another community. It is submitted that marriage, by itself, does not
automatically extinguish a status acquired by birth, particularly where
the person continues to retain the characteristics and acceptance of the
concerned community.

13.       It is next submitted that the petitioner was issued a Scheduled
Tribe certificate by the competent authority after due inquiry and
verification and that the registered sale deeds itself disclosed the caste
status of the parties. Learned counsel submits that there was, therefore,
no concealment of the petitioner's caste status and that the State cannot,
after several years, simply disregard a certificate issued by its own
competent authority. The absence of any order cancelling the certificate
has also been emphasised. It is contended that the inquiry upon which
the impugned order rests was conducted many years after the marriage
and relies substantially upon circumstances relating to marriage and
religion which, even if true, cannot conclusively establish loss of tribal
status.

14.       The petitioner has further assailed the proceedings on the ground
of delay. It is submitted that almost all the sale deeds were executed
between 2011 and 2018, whereas notice under Sections 104 and 105 was
issued only on 12.12.2025. After more than a decade, the State,
according to learned counsel, could not reopen a concluded and
registered transaction merely on the basis of a subsequently generated
inquiry, particularly when the sale deed was never cancelled and the
caste particulars of the parties were disclosed therein. It is also argued
that the petitioner has remained in possession and that the delay, in the
absence of any satisfactory explanation, renders the proceedings
arbitrary.

15.       The petitioner has also alleged non-consideration of material
evidence and violation of natural justice. It is submitted that the
Scheduled Tribe certificate, registered sale deed and revenue records
were placed before the competent authority but were not properly
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                                                   WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

considered and that the petitioner was not afforded a meaningful
opportunity to establish her status.

16.   Per contra, learned Senior Counsel/Additional Advocate General
assisted by learned counsel appearing for the State respondents has
submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the
efficacious statutory remedy available under Section 210 of the Code. It
is contended that the impugned order is revisable before the competent
revisional authority/Board of Revenue and that the petitioner ought to
have exhausted the statutory remedy rather than directly invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance has been placed upon
Paltoo Ram Yadav v. State of U.P. & Others, Neutral Citation No.
2023:AHC:166655, in support of the objection regarding availability of
the revisional remedy.

17.   On merits, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the
petitioner's Scheduled Tribe status had ceased to be available to her by
the relevant date in view of her subsequent religious and social identity.
The respondents rely upon the inquiry reports dated 19.11.2025,
18.12.2025 and 19.01.2026, the statements recorded during the inquiry,
identity documents and the family register. According to the State, the
material establishes that the petitioner, originally known as Nanhki,
married Sirajuddin according to Islamic rites, thereafter adopted the
name Naimunnisha, lived with him for several decades and raised two
children, one son and one daughter, bearing Muslim names, Ejajuddin
and Haseena Bano. The family register, according to the respondents,
records her religion as Muslim. These circumstances are relied upon not
as an isolated instance of inter-religious marriage but as evidence of a
prolonged adoption of a different religious and social identity.

18.   It was further submited that the petitioner has not produced any
substantive   material    demonstrating    that,   notwithstanding   these
circumstances, she continued to follow the customs, traditions and social
practices of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe, continued to participate in its
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community life or continued to be recognised and accepted by the
Bhuiyan community as one of its members. Learned counsel therefore
submits that once the respondents placed before the authority material
indicating a long-standing identity inconsistent with the tribal status
claimed by the petitioner, a mere assertion in the pleadings that she
continued to be a member of the Bhuiyan tribe was insufficient.

19.   The learned Senior Counsel distinguished the case of Rameshbhai
Dabhai Naika (supra) on the ground that it concerned the status of a
child in the context of marriage and parentage and cannot be treated as
laying down that a person who has completely severed her connection
with the tribal community and adopted another religious and social
identity continues to enjoy the statutory benefits reserved for members
of the Scheduled Tribe. He submitted that the present case is
distinguishable because their case is based upon a prolonged course of
conduct and social identity and not merely upon the fact of marriage.

20.   Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of Kerala v. Chandramohanan, 2004(3) SCC 429. It is
submitted that the Supreme Court recognised that a member of a tribe
may continue to remain a member notwithstanding conversion if the
person continues to possess the tribal traits and follows the customs and
traditions of the tribe. In such a situation, it has to be established that a
person who has embraced another religion is still suffering from social
disability and also following the customs and tradition of the community,
which he earlier belonged to.

21.   Reliance has also been placed upon the decision in Chinthada
Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, 2026 (3) Supreme 514, the
relevant paragraph reads as under:-

          “From the above, it becomes clear, that once a person belonging
          to a Scheduled Tribe converts to another religion, ultimately
          through the passage of time, the customs, rituals and other traits
          of that particular tribe may fall into eclipse. If so, in such
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           circumstance, it is proved that the person in question has
           completely renounced himself from the customs, rituals and
           other traits of his tribe, and has assimilated into the converted
           religion following the practices and customs of that particular
           religion, a reasonable inference can be drawn that such a person
           shall not be considered a part of the tribe.”


22.      The learned Senior Counsel further argued that the petitioner
cannot derive any advantage from the Scheduled Tribe certificate if, as
alleged, the certificate was obtained by suppression of material facts. It
is contended that the petitioner represented herself as the daughter of
Mahaveer and relied upon her tribal origin without disclosing the long-
standing marriage with Sirajuddin, the subsequent name Naimunnisha
and the circumstances relating to her religious and social identity. A
certificate obtained upon a false or incomplete factual representation,
cannot become conclusive merely because it was issued by a public
authority. The competent authority was consequently justified in
examining the petitioner's actual status when the relevant facts came to
light.

23.      The respondents have also relied upon Sections 99, 104 and 105
of the Code and Section 157-B of the repealed U. P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Their submission is that the statutory
protection attaches to land belonging to a member of the Scheduled
Tribe and restricts its transfer to a person who does not possess the status
prescribed by the statute. Consequently, if the petitioner did not possess
the requisite Scheduled Tribe status on the date of transfer in her favour,
it was prohibited notwithstanding the registration of the sale deed.
Registration, payment of consideration or mutation in the revenue
records, according to the respondents, cannot validate a transaction
which the statute itself prohibits. The consequence of a prohibited
transfer, they submit, is governed by Sections 104 and 105 of the Code.
In support of their argument reliance has been placed on the judgment of
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                                                  WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

the Supreme Court in Additional Commissioner, Revenue v. Akhlaq
Hussain and another, 2020 (4) SCC 507.

24.   Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel
for the parties and having perused the material brought on record, the
first question which arises for consideration is the preliminary objection
regarding availability of an alternative statutory remedy. Learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the State has submitted that the impugned orders
are revisable under Section 210 of the Code and that the petitioner ought
to have availed the said remedy. There can be no quarrel with the general
proposition that where an efficacious statutory remedy is available, this
Court ordinarily exercises self-restraint in entertaining a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution. The rule, however, is one of discretion
and does not constitute an absolute bar to the exercise of the
constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

25.   In the present case, the controversy is not confined to a challenge
to the appreciation of evidence by the revenue authority. The
proceedings concern transfers made prior to the commencement of the
substantive provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006,
whereas the impugned orders have been passed in proceedings under
Sections 104 and 105 of the Code. The question as to the statutory
regime governing such pre-Code transactions, and the applicability of
the protective provisions relating to transfers by members of the
Scheduled Tribe, therefore, arises for consideration. The matter also
involves the legal test for determining whether a person admittedly born
in a Scheduled Tribe continued to possess that status on the respective
dates of the transactions. These questions bear upon the legality of the
very exercise undertaken by the revenue authority. In the circumstances,
and having regard to the nature of the questions arising for
determination, this Court considers it appropriate to examine the
challenge on merits rather than relegate the petitioner to another round of
proceedings. The decision of the Coordinate Bench in Qamar Abbas v.
Additional Commissioner, 2024 (1) ADJ 640, also indicates that the
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                                                  WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

existence of a statutory remedy does not result in mechanical rejection of
a writ petition in every case. The preliminary objection regarding
alternative remedy is, accordingly, rejected.

26.   The central question, on merits of the controversy, is whether the
petitioner possessed the status of a member of the Bhuiyan Scheduled
Tribe on each of the respective dates on which the disputed sale deeds
were executed. The fact that the petitioner claims to have been born in
the Bhuiyan community is not, by itself, decisive of the question which
arises in the present proceedings. What is required to be examined is
whether, notwithstanding the circumstances relied upon by the
respondents concerning her subsequent religious and social identity, she
continued to possess the tribal identity and community affiliation
necessary to constitute membership of the Scheduled Tribe on the
respective dates of the transactions.

27.   The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that mere
conversion to another religion does not, by itself, automatically
extinguish Scheduled Tribe status is well founded to that limited extent.
In Chandramohanan (supra), the Supreme Court held that there can be
no broad proposition of law that a person ceases to be a member of a
Scheduled Tribe merely by reason of change of religion. The question
whether, notwithstanding conversion, a person continues to remain a
member of the tribe is essentially a question of fact, to be determined
with reference to the tribal traits, customs, traditions and continuing
connection with the tribal community. The same principle has been
reiterated in Chinthada Anand (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has
clarified that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not
prescribe any religion-based exclusion and that the determination of
Scheduled Tribe status must turn upon whether the claimant continues to
possess and is recognised for the essential attributes of tribal identity,
including customary practices, social organisation, community life and
acceptance by the concerned tribal community. Thus, conversion,
considered in isolation, cannot be treated as an inflexible rule resulting
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                                                   WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

in extinction of Scheduled Tribe status; the issue has to be determined on
the facts and evidence of each case.

28.   The decision of the Supreme Court in Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika
(supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, does not
directly govern the controversy involved in the present case. That
decision was principally concerned with determination of the Scheduled
Tribe status of a child born from an inter-community marriage and the
relevance of upbringing, social circumstances and acceptance by the
tribal community in determining such status. It does, however, reinforce
the principle that the question of tribal identity and community affiliation
cannot be determined by applying an inflexible rule divorced from the
factual circumstances of the case. The question before this Court,
however, is different, namely, whether the petitioner, admittedly born in
the Bhuiyan community, continued to retain the attributes and
community affiliation necessary to constitute membership of the
Scheduled Tribe on the dates of the transactions in question. That
question has to be examined in the light of the principles laid down
specifically with regard to conversion and continuing tribal identity in
Chandramohanan (supra) and Chinthada Anand (supra).

29.   On this aspect, the material relied upon by the respondents
assumes significance. Their case is not confined to the fact that the
petitioner married Sirajuddin. The material discloses a course of
circumstances extending over several decades. The petitioner, originally
known as Nanhki, married Sirajuddin and thereafter came to be known
as Naimunnisha. She lived with him for a prolonged period; children
were born from the relationship and bear Muslim names; the family
register records her religion as Muslim; and other documents and inquiry
material have been relied upon to show the identity under which she
subsequently lived. These circumstances cannot be treated as conclusive
individually, but neither can they be ignored when the Court is required
to determine the factual question of continuing tribal identity.
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30.   What is of particular importance is the absence of convincing
evidence from the petitioner showing continuity of her connection with
the Bhuiyan community. Upon consideration of the material placed
before the competent authority and the material brought on record before
this Court, the Court finds that the petitioner has not satisfactorily
established continuity of her connection with the Bhuiyan community by
producing credible material demonstrating that, notwithstanding those
circumstances, she continued to follow the customs and traditions of the
Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe, continued to participate in its social and
community life and continued to be recognised and accepted by that
community. The material before the Court does not satisfactorily
establish such continuity. The petitioner has principally denied
conversion and asserted that she continued to belong to the Bhuiyan
tribe, but the assertion is not supported by sufficient substantive material
showing the actual continuance of tribal customs, social relations or
community recognition.

31.   The Court is conscious that a person cannot be required to prove
tribal status by demonstrating observance of every custom of the
community throughout her life, nor can a single document describing her
religion as Muslim be treated as determinative. The conclusion reached
herein is not based upon any such rigid test. It is based upon the
cumulative effect of the circumstances brought on record and, equally
importantly, upon the absence of evidence establishing continuity of
tribal life in the face of the respondents' specific case. The relevant
question is not merely what the petitioner's status was at birth, but
whether she continued to possess the status required for the protection of
Section 99 on the date of the transaction.

32.   The Scheduled Tribe certificate does not compel a contrary
conclusion. The certificate is undoubtedly a relevant piece of evidence
and records the certification made by the competent authority at the
relevant time. Its existence, however, does not preclude examination of
the underlying question of continuing tribal status when subsequent
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material bearing upon that status is brought on record. The respondents
have specifically alleged that, while obtaining the certificate, the
petitioner relied upon her parentage and tribal origin without disclosing
the circumstances concerning her long-standing marriage with
Sirajuddin, her subsequent name and her religious and social identity.
The material placed before this Court does not disclose a satisfactory
explanation for the alleged non-disclosure. The certificate, therefore,
cannot be treated as conclusive against an examination of whether the
petitioner continued to possess the statutory status on the respective
dates on which the disputed lands were acquired.

33.   The significance of the aforesaid circumstance is not that a
married woman is invariably required to use her husband's name or that
use of her father's name after marriage is, by itself, unlawful. No such
proposition can be accepted. The relevance lies in the particular factual
setting of the present case. The petitioner relies upon her parentage and
tribal origin to claim a status protected by law, while the material relied
upon by the respondents indicates that, for several decades, she lived
under a different name and within a different religious and social setting.
These circumstances are relevant to the factual enquiry whether she
continued to retain her tribal identity and community affiliation. The
Scheduled Tribe certificate, though relevant, cannot by itself foreclose
that enquiry.

34.   The same reasoning applies to the registered sale deeds.
Registration of an instrument establishes its registration; it does not, by
itself, validate a transaction which is prohibited by a mandatory
provision of law. The recital in a sale deed that the purchaser belongs to
the Scheduled Tribe is evidence of the representation contained in the
document, but such recital cannot itself confer a statutory status upon a
person who did not possess that status on the relevant date. Likewise,
subsequent mutation or revenue entries cannot create an independent
right contrary to a substantive statutory prohibition.
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                                                  WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

35.   The transactions in question, as noticed hereinabove, were
executed between 04.11.2011 and 26.11.2018, i.e. prior to the
commencement of the substantive provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Revenue Code, 2006, i.e. 11.02.2016. Their validity must, therefore, be
examined with reference to the statutory regime governing the respective
dates of transfer. The repeal of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 did not affect the previous operation of that
enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder. Consequently,
the validity and legal consequences of the transfers in question fall to be
considered with reference to Section 157-B of the Uttar Pradesh
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and Sections 166 and
167 thereof. The corresponding provisions contained in Sections 99, 104
and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 may be noticed as
reflecting the continuing legislative policy, but the validity of
transactions completed prior to commencement of the relevant
provisions of the Code cannot be determined by retrospectively applying
those provisions.

36.   Section 157-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 imposed a statutory restriction upon transfer by a
bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a
person who did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. A transfer made in
contravention of the said prohibition attracted the consequences
prescribed by the Act. The material question, therefore, is whether the
petitioner possessed the status of a member of the Scheduled Tribe on
each of the respective dates of acquisition. If she did not possess such
status, the fact that the transferors themselves belonged to the Scheduled
Tribe would not, by itself, save the transactions from the statutory
prohibition.

37.   The judgment of the Supreme Court in Akhlaq Hussain (supra)
reinforces the aforesaid conclusion. The Supreme Court, while
considering the protective provisions governing transfer of land
belonging to members of Scheduled Tribes, held that a transfer made in
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breach of the statutory prohibition is void and that registration of the
document, payment of stamp duty or the form in which the transaction
was entered into cannot validate a transaction prohibited by law. The
statutory consequences prescribed by the enactment follow from such
prohibited transfer. The decision also emphasises the beneficial object of
the protective legislation, namely, preservation of tribal land and the
protection of the social and economic interests of members of Scheduled
Tribes.

38.   The principle laid down in Akhlaq Hussain (supra) does not,
however, determine whether the petitioner continued to be a member of
the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe. That question has to be determined upon
the facts of the present case in the light of the principles laid down in
Chandramohanan (supra) and Chinthada Anand (supra). Once the
petitioner is found not to have established the requisite Scheduled Tribe
status on the respective dates of the transfers, the legal consequence
under the statutory scheme applicable to those transactions follows. A
registered instrument cannot override the statutory prohibition, and a
transfer prohibited by law cannot acquire validity merely because it has
been entered in the revenue records or acted upon for a period of time.

39.   The plea of delay must also be considered in the aforesaid context.
The disputed sale deeds were executed during the period from
04.11.2011 to 26.11.2018, whereas the proceedings were initiated in the
year 2025. The respondents have stated that the material circumstances
concerning the petitioner's marriage, subsequent name and religious and
social identity came to light subsequently, whereafter inquiry was
undertaken. Be that as it may, once a transfer is found to be void by
reason of contravention of a protective statutory prohibition, mere lapse
of time, mutation in the revenue records or continued possession cannot,
by itself, confer validity upon such transfer. The principle recognised in
Akhlaq Hussain (supra) does not permit a transaction prohibited by law
to acquire validity merely by passage of time. The Court, therefore, finds
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                                                  WRIC No. - 17043 of 2026

no ground to invalidate the proceedings solely on the ground that they
were initiated after several years.

40.   The allegation that the competent authority failed to consider the
petitioner's material evidence or denied her natural justice also does not
warrant interference. The petitioner was issued notice dated 12.12.2025
and submitted her reply dated 07.01.2026. Her case regarding the
Scheduled Tribe certificate, the registered sale deeds and her claim of
continuing tribal identity was thus before the authority. The fact that the
authority did not accept her explanation or did not attach to the
documents the evidentiary value claimed by her does not, by itself,
amount to denial of opportunity. The grievance, in substance, is against
the appreciation and evaluation of the material. Upon examination of the
material referred to by the authority, this Court finds that the conclusion
cannot be characterised as unsupported or perverse merely because it is
adverse to the petitioner.

41.   The family register and the documents relied upon by the
respondents also require to be considered in their proper perspective.
The Court does not treat the entry recording the petitioner as Muslim as
independently determinative of her Scheduled Tribe status. It is one
circumstance forming part of the larger evidentiary chain. When
considered along with the marriage with Sirajuddin, the subsequent
identity as Naimunnisha, the long association with him, the names of the
children and, most importantly, the absence of satisfactory evidence
showing continuing Bhuiyan customs, social practices and community
acceptance, the material assumes evidentiary significance. The State's
case is thus not founded upon an isolated documentary entry but upon a
prolonged course of circumstances which, cumulatively considered,
support the conclusion reached by the revenue authority.

42.   Upon a cumulative consideration of the material, this Court is
satisfied that the petitioner has failed to establish that she continued to
possess the status of a member of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe on the
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respective dates of execution of the disputed sale deeds. This conclusion
is not founded upon the mere fact of her marriage with Sirajuddin, nor
upon the mere allegation of conversion, nor upon the isolated entry
recording her religion as Muslim. It rests upon the prolonged
circumstances brought on record by the respondents concerning her
subsequent family, religious and social identity, coupled with the
absence of convincing material establishing continued adherence to the
customs and social practices of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe, continuing
participation in its community life and acceptance by the Bhuiyan
community. The principle that change of religion does not ipso facto
terminate Scheduled Tribe status is therefore accepted; however, on the
facts established in the present case, the petitioner has failed to
demonstrate the continuing tribal identity necessary to retain that status
on the relevant dates.

43.   Once the petitioner is found not to have established the requisite
Scheduled Tribe status on the respective dates of the transfers, the
statutory basis of her acquisition fails. The status of the transferors as
members of the Scheduled Tribe cannot, by itself, validate the transfers
because Section 157-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950 also prohibited transfer in favour of a person
who did not belong to the Scheduled Tribe. The disputed transfers were,
consequently, hit by the statutory prohibition and were void in terms of
Section 166, with the consequences prescribed under Section 167 of the
said Act. Neither registration of the sale deeds, nor subsequent revenue
entries, nor possession, nor lapse of time can override the statutory
consequences flowing from a transfer prohibited by law.

44.   The Court has considered the case set up by the petitioner as well
as the objections and material relied upon by the respondents. No
jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of natural justice has been
established so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Although the impugned orders dated 22.01.2026 refer to
proceedings under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue
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                            Code, 2006, the transactions in question having been completed prior to
                            commencement of the relevant provisions of the Code, the legality of the
                            underlying transfers and their consequences have been examined in this
                            judgment with reference to the statutory regime applicable on the
                            respective dates of transfer, namely Section 157-B read with Sections
                            166 and 167 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
                            Reforms Act, 1950. To the extent the impugned orders give effect to the
                            same statutory prohibition and consequences, no interference is
                            warranted.

                            45.         For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petitions are dismissed.

                            46.         The impugned orders dated 22.01.2026 passed by the competent
                            revenue authority/Dy. Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra, the
                            respondent no.3, are affirmed. Any interim order operating in favour of
                            the petitioner shall stand vacated. The competent authority shall be at
                            liberty to give effect to the impugned orders in accordance with law.

                            47.         There shall be no order as to costs.

                                                                                           (Arun Kumar, J.)

                            September 14, 2026
                            Ranjeet Sahu




Digitally signed by :-
RANJEET SAHU
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad