A.S. PHARMA PVT. LTD.versusNAYATI MEDICAL PVT. LTD. & ORS.

          [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1476 : 2024 INSC 690

                  A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd.
                            v.
              Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
         (Criminal Appeal No(s). 3051-3052 of 2024)
                           23 July 2024
        [C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.]

                     Issue for Consideration
High Court whether justified in exercising its inherent power under
Section 482, Cr.P.C and the power under Section 147, N.I. Act, 1881
to compound the offence u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881, despite the non-consent of the complainant-appellant.

                            Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 147 – Scope – Trial Court
dismissed the application for compounding the offence u/s.138,
N.I. Act filed u/s.320 Cr.P.C. – High Court despite the absence
of the consent of the appellant-complainant compounded
the offence u/s.138, N.I. Act qua the respondent-accused,
exercising its inherent power u/s.482 Cr.P.C. and the power
u/s.147, N.I. Act, on the ground that the appellant was equitably
compensated – Sustainability:
Held: Cannot be sustained, set aside to that extent – s.482, Cr.P.C.
and s.147, N.I. Act are different and distinct – s.482, Cr.P.C. is the
inherent power of High Court exercisable even suo motu to give
effect to any order under Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice – However,
the provision for compounding every offence punishable under the
N.I. Act, u/s.147, N.I. Act, is not a power available to a Court to
exercise without the consent of the complainant – Inherent powers
u/s.482, Cr.P.C. are invocable when no other efficacious remedy is
available to the party concerned and not where a specific remedy
is provided by the statute concerned – Power u/s.482, Cr.P.C.
cannot be invoked ignoring the factor which is sine qua non for the
exercise of power to compound the offence(s) under N.I. Act viz.,
the consent of the complainant – An offence u/s.138, N.I. Act could
be compounded u/s.147 only with the consent of the complainant
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                              1477

         A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.


     concerned – In view of the peculiar facts w.r.t the deposit of the
     amount payable under the impugned judgment and the readiness
     of the respondent-accused to effect the payment and to settle the
     matter, there is no point in restoring the proceedings and continue
     them before the trial Court though the impugned judgment has
     been set aside – Hence, despite the lack of consent from the
     appellant, complaint and all the proceedings emerging therefrom
     quashed exercising power u/Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
     [Paras 11, 17, 19, 21]
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Negotiable
     Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 147 – Constitution of India –
     Article 142 – Exercise of power u/Article 142 by the Supreme
     Court in Raj Reddy Kallem’s case to quash the proceeding
     pending u/s.138, N.I. Act – High Courts quashing proceeding
     u/s.138, N.I. Act on the similar lines – Impermissibility:
     Held: Supreme Court in Raj Reddy Kallem’s case took note of the
     fact that the accused therein had compensated the complainant
     and deposited the additional amount as ordered – It was in view of
     such peculiar factual situation obtained therein that the Supreme
     Court invoked the power u/Article 142 of the Constitution of India
     to quash the proceeding pending against the appellant-accused
     therein u/s.138, N.I. Act, despite the non-consent of the complainant-
     respondent – However, this cannot be a reason for ‘compounding’
     an offence u/s.138, N.I. Act, invoking the power u/s.482, Cr.P.C.
     and the power u/s.147, N.I. Act, in the absence of consent of the
     complainant concerned – The fact that Supreme Court quashed
     the proceedings u/s.138, N.I. Act, invoking the power u/Article 142
     can be no reason at all for High Courts to pass an order quashing
     proceeding u/s.138, N.I. Act, on the similar lines as the power
     u/ Article 142 of the Constitution of India is available only to the
     Supreme Court of India. [Para 18]

                              Case Law Cited
     Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2008] 9 SCR 943 :
     (2008) 8 SCC 781; Arvind Barsaul (Dr.) v. State of M.P. (2008) 5
     SCC 794; Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [2010] 5 SCR
     678 : (2010) 5 SCC 663; K.M. Ibrahim v. K.P. Mohammed & Anr.
     [2009] 15 SCR 1300 : (2010) 1 SCC 798; O.P. Dholakia v. State
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    of Haryana & Anr. (2000) 1 SCC 762; JIK Industries Ltd. & Ors
    v. Amarlal V. Jumani & Anr. [2012] 3 SCR 114 : (2012) 3 SCC
    255; Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr. [2024] 5
    SCR 203 : 2024 INSC 347; Meters and Instruments Private Ltd.
    & Anr. V. Kanchan Mehta [2017] 10 SCR 66 : (2018) 1 SCC 560;
    Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138, N.I. Act, 1881, In
    re [2021] 4 SCR 257 : (2021) 16 SCC 116; State of Punjab &
    Ors. v. Surinder Kumar & Ors. [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 553 : (1992)
    1 SCC 489 – referred to.

                              List of Acts
    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure,
    1973; Constitution of India.

                           List of Keywords
    Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 147,
    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Article 142 of the Constitution
    of India; Quashing of proceeding u/s.138, Negotiable Instruments
    Act, 1881; Inherent power; Compounding the offence u/s.138 of the
    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Dishonor of cheques; Consent;
    Consent of the complainant; Non-consent of the complainant;
    Lack of consent of the complainant; ‘Consent’ for compounding
    offence; Compounding of offence; Complainant compensated; To
    do complete justice between the parties.

                          Case Arising From
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.
    3051-3052 of 2024
    From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2023 of the High Court
    of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC No. 970 of 2023 and CRLMA No.
    3701 of 2023

                       Appearances for Parties
    Vimit Trehan, Dhruv Dwivedi, Ravi Bharuka, Advs. for the Appellant.
    Giriraj Subramanium, Simarpal Singh Sawhney, Siddhant Juyal,
    Veda Singh, Ravi Pathak, Simar Singh Sawhney, Akhilesh Talluri,
    Joy Banarjee, Ms. Urvarshi Singh, Aditya Singh, Advs. for the
    Respondents.
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                          1479

         A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.


                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Order
     Delay condoned.
     Leave granted.
1.   These appeals are directed against the judgment dated 13.12.2023
     passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Miscellaneous Case
     No. 970 of 2023 and Criminal Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3701 of
     2023. The appellant filed Complaint Case No. 5564 of 2022 alleging
     commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
     Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘N.I. Act’) against
     the respondents. On receipt of the summons, the respondents
     appeared before the Court and expressed their readiness to settle
     the matter by effecting the payment. An application to permit to
     compound the offence was filed under Section 320 of the Code of
     Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the ‘Cr.P.C.’). The Trial Court
     dismissed the same as per order dated 06.02.2023. Aggrieved by
     the order of the Trial Court, respondents took up the matter before
     the High Court challenging the order dismissing the application for
     compounding the offence under Section 138, N.I. Act also seeking
     quashment of C.C. No.5564 of 2022 and all further proceeding
     thereon in Criminal M. C. No. 970 of 2023. As per the impugned
     judgment the High Court, apparently, exercised the inherent power
     under Section 482, Cr.P.C., coupled with those under Section 147,
     N.I. Act, and ordered thus:-
           “17. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the
           offence of the petitioners/ accused persons in Complaint
           Case No.5564/2022 titled A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. vs M/S
           Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. pending before the learned
           Trial Court is hereby compounded, albeit subject to the
           petitioners depositing before the concerned learned Trial
           Court the cumulative cheque(s) amount of Rs.6,50,000/-
           (Rs. Six Lakhs fifty thousand only) with 12% simple interest
           per annum thereon from the date of cheque(s) return
           memo i.e. 18.03.2020 till the date of actual payment of the
           amount as also a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- Rs. One Lakh only),
           within a period of eight weeks. Needless to mention, the
           amount, if any, already deposited before the learned Trial
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          Court be adjusted in the aforesaid sum(s). The respondent/
          complainant is free to move an appropriate application for
          release of the amount deposited before the learned Trial
          Court in above terms.”
2.   Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the
     learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
3.   The core contention of the appellant is that an offence under Section
     138 of the N.I. Act is not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C.,
     and in such circumstances, the application was rightly dismissed by
     the Trial Court. Ergo, invoking the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
     coupled with those under Section 147, N.I. Act, the High Court
     ought not to have compounded the offence without the consent of
     the appellant.
4.   Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents
     submitted that when the indisputable position is that the offence under
     Section 138 of the N.I. Act is compoundable under Section 147 of
     the N.I. Act, no palpable illegality could be attributed to the action
     in invoking the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C, coupled with the
     power under Section 147, N.I. Act to compound the offence. The said
     contention of the respondents was resisted by the learned counsel for
     the appellant contending that for compounding the offence, consent
     of the complainant is required. Sans consent from the complainant,
     the High Court was not justified in compounding of the offence under
     Section 138, N.I. Act, it is further contended.
5.   A perusal of the impugned order would reveal that though the
     High Court entertained the challenge against the order rejecting
     an application for compounding the offence under Section 138,
     N.I. Act filed under Section 320 Cr.P.C., the High Court actually
     compounded the offence invoking its inherent power under Section
     482 Cr.P.C., coupled with the power under Section 147 of the N.I.
     Act. To consider the legality and correctness of the said exercise
     of power, it is imperative to understand the scope of Section 482,
     Cr.P.C, as also Section 147 of the N.I. Act. Section 482, Cr.P.C.,
     reads thus: -
          “482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. — Nothing
          in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
          powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                        1481

         A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.


           necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or
           to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise
           to secure the ends of justice.”
6.   In the decision in Monica Kumar (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh
     [(2008) 8 SCC 781], this Court held that the inherent jurisdiction
     under Section 482, Cr.P.C, would be exercised sparingly, carefully
     and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
     specifically laid down in the Section itself viz., to give effect to any
     order under Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or
     otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
7.   In the decision in Arvind Barsaul (Dr.) v. State of M.P. [(2008) 5
     SCC 794], this Court held that though offence under Section 498A,
     IPC is not compoundable, but when parties have compromised,
     continuance of proceedings would be an abuse of process of law
     and hence, could be quashed on a petition filed under Section 482,
     Cr.P.C. We referred to this decision to show that when the parties
     are ad idem for discontinuance of criminal proceedings which are
     not of grave nature, power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. is exercisable.
8.   Now, we will refer to Section 147 of the N.I. Act and it reads thus: -
           “147. Offence to be compoundable-
           Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
           Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable
           under this Act shall be compoundable.”
9.   Thus, a bare perusal of Section 482, Cr.P.C., and Section 147, N.I.
     Act would reveal they are different and distinct. The former being the
     inherent power of High Court exercisable even suo motu to give effect
     to any order under Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse of the process of
     any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, the
     provision for compounding every offence punishable under the N.I.
     Act, under Section 147, N.I. Act, is not a power available to a Court
     to exercise without the consent of the complainant. We will dilate
     on this aspect a little later.
10. Now, in the context of the rival contentions, it is worthwhile to note
    that by the combined exercise of powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C.,
    and Section 147, N.I. Act, the High Court, has actually compounded
    the offence, under Section 138, N.I. Act, despite the non-consent of
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     the complainant/ appellant herein therefor. Contextually, it is relevant
     to refer to paragraph 102 (6) of the decision of this Court in State
     of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604), which reads thus: -
           “Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
           the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
           which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
           and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
           is a specific provision in the code or the concerned Act,
           providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
           aggrieved party.”
                                                  (underline supplied)
11. It is thus well-neigh settled position that the inherent powers under
    Section 482, Cr.P.C., are invocable when no other efficacious remedy
    is available to the party concerned and not where a specific remedy
    is provided by the statute concerned. We may further add here that
    certainly the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., is not invocable,
    ignoring the factor which is sine qua non for the exercise of power
    to compound the offence(s) under N.I. Act viz., the consent of the
    complainant.
12. Before delving into the question whether consent of the complainant,
    who is to compound the offence, is required to exercise the power
    under Section 147, N.I. Act, it is only appropriate to refer to paragraphs
    12 and 13 of the impugned judgment of the High Court. They read
    thus: -
           “12. Broadly speaking, in the considered opinion of this
           Court, the essence of all the aforesaid pronouncements
           by the Hon’ble Supreme Court coupled with Section 138
           of the N.I. Act read together with the other provisions of
           the N.I. Act is that the consent of the complainant is not
           mandatory at the time of compounding of the offence
           under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, once the complainant
           has been equitably compensated.
           13. In effect, whence the complainant has been reasonably
           compensated the accused can be discharged/ acquitted
           even without the consent of the complainant, in the interest
           of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of law,
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         1483

         A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.


           since once an accused accepts his liability to pay the
           cheque amount, there will be no fruitful purpose in keeping
           the complaint alive.”
                                                 (Underline supplied)
13. Having gone through the factual matrix of the case on hand and
    the afore-extracted paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 of the impugned
    judgment, we are of the considered view that the understanding and
    exposition of law by the High Court on the question of invocation of
    the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., and Section 147, N.I. Act to
    compound the offence under Section 138, N.I. Act, run contrary to
    the law enunciated by this Court on the said question. In the light of
    the decisions of this Court in Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal
    H. [(2010) 5 SCC 663], K.M. Ibrahim v. K.P. Mohammed & Anr.
    [(2010) 1 SCC 798] and O.P. Dholakia v. State of Haryana & Anr.
    [(2000) 1 SCC 762], there cannot be any doubt with regard to the
    position that offence under Section 138, N.I. Act could be compounded
    under Section 147, N.I. Act, at any stage of the proceedings.
14. As relates the requirement of ‘consent’ for compounding offence
    under Section 138, N.I. Act, by invoking the power under Section
    147, N.I. Act, it is to be noted that the question is no longer res
    integra. This Court in the decision in JIK Industries Ltd. & Ors v.
    Amarlal V.Jumani & Anr. [(2012) 3 SCC 255] declined to accept
    the contention that in view of the non-obstante clause in Section
    147, NI Act, which is a special statute, the requirement of consent
    of the person compounding the offence under Section 138, N.I. Act,
    is not required. After extracting provision under Section 147, N.I. Act,
    this Court in JIK Industries Ltd. case (supra) observed and held in
    paragraph 58 and 59 thereof thus: -
           “58. Relying on the aforesaid non obstante clause in
           Section 147 of the NI Act, the learned counsel for the
           appellant argued that a three-Judge Bench decision of
           this Court in Damodar [(2010) 5 SCC 663], held that in
           view of non obstante clause in Section 147 of the NI Act,
           which is a special statute, the requirement of consent of
           the person compounding in Section 320 of the Code is
           not required in the case of compounding of an offence
           under the NI Act.
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          59. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention
          for various reasons which are discussed below.”
15. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a recent decision
    of this Court in Raj Reddy Kallem v. The State of Haryana & Anr.
    [2024 INSC 347]. The said decision would reveal that this Court
    took note of earlier decisions of this Court in JIK Industries Ltd.
    case (supra) as also in the decision in Meters and Instruments
    Private Ltd. & Anr. V. Kanchan Mehta [(2018) 1 SCC 560] and in
    un-ambiguous terms held that for compounding the offence under
    Section 138, N.I. Act, ‘consent’ of the complainant is required. In
    Kanchan Mehta’s case (supra) even after referring to the decision
    in JIK Industries ltd. case (supra) this Court held that even in the
    absence of ‘consent’ Court could close criminal proceedings against
    an accused in a case under Section 138, N.I. Act, if the accused had
    compensated the complainant. It was held therein thus: -
          18.3. Though compounding requires consent of both
          parties, even in absence of such consent, the court, in the
          interests of justice, on being satisfied that the complainant
          has been duly compensated, can in its discretion close
          the proceedings and discharge the accused.
16. But then, it is to be noted that later a five-Judge Constitution Bench
    in Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138, N.I. Act, 1881,
    In re (2021) 16 SCC 116 held that observation in Kanchan Mehta’s
    decision giving discretion to the trial Court “to close the proceedings
    and discharge the accused”, by reading Section 258, Cr.P.C.,
    which confers the power to stop proceeding in certain cases, ‘not
    a good law’. In Raj Reddy Kallem’s case (supra), after referring
    to the above positions this Court further observed that even in
    Kanchan Mehta’s case (supra) nowhere it was contemplated that
    ‘compounding’ could be done without the ‘consent’ of the parties.
    It is worthwhile to note at this juncture that in Raj Reddy Kallem’s
    case this Court drew nice distinction between ‘quashing of a case’
    and ‘compounding an offence’. To drive that point home, this Court
    referred to the decision in JIK Industries Ltd. case (supra), where
    this Court distinguished the quashing of a case from compounding
    as hereunder: -
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         1485

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           “Quashing of a case is different from compounding. In
           quashing, the Court applies it but in compounding it is
           primarily based on consent of the injured party. Therefore,
           the two cannot be equated.”
17. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that we held that the question
    whether the offence under Section 138, N.I. Act could be compounded
    invoking the power under Section 147, N.I. Act, without consent of the
    complainant concerned, is no longer res integra. In short, the position
    is ‘that an offence under Section 138, N.I. Act could be compounded
    under Section 147 thereof, only with the consent of the complainant
    concerned’. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment of
    the High Court wherein despite the absence of the consent of the
    appellant-complainant compounded the offence under Section 138,
    N.I. Act, on the ground that the appellant was equitably compensated,
    could not be sustained.
18. In the context of the issues involved another aspect of the matter
    also requires consideration. The decision in Raj Reddy Kallem’s case
    (supra), also stands on a similar footing inasmuch as the complainant
    therein was duly compensated by the accused but the complainant did
    not agree for compounding the offence. After observing that, Courts
    could not compel the complainant to give consent for compounding the
    offence under Section 138, N.I. Act, this Court in Raj Reddy Kallem’s
    case (supra) took note of the peculiar factual situation obtained and
    invoked the power under Section 142 of the Constitution of India to
    quash the proceeding pending against the appellant-accused under
    Section 138, N.I. Act. True that in Raj Reddy Kallem’s case it was
    despite the non-consent of the complainant-respondent that the
    proceedings were quashed against the appellant therein, inter alia,
    taking note of the fact that the accused therein had compensated
    the complainant and furthermore deposited the additional amount,
    as has been ordered by this Court. We have no doubt in holding that
    merely because taking into account such aspects and circumstances
    this Court ‘quashed’ the proceedings by invocation of the power
    under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, cannot be a reason for
    ‘compounding’ an offence under Section 138, N.I. Act, invoking the
    power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. and the power under Section 147,
    N.I. Act, in the absence of consent of the complainant concerned
    in view of the decision referred hereinbefore. In this context, this is
    to be noted that the fact that this Court quashed the proceedings
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    under Section 138, N.I. Act, invoking the power under Article 142 of
    the Constitution of India can be no reason at all for High Courts to
    pass an order quashing proceeding under Section 138, N.I. Act, on
    the similar lines as the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of
    India is available only to the Supreme Court of India. In this context
    it is relevant to refer to the three-Judge Bench of this Court in State
    of Punjab & Ors. v. Surinder Kumar & Ors. [(1992) 1 SCC 489],
    this Court in paragraph 6 to 8 therein held thus: -
         6. A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides
         a question of law. The respondents are, therefore, not
         entitled to rely upon an order of this Court which directs a
         temporary employee to be regularised in his service without
         assigning reasons. It has to be presumed that for special
         grounds which must have been available to the temporary
         employees in those cases, they were entitled to the relief
         granted. Merely because grounds are not mentioned in a
         judgment of this Court, it cannot be understood to have
         been passed without an adequate legal basis therefor.
         On the question of the requirement to assign reasons for
         an order, a distinction has to be kept in mind between
         a court whose judgment is not subject to further appeal
         and other courts. One of the main reasons for disclosing
         and discussing the grounds in support of a judgment is
         to enable a higher court to examine the same in case of
         a challenge. It is, of course, desirable to assign reasons
         for every order or judgment, but the requirement is not
         imperative in the case of this Court. It is, therefore, futile
         to suggest that if this Court has issued an order which
         apparently seems to be similar to the impugned order, the
         High Court can also do so. There is still another reason
         why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court.
         The Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the
         Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary
         “for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending
         before it”, which authority the High Court does not enjoy.
         The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ
         petition, is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and
         declared by the judicial decisions, and it cannot transgress
         the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of
         justice varying from Judge to Judge.
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                              1487

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           7. It is true that the High Court is entitled to exercise its
           judicial discretion in deciding writ petitions or civil revision
           applications but this discretion has to be confined in
           declining to entertain petitions and refusing to grant relief,
           asked for by petitioners, on adequate considerations; and
           it does not permit the High Court to grant relief on such
           a consideration alone.
           8. We, therefore, reject the argument addressed on behalf
           of the respondents that the High Court was entitled to
           pass any order which it thought fit in the interest of justice.
           Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and allow
           the appeal, but in the circumstances without costs.
19. The upshot of the discussion is that the High Court had clearly fallen
    in error in invoking the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., as also the
    power under Section 147, N.I. Act, to compound the offence under
    Section 138 of the N.I. Act qua the respondent-accused. Hence, the
    impugned judgment to the extent it compounded the offence under
    Section 138, N.I. Act invoking the inherent power under Section 482,
    Cr.P.C. and the power under Section 147, N.I. Act stands quashed
    and set aside.
20. However, the position is that the respondents have, by now, deposited
    an amount of Rs. 6,50,000/- along with 12% simple interest per annum
    from the date of cheque till the date of actual payment besides a sum
    of Rs. 1 lakh payable additionally, as ordered under the impugned
    judgment before the trial court. Therefore, the amount is available
    to be withdrawn by the appellant-complainant.
21. In view of the peculiar position thus obtained with respect to the
    deposit of the amount payable under the impugned judgment, the
    fact that the dishonored cheque Nos.17632 dated 19.01.2020 and
    17633 dated 09.02.2020 were respectively for Rs.3,00,000/- and
    Rs.3,50,000/- and the further fact that upon receiving the summons,
    the respondent-accused have expressed their readiness to effect
    the payment and to settle the matter, we are of the considered view
    that there is no point in restoring the proceedings and to permit their
    continuance before the trial Court, though we have set aside the
    impugned judgment to the extent it compounded the offence under
    Section 138, of the N.I. Act, invoking the power under Section 482,
    Cr.P.C., and Section 147, N.I. Act. Hence, despite the lack of consent
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    from the appellant-complainant, we found that it is a befitting case to
    invoke the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution
    of India to do complete justice between the parties and to quash
    Complaint Case No.5564 of 2022 as also all proceedings emerging
    therefrom. Hence, Complaint Case No. 5564 of 2022, pending before
    the Court of MM (N.I. Act), Digital Court-02/SED, Saket District
    Courts and all the further proceedings therefrom stand set aside and
    quashed. The appellant-complainant will be entitled to withdraw, in
    accordance with law, entire amount in deposit before the trial Court
    viz., Rs.6,50,000/- along with 12% simple interest per annum from
    the date of the cheque in question till the date of actual payment
    along with the additionally paid Rs.1,00,000/-. We make it clear that
    observations, if any, made in this case are solely for the purpose of
    deciding the captioned appeals.
22. The appeals stand disposed of on the above terms.
    Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

    Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.



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        Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey