ABDUL REHMAN & ORS.versusK.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ

              [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1033


                 ABDUL REHMAN & ORS.                          A
                             V.
                   K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ
         (Criminal Appeal Nos.2090-2093 of 2011)

                   NOVEMBER 14, 2011
                                                              B
       [CYRIAC JOSEPH AND T'5. THAKUR, JJ.]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

       s.195 - Complaint filed by appellant before CAW cell c
  accusing respondent of commission of offence punishable
  under s. 406 read with s. 34 /PC and ss.3 and 4 of Dowry
 Prohibition Act - Complaint by respondent alleging that
  appellant had instituted criminal proceedings against him
 without any basis and falsely charged him with commission 0
 of offences knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for
 such proceedings or charge and thereby committed offences
 punishable u/ss.211 and 500 read with s.109, 114 and 34 /PC
 - Maintainability of - Plea of appellant that bar of s. 195 was
 attracted to the complaint filed by the respondent inasmuch E
 as the offence allegedly committed by them was "in relation
 to the proceedings" in the court which the respondent had
 approached for grant of bail and the court concerned had
 granted the bail prayed for by him - Held: The bail
 proceedings conducted by Sessions Judge in connection with F
 the case which appellant had lodged with CAW Cell were
judicial proceedings and the offence punishable under s.211
 /PC alleged to have been committed by the appellant related
 to the said proceedings - Such being the case the bar
contained in s.195 was attracted to complaint filed by
respondent - Complaint of respondent was not, thus, G
maintainable - Penal Code, 1860- ss.406 rlw s.34 - bowry
 Prohibition Act - ss. 3 and 4.

    s. 195 - Scope and ambit of - Discussed.
                           1033                               H
    1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A        Aggrieved by the institution of criminal complaint
    against him by the appellant before the CAW cell under
    Section 406 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and
    4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the respondent filed a
    complaint alleging that the appellants had instituted
B   criminal proceedings against him without any basis and
    falsely charged him with commission of offences
    knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for such
    proceedings or charge and thereby committed offences
    punishable under Sections 211 and 500 read with
c   Sections 109, 114 and 34 IPC. The Magistrate held that
    there was sufficient material to show commission of
    offences punishable under Sections 211 and 500 IPC. The
    appellant preferred a criminal revision which was
    dismissed as time barred. The appellant then filed a
    petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C~ before the High Court
0
    for quashing complaint pending before the Magistrate
    and all proceedings consequent thereto. The High Court
    dismissed the said petition holding that since no judicial
    proceedings were pending in any court at the time when
E   the complaint under Sections 211 and 500 IPC was filed
    by the respondent-complainant, the bar contained in
    Section 195 Cr.P.C. was not attracted nor was there any
    illegality in the order passed by the Magistrate
    summoning the appellants to face trial. The instant
    appeals were filed challenging the order of the High
F   Court.

        Allowing the appeals, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. A plain reading of Section 195, Cr.P.C.
  shows that there is a legal bar to any Court taking
G cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 193
  to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both
  inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alleged to have
  been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in
  any Court except on a complaint in writing, of that Court
H
  ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1035

or by such officer of the Court as may be authorised in       A
that behalf, or by some other Court to which that Court
is subordinate. That a complaint alleging commission of
an offence punishable under Section 211 IPC, "in or in
relation to any proceedings in any Court", is maintainable
only at the instance of that Court or by an officer of that   B
Court authorized in writing for that purpose or some
other Court to which that Court is subordinate, is
abundantly clear from the language employed in the
provision. It is common ground that the offence in the
present case is not alleged to have been committed "in        c
any proceedings in any Court". [Para 7] [1041-C-F]
     1.2. Upon the filing of the complaint by the appellants
 with the CAW Cell, the respondent-complainant had
sought an order of anticipatory bail from the Sessions
 Judge and. an order granting bail was indeed passed in D
favour of the respondent. On completion of the
investigation into the case lodged by the appellants
under Section 406 read with Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, a charge sheet under Section 173 Cr.P.C.
was filed before the court competent to try the said E
offences in which the respondents wer released on
regular bail. The filing of the charge sheet, however,
being an event subsequent to the taking of cognizance
by the Magistrate on the complaint filed by the
respondent-complainant, the same can have no F
relevance for determining whether cognizance was
properly taken. The question all the same would be
whether the grant of anticipatory bail to the respondent
by the Sessionli> Judge .would constitute judicial
proceedings and, if so, whether the offence allegedly G
committed by the appellants could be said to have been
committed in relation to any such proceedings. [Para 8)
[941-G-H; 942-A-C
   1.3. The bail proceedings conducted by the Court of
Sessions 'Judge in connection with the case which the         H
         '
     1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


  A appellants had lodged with CAW Cell were judicial
    proceedings and the offence punishable under Section
    211 IPC alleged to have been committed by the appellants
    related to the said proceedings. Such being the case the
    bar contained in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. was clearly
  B attracted to the complaint filed by the respondent. The
    Magistrate and the High Court had both failed to notice
    the decision of this Court in *Kam/apati Trivedi's and **SK.
    Bannu's cases and thereby fallen in error in holding that
    the complaint filed by the respondent was maintainable.
  c The High Court also failed to appreciate that the real
    question that fell for consideration before it was whether
    the bail proceedings were tantamount to judicial
    proceedings. That question was left open by this Court
    in ***M.L Sethi's case but was squarely answered in
.   * Kamalapati Trivedi's case. Once it is held that bail
  0
    proceedings amounted to judicial proceedings the same
    being anterior in point of time to the taking of cognizance
    by the Metropolitan Magistrate, there is no escape from
    the conclusion that any offence punishable under Section
  E 211 IPC could be taken cognizance of only at the instance
    of the Court in relation to whose proceedings the same
    was committed or who finally dealt with that case. A
    charge-sheet has already been filed against the
    respondent by the CAW Cell before the Competent Court.
    The respondent would, therefore, have a right to move
  F the said Court for filing a complaint against the appellants
    for an offence punishable under Section 211 IPC or any
    other offence committed in or in relation to the said
    proceedings at the appropriate stage. It goes without
    saying that if an application is indeed made by the
  G respondent to the Court concerned, it is expected to pass
    appropriate orders on the same having regard to the
    provisions of Section 340 of the Code. So long as the said
    proceedings are pending before the competent Court it
    would neither be just nor proper nor even legally
  H permissible to allow parallel proceedings for prosecution
  ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1037


of the appellants for the alleged commission of offence       A
punishable under Section 211 IPC. (Paras 14, 15] (1047-
8-H; 1048-A-B]

    *Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal 1980 (2) SCC
91: 1979 (2) SCR 717; **State of Maharashtra v. SK. Ban nu    8
and Shankar (1980) 4 SCC 286: 1981 (1) SCR 694; ***M.L.
Sethi v. R.P. Kapur AIR 1967 SC 528: 1967 SCR 520 -
relied on.

      2. Allowing the respondents to continue with the
 prosecution against the appellants for the offence C
 punishable under Sectlon 500 IPC would not subserve
 the ends of justice and_ may result in the appellants
 getting vexed twice on the same facts. Any complaint
 under Section 500 IPC may become time barred if the
 complaint already lodged is quashed. That is not an D
 insurmountable difficulty and can be taken care of by
 moulding the relief suitably, It would be appropriate if the
 orders passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and that
 passed by the High Court are set aside and the complaint
filed by the respondent directed to be transferred to the E
Court dealing with the charge sheet filed against the
respondent. The said court shall treat the complaint as
an application for filing of a complaint under Section 211
of the IPC to be considered and disposed of at the final
conclusion of the trial; having regard to the provisions F
of Section 340 of IPC and the finding regarding guilt or
innocence of the respondent as the case may be
recorded against him. The respondent shall also have the
liberty to proceed with the complaint in so far as the same
relates to commission of the offence punishable under G
Section 500 of the IPC depending upon whether there is
any room for doing so in the light of the findings which
the court may record at the conclusion of the trial against
the respondent. [Para 16) (1048-G-H; 1049-A-C]
    Badri v. State ILR (1963) 2 All 359 - referred to.        H
    1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A                        Case Law Reference:

        1967 SCR 520                 relied on      Paras 4, 9,
                                                          14

        ILR (1963) 2 All 359         referred to    Para 9
B
        1979 (2) SCR 717             relied on      Paras 11, 14

        1981 (1) SCR 694             relied on      Paras 13, 14

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
c   Nos. 2090-2093 of 2011.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 26.2.2008 of the High
    Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C. No. 4183-86 of 2006.

      Chandra Shekhar, Saurabh Upadhyay, Meghna De, S.K.
D Verma for the Appellants.

        T.S. Doabia, Sdhna Sandhu, Priyanka Mathur Sardana,
    Anil Katiyar, P.O. Sharma, Dr. Alok K. Sharma for the
    Respondent.

E       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. The short question that arises for determination in these
F appeals is whether the complaint filed by the respondent-
  complainant against the appellants, alleging commission of
  offences punishable under Sections 211, 500, 109, and 114
  read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 was barred
  by the provisions of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973. The High Court of Delhi has, while dismissing
G the petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. filed by the
  appellants held that the complaint in question is not barred and
  that the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, commHted no error of
  law or jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offence
  punishable under Sections 211 and 500 IPC. The appellants
H who happen to be the accused persons in the complaint
  ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1039
              (T.S.THAKUR, J.]
 aforementioned have assailed the said finding in the present A
 appeal by special leave. The appellants contend that the bar
 contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. was attracted to the complaint
filed by the respondent inasmuch as the offence allegedly
committed by them was "in relation to the proceedings" in the
court which the Respondent-complainant had approached, for B
the grant of bail and in which the court concerned had granted
the bail prayed for by him. What is the true purport of the
expression "in relation ~o any proceedings in any Court"
appea_r:!_n_g in Section 195(1 )(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and in particular whether the grant of bail to c
the respondent in connection with the FIR registered against
him would attract the bar contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C is
all that falls for determination. Before we advert to the provisions
of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., we may briefly set out the facts
in the backdrop.                                                     D
      3. Appellant-Abdul Rehman lodged a complaint with the
 Crime against Women (CAW) Cell, Nanakpura, Moti Bagh,
 New Delhi, accusing the Respondent-K.M. Anees-Ul-Haq and
four others of commission of an offence punishable under
 Section 406 read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 E
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The complainant's case is that
the accusations made by the appellant in the report lodged with
the Women Cell were totally false and fabricated. In particular,
allegations regarding demand of dowry as a condition
precedent for performance of Nikah between the complainant's F
nephew and Ms Aliya-appellant No.3 in this appeal were also
false and unfounded. It was on that premise that the respondent
filed a complaint alleging that the appellants had instituted
criminal proceedings against him without any basis and falsely
charged him with commission of offences knowing that there G
was no just or lawful ground for such proceedings or charge
and thereby committed offences punishable under Sections
211 and 500 read with Sections 109, 114 and 34 IPC.
    4. The Metropolitan Magistrate entertained the complaint,      H
    1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   recorded statements of three witnesses produced by the
    respondent and came to the conclusion that there was su'ificient
    material to show commission of offences punishable under
    Sections 211 and 500 IPC. While doing so, the Magistrate
    placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in M.L. Sethi v.
s   R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528) to hold that a complaint for
    commission of an offence punishable under Section 211 IPC
    is maintainable even at the stage of investigation into a First
    Information Report.

        5. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Metropolitan
C Magistrate, the appellant preferred a Criminal Revision before
  the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, who dismissed the
  same as barred by limitation. The appellant then preferred a
  petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court of
  Delhi for quashing complaint No.180/1 of 2002 pending before
D the Metropolitan Magistrate and all proceedings consequent
  thereto. The High Court has, as mentioned above, dismissed
  the said petition holding that since no judicial proceedings were
  pending in any Court at the time when the complaint under
  Sections 211 and 500 IPC was filed by the respondent-
E complainant, the bar contained in Section 195 Cr.P.C. was not
  attracted nor was there any illegality in the order passed by the
  Metropolitan Magistrate summoning the appellants to face trial.

       6. We have .heard learned counsel for the parties at
F considerable length and perused the order under challenge.
  Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. to the extent the same is relevant
  for our purposes may be extracted at this stage:

        "195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of
        public servants, for offences against public justice and
G       for offences relating to documents given in evidence. -
        (1) No Court shall take cognizance -

        )()()( xxx                   xxx

H
        xxx xxx                      xxx
  ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1041
              [T.S. THAKUR, J.] ·

      (b )(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following   A
              sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),
              namely, sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199,
              200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when
              such offence is alleged to have been c-0mmitted in,
              or iii relation to, any proceeding 1n any court, or    B

            )()()(   )()()(   )()()(


            )()()( )()()(     xxi'

       7. A plain reading of the above would show that there is a    C
legal bar to any Court taking cognizance of offences punishable
under Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to·
211 (both inclusive) and 228 when such offence is alieged to
have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any
Court except on a complaint in writing, of that Court or by such     D
officer of the Court as may be authorised in that behalf, or by
some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. That a
complaint alleging commission of an offence punishable under
Section 211 IPC, "in or in relation to any proceedings in any
Court", is maintainable only at the instance of that Court or by     E
an officer of that Court authorized in writing for that purpose or
some other Court to which that Court is subordinate, is
abundantly clear from the language employed in the provision.
It is common ground that the offence in the present case is not
alleged to have been committed "in any proceedings in any
                                                                     F
Court". That being so, the question is whether the offence
alleged against the appellants can be said to have been
committed "in relation to any proceedings in any Court".

    8. It is not in dispute that upon the filing of the complaint
by the appellants with the CAW Cell the respondent-                  G
complainant had sought an order of anticipatory bail from the
Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, Delhi, nor is it
disputed that an order granting bail was indeed passed in
favour of the respondent. It is also not in dispute that on
completion of the investigation into the case lodged by the          H
    1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A appellants under Section 406 read with Sections 3 and 4 of
  Dowry Prohibition Act, a charge sheet under Section 173
  Cr.P.C. has already been filed before the Court competent to
  try the said offences in which the ·respondents have been
  released on regular bail on a sum of rupees ten thousand with
B one surety of the like amount. The filing of the charge sheet,
  however, being an event subsequent to the taking of cognizance
  by the Metropolitan Magistrate on the complaint filed by the
  respondent-complainant, the same can have no relevance for
  determining whether cognizance was properly taken. The
c question all the same would be whether the grant of anticipatory
  bail to the respondent by the Additional Sessions Judge,
  Karkardooma Court, Delhi, would constitute judicial
  proceedings and, if so, whether the offence allegedly committed
  by the appellants could be said to have been committed in
  relation to any such proceedings.
0
       9. The question whether grant of bail would attract the bar
  contained in Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. is no longer res
  integra. In Badri v. State [ILR (1963) 2 All 359] an offence
  punishable under Section 211 IPC was alleged to have been
E committed by the person making a false report against the
  complainant and others to the police. It was held that the said
  offence was committed in relation to the remand proceedings
  and the bail proceedings which were subsequently taken before
  the Magistrate in connection with that report to the police and,
F therefore, the case was governed by Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C.
  and no cognizance could be taken except on a complaint by
  the Magistrate under Section 195 read with Section 340 of the
  Cr.P.C. The said decision came up for consideration before a
  three-Judge Bench of this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur
G [AIR 1967 SC 528], but this Court left open the question
  whether remand and bail proceedings before a Magistrate
  would constitute proceedings in a Court. This Court observed:

        "We do not consider it necessary to express any opinion
        whether the remand and bail proceedings before the
H
        Magistrate could be held to be proceedings in a Court, nor
  ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1043
             JT.S. THAKUR, J.]

     need we consider the question whether the charge of             A
     making of the false report could be rightly held to be in
     relation to those proceedings. That aspect need not detain
     us, because, in the case before us, the facts are different."

     10. The legal position regarding maintainability of a
                                                                     8
complaint under Section 211 IPC by reference to a false
complaint lodged before the police was nevertheless stated in
the following words:

     "Consequently, until some occasion arises for a Magistrate
     to make a judicial order in connection with an investigation    C
     of a cognizable offence by the police no question can arise
     of the Magistrate having the power of filing a complaint
     under Section 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. In such circumstances,
     if a. private person, aggrieved by the information given to
     the police, files a ·complaint for commission of an offence     D
     under Section 211, IPC, at any stage before a judicial order
     has been made by a Magistrate, there can be no question,
    on the date on which cognizance of that complaint is taken
    by the Court, of the provisions of Section 195(1 )(b) being
    attracted, because, on that date, there would be no              E
    proceeding in any Court in existence in relation to which
    Section 211, IPC can be said to have been committed.
    The mere fact that on a report being made to the police
    of a cognizable offence, the proceedings must, at some
    later stage, and in a judicial order by a Magistrate, cannot     F
    therefore, stand in the way of a private complaint being
    filed and of cognizance being taken by the Court on its
    basis."

     11. The question regarding bail proceedings before the
Court being proceedings in a Court within the meaning of             G
Section 195(1)(b)(i) once again fell for consideration before this
Court in Kamlapati Trivedi v. State of West Bengal [1980 (2)
sec 91]. Kamlapati Trivedi had in that case filed a complaint
under Sections 147, 448 and 379 IPC against six persons
including one Satya Narayan Pathak. Warrants were issued for         H
    1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDI..) S.C.R.


A the arrest of the accused, all of whom surrendered before the
  Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Howrah, who
  passed an order releasing them on bail. In due course the
  police completed the investigation and submitted a final report
  under Section 173 Cr.P.C. stating that the complaint filed by
B Shri Trivedi was false. The Magistrate agreed with the report
  and passed an order discharging the accused. Sometime after
  the discharge order made by the Magistrate, Mr. Pathak, who
  was one of the accused persons of committing the offence, filed
  a complaint before the SDJM accusing Kamalapati Trivedi of
C the commission of offences punishable under Sections 211 and
  182 IPC by reasons of the latter having lodged with the police
  a false complaint. Trivedi filed a petition before the High Court
  praying for quashing of the proceedings before the Magistrate
  in view of the bar contained in Section 195(1 )(b)(i) of the Code.
D That prayer was declined by the High Court who took the view
  that criminal proceedings before the Court became a criminal
  proceeding only when cognizance was taken and not before
  and since no proceeding was pending before the Court, the
  provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(i) were not attracted. In appeal,
  this Court formulated the following two questions:
E
        "33. The points requiring determination therefore are:

              "(a) Whether the SDJM acted as a Court when he
        passed the orders dated May 6, 1970 and July 31, 1970
F       or any of them?

               (b) If the answer to question (a) is in the affirmative,
        whether the offence under Section 211 of the Indian Penal
        Code attributed to Trivedi could be regarded as having
        been committed in relation to the proceedings culminating
G       in either or both of the said orders?"

        12. Answering the questions in the affirmative this Court
    observed:

        "60. As the order releasing Trivedi on bail and the one
H


                                     y
   ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1045
               [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

      ultimately discharging him of the offence complained of        A
      amount to proceedings before a Court, all that remains to
      be seen is whe.ther the offence under Section 211 of the
      Indian Penal Code which is the subject-matter of the
      complaint against Trivedi can be said to have been
      committed "in relation to" those proceedings. Both the         B
    . orders resulted directly from the information lodged by
      Trivedi with the police against Pathak and in this situation
      there is no getting out of the conclusion that the said
      offence must be regarded as one committed in relation to
      those proceedings. This requirement of clause (b)              c
      aforement(pned is also therefore fully satisfied.

     61. For the reasons stated, I hold that the complaint against
     Trivedi is in respect of an offence alleged to have been
     committed.in .relation to a proceeding in Court and that in
     taking cognizance of it the SDJM acted in contravention         D
     of the bar contained in the said clause (b}, as there was
     no complaint in writing either of the SDJM or of a superior
     Court. In the result, therefore, I accept the appeal and,
     setting aside the order of the High Court, quash the
     proceedings taken by the SDJM against Trivedi."                 E

      13. The above view was reiterated by this Court in State
of Maharashtra v. SK. Bannu and Shankar [(1980) 4 SCC
286]. The question in that case was whether prosecution for an
offence punishable under Section 476 IPC could be lodged at          F
the instance of a transferee Court in a case where the offence
was committed in the other Court which was earlier dealing with
a different stage of the said proceedings. Answering the
question in the affirmative this Court held that the two
proceedings namely one in which the offence was committed            G
and the other in which the final order is made are, in substance,
different stages of the same integrated judicial process and that
the offence committed in the earlier of the said proceedings
can be said to be an offence committed in relation to the
proceedings before the Court to whom the case was                    H
    1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A subsequently transferred or the Court which finally tried the
  case. It was further held that bail proceedings before the
  Magistrate were judicial proceedings even though such
  proceedings had taken place at a stage when the offence
  against the acctsed, who were bailed out, was under police
B investigation. This Court observed:-

        "16 .............. This being the real position, the bail
        proceedings before Shri Deshpande, and the subsequent
        proceedings before Shri Karandikar commencing with the
        presentation of the challan by the police for the prosecution
c       of Deolal Kishan, could not be viewed as distinct and
        different proceedings but as stages in and parts of the
        same judicial process. Neither the time-lag between the
        order of bail and the challan, nor the fact that on
        presentation of the challan, the case was not marked to
D       Shri Deshpande but was transferred under Section 192 of
        the Code, to Shri Karandikar, would make any difference
        to the earlier and subsequent proceedings being parts or
        stages of the same integral whole. Indeed, the commission
        of the offences under Sections 205, 419, 465, 467 and
E       471 of the Penal Code, came to light only when Shri
        Karandikar, on the basis of the forged surety bond in
        question, attempted to procure the attendance of the
        accused. If the earlier proceedings before Shri Deshpande
        and the subsequent proceedings before Shri Karandikar
F       were stages in or parts of the one and the same process
        - as we hold they were - then it logically follows that the
        aforesaid offences could be said to have been committed
        "in or in relation to" the proceedings in the Court of Shri
        Karandikar, also, for the purpose of taking action under
G       Section 476 of the Code.

       21. In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the bail
  proceedings before Shri Deshpande were judicial proceedings
  before a court, although such proceedings took place at a stage
H when the offence against the accused, who was bailed out, was
  ABDL)L REHMAN & ORS .. v. K,M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1047 .
              . . [T.S. THAKUR, J.] . . .

under police investigation. Thus, the facts in Nirmaljit Singh       A
case (1973) 3 sec 753 were materially different. The ratio of
that decision; therefore, has no application to the case before
us.

    · 14. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, there   8
is no gainsaying that the bail proceedings conducted by the
Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Karkardooma, Delhi, in
connection with the case which the appellants had lodged with
CAW Cellwerejudicial proceedings and the offence punishable
under Section 211 IPC allegedte, have been committed by the          C
appellants related to the said proceedings. Such being the case
the bar contained in Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. was clearly
attracted to the complaint· filed. by the respondent. The
Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court had both failed to
notice the decision o.f this Court in Kam/apC1fi Trivedi's and SK.
Bannu's cases (supra) and thereby fallen in error in holding. that   0
the complaint filed by the respondent was maintainable .. The
High Court appears to have also failed to appreciate that the
real question that fell for consideration before it was whether
the bail proceedings were tantamount to judicial proceedings.
That question had been left open by this Court in M.L Sethi's        E
case (supra) but was squarely answered in Kamalapati
Trivedi's case (supra). Once it i_s held that bail proceedings
amounted to judicial proceedings the same ~eing anterior in
point of time to the taking of cognizance by the Metropolitan
Magistrate, there is no escape from the conclusion that any          F
offence punishable under Section 211 IPC could be taken
cognizance of only at the instance of the Court in relation to
whose proceedings the same was committed or who finally
dealt with that case.                        ·
                                                                     G
      15. As noticed above, a charge-sheet has already been
filed against the respondent by the CAW Cell before the
Competent Court. The respondent would, therefore, have a right
to move the said Court for filing a complaint against the
appellants for an offence punishable under Section 211 IPC or        H
    1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A any other offence committed in or in relation to the said
  proceedings at the appropriate stage. It goes without saying
  that if an application is indeed made by the respondent to the
  Court concerned, it is expected to pass appropriate orders on
  the same having regard to the provisions of Section 340 of the
B Code. So long as the said proceedings are pending before the
  competent Court it would neither be just nor proper nor even
  legally permissible to allow parallel proceedings for prosecution
  of the appellants for the alleged commission of offence
  punishable under Section 211 IPC.
c        . 16. It was next argued by learned counsel for the
     respondent that while an offence under Section 211 IPC cannot
     be taken cognizance of, there was no room for interfering with
     the proceedings in so far as the same related to the
     commission of an offence punishable under Section 500, since
D    the bar of Section 195 Cr.P.C. was not attracted to the
     proceedings under Section 500 IPC. The argument though
    attractive does not stand closer scrutiny. The substance of the
    case set up by the respondent is that the allegations made in
    the complaint lodged with CAW Cell accusing him of an offence
E   punishable under Section 406 and Sections 3 and 4 of the
     Dowry Prohi.bition Act were false which according to the
    respondent tantamounts to commission of an offence
    punishable under Section 211 IPC apart from an offence
    punishable under Section 500 IPC. The factual matrix for both
F   the offences is however one and the same. Allowing the
    respondents to continue with the prosecution against the
    appellants for the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC
    would not, in our opinion, subserve the ends of justice and may
    result in the appellants- getting vexed twice on the same facts.
G   We are doubtless conscious of the fact that any complaint under
    Section 500 IPC may become time barred if the complaint
    already lodged is quashed. That is not an insurmountable
    difficult; and can be taken care of by moulding the relief suitably.
    It would, in our opinion, be appropriate if the orders passed by
H   the Metropolitan Magistrate and that passed by the High Court
  ABDUL REHMAN & ORS. v. K'.M. ANEES-UL-HAQ 1049
              [lS. THAKUR, J.]

are set aside and.the complaint filed by the respondent directed A
to be transferred to the Court dealing with the charge sheet filed
against the respondent. The said court shall treat the complaint ·
as an application for filing of a complaint under Section 211 of
the IPC to be considered and disposed of at the final conclusion
of the trial; having regard to the provisions of Section 340 of B
IPC and the finding regarding guilt or innocence of the
respondent as the case may be recorded against him. The
respondent shall also have the liberty to proceed with the
complaint in so far as the same relates to commission of the
offence punishable under Section 500 of the IPC depending         c
upon whether there is any roorn for doing so in the light of the
findings which the court may record at the conclusion of the trial
against the respondent.

      17. In the result, these appeals are allowed, and order
dated 3rd February, 2003 passed by the Metropolitan               D
Magistrate and that passed by the High Court dated 26th
February, 2008
             I
                 are quashed. Crl. complaint No.180/1 of 2002
filed by the respondent shall stand transferred to the Court of
competent jurisdiction seized of the charge-sheet filed against
the respondents, for such orders as the Court may deem fit at     E
the conclusion of the trial of the respondent having regard to
the observations made above.

D.G.                                        Appeals allowed.