AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIAversusPRADIP KUMAR BANERJEE

                 [2025] 2 S.C.R. 404 : 2025 INSC 149

                       Airports Authority of India
                                   v.
                        Pradip Kumar Banerjee
                      (Civil Appeal No. 8414 of 2017)
                              04 February 2025
            [J.K. Maheshwari and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was correct in setting
       aside the order of dismissal of the respondent.

                                  Headnotes†
       Service law – Dismissal in service – Disciplinary proceedings –
       Scope of intra-court writ appeal – Respondent, working with
       the appellant, arrested on allegations of demanding and
       accepting illegal gratification – Order of conviction – During
       pendency, the Disciplinary Authority ordered dismissal of
       the respondent, upheld by the Appellate Court – Writ petition
       thereagainst, disposed of by the High Court, with direction that
       if the respondent is acquitted, he could approach the Authority
       to reconsider the dismissal order – High Court acquitted
       the respondent – Respondent then filed representation, the
       Appellate Authority set aside the order of dismissal, however,
       placed the respondent under deemed suspension – Writ
       petition thereagainst, seeking direction to restrain the Authority
       from initiating fresh departmental proceedings and quash
       the memorandum of charge issued against him, allowed by
       the Single Judge, and directed to re-instate him – Appellant
       authority then filed intra-court appeal, which was allowed by
       the Division Bench – SLP thereagainst also dismissed directing
       the disciplinary proceedings pending against the respondent
       be expedited – Disciplinary Authority then accepted the enquiry
       report and imposed penalty of dismissal which was affirmed
       by the sub-committee, and thereafter upheld by the Single
       Judge of the High Court – However, the Division Bench set
       aside the order – Sustainability:

* Author
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                              405

          Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


     Held: Not sustainable – Division Bench in the impugned judgment
     overturned the findings recorded in the earlier round of litigation,
     despite such judgment having attained finality – Division Bench
     erred in holding that non-examination of the complainant was
     fatal to the disciplinary proceedings conducted by the appellant-
     Authority – Even in a criminal case pertaining to demand and
     acceptance of illegal gratification, the courts are empowered
     to record conviction, where the decoy turns hostile, and the
     prosecution case is based purely on the evidence of the Trap
     Laying Officer and the trap witness – Representation submitted
     by the respondent duly adverted to and objectively considered by
     Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority – In disciplinary
     proceedings, it is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to
     deal with each and every ground raised by the delinquent officer
     and detailed reasons are not required in the order imposing
     punishment – Disciplinary Authority should examine the evidence
     in the disciplinary proceedings and arrive at a reasoned conclusion
     that the material placed on record during the course of enquiry
     establishes the guilt of the delinquent employee on the principle
     of preponderance of probabilities – Disciplinary Authority and
     the Appellate Authority precisely did the same – Division Bench
     also erred in substituting the standard of proof required in a
     criminal trial vis-a-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the
     employer – In an intra-court writ appeal, the appellate court must
     restrain itself and the interference into the judgment passed
     by the Single Judge is permissible only if the judgment of the
     Single Judge is perverse or suffers from an error apparent in
     law – However, Division Bench failed to record any such finding
     and rather, proceeded to delve into extensive re-appreciation of
     evidence to overturn the judgment of the Single Judge – Thus,
     the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority fully justified
     in imposing the penalty of dismissal from service upon the
     respondent, which was rightly affirmed by the Single Judge of
     the High Court – Judgment rendered by the Single Judge well-
     reasoned and unassailable – Division Bench while exercising the
     intra-court writ appellate jurisdiction clearly erred in interfering
     with the concurrent findings, thus the impugned judgment set
     aside. [Paras 27-34, 37-40]
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                                 Case Law Cited
       G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [2006] Supp. 2 SCR 253 : (2006) 5
       SCC 446; Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh
       [2006] 3 SCR 872 : (2006) 4 SCC 265; Bhanuprasad Hariprasad
       Dave v. State of Gujarat [1969] 1 SCR 22 : 1968 SCC OnLine
       SC 81; Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank [2021] 1 SCR
       858 : (2021) 3 SCC 806; Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [1972]
       2 SCR 218 : (1972) 4 SCC 618; Management of Narendra &
       Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company
       [2016] 1 SCR 597 : (2016) 3 SCC 340 – referred to.

                                    List of Acts
       Airport Authority of India Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003.

                                List of Keywords
       Dismissal; Illegal gratification; Deemed suspension; Memorandum
       of charge; Enquiry report; Sub-committee; Earlier round of litigation;
       Disciplinary proceedings; Departmental enquiry; Enquiry officer;
       Departmental appeal; Dismissal from service; Standard of Proof;
       Preponderance of probabilities; Rules of evidence; Admissibility of
       Confessional statements; Intra-court writ appeal; Illegal gratification;
       Acquittal on benefit of doubt; Acquittal not honorable; Trap Laying
       Officer; Trap witness.

                               Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8414 of 2017
       From the Judgment and Order dated 01.03.2012 of the High Court
       of Calcutta in MAT No. 1311 of 2011

                            Appearances for Parties
       K. M. Nataraj, A.S.G., Ms. Neetica Sharma, Ms. Shrinkhla Tiwari,
       Tavinder Sidhu, M/s. M. V. Kini & Associates, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Anurag Pandey, Ms. Reena Pandey, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Advs.
       for the Respondent.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           407

              Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


                       Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                               Judgment

       Mehta, J.

1.     Heard.
2.     The instant appeal by special leave preferred by the appellant1
       takes exception to the judgment dated 1st March, 2012 passed by
       the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta2 in an intra-court
       writ appeal3, whereby the Division Bench allowed the appeal filed
       by the respondent and set aside the order passed by the learned
       Single Judge.
       The learned Single Judge vide order4 dated 29th June, 2011, upheld the
       punishment of dismissal from service imposed upon the respondent
       by the Disciplinary Authority and subsequently confirmed by the sub-
       committee while acting as the Appellate Authority.

       Brief Facts:-
3.     The respondent, while working with the appellant-Authority as an
       Assistant Engineer (Civil), was arrested along with a co-employee,
       who was working as a Junior Engineer in the appellant-Authority, for
       the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(2) read with Section
       13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19885 and Section 34 of
       the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on the allegations of demanding and
       accepting illegal gratification from the representative of a contractor.
       Pursuant to the aforesaid arrest, both of them were suspended and
       a CBI Case6 was registered against them. The learned Special
       Judge, CBI Court, Alipore 7, vide order dated 10th December, 1999,
       found the respondent guilty for the above-mentioned offences. On
       the contrary, the co-accused(Junior Engineer) was acquitted by the


1    Hereinafter referred to as the “appellant-Authority”.
2    Hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”.
3    Tender of Mandamus Appeal (MAT) No. 1311 of 2011.
4    Writ Petition No. 9701(W) of 2010.
5    For short “PC Act”.
6    Special Case No. 8 of 1993.
7    For short “CBI Court”.
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       CBI Court. Aggrieved by his conviction, the respondent preferred a
       criminal appeal8 before the High Court.
4.     While the criminal appeal was pending before the High Court, the
       Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 13th July, 2000, dispensed
       with the enquiry and ordered dismissal of the respondent from
       service relying on the CBI Court’s order. Aggrieved by his dismissal,
       the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which
       came to be rejected. Thereupon, the respondent preferred a writ
       petition9 before the High Court challenging the order of dismissal.
       The same was disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 5th
       February, 2001, with a direction that if the respondent is acquitted
       in the pending criminal appeal, then it would be open for him to
       make an appropriate representation before the appellant-Authority
       to reconsider the dismissal order, which would, in turn, be decided
       in accordance with law.
5.     Vide judgment dated 16th July, 2004, the criminal appeal preferred
       by the respondent was ultimately allowed by the High Court, and
       his conviction and sentence was set aside. Based on his acquittal,
       the respondent filed a representation before the appellant-Authority
       seeking reinstatement in service, in terms of the order dated 5th
       February, 2001 passed by the High Court in W.P. No. 22034(W) of
       2000. However, the appellant-Authority rejected the respondent’s
       representation. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition10,
       which came to be disposed of by the High Court vide order dated
       22nd December, 2004, directing the Chairman of appellant-Authority
       to reconsider the grievances of the respondent by granting him an
       opportunity of hearing.
6.     In compliance with the order dated 22nd December, 2004, the
       Chairman of the appellant-Authority heard the respondent and vide
       order dated 24th March, 2005, directed that a fresh disciplinary
       proceeding for major penalty of dismissal from service should be
       initiated against the respondent under the Airport Authority of India
       Employees (CDA) Regulations, 2003. The Chairman was of the
       opinion that the High Court had set aside the conviction of the


8    Criminal Appeal No. 393 of 1999.
9    Writ Petition No. 22034(W) of 2000.
10   Writ Petition No. 21324(W) of 2004.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                          409

             Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


      respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt and hence, it was
      not an honourable acquittal. The Chairman, therefore, set aside the
      respondent’s order of dismissal dated 13th July, 2000 and placed him
      under deemed suspension with effect from the said date. Aggrieved,
      the respondent preferred another writ petition11 and prayed to set
      aside the aforesaid order passed by the Chairman and to restrain
      the appellant-Authority from initiating fresh disciplinary proceedings
      against him. During the pendency of this writ petition, a memorandum
      of charge dated 7th September, 2005 was issued by the Disciplinary
      Authority proposing to hold an enquiry against the respondent. The
      High Court allowed the writ petition vide order dated 23rd February,
      2007, whereby it quashed and set aside the order of suspension
      as well as the memorandum of charge, and directed the appellant-
      Authority to reinstate the respondent.
7.    The appellant-Authority challenged this order by filing an intra-court
      appeal12, which was allowed by the Division Bench vide order dated 6th
      August, 2007, holding that it was imperative for the appellant-Authority
      to hold a departmental enquiry and, thus, the appellant-Authority was
      fully justified in issuing a fresh chargesheet against the respondent,
      since his acquittal was based on the benefit of doubt on account of
      insufficient evidence rather than being an honourable one.
8.    Aggrieved by the order dated 6th August, 2007, the respondent
      filed a special leave petition13 before this Court, which came to be
      dismissed vide order dated 29th February, 2008, with a direction
      that the disciplinary proceedings pending against the respondent
      be expedited.
9.    Subsequently, the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and
      submitted an enquiry report, observing therein that the respondent
      had shown negligence in the performance of his duties, exhibited a
      lack of integrity, and acted in a manner unbecoming of an employee
      of the appellant-Authority. The Enquiry Officer’s report also concluded
      that the respondent had demanded a bribe of Rs.6000/- from the
      contractor who paid Rs. 3000/- as the first instalment, and the
      remaining sum of Rs. 3000/- as the second instalment.


11   Writ Petition No. 8256(W) of 2005.
12   Tender of Mandamus Appeal No. 1840 of 2007.
13   Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 496 of 2008.
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10. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the enquiry report and imposed
    a major penalty of dismissal from service on the respondent.
    Aggrieved, the respondent filed an intra-departmental appeal before
    the Chairman, which was rejected vide order dated 3rd August, 2009.
    In the aforesaid circumstances, the respondent instituted another
    writ petition14, asserting that the Chairman, in his capacity as the
    Appellate Authority, was not competent to take a decision as against
    the appellant, as he had also acted as the Disciplinary Authority in
    the past proceedings. The High Court, vide order dated 26th October,
    2009, allowed the writ petition and issued directions to the appellant-
    Authority to form a sub-committee from amongst the Board Members
    to act as the Appellate Authority and decide the appeal preferred
    by the respondent.
11. Accordingly, in terms of the order dated 26th October, 2009, a sub-
    committee was constituted which considered the appeal preferred by
    the respondent and affirmed the decision taken by the Disciplinary
    Authority concluding that there was no merit in the Departmental
    Appeal filed by the delinquent employee(respondent herein).
    Aggrieved by the order of sub-committee, the respondent filed a
    writ petition15 before the High Court, which came to be dismissed by
    learned Single Judge vide order dated 29th June, 2011. Aggrieved,
    the respondent preferred an intra-court writ appeal16, which was
    allowed by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 1st March, 2012
    which is subjected to challenge by the appellant-Authority in this
    appeal by special leave.
12. While entertaining the SLP, this Court had granted a stay on the
    impugned judgment of the High Court vide order dated 16th March, 2012.

       Submission on behalf of the appellant-Authority:-
13. Shri KM Nataraj, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the appellant-
    Authority, submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court failed
    to appreciate the law with respect to appreciation of evidence and the
    standard of proof required for proving the charges against a delinquent
    employee in a departmental enquiry. He urged that the standard of


14   Writ Petition No. 17503(W) of 2009.
15   Writ Petition No. 9701(W) of 2010.
16   Tender of Mandamus(MAT) Appeal No. 1311 of 2011.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           411

             Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


      proof required to bring home the charge in a disciplinary enquiry is
      entirely different from that required in a criminal proceeding. In a
      criminal proceeding, the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of
      the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in a departmental
      enquiry, the standard of proof is that of preponderance of probabilities.
      He further urged that there are no strict rules of evidence that govern
      the departmental proceedings and thus, a major penalty can be
      imposed on the delinquent employee merely on a finding recorded
      on the basis of preponderance of probabilities.
14. Learned counsel urged that in the instant case, the acquittal of the
    respondent in the criminal appeal17 decided by the High Court was
    not an honourable and that of complete exoneration, i.e., one based
    on the finding of innocence, rather it was based on benefit of doubt
    and insufficient evidence. The High Court also reiterated the same
    in its judgment and order dated 6th August 2007 passed in MAT No.
    1840 of 2007, preferred by the appellant-Authority. Further, a Special
    Leave Petition18 filed against the said order by the respondent, was
    also dismissed by this Court vide its order dated 29th February, 2008.
15. Learned counsel contended that the High Court grossly erred and
    acted in contravention of the limitations governing the exercise of the
    writ jurisdiction while re-appreciating the evidence and by delving into
    the evidentiary value of the report of the Enquiry Officer. He submitted
    that in an intra-court writ appeal, the High Court cannot delve into
    a detailed re-evaluation of evidence and, more significantly, there
    must exist an issue of law that calls for interference in the appellate
    jurisdiction. Once the learned Single Judge while exercising the
    writ jurisdiction concluded that the Enquiry Officer had conducted
    the enquiry as per the procedure prescribed by law by granting an
    opportunity of hearing to the respondent, it was not permissible for
    the Division Bench exercising the intra-court appellate jurisdiction
    to disturb or interfere with the order passed by the learned Single
    Judge by re-appreciating the facts and evidence.
16. He further submitted that the High Court was wholly unjustified in
    arriving at the finding of bias against the Disciplinary Authority, when
    the said Disciplinary Authority did not, in fact, acted as the Appellate


17   Supra note 8.
18   Supra note 13.
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       Authority in view of the order dated 26th October, 2009 passed by the
       High Court in the earlier round of litigation. Pursuant to this order, a
       special sub-committee was constituted to hear the appeal preferred
       by the respondent, and the appeal was not heard individually by the
       Chairman of the appellant-Authority who had previously acted as
       the Disciplinary Authority.
17. He further submitted that the High Court erred in holding that while
    considering the charges levelled against the respondent, the Enquiry
    Officer ought to have relied upon the findings of the criminal Court
    with respect to the evidence of PW-2, i.e., DN Biswas (Trap Laying
    Officer) and PW-3, i.e., MK Bagchi (Executive Engineer). He urged
    that there is no legal bar against the Enquiry Officer to arrive at
    a finding different from that of the criminal Court even though the
    factual allegations, witnesses and documents in both the proceedings
    may be common.
18. Learned counsel further urged that the Division Bench fell in grave
    error in concluding that the proceedings before the Disciplinary
    Authority were vitiated due to the non-examination of the complainant
    from whom the respondent accepted the illegal gratification. He
    submitted that PW-2, i.e., DN Biswas (Trap Laying Officer), was
    examined before the Enquiry Officer, and his testimony was sufficient
    to prove the charges of bribery levelled against the respondent.
19. He further contended that the Division Bench relied upon the judgment
    of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat19 to hold that the findings recorded
    in the judgment of the Criminal Appellate Court would be binding on
    the Disciplinary Authority. The observations in the impugned judgment
    as referred to by the learned counsel are reproduced hereinbelow: -
             “Going through the available records and specially
             scrutinising the enquiry report, we find that the Enquiry
             Officer mainly relying on the evidence of P.W.2 held the
             appellant guilty of the charges ignoring the judicial findings
             of the Criminal Court. The Enquiry Officer furthermore, did
             not properly appreciate the evidence adduced by P.W.3. It
             appears from the evidence on record that P.W. 3 instructed
             the appellant to withhold a sum of Rs. 2000/- from the


19   (2006) 5 SCC 446.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                            413

          Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


           first running bill of the Contractor due to slow progress
           of work. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant
           herein was responsible for non-payment of the bills of the
           Contractor in time. The conduct of the Contractor should
           also be taken into consideration specially when we find
           that the Superior Authority like P.W. 3 was compelled to
           issue instruction for withholding of the running bill of the
           said Contractor. In any event, the Enquiry Officer cannot
           overreach the judicial findings in respect of P.W.2. The
           Enquiry Officer relied on the evidence of P.W.2 (D. N.
           Biswas) for the purpose of holding the appellant guilty of
           the charges, not remembering that the evidence of P.W. 2
           has not been accepted by the Criminal Court. In the case
           of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. (supra), Hon’ble
           Supreme Court observed that the findings of the Judicial
           Authority should prevail upon the findings of the Disciplinary
           Authority on any particular issue. In the instant case, the
           Enquiry Officer did not adhere to the aforesaid principle
           as specifically laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
           in the case of G.M. Tank (supra).”
     Learned Counsel submitted that the issue regarding the applicability
     of the judgment delivered by this Court in G.M. Tank (supra) to the
     case at hand was no longer res integra because in the earlier round
     of litigation, the Division Bench had already concluded that G.M.
     Tank’s case would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances
     of the present case.
20. Learned counsel relied upon the observations made by the Division
    Bench of the High Court in MAT No. 1840 of 2007 decided on 6th
    August, 2007 and urged that the Division Bench while rendering
    the impugned judgment has impliedly overruled pertinent findings
    recorded by the Coordinate Bench in the earlier round of litigation
    which stood affirmed by this Court vide judgment dated 29th February,
    2008. The relevant observations from the judgment dated 6th August,
    2007 read as under:-
           “Likewise, the criminal proceedings were initiated against
           the appellant for the alleged charges punishable under
           the provisions of the PC Act on the same set of facts
           and evidence. It was submitted that the departmental
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       proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical
       and similar (verbatim) set of facts and evidence. The
       appellant has been honourably acquitted by the
       competent court on the same set of facts, evidence and
       witness and, therefore, the dismissal order based on
       the same set of facts and evidence on the departmental
       side is liable to be set aside in the interest of justice.
       “Such is not a situation in the present case. In our
       opinion the present is not a case of no evidence; it
       is a case of not sufficient evidence. There is a clear
       distinction between the two situations. Therefore, in
       our opinion, the observations in G.M. Tank’s case
       (supra) would not be applicable in the facts and
       circumstances of the present case. In this case, before
       concluding that it is necessary to hold a departmental
       enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has also considered
       the observations made by the Appeal Court to the effect
       that due to non-mentioning of arrangement to keep the
       flush door open in the pre-trap memo, it could hardly be
       accepted that such arrangement was made for keeping the
       door partly open. The Disciplinary Authority was certainly
       aware of the entire reasoning of the Appellate Court. The
       Disciplinary Authority was aware of the conclusion of the
       Appellate Court that “hardly, I find any material to place
       reliance on such evidence so as to hold that really some
       sort of shady transaction as has been alleged from the
       side of prosecution was going on between the petitioner
       and P.W.-1.” The Disciplinary Authority also notices that, in
       conclusion it is observed by the Court of Appeal that the
       present case casts “serious doubt” on the allegation. On a
       very close scrutiny of the entire matter the Disciplinary
       Authority has concluded that it would not amount to
       an honourable acquittal. We are inclined to accept the
       reasons of the Disciplinary Authority, as we are also of
       the opinion that this acquittal can hardly be equated
       with the declaration of innocence of the respondent. In
       view of the above, we hold that the appellants are justified
       in issuing a charge-sheet to the respondent.”
                                              (emphasis supplied)
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        415

          Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


     On these grounds, learned counsel for the appellant implored the
     Court to accept the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, and
     restore the judgment of the learned Single Bench and the penalty
     of dismissal from service as awarded to the respondent by the
     Departmental Authorities.

     Submission on behalf of the respondent-employee:-
21. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently and
    fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the counsel for the
    appellant-Authority and contended that the original complainant was
    neither the contractor nor an authorised person of the contractor. He
    submitted that the original complainant had claimed himself to be
    the authorised representative of the contractor company, however,
    he had neither produced any authorisation nor provided any proof of
    identity showing that he was under the employment of the contractor.
22. Learned counsel drew this Court’s attention to the specific finding in
    the impugned judgment with regard to the statement of PW-3, i.e., MK
    Bagchi, then working as Executive Engineer in the appellant-Authority,
    wherein he admitted in his cross-examination that the respondent had
    no role to play in preparing the bills and the direction to withhold the
    payment of Rs. 2000/- from the first running bill was given by PW-3
    himself. He urged that the respondent was an Assistant Engineer
    who had no role to play in the preparation of bills and therefore,
    there was no possibility of the respondent demanding any bribe for
    the preparation of bills.
23. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent could not
    have been made to undergo disciplinary enquiry proceedings on the
    very same charges which were the subject matter of the criminal
    proceedings because in the criminal case, the High Court had
    ultimately granted acquittal to the appellant vide judgment dated
    16th July, 2004 and hence, the Disciplinary Authority was under an
    obligation to treat the findings of fact on same issues, recorded
    by the High Court in its criminal appellate jurisdiction, at a higher
    pedestal while considering the enquiry report submitted by the
    Enquiry Officer.
     He concluded his submissions by urging that the non-examination of
     the complainant, i.e., the respondent in the enquiry proceedings is
     fatal to the case of the appellant-Authority and hence, the Division
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       Bench was wholly justified in interfering with the order of the Single
       Judge by setting aside the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority
       and further confirmed by the Appellate Authority. On these grounds,
       learned counsel for the respondent contended that the impugned
       judgment is unassailable in facts as well as in law and implored the
       Court to dismiss the appeal.

       Discussion and Conclusion: -
24. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
    advanced at bar and have gone through the material placed before us.
25. The respondent was subjected to disciplinary proceedings on the
    charge of accepting illegal gratification during the course of discharge
    of his official duties. In view of the conviction and sentence awarded by
    the CBI Court vide judgment dated 10th December, 1999, the enquiry
    was dispensed with and the respondent was dismissed from service
    vide order dated 13th July, 2000. Aggrieved, a criminal appeal was
    preferred by the respondent which came to be accepted by the High
    Court, vide judgment dated 16th July, 2004, and the respondent was
    acquitted of the charges levelled against him by giving him the benefit
    of doubt. Thereafter, the respondent availed of the remedy given to
    him in the earlier round of litigation, i.e., to revive the challenge to
    the order of dismissal by filing a representation with the appellant-
    Authority. The Appellate Authority gave an opportunity of personal
    hearing to the respondent and vide order dated 24th March, 2005,
    the order of dismissal dated 13th July, 2000 was set aside, however,
    the respondent was placed under deemed suspension with effect
    from 13th July, 2000. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition20
    before the High Court, assailing the order dated 24th March, 2005,
    and seeking a direction to restrain the Authority from initiating fresh
    departmental proceedings and quash the memorandum of charge
    dated 7th September, 2005 issued against him. The said writ petition
    came to be allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated
    23rd February, 2007.
26. The appellant-Authority preferred a writ appeal21 against the aforesaid
    order of the learned Single Judge which came to be allowed by the


20   Supra note 11.
21   Supra note 12.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                             417

             Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


      Division Bench vide order dated 6th August, 2007 with the following
      pertinent findings: -
      (i)     That the decision taken by the appellant-Authority to initiate
              departmental proceedings against the respondent is unassailable;
      (ii)    The finding of the learned Single Judge, that in case the
              appellant-Authority is permitted to hold enquiry into the charges,
              it would be giving an opportunity to the employer to sit in appeal
              over the findings recorded by the High Court in criminal appeal22
              decided vide judgment dated 16th July, 2004, was erroneous;
      (iii) The two proceedings, i.e., the criminal trial and domestic enquiry,
            in which the same evidence is to be evaluated, is distinct from
            each other. Therefore, even if the Enquiry Officer comes to a
            different conclusion, it would not be a reflection on the findings
            given by a Judge in a criminal trial, be that a trial Court or the
            High Court as a Court of Appeal;
      (iv) Many witnesses have consistently narrated about the confession
           made by the respondent before the CBI at the time of the raid
           itself. The Enquiry Officer would have to assess the evidentiary
           value of the evidence given by the witnesses examined in their
           enquiry proceedings. This evidence may be inadmissible in a
           criminal trial, but the strict rules of evidence do not apply to the
           departmental proceedings. Department witnesses, including PW-
           1, i.e., Mr. S.K. Dasgupta (Assistant Commissioner of Police,
           Economic Offences Wing and Detective Department) and PW-
           4, i.e., Mr. Pijush Ghata (Chance Witness) has categorically
           stated that the respondent had taken money from the decoy;
      (v)     The Division Bench relied upon the judgment in Commissioner
              of Police, New Delhi v. Narender Singh23 to hold that even a
              confession made by the employee could be admitted in evidence,
              in departmental inquiries and observed:-
                     “In view of the aforesaid statement of law it becomes
                     obvious that the Enquiry Officer would be entitled to
                     take into consideration the confession made by the
                     petitioner before the CBI. Even though, the same


22   Supra note 8.
23   (2006) 4 SCC 265.
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       was not relied upon by the Criminal Court in view of
       Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
       and Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
       1973. This bar is not applicable in departmental
       proceedings. Therefore, the Enquiry Officer would
       be entitled to take into consideration the evidentiary
       value of the confession made by the respondent.
       The other instance that seems to have weighed with
       the Appellate Court is that there is no mention in the
       pre-raid memo with regard to the arrangement having
       been made for the door being kept open. Again the
       evidence on this may not have been sufficient to say
       that the fact has been proved beyond reasonable
       doubt in a criminal trial, but the Enquiry Officer
       would have to look at the evidence on the basis of
       preponderance of probabilities. P.W.-12, the leader
       of the CBI Trap-party, has categorically stated “that
       he made an arrangement to keep the door of the
       chamber of Accused No.1 partly opened so that one
       can see inside the chamber from the outside.” The
       statement of P.W.1 is corroborated by the statements
       of P.W.2 and P.W.3 who stated in their evidence
       that they witnessed the transaction of bribe from
       outside the chamber as the door of the chamber was
       partly opened. He found that the evidence given by
       the leader of the Trap-party is corroborated by the
       contents of Post-Trap Memorandum (Ext.4). In this
       Memorandum it is categorically stated that P.W.-12
       made arrangement to keep the door of the chamber
       partly open. The Trial Court after assessing entire
       evidence came to the conclusion that the prosecution
       has been able to prove the case beyond reasonable
       doubt. From the above it would become apparent
       that this cannot be said to be a case of no
       evidence. It cannot be said that even if the entire
       evidence is accepted as true, it would still lead
       to the conclusion that the respondent No.1 was
       innocent of having committed any crime. We,
       therefore, hold that initiation of the departmental
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                                  419

             Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


                      proceedings against the respondent No.1 cannot
                      be said to be vitiated or without jurisdiction.”
                                                       (emphasis supplied)

      (vii) The Division Bench also held that the ratio of this Court’s
            judgment in G.M. Tank (supra) would not apply to the case
            at hand.
      The said judgment of the Division Bench has been affirmed by this
      Court with the dismissal of the special leave petition24 filed by the
      respondent. Hence, these findings recorded by the Division Bench of
      the High Court in the earlier round of litigation have attained finality
      inter se amongst the parties.
27. The Division Bench, in the impugned judgment, while allowing the
    writ appeal25 filed by respondent, virtually overturned these pertinent
    findings recorded in the judgment dated 6th August, 2007 rendered
    by the Division Bench in the earlier round of litigation, despite such
    judgment having attained finality. Hence, on this count alone, the
    impugned judgment dated 1st March, 2012, is unsustainable in the
    eyes of law.
28. Further, we are unable to sustain the finding of the Division Bench
    that the non-examination of the complainant is fatal to the case of
    the appellant-Authority. It is well settled principle of law that even
    in a criminal case pertaining to demand and acceptance of illegal
    gratification, the courts are empowered to record conviction, where
    the decoy turns hostile, and the prosecution case is based purely
    on the evidence of the Trap Laying Officer and the trap witnesses.
    In this regard, we are benefited by the judgment of this Court in
    Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of Gujarat,26 wherein it
    was held thus:
              “7. . . . It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this
              Court that while in the case of evidence of an accomplice,
              no conviction can be based on his evidence unless it is



24   Supra note 13.
25   Tender of Mandamus Appeal No. 1311 of 2011.
26   1968 SCC OnLine SC 81.
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          corroborated in material particulars but as regards the
          evidence of a partisan witness it is open to a court to convict
          an accused person solely on the basis of that evidence, if
          it is satisfied that that evidence is reliable. . . .”
29. In the case at hand, the subject matter concerns a domestic
    enquiry, where the strict rules of evidence prohibiting admissibility of
    confessional statements recorded by the police officials do not apply.
    Likewise, non-examination of the decoy cannot be treated to be fatal
    in the domestic enquiry where other evidence indicts the delinquent
    officer. As has been held by this Court in the case of Narender Singh
    (supra), even a confession of the delinquent employee recorded by
    the Trap Laying Officer during the criminal investigation can be relied
    upon by the Disciplinary Authority.
30. It is pertinent to note that the Trap Laying officer i.e., DN Biswas
    was examined during the course of disciplinary proceedings as
    PW-2, and he supported the case of the appellant-Authority to the
    hilt. The evidence of PW-2 was substantially corroborated by the
    other departmental witnesses including PW-1, i.e., Mr. S.K. Dasgupta
    (Assistant Commissioner of Police, Economic Offences Wing and
    Detective Department) and PW-3, i.e., Mr. M.K. Bagchi (Executive
    Engineer). Thus, the Division Bench clearly erred in holding that
    non-examination of the complainant was fatal to the disciplinary
    proceedings conducted by the appellant-Authority.
31. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment, further observed
    that the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority did not
    consider the representation of the respondent and acted without
    application of mind while imposing the penalty of dismissal from
    service against the respondent. On a perusal of the orders passed
    by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, we find
    that the representation submitted by the respondent has been duly
    adverted to and objectively considered by both the authorities and
    the same were found to be devoid of substance.
32. It is trite law that in disciplinary proceedings, it is not necessary for
    the Disciplinary Authority to deal with each and every ground raised
    by the delinquent officer in the representation against the proposed
    penalty and detailed reasons are not required to be recorded in the
    order imposing punishment if he accepts the findings recorded by
    the Enquiry Officer. Our view stands fortified by the decision of this
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                               421

            Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


      Court in Boloram Bordoloi v. Lakhimi Gaolia Bank27, wherein it
      was held:-
             “11. . . . Further, it is well settled that if the disciplinary
             authority accepts the findings recorded by the enquiry
             officer and passes an order, no detailed reasons are
             required to be recorded in the order imposing punishment.
             The punishment is imposed based on the findings recorded
             in the enquiry report, as such, no further elaborate reasons
             are required to be given by the disciplinary authority. . . .”
33. All that is required on the part of the Disciplinary Authority is that
    it should examine the evidence in the disciplinary proceedings and
    arrive at a reasoned conclusion that the material placed on record
    during the course of enquiry establishes the guilt of the delinquent
    employee on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. This
    is precisely what was done by the Disciplinary Authority and the
    Appellate Authority while dealing with the case of the respondent.
34. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in
    substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-a-vis
    the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled
    principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal
    trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a
    disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and
    it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of
    probabilities. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of
    this Court in the Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur,28 wherein this
    Court held as follows: -
             “15. . . . A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial.
             The standard proof required is that of preponderance of
             probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
             inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have
             official dealings with the respondent was one which a
             reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of
             the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal
             over a decision based on it. Where there are some



27   (2021) 3 SCC 806.
28   (1972) 4 SCC 618.
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               relevant materials which the authority has accepted and
               which materials may reasonably support the conclusion
               that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High
               Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review
               the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on
               the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the
               question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot
               be canvassed before the High Court. . . .”
35. We find that the learned Single Judge, while dealing with the writ
    petition29 filed by the respondent against the orders passed by the
    Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, considered the
    entire factual matrix in detail and dismissed the writ petition preferred
    by the respondent vide a detailed and well-reasoned judgment dated
    29th June, 2011.
36. The law relating to the exercise of intra-Court jurisdiction is crystallised
    by this Court in the case of Management of Narendra & Company
    Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company,30 wherein
    it was held as under:
               “5. Once the learned Single Judge having seen the
               records had come to the conclusion that the industry was
               not functioning after January 1995, there is no justification
               in entering a different finding without any further material
               before the Division Bench. The Appellate Bench ought to
               have noticed that the statement of MW 3 is itself part of
               the evidence before the Labour Court. Be that as it may,
               in an intra-court appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the
               Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that the finding
               of the Single Bench is perverse, it shall not disturb the
               same. Merely because another view or a better view
               is possible, there should be no interference with or
               disturbance of the order passed by the Single Judge,
               unless both sides agree for a fairer approach on relief.”
                                                      (emphasis supplied)




29     Supra note 15.
30   (2016) 3 SCC 340.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                      423

              Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee


37. The position is, thus, settled that in an intra-court writ appeal, the
    Appellate Court must restrain itself and the interference into the
    judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is permissible only
    if the judgment of the learned Single Judge is perverse or suffers
    from an error apparent in law. However, the Division Bench, in the
    present case, failed to record any such finding and rather, proceeded
    to delve into extensive re-appreciation of evidence to overturn the
    judgment of the learned Single Judge.
38. On going through the material on record, we are of the view that the
    Disciplinary Authority was fully justified in imposing the penalty of
    dismissal from service upon the respondent. The Appellate Authority
    too has duly applied its mind to the facts available on record while
    affirming the order of the Disciplinary Authority and rejecting the
    appeal filed by the respondent. These two orders have rightly
    been affirmed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court while
    dismissing the writ petition31 filed by the respondent. The judgment
    dated 29th June, 2011 rendered by the learned Single Judge is well-
    reasoned and unassailable.
39. In the wake of the above discussion, we hold that the Division
    Bench, while exercising the intra-court writ appellate jurisdiction
    clearly erred in interfering with the concurrent findings recorded by
    the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority as affirmed by the
    learned Single Judge.
40. As an upshot of the above discussion, we find that the impugned
    judgment dated 1st March, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the
    High Court is unsustainable in the eyes of law. The same deserves
    to be and is hereby set aside.
41. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.
42. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

      Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



      †
          Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain


31   Supra note 15.