ALAMELU & ANR.versusSTATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE

                   [2011) 2 S.C.R. 147

                 ALAMELU & ANR.                                A
                         v.
  STATE REPRESENTED BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
         (Criminal Appeal No.1053 of 2009)
                    JANUARY 18, 2011.
                                                               B
   [B.SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
                 NIJJAR, JJ.]

    Penal Code, 1860 - ss.366 and 3~6 rlw s.109:
                                                               c
       PW-2 was allegedly abducted and thereafter subjected
to forcible marriage and rape - Eight accused - Conviction
of, by Courts below - Justification of - Held: Not justified -
The entire story about the abduction by car and the forced
marriage was seemingly concocted - It cannot be ruled out 0
that PW-2's father suspected that PW-2 was romantically
involved with A-1 - Therefore, when she disappeared from
home, A-1 was pre~;umed to be responsible for it and hence.
the false story of abduction - Conclusions made by the High
Court that PW-2 would not have voluntarily gone with A-1 and E
that she was not a major at the relevant time are contrary to
the evidence on record - No reliable evidence to vouchsafe
the correctness of the date of birth as recorded in the school
transfer certificate of PW-2 - Expert evidence did not rule out
the possibility of PW-2 being a major-:- Even after the alleged
marriage with A-1, PW-2 continued to be a willing partner in F
the entire episode - She did not protest nor made any ·
complaint though she had the opportunity to do so on many
occasions - Conduct of PW-2 from the time of her alleged
abduction till the time of her alleged recovery was not natural .
for a girl who had been compelled to marry and subjected to G
illicit sexual intercourse - The trial court as we// as the. High
Court failed to take into consideration the inherent
improbabilities in the case - The findings recorded by both
the Courts below were perverse and unsupportable by the
                            147                                H
    148       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A evidence on record - Accused-appellants clearly entitled to
    benefit of doubt, thus, acquitted.

       Rape victim - Date of birth of the victim - Entry in her
  school transfer certificate - Evidentiary value of - Held: The
  date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have
8
  no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry
  or who gave the date of birth is examined - On facts, the father
  of the victim said nothing about the transfer certificate in his
  evidence - The Headmaster of the school was also not
  examined - There was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe for
C the truth of the facts stated in the transfer certificate - The
  burden of proof having not been discharged by the
  prosecution, the entry in the transfer certificate could not be
  relied upon to definitely fix the age of the victim - Evidence
  Act, 1872 - s.35.
D
        Rape victim - Determination of victim's age -
    Radiological examination - Margin of error in age as
    ascertained in radiological examination.
          Rape victim - Conviction based on sole evidence of the
E victim - Permissibility of - Held: The testimony of a victim of
  sexual assault stands at par with testimony of an injured
  witness, and is entitled to great weight - Corroboration is not
  the sine qua non for conviction in a rape case - Conviction
  can be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a
F victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities
  or improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence.
      Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136 - Powers under
  - Scope and ambit of - Held: Even though the powers of the
G Supreme Court under Article 136 are very wide, but in criminal
  appeals, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the
  concurrent findings of facts, save in very exceptional cases
  - The assessment of the evidence by the High Court is
  accepted as final except where the conqlusions recorded by
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    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF              149
                    POLICE
the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable by A
the evidence on record.
      According to the prosecution, when PW2, the ·
 daughter of PW1, was walking on the way to her house,
 A-1 told her that he loved her and wanted to marry her
                                                              8
 but PW-2 did not agree to such proposal; that thereafter,
 a car came near PW-2 and she was forcibly· pushed into
'the car by A-1; that A-2, A-4 and A-5 were already inside
 the car; that thereafter PW-2 was forcibly taken to a temple
 where A-1 married her in spite of her resistance and
 subsequently kept her in a house and repeatedly raped C
 her for three days. The prosecution alleged that PW-2 was
 a minor on the relevant date.
    Charge-sheet was filed against A-1 for offences
punishable under Sections 366 and 376 IPC and accused         o
Nos. 2 to 8 for offences punishable under Sections 366
and 376 read with Section 109 IPC. The trial court
convicted all the accused. The conviction was affirmed
by the High Coul"t.
    In the instant appeals, the conviction of the accused-    E
appellants was c'iallenged on the ground that the
conclusions reached by both the Courts below were
perverse and that they ignored the inconsistencies and
contradictions in the evidence .of the witnesses. It was
contended that the facts of the case clearly suggested        F
that there was no question of any abduction, forcible
marriage or rape.
    Per contra, the State contended that the prosecution
version was consistent and further that, in exercise of its   G
powers under Article 136 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court normally does not Interfere with the
concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below and,
thus, the instant appeals were liable to be dismissed.
    Allowing the appeals, the Court                           H
        150      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A       HELD:1. Even though the powers of this Court under
   Article 136 of the Constitution are very wide, but in
   criminal appeals, this Court would not interfere with the
  .concurrent findings of facts, save in very exceptional
   cases. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution,
B this Court does not normally appreciate the evidence by
   itself and go into the question of credibility of witnesses.
   The assessment of the evidence by the High Court is
   accepted as final except where the conclusions recorded
   by the High Court are manifestly perverse and
c unsupportable by the evidence on record. [Para 19] [166-
   0-F]

      1.2. In the instant case, the trial court as well as the
  High Court failed to take into consideration the inherent
  improbabilities in the case sought to be projected by the
D prosecution. The findings recorded by both the Courts
  below were perverse and unsupportable by the evidence
  on record. [Para 20] [166-G]
      2.1. The prosecution version was distorted from
E beginning to the end, in an effort to suppress the actual
  truth.The subsequent events make the story of
  abduction wholly improbable. 'S', who had informed the
  father of the abduction, was not examined in the Court.
  It would be rather odd that A-1 would himself inform 'S'
F of the abduction, if he was respons_ible for the same.
  Further, PW1 admits that A-1 was not on visiting terms
    1
        with the family of the girl. There is no previous history of
  any relationship between A-1 and the girl. Even the High
  Court concluded that there was no familiarity between the
  two. There was no material placed on the record to show
G that A·1 was involved with the girl. Even in this Court, no
  explanation was offered as to why A·1 would want to
  marry the victim; in the absence of any previous
  familiarity between the two. [Paras 21 and 22) [166-H; 167·
H A-F]
    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF               151
                    POLICE
     2.2. There is no evidence to prove that the victim was    A
forcibly taken in a car. tJeither the owner nor the driver
of the car has been examined in the"C.e_urt. [Para 23] [167·
F~                                      ~


     2.3. The very close relatives of PW1, who Were almost
                                                               8
family members, had told PW1 that his daughter could
not be located. But surprisingly, these very relatives,
according to PW2, were present at the temple just before
the marriage. Although, PW2 knew that if she was in
trouble they would come forward to help her, she did not
raise any alarm. The presence of these blood relatives is      C
also confirmed by PW3, a cousin of PW-2. He stated that
even though these relatives were present at the marriage,
they could not prevent the forced marriage. Knowing fully
well that the PW2 was being compelled to marry A1, they
did not send someone to the police station with the            D
necessary complaint. [Para 24] [168-B-D]
     2.4. PW1 admits that he had been told that PW2 had
been abducted by A1. The distance between the house
of A1 and the house of PW1 was only one kilometer. PW- E
1 did not go to the house of A1 to complain to his mother.
He also did not go to the police station. Even the
complaint with the police was registered only at 6.00 p.m.
a couple of days later. From the evidence of PW-1, it
becomes quite clear that there was a dispute between F
him and his wife about the proposed marriage of PW-2.
PW1 states that he did not want his daughter to get
married at all till she completes higher studies. He wanted
her to get married only after she had become a teacher
like himself. On the other hand, his wife had thought that G
PW2 s~ould be married to the son of her maternal uncle's
son. PV\12 did not want to marry her cousin. [Para 26]
[168-G-H; 169-A-D]
    2.5. Taking the aforesaid evidence into consideration,
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   152      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A one cannot rule out the possibility that PW-2 had run
  away from her parental house. This is further apparent
  from the statement of PW1 himself. He had stated that
  soon after the incident a Panchayat was held in the
  house of the local MLA. At that meeting, his wife and his
B daughter were also present. But, in his anxiety to deny
  that his daughter had agreed to go back home on asking
  of MLA, he made a very relevant disclo~ure. He stated
  that "My daughter was asked to talk with myself and wife
  separately in a room for one hour. After the iapse of one
C hour my daughter told me that she will accompany me
  and we also brought her." This statement itself is
  indicative of the fact that disappearance of his daughter
  for few days may not have been the responsibility of the
  accused persons. Otherwise, it would not have taken
D over one hour to convince the girl to return hon11.:. [Para
  27] [169-E-G]
       2.6. The testimony of PW1 in fact makes it further
  clear that the whole prosecution version was concocted
  to falsely implicate the accused. This witness had
E admitted that the police had arrived on 3rd August, 1993
  and though during that time, A1 was also present, no
  demand was made for his arrest at all. He also stated that
  all the other accused were also present, but he did not
  ask for the arrest of those accused also. No complaint
F was made to the police at that stage that any of the
  accused persons were involved in any incident of
  abduction. [Para 28) [169-H; 170-A-B]
       2.7. Even the testimony given by PW2 also seems to
  be wholly unreliable and contrary to the evidence of PW1.
G According to her, she was walking towards her house
  and she was being followed by A1. He had told her that
  he liked her and wanted to marry her. She simply told him
  to go away and continued to walk towards the house.
  There was a car parked near the house of A-1 's maternal
H
    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                153
                    POLICE
. aunt. She then narrates the story as to how she was           A
  pushed into the car. She stated that she had dropped her
  books on the road but, surprisingly though the car was
  parked in front of A-1 's a.unt's house, no one found the
  books. She then stated that when she was· being taken
 to the temple, she saw some known persons standing at          B
 a distance. But she did not yell out for help. According
 to her, A1 had raped her on three consecutive days, i.e.,
 1st, 2nd and 3rd of August. On 5th August, 1993 A1 took
  PW2 to the police station and told the police that they
 were married. She again did not complain; nor did seek         c
  help to be returned home. Thereafter, on 10th August,
 1993 tile Circle Inspector (PW11) had arrived and arrested
  A1. It was only after .that she was left with her parents.
 On the other hand, PW 1 stated that she has been at home
 with her parents since 3rd August, 1993. This leads to an      0
  inescapable conclusion that the versions,    ol  the father
  and the girl are in sharp contrast, if not contradictory to
  each other. [Paras 29, 30] [170-0-H; 171-A-B]
       2.8. PW-2 had further stated that during the night of
 10th August, 1993, she had narrated the entire sequence E
 of events to the police. The police had also given her
 alternative clothing to wear and taken her clothes in
 possession. According to PW-2 herself, even after she
 was recovered on the 10th August, 1993, she did not go
·to the house of her parents, instead she went to the F
 house of her senior paternal uncle. Therefore, it becomes
 increasingly difficult to place reliance on any one of the
 prosecution witnesses. Talking about her alleged forced .
 stay in a house, again PW-2 was unable to state whether
 it \"'as thatched house or terraced house. She was also G
 unab1e: to state as to whether the door of the room in
 which she was kept could be locked only from outside
 or from inside. In the same breath, she said that she
 remained in the room by locking it from inside. But again
 she changed her mind and scii-1 that the do9r was not H
    154     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011) 2 S.C.R..

A locked but it was closed. She talked of one Rangasamy
  being present. But then she said that there were two
  individuals by that name, one old and one young. But she
  did not give any of their particulars to the police, as the
  police did not ask for them. Yet she claimed that both the
B Rangasamy had taken her to the temple. B.ut then she
  said to the police that only one Rangasamy took her.
  [Paras 31, 32) [171-C-G]

       2.9. PW-2 reiterated that some known persons/
  relatives were present at the temple but on seeing them
C s.he did not raise any alarm. She also admits that if she
  had told them that she was in trouble they would have
  helped her. But she did not complain to her relatives. This
  would be wholly unnatural behaviour from a girl who had
  been abducted and was being compelled to marry
D someone, she did not want to marry. The scene after the
  alleged marriage is equally blurred. The girl denied ever
  going to the house of local MLA on 3rd August, 1993. She
  was not aware that any panchayat had been held in his
  house on that day. She also stated that she did not go
E to the house of her father on 3rd August, 1993. She
  further denied that she had ever narrated the events that
  had occurred between 31st July, 1993 to 10th August,
  1993 to her parents. [Paras 33, 34) [171-H; 172-A·C]

F      3. The trial court as well as the High Court had failed
  to bestow proper attention on the inherent improbabilities
  contained in the evidence of the prime witnesses of the
  prosecution. Both the courts below had failed to notice
  that the prosecution did not even care to produce any
G witness from the temple where the marriage has been
  allegedly solemnized. No cogent reason was given as to
  why the 'Pujari' of the Temple or some other office bearer
  could not have been summoned. The entire story about
  the abduction by car and the forced marriage seems to
H have been concocted to falsely implicate all the accused
   ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF               155
                   POLICE
under Section 366 IPC. There.is no reliable evidence to       A
support the conviction of A-1, or the accused relatives of
A·1, for the offence of abduction under Section 366 IP¢~
Possibility cannot be ruled out of the father, PW1
suspecting that his daughter was· romantically Involved
with A-1. Therefore, whe.n she disappeared from home,         8
A-1was presumed to be responsible for it. Hence the false
story of abduction. Even ·111 the face of the wholly
unreliable evidence, both the Courts have convicted all
the accused under Section 366 anc;I 376 IPC. The High
Court committed a grave error In confirming the               C
conviction of the accused/appellants under Section 366
IPC. [Paras 35, 36) [172~0-H]

    4.1. Whilst upholding the conviction of A-1 under
Section 376 IPC, the High Court held that PW-2 would not
have voluntarily gone with A-1. It also held that she was     D
not a major at the relevant time. Both the conclusions
recorded by the High Court are contrary to the .evidence
on record. [Para 37] [173-A-B]
    4.2~ With regard to the age of the girl, the High Court   E
based its conclusion on the transfer certificate and the
certificate issued by PW8, Radiologist. The transfer
certificate indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th
June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid
certificate, .she would be above 16 years of age (16 years
                                                             F
1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident,
i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been
issued by a Government School and has been duly
signed by the. Headmaster. Therefore, it would be
admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian
Evidence Act:"'However, the admissibility of such· a G
document would be of not much evidentiary value to
prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material
on the basi~ ~'Which the age was recorded. The date of . ··

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    156     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no
  evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry
  or who gave the date of birth is examined. PW1, in his
  evidence, made no reference to the transfer certificate. He
  did not mention her age or date of birth. PW2, when
8 examined,   also made n9 reference either to her age or to
  the transfer certificate. In her cross-examination, she had
  merely stated that she had signed on the transfer
  certificate issued by the School and accordingly her date
  of birth noticed as 15th June, 1977. She also stated that
C the certificate has been signed by her father as well as
  the Headmaster. But the Headmaster has not been
  examined. Therefore, there was no reliable evidence to
  vouchsafe for the truth of the facts stated in the transfer
  certificate. [Para 38] [173-C-H; 174-A-B]

D       Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, 1988 (Suppl.) SCC
    604; Narbada Devi Gupta v. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, (2003)
    8 sec 745 - relied on.

       4.3. The burden of proof was not discharged by the
E prosecution. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate
  cannot be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl.
  In fixing the age of the girl as below 18 years, the High
  Court relied solely on the certificate issued by PW8.
  However, the High Court failed to notice that in his
F evidence before the Court, PW8, the X-ray Expert had
  clearly stated in the cross-examination that on the basis
  of the medical evidence, generally, the age of an
  individual could be fixed approximately. He had also
  stated that it is likely that the age may vary from individual
  to individual. The doctor had also stated that in view of
G the possible variations in age, the certificate mentioned
  the possible age between one spec;fic age to another
  specific age. On the basis of the above, it would not be
  possible to give a firm opinion that the girl was definitely

H
       ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF             157
                       POLICE
                                       ..
below 18 years of age. In addition, the High Court failed        A ·
to consider the expert evidence given by PW13, who had
medically examined the victim .. In his cross-examination,
he had clearly stated that·a medical examination would
only point out the age approximately with a variation of
two years. He had stated that in this case, the age. of the      B
girl could be from 17 to 19 years. This margin of error in
age (as ascertained by radiological examination) has
been judicially recognized by this Court. In the facts of
this case, the age of the girl could not have been fixed
on the basis of the transfer certificate. There was no           c
reliable evidence to vouchsafe the correctness of the date
of birth as recorded in the.transfer certificate. The expert
evidence does not rule out the possibility of the girl being
a major. The prosecution, thus, failed to prove that the girl
                                                                       ..
was a minor, at the relevant date. [Paras 41, 42] [175-E-        0
H; 176-A·D] .                        .

·       Jaya Mala v, Home Secretary, Government of Jammu ·
    & Kashmir & Ors., (1982) 2 SCC 538 - relied on.    .. . "'
     4.4. Further, even with reference to Section 35 of the      E
Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested
by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal
proceedings. In such circumstances, the High Court,
without examining the factual and legal issues,
unnecessarily rushed to the conclusion that PW-2 was a           F
minor at the time of the alleged abduction. There is no
satisfactory evidence to indicate that she was a minor.
[Paras 43, 44] [176-E-F; 177-D]
    Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC
584 - relied on.                                                 G
    4.5. The· High Court concluded that even. if one was
to exclude the evidence given by PW3, the conviction for
abduction and rape by A-1 could be recorded on the sole
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    158     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A evidence of PW2. Undoubtedly, the testimony of victim
  of sexual assault stands at par with testimony of an
  injured witness, and is entitled to great weight. Therefore,
  corroboration for the testimony of the victim would not
  be Insisted upon provided the evidence does not suffer
B from any basic infirmities and the probability factors do
  not render it unworthy of credence. However, the
  evidence of PW2 does not satisfy the aforesaid test. [Para
  45 and 46] [177-E-G; 178·C·E]

C        Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan, (1952) SCR 377 -
    relied on.

       4.6. The High Court erroneously concluded that the
  girl had not willingly gone with A-1. The conclusion could
  only be recorded by ignoring the entire evidence with
D regard to the conduct of the girl from the time of the
  alteged abduction till the time of the alleged recovery.
  PW-2 did not make any complaint on so many occasions .
  when she had the opportunity to do so. Even after the
  alleged marriage, the girl continued to be a willing partner
E in the entire episode. Even if the prosecution version is
  accepted in its totality, it would be established that the
  girl was staying with A1 from 31st July, 1993 till 10th
  August, 1993. Even PWS, stated that A1 had brought the
  girl with him to his house and told him that he had
F married her. They had come to see Trichy and requested
  a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that he
  thought that they were newly married couple. He had
  made them stay, which was under his responsibility. On
  10th August, 1993, the police inspector, who arrived there
G at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that A1 had married the girl
  by threatening her and "spoiled her". The girl, according
  to the prosecution, was recovered from the aforesaid
  premises. Therefore, for six days, this girl was staying
  with A1. She did not raise any protest. She did not even
H complain to this witness or any other residents in the
   ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                159
                   POLICE
 locality. Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at       A
 any of the stages after being allegedly abducted would
 be wholly unnatural. Earlier also, she had many
 opportunities to complain or to run away, but she made
 no such effort. She made no protest on seeing some
 known persons near the car, after her alleged abduction.      B
 She did not make any complaint at the residence of the
sister of A1. Again, there was no complaint ori seeing her
 relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives
apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra
was forcibly tied around her neck by A1. No.one sent for       C
 police help even though a car was available. She made
 no complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5,
and stayed at his place. Again, there was no protest when
A1 took her to the police station on 5th day of the alleged
abduction and told at the Police Station that they had
                                                               D
already been married. The above behaviour would not be
·natural. for a girl who had been compelled to marry and
subjected to illicit sexual intercourse. [Para 46] [178~E-H;
179-A-E] .

    5. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable       E
doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had
been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story
was concocted for reasons best known to the
prosecution. The conclusions recorded by both the
courts below were wholly perverse. The accused-                F
appellants are clearly entitled to the benefit of doubt. All
the appellants are acquitted. [Para 47 and 48] [179-F-H]
                    Case Law Reference:
    1988 (Suppl.) sec 604 ,relied on              Para 39      G
    (2003) 8 sec 745         relied on            Para 39
   .(1982) 2 sec 538         relied on           Para 41
    (2006) s sec 584         relied on            Para 43
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    160       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A         (1952) SCR 377          relied on              Para 45
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    NO. 1053 of 2009.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 06.02.2008 of the High
B Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 414 of
  2000.

                                  WITH
    Crl. A. Nos. 1063 & 1062 of 2009.
c
         R. Venkataramani, R. Ayyam Perumal, Aljo K. Joseph for
    the Appellants.
          S. Thananjayan for the Respodent.
D         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by .
       SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. These three appeals
  are directed against the common judgment of the High Court
  of Judicature at Madras dated 6th February, 2008 in Criminal
E Appeal Nos. 406 and 414 of 2000 confirming the common
  judgment passed in S.C. No. 255 of 1997 by the learned
  Assistant Sessions Judge, Namakkal dated 28th April, 2000
  whereby the trial court had convicted and sentenced the
  appellants as under:-
F         The appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 1053 of 2009 had
          been convicted under Sections 366 and 376 read with
          Section 109 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
          imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.500/-, in
          default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous
G         imprisonment for a period of three months.
          In Criminal Appeal No. 1063 of 2009, Sekar, appellant
          No.1, had been convicted under' Sections 366 and 376
          IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
H
    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                    161
       POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     ten years and a fine of Rs.500/- in default of payment of      A
     fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period
     of three months. Appellant No.2 Kandasamy had been
     convicted under Sections 366 and 376 read with Section
     109 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
     for ten years and a fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment    B
     of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
     period of three months.

     In Criminal Appeal No.1062 of 2009, t:·· !h the appellants
     were convicted under Sections 366 and 376 read with            C
     Section 109 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for ten years and a fine of Rs.500/- in default
     of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for a period of three months.

      2. Briefly stated the prosecution story is that PW2           D
, (hereinafter referred to as the "victim" or "girl" according to
  context) is the daughter of Chinnathambi, (PW1) who is a
  teacher and resident of Nedupatti Village, Namakkal District,
  Tamil Nadu. The victim had failed in the SSLC examination.
  Therefore, she was admitted in private tutorial college called    E
  Seran Tutorial College.

      3. It is alleged that on 31st July, 1993 at about 3.00 p.m.
when she was walking near Nedupatti on the way to her house
from the local bus stop, after attending her tutorial classes,
Sekar (A 1) told her that he loved her and wanted to marry her.
                                                                    F
The victim, however, did not agree to such proposal. Thereafter,
a car bearing registration No. TTA 1886 came near the victim
and she was forcibly pushed into the car by Sekar (A1).
Rangaswami (A2), Paramasivam (A4) and Alamelu (A5) were
already inside the car. This incident was informed to the father    G
(PW1) of the victim by one Sugavanam, who had received a
call from Sekar (A1). The incident was confirmed by another
person called Thangavel (PW3) who informed PW1 about an
hour later.
                                                                    H
    162      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A      4. Since PW1 is a handicapped person and unable to
  walk, he sent his relatives in search of his daughter. According
  to the prosecution case, the car was taken to the residence of
  Selvi, who is the sister of Sekar (A 1) at f>.Udupatti. Thereafter,
  Parmasivam (A4), Alamelu (AS) and Subramani (AS) were
B advising the victim to marry Sekar (A 1), however; she refused
  to do so. At that stage, Kandasamy (A7) deClared that it is not
  necessary to take the consent of PW2 and they should just go
  to the temple in the morning and perform the marriage
  ceremony.
c      5. The next morning, on 1st August, 1993 at 4 'o' clock,
  they all took the victim to Arapaleeswarar Temple at Kolli Hills.
  On reaching the temple, Sekar (A 1) tied the mangalsutra on
  the neck of the victim in spite of her resistance. Thereafter, she
  was taken to Mullukurichi. She was kept in a house and
D repeatedly raped for three days.

       6. On 4th August, 1993, she was taken by Sekar (A1) to
  Palampatti. Since it was known to Sekar (A 1) that the police
  was searching for the girl (PW2), he took her to Thiruverumbur
E Police~ Station. He told the police officials there that they were
  husband and wife and had been legally married.

       7. In the meantime on 3rd August, 1993, PW-10, the Sub-
  Inspector of Police of Vennandur Police Station on the basis
F of the complaint dated 2nd August, 1993 went to the place of
  occurrence and prepared observations mahazar (Ex.PS) and
  rough sketch (Ex.P7) and recorded the statements of the
  witnesses.
       8. On receipt of a copy of the Fl.R on 6th August, 1993,
G the Circle Inspector of Rasipuram Circle (PW11) took over the
  investigation. On the basis of the information gathered, PW11
  arrested Sekar (A 1) and rescued the girl (PW2) from door
  No.86, Thiruverumbur Police colony on 10th August, 1993. In
  the presence of the witnesses PW11 recovered mangalasutra,
H the dresses worn by the accused (A 1) and the victim under
    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                    163
       POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
mahazars. He arranged to send the seized properties for             A
chemical analysis. In the morning of 11th August, .1993, Sekar
(A 1) and Thangamani were sent to the local Magistrate's Court.
Thereafter, he (A 1) was remanded to judicial custody.

     9. At the same time, the victim was sent for a medical         8
examination. PW13 Dr. Manimegalaikumar examined the
victim on 12th August, 1993 at 2.00 p.m. and recorded her
findings in report Ex.P13. In th~ report, she opined that age of
the victim was between 17 to 19 years. On the other hand,
PW8, Dr. Gunasekaran, the Radiologist had given her age as          C
above 17 years and below 18 years. Dr. Chidambaram (PW14)
examined A1on11th August, 1993 at 8.00 p.m. In his report
(Ex.P15) he stated about the potency of A1.

     10. Thereafter, PW12, the successor of PW11, after
seizing the vehicle used for abduction and after completing the     D
investigation filed the charge sheet on 19th June, 1996 (Ex.P13)
against Sekar (A 1) for offences punishable under Sections 366
and 376 !PC and accused Nos. 2 to 8 for offences punishable
under Sections 366 and 376 read with Section 109 IPC.
                                                                    E
     11. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined
PWs.1to14. Ex. :'1 to P16 have been marked besides M.0.1
to 11. No one was examined on behalf of the accused and no
documents were produced on their behalf.

      12. When the accused were questioned with regard to           F
incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the
evidence of witnesses, the accused had denied the same as
fal!)e. Sekar (A1) filed a written statement which reads as
follows :- ·         ·
                                                                    G
     "I am innocent. The charge that I have kidnapped PW2 and .
   . married her and raped her is false. On my enquiry I came
     to know ttiat PW1 and.his wife parents of PW2 compelled
     her to marry her uncle;s son. But PW2 refused and she had
     left the house voluntarily. To suppress the mistake H
    164       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2011] 2 S.C.R.


A         committed by PW2, at the instance of my enemies after
          ~everal days a false case has been filed against me. The
          evidence that PW11 arrested me along with PW2 at
          Thiruverumbur Police colony is false. I was staying in my
          village and they took me from my house and foisted the
B         case. PVV3 is the sister's son of PW2 and, therefore, he
          is deposing falsely. PW4 is the co-brother of PW1 and
          therefore, he is giving evidence in support of PW1. PW6
          is the close relative of PW2 and therefore, is giving false
          evidence."
c        13. On consideration of the oral and documentary
    evidence, the trial court convicted and sentenced the accused
    as noticed in the opening paragraph of the judgment. The
    conviction as well as the sentence have been maintained in
    appeals. Hence the present appeals.
0
          14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
       15. The learned counsel has submitted that the conclusions
  reached by both the Courts are perverse; According to him the
E inc:onsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of the
  witnesses which have been ignored by both the courts would
  destroy the very root and foundation of the prosecution case.
  The High Court has even failed to take note of the plea raised
  by the appellant (A 1) in the statement under Section 313 of the
F Criminal Procedure Code. Learned counsel submitted that this
  is a clear case of false implication. The prosecution is based
  on an imaginary story. The witnesses of the prosecution are
  procured. They are all close relatives of PW1. He submits that
  non appreciation of the evidence by the Courts below has
  resulted in miscarriage of justice.
G
        16. Elaborating his submissions, the learned counsel then
  submitted that the complaint was falsely lodged by the father
  (PW1) of the girl (PW2) due to old enmity against A1. PW2 had
  only given evidence under pressure from her father and her
H relatives. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution has
     ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                  165
        POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
·deliberately suppressed the true ~tory which would clearly show A
 that there was no incidence of abduction. The girl had run away
 from home as she was being compelled to marry one of her
 relatives. The entire abduction story is due to enmity because
 of a dispute over land. According to the learned counsel, the
 prosecution has deliberately suppressed the material B
 particulars which were duly narrated by the prosecution
 witnesses themselves. There was no question of any forced
 marriage between the victim and Sekar (A1) Learned counsel
 has pointed out that at the time of the alleged marriage,
 according to the victim (PW2) and Thangavel (PW3), the c
 relatives of the victim were present. In their presence, there
 could be no forced marriage. He further submitted that had it
 been a case of abduction PW1, the father of the victim, would
 not have waited for two days to lodge a complaint. Referring
 to the evidence of PW1; it is pointed out that he had stated that D
 there was a panchayat held in the house of the local MLA
 Palaniammal. It was on the direction of the Panchayat that the
 victim had decided to go with her father. Since then she has
 been with her parents.                                           ·
        17. The learned counsel has further pointed out that if E
  Sekar (A 1) had taken the victim to the police station, she would
  have complained. According to the learned counsel, the truth
  of the matter is, which has been admitted by PW1 in his
  evidence, that the mother of the girl did not want her daughter
  to get marrie.d to her maternal uncle's son. The entire story has F
  been concocted subsequent to the time when the panchayat
  was held in the house of the local MLA. At that time, the police
 ·was present but PW1 did not demand that any one of the
  accused be arrested. Learned counsel submitted that a close
  scrutiny of evidence of the prosecution witnesses would show G
  that deliberate efforts have been made ·to suppress the true
. version. In any event, there is no question of any abduction,
· forcible marriage or rape.
      18. The learned counsel for the State submitted that the     H
        166       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 2 S.C.R.


    A prosecution version is consistent. The trial court as well as the
      High Court, upon a thorough scrutiny of the evidence, have given
      concurrent conclusions about the abduction as well as rape.
      Learned counsel further submitted that according to the father
      (PW1), the girl (PW2) was only 15 years and 2 months old on
    B 31st July, 1993. Therefore, all the accused have rightly been
      found to be guilty of the offences under Sections 366 and 376
      read with Section 109 IPC. He submits that in exercise of the
      powers under Article 136, this Court would normally not
      interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts
    c below. He, therefore, prayed that the appeal be dismissed,
         19. We have considered the submissions made by the
    learned counsel for the parties. Before we embark upon an
    examination of the evidence, we may point out that even though
    the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
  D are very wide, but in criminal appeals, this Court would not
    interfere with the concurrent findings of facts, save in very
    exceptional cases. In an appeal under Article 136 of the
    Con~.titution, this Court does not normally appreciate the
    evidence by itself and go into the question of credibility of
  E witnesses. The assessment of the evidence by the High Court
    is accepted as final except where the conclusions recorded by
    the High Court are manifestly perverse and unsupportable by
    the evidence on record. Keeping in view the aforesaid
    principles, we have examined the findings recorded by the
/ F Courts below.              ·
I          20. In our opinion, there is much substance in the
      submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. The trial
      court as well as the High Court have failed to take into
    G consideration the inherent improbabilities in the case sought .
      to be projected by the prosecution. In our opinion, the findings
      recorded by both the Courts below are perverse and
      unsupportable by the evidence on record.             ,

              21. In our opinion, the prosecution version has been
    H
     ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF·                 167
        POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
  distorted from beginning to the end, in an effort to suppress the A
  actual truth. It was the case of the prosecution that Sugavanam
  had seen the victim being abducted on 31st July, 1993. This
  fact was brought to the notice of the father (PW1) of the victim
  (PW2) immediately. Sugavanam had been told about the
  abduction on the phone by Sekar (A 1) himself. The abduction B
  was further confirmed by Thangavel (PW3) about an hour later.
  According to PW1; he had sent his relatives, namely,
  Kuppusami, Athiappan, Velumani and Thangavel (PW3) in
  search of his daughter. But he did not go with them. According
  to this witness, these persons told him that his daughter could · c
  not be located. Therefore, on 2nd August, 1993 he lodged a
· complaint with the police.

       22. The subsequent events make the story of abduction
 wholly improbable. Sugavanam, who had informed the father
 of the abduction, was not examined in the Court. It would be D
 rather odd that Sekar would himself inform Sugavanam of the
 abduction, if he was responsible for the same. Further, PW1
 admits that Sekar was not on visiting terms with the family of
 the girl. There is no previous history of any relationship between
 Sekar and the girl. Even the High Court concluded that there E
 was no familiarity between the two. There was no material
 placed on the record to show that Sekar was involved with the
 girl. Even in this court, no explanation was offered as to why
 Sekar would want to marry the victim; in the absence of any
 previous familiarity between the two.                              F
       23. There is no evidence to prove that the victim was
 forcibly taken in a car. Neither the owner nor the driver of the
                                                              /

 car has been examined in the Court. PW3 states that they had
 mac.;..; enquiries and had been told that the car used in          G
 abductio1i had gone towards Senthamangalam. They had also
 hired a cart... ,;;o after them. None of these persons have been
 examined.
      24. Proceeding further, we notice that PW1 admits that all
                                                                    H
    168      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A the relatives mentioned above are very close blood relations.
  In fact, Thangavel (PW3) is the son of his elder sister. In other
  words, PW3 is a cousin of the girl. Athiappan is the son of his
  coparcener Kailasam. Palanivel is the brother-in-law of
  Murugesan. Murugesan is the son of Kailasam. Kuppusamy is
B the elder brother of Velumani who is the son of his senior
  coparcener. Kumaravel is the grand son of. the aunt of
  Kuppusami. These very close relatives, who were almost family
  members, had told PW1 that his daughter could not be located.
  But surprisingly, these very relatives, according to PW2, were
c present at the temple just before the marriage. Although, the
  victim (PW2) knew that if she was in trouble they would come
  forward to help her, she did not raise any alarm. The presence
  of these blood relatives is also confirmed by Thangavel (PW3).
  He stated that even though these relatives were present at the
  marriage, they could not prevent the forced marriage. Kr:vw1ng
0
  fully well that the victini (PW2), was being compelled to marry
  Sekar (A1), they did not send someone to the poHce station
  with the necessary complaint.
       25. The presence of the relatives at the alleged wedding
E is confirmed by Thangavel (PW3). He has stated that they could
  not find the girl (PW2) or Sekar (A 1) in Rasipuram. But the
  search party was told on enquiry that Sekar (A1) and the girl
  (PW2) had gone in a car towards Santhamangalam. Therefore,
  Thangavel (PW3) and his relatives also hired a car and reached
F Arapaleeswar Temple. But since none of the accused were
  present, they decided to stay the night in the temple itself. He
  further stated that they had suspected that the marriage will take
  place in the morning, therefore, they had waited till the morning.
  This witness also stated that he informed his uncle about the
G marriage on 2nd August, 1993.
         26. PW1 admits that he had been told that his daughter
    (PW2) had been abducted by Sekar (A 1). The distance
    between the house of Sekar (A 1) and the house of PW1 was
    only one kilometer. He also admits that Sekar (A 1) is a local
H
    ALAMELU v.. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                    169
       POLldE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.] .

boy but is not related to him. He had received the information A
about the alleged abduction on 31st July, 1993. He did not go
to the house of Sekar (A 1) to complain to his mother. He also
did not go to the police station. Even the complaint with the
police was registered only at 6.00 p.m. on 2nd August, 1993.
In his cross-examination, he reiterated that his relatives had . B
gone to the neighbouring village and searched but were not
able to locate his daughter. From the evidence of this witness,
it becomes quite clear that there was a dispute between the
husband and wife i.e. mcther and father of the victim (PW2)
about the proposed marriage of the girl. Chinnathambi (PW1)          c
states that he did not want his daughter to get married at all till
the completes higher studies. He wanted her to get married
only after she had become a teacher like himself. On the other
hand, his wife had thought that her daughter (PW2) should be
married to the son of Kuppusami, her maternal uncle's son. The
                                                                    0
girl (PW2) did not want to marry her cousin.

     27. Taking the aforesaid evidence into consideration, one
cannot rule out the possibility that the victim girl had run away
from her parental house. This is further apparent from the
statement of PW1 himself. He had stated that soon after the          E
incident a panchayat was held in the house of Rasipuram ML.A,
Palaniammal. At that meeting, his wife and his daughter were
also present. But, in his anxiety to deny that his daughter had
agreed to go back home on asking of MLA, he made a very
relevant disclosure. He stated that "My daughter was asked to        F
talk with myself and wife separately in a room for one hour. After
the lapse of one hour my daughter told me that she will
accompany me and we also brought her." This statement itself
is indicative of the fact that disappearance of his daughter for
few day~ may not have been the responsibility of the accused         G
persons. L;!1erwise, it would not have taken over one hour to
convince the girl to return home.

    28. The testimony of PW1 in fact makes it further clear that
the who!e prosecution version has been concocted to falsely          H
    ·170     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A implicate the accused. Thi~ witness had admitted that the police
  had arrived on 3rd August, 1993. During that time, Sekar (A 1)
  was also present but no demand was made for his arrest at
  all. He also stated that all the accused were also present, he
  did not ask for the arrest of those accused also. No complaint
B was made to the police at that stage that any of the accused
  persons were involved in any incident of abduction. In fact he
  rnade another startling disclosure where he states that "till date
  I am not aware as to what happened to Thangamani. On 3rd
  August, 1993 either myself or any other witness had not
c furnished any information against the accused to the police."
  According to this witness, the victim, has been with her family
  since 3rd August, 1993. He went on to state that after 3rd
  August, 1993 the police did not undertake any further enquiry.

       29. Even the testimony given by PW2 also seems '"' be
D wholly unreliable and contrary to the evidence of PW1.
  According to her, she was walking towards her house and she
  was being followed by Sekar (A 1). He had told her that he liked
  her and wanted to marry her. She simply told him to go away
  and continued to walk towards the house. There was a car
E parked near the house of Sekar's mother's elder sister. She
  then narrates the story as to how she was pushed into the car.
  She stated that she had dropped her books on the road but,
  surprisingly though the car was parked in front of Seka r's aunt's
  house, no one found the books.
F
       30. She then states that when she was being taken to the
  temple, she saw some known persons standing at a distance.
  But she did not yell out for help. According to her, Sekar (A1)
  had raped her on t11ree consecutive days, i.e., 1st, 2nd and 3rd
G of August at Mullukurlc;:hi. On 4th of August she was taken to
  Palampatti. However, cin {)th August, 1993 when Sekar (A1)
  received the news that the pqjice was looking for her, she was
  taken to Tiruchy police statjon. There he h?d told the police that
  they_were married. She again did not complain; nor did seek
H
    ALAMELU v. STATE,REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                  171
    . POLICE [SURINDER SINGH,NIJJAR, J.]
                                  .,   '   '


  help to be r~turned home. Thereafter, on 1.0th 'August, 1993 .· A ,·
· Rasipuram Circle Inspector (PWf1) t:iac;I arrived and arrested
  Sekar (A 1). It was only after that she was left with her parents .
. On the other hand, as noticed earlier, father states that she has
  been at home with her parents since 3r9 August, 1993. This in ·
  our opinion leads to an inescapable condusion that the versions .S ·
  of the father and the girl are in sharp contrast, if not ·
  contradictory to each other.

       31. She had further stated that during the night of 10th·
 August, 1993, she had narrated the entire sequence of events C
 to the police. The police had also given her alternative· clothing
 to wear and taken. her clothes in possession. According to the
 victim herself, even after she was recovered on the 10th August,
 1993, she did not go to the house of her parents, instead she
 went to the house of her senior paternal uncle, situated at
 Thengalpalayam. Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult to D
 place reliance on any one of the prosecution witnesses.
      32. Talking about her alleged forced stay in the house at
 Pudupatti, again she was unable to state whether it was
 thatched house or terraced house. She was also unable to state E
 as to whether the door of the room in which she was kept could
 be locked only from outside or from inside. In the same breath,
 she says that she remained in the room by locking it from inside.
 But again she changed her mind and said that the door. was
 not locked but it was closed. S.he talks of one Rangasamy F
 being present. But then she says that there were two individuals
 by that name, one old and one young. But she did not give any
 of their particulars to the police, as the police did not ask for
 them. Yet she claims that both the Rar.gasamy had taken her
 to the temple. But then she says to the police that only one G
 Rangasamy took her.
     33. Now coming to the marriage, she reiterates that some
 known persons were present at the temple but on seeing them
 she did not rair9 any alarm. She admits that Kuppusami,
 Velumani, Athiappan, Thangavel and Palaniammal are her           H
    172      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


,A close relatives. She also admits that if she had told them that
   she was in trouble they would have helped her. But she did not
   complain to her relatives. This would be wholly unnatural
   behaviour from a girl who had been abducted and was being
   compelled to marry someone, she did not want to marry.
 B
        34. The scene after the alleged marriage is equally blurred.
   The girl denies ever going to the house of MLA on 3rd August,
   1993. She was not aware that any panchayat had been held in
   his house on that day. She also states that she did not go to
 C the house of her father on 3rd August, 1993. She further denies
   that she had ever narrated the events that had occurred
   between 31st July, 1993 to 10th August, 1993 to her parents.

       35. In our opinion, the trial court as well as the High Court
  had failed to bestow proper attention on the inherent
D improbabilities contained in the evidence of the prime
  witnesses of the prosecution. Both the courts below had failed
  to notice that the prosecution did not even care to produce any
  witness from the temple where the marriage has been allegedly
  solemnized. No cogent reason has been given as to why the
E 'Pujari' of the Temple or some other office bearer could not have
  been summoned.

       36. In our opinion, the entire story about the abduction by
  car and the forced marriage seems to have been concocted
F to falsely implicate all the accused under Section 366 IPC.
  There is no reliable evidence to support the conviction of Sekar,
  or the accused relatives of Sekar, for the offence of abduction
  under Section 366 IPC. Possibility can not be ruled out of the
  father, PW1 suspecting that his daughter was romantically
  involved with Sekar. Therefore, when she disappeared from
G home, Sekar was presumed to be responsible for it. Hence the
  false story of abduction. Even in the face of the wholly unreliable
  evidence, as noticed above, both the Courts have convicted all
  the accused under Section 366 and 376 IPC. The High Court,
  in our opinion, committed a grave error in confirming the
H conviction of the accused/appellants under Section 366 IPC.
    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF .                   173
      . POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
      37. We may now take up the issue of Sekar's conviction          A
under Section 376 IPC. Whilst upholding the, con.viction of
Sekar under Section 376.IPC, the High Court has held thatthe
girl would not have voluntarily gone with Sekar: It has also been
held that she was not a major at the relevant time. In our opinion,
both the conclusions recorded by the High Court are contrary          B
to the evidence on record.
        38. We will first take up the issue with regard to the age
 of the girl. The High Court has based its conclusion on the
 transfer certificate, Ex.P16 and the certificate issued by PWB
  Dr. Gunasekaran, Radiologist, Ex.P4 and Ex.PS. Undoubtedly, C
  the transfer certificate, Ex.p16 indicates that the girl's date of
  birth was 15th June, 1971. Therefore, even according to the
  aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16
 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident,
  i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued D
  by a Government School and has been duly signed by the
  Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence
  under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the
· admissibility of such a document would be of not much
  evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of E
  the material on the basis of which the age was re.corded. The
  date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have
  no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or
  who gave the date of birth is examined. We may notice here
  that PW1 was examined in the Court on 9th August, 1999. In F
  his evidence, he made no reference to the transfer certificate
  (Ex.P16). He did not mention her age or date of birth. PW2 was
  also examined on 9th August, 1999. She had also made no
  reference either to her age or to the transfer certificate. It
  appears from the record that a petition was filed by the G
  complainant under Section 311 Cr.P.C. seeking permission to
  produce the transfer certificate and to recall PW2. This petition
  was allowed. She was actually recalled and her examination
  was continued on 26th April, 2000. The transfer certificate was
  marked as Ex.P16 at that stage, i.e., 26th April, 2000. The H
          174         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2011] 2 S.C.R.


     A . judgment was delivered on 28th April, 2000. In her cross-
         examination, she .had merely stated that she had signed on the
       . transfer certificate, Ex.P16 issued by the School and
         accordingly her date of birth noticed as 15th June, 1977. She
         also stated that the certificate has been signed by the father
     B as well as the Headmaster. But the Headmaster has not been
         examined. Therefore, in our opinion, there was no reliable
         evidence to vouchsafe for the truth of the facts stated in the
         transfer certificate.

            39. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded
     C in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad
       Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:-

                 "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has
                 no evidentiary value unless the person who made the
     D           entry or who gave the date of birth is
                 examined ................... : ......................... .... Merely
                 because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were
                 proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents
.•
                 were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9,
     E           10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the
                 contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the
                 documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of
                 birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in
                 issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the
     F           aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the
                 truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth
                 or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth
                 of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents
                 could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the
                 evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the
     G
                 truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind
                 was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the
                 facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of
               , Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of
     ,H   1.    1988 (Supp) sec 604
    ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                      175
       POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     birth as tnentione.d in the aforesaid documents have no          A
     probative value .and the dates of birth as mentioned
     therein could not be accepted.•
The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the
case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, 2              8
where this Court obseived as follows:-

     "The legal position is not in dispute that mere productfon
     and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot
     be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has
     to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the             C
    ·"evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth
     of the facts in issue"."

      40. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not
been discharged by the prosecution . .The father says nothing         D
about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster
has not been examined.at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer
certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the
girl.                                                '

      41. In fixing the age of the girl as below 18 years, the High   E
Court relied solely on the certificate issued by PW8 Dr.
Gtmasekaran. However, the High Court failed to notice that in
his evidence before the Court, PW8, the X-ray Expert had
clearly stated in the cross-examination that on the basis of the
medical evidence, generally, the age of an individual could be        F
fixed approximately. He had also stated that it is likely that the
age may vary from individual to individual. The doctor had also
stated that in view of the possible variations in age, the
certificate mentir"ned the po~sible age between one specific
age to another sµecific age. ·on the basis of the above, it would     G
not be possible to give a firm opinion that the girl was definitely
below 18 years o,f age. In addition, the High Court failed to
consider the expert evidence given by · PW13 Dr.
Manimegalaikumar, who had medically examined the victirn. In
2.. c2003) a sec 745.                                                 H
    176       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011} 2 S.C.R.

A his cross-examination, he had clearly stated that a medical
  examination would only point out the age approximately with a
  variation of two years. He had stated that in this case, the age
  of the girl could be from 17 to 19 years. This margin of error in
  age has been judicially recognized by this Court in the case of
B Jaya Mala Vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu &
  Kashmir & Ors. 3, In the aforesaid judgment, it is observed as
  follows:-
          "...... However, it is notorious and one can take judicial
          notice that the margin of error in age ascertained by
c         radiological examination is two years on either side."
        42. We are of the opinion, in the facts of this case, the age
  of the girl could not have been fixed on the basis of the transfer
  certificate. There was no reliable evidence to vouchsafe the
D correctness of the date of birth as recorded in the transfer
  certificate. The expert evidence does not rule out the possibility
  of the girl being a major. In our opinion, the prosecution has
  failed to prove that the girl was a minor, at the relevant date.
E      43. We may further notice that even with reference to
  Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has
  to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as
  criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate
  to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of
F Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. 4 held as follows:-
          "The age of a person as recorded in the school register
          or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely,
          for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for
          contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a
G         separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the
          purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of
          being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where
          a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor
    3.   (1982) 2 sec 538.
H 4. (2006) s sec 584.
     ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                 177
        POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
     he was not appropriately represented therein or any          A'
     transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a
     minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the
     age of a party to the /is, having regard to the provisions
     of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the
     Sf:Jme standard. No difforent standard can be applied in     B
     case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or
     similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix
     although might have consented with the accused, if on
     the basis of the entries made in the register maintained
     by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the     c
     accused would be deprived of his constitutional right
     under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the
     accused may unjustly be convicted."
     44. In such circumstances, we are constrained to hold that
the High Court without examining the factual and legal issues     D
has unnecessarily rushed to the conclusion that the girl was a
minor at the time of the alleged abduction. There is no
satisfactory evidence to indicate that she was a minor.

     45. The High Court concluded that even if one was to E
exclude the evidence given by PW3, the conviction for
abduction and rape by Sekar could be recorded on the sole
evidence of PW2. Undoubtedly, the testimony of victim of sexual
assault stands at par with testimony of an injured witness, and
is entitled to great weight. Therefore, corroboration for the F
testimony of the victim would not be insisted upon provided the
evidence does not suffer from any basic infirmities and the
probability factors do not render it unworthy of credence. This
Court in Rameshwar Vs. State of Rajasthan 5 declared that
corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape G
case. In the aforesaid case; Vivian Bo$e, J. speaking for the ·
Court observed as follows:-

     "The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into

5.   (1952) SCR 377.                                              H
        178        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 2 S.C.R.


    A         one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before
              there can be a conviction but that the necessity of
              corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the
              circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be
              present to the mind oft.he judge, ... The only rule of law is
    B         that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of
              the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood
              and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of
              practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration
              before a conviction can be allowed to stand."
    C The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by this
      Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These
      observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can
      be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a victim
      provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or
    D improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence.
               46. In our opinion, the evidence of PW2 does nQt satisfy
     . the aforesaid test. The High Court erroneously concluded that
        the girl had not willingly gone with Sekar. The conclusion could
        only be recorded by ignoring the entire evidence with regard
    E to the conduct of the girl from the time of the alleged abduction
        till the time of the alleged recovery. We have noticed earlier that
        she did not make any complaint on so many occasions when
        she had the opportunity to do so. We may, however, notice that
        even after the alleged marriage, the girl continued to be a
    F willing partner in the entire episode. Even if the prosecution
        version is accepted in its totality, it would be established that
        the girl was staying with Sekar (A 1) from 31st July, 1993 till 10th
        August, 1993. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that
        Sekar (A1) had brought the girl with him to his house and told
    G him .that he had married her. They had c9me to see Trichy and
        requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated that
        he thought that they were newly married couple. He had made
        them stay in door no. 86 of the Police Colony, which was under
    • his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the police inspector,
    H . who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this witness that Sekar (A1)
              •



"
       ALAMELU v. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF                     179
          POLICE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    . had married the girl by threatening her and "spoiled her". The · A
· • . girl, acc0rding to the. prosecution, was recovered from the
      aforesaid premises; Therefore, for six days, this girlwas staying
      with Sekar (A1 ). She did not raise any protest. She did not even
    ·.complain to this witness or any other residents in the locality.
      Her behavior of not complaining to anybody at any of the stages B
      after being allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural. .
      Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or to run
      away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy that she
      made no protest on seeing some known persons near the car,
      after her alleged abduction. She did not make any complaint c
      at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1) at Pudupatti.
      Again, there was no complaint on seeing her relatives allegedly
      assem~led at the temple. Her relatives apparently took no steps
      at the time when mangalsutra was forcibly tied around her neck
      by Sekar (A1). No one sent for police help even though a car
                                                                        0
      w~s available. She made no complaint when she was taken to
      the house of PWS, Thiru Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his
   . place. A~ain, there was no protest when Sekar (A1) took her
     ·to the police station on 5th day of the alleged abduction and
      told at the Tiruchi Police Station that they had already been E
      married. The above behaviour would not be natural for a girl
      who had been comp,,,iled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual
      intercourse.
       47. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered
   opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond               F
   reasonable doubt any of the offences with which the appellants
   had been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story
   has been concocted for reasons best known to the prosecution.
         48. In our opinion, the conclusions recorded by both the        G ,
   cpurts below are wholly per\terse. The appellants are dearly
 · entitled to the benefit of doubt. In view of the above; the appeals
   ate allowed. All the appellants are acquitted. They are directed
   to be released forthwith.
   B.B.B.                                         Appeals allowed.       H