Supreme Court of India
AMAN BHATIAversusSTATE (GNCT OF DELHI)
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 618
- Decided
- 1 May 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
A licensed stamp vendor is a public servant for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, but the appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained as the prosecution failed to prove the demand and acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt.
Summary
The appellant, a licensed stamp vendor, was caught in a sting operation after demanding Rs 12 for a Rs 10 stamp paper and was convicted under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The key issue was whether a licensed stamp vendor qualifies as a “public servant” under Section 2(c)(i) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that stamp vendors perform an important public duty and receive remuneration in the form of a government‑sanctioned discount, satisfying both limbs of the definition. However, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant demanded or accepted illegal gratification, a requisite element for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d). Consequently, the presumption under Section 20 could not be invoked and the convictions were set aside. The appeal was allowed, overturning the trial and High Court judgments.
Issues considered
- Whether a licensed stamp vendor falls within the definition of ‘public servant’ under Section 2(c)(i) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Whether the prosecution proved the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt to sustain the convictions under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act.
Legislation cited
- Delhi Province Stamp Rules, 1934
- Income Tax Act, 1961s. 194H
- Indian Penal Code, 1860
- Indian Stamp Act, 1899
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 20, s. 2(c)(i), s. 7
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the High Court was right in holding that a licensed stamp vendor falls within the ambit of a public servant for the purposes of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and whether the conviction of the appellant-licensed stamp vendor for offences punishable sustainable. Headnotes† Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c) – Public servant – Stamp vendors, if public servants – Appellant-licensed stamp vendor, apprehended for selling Rs.10/- stamp paper at Rs.12/- – Trial court held the appellant guilty for
Subjects
Stamp vendorPublic servantPublic dutyRemunerationCommissionPrevention of Corruption ActSection 2(c)Section 7Section 13(1)(d)Section 20Bribe demandTrap operationDelhi Province Stamp Rules 1934Income Tax Act 1961Purposive constructionLegislative intent
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 64 : 2025 INSC 618
Aman Bhatia
v.
State (GNCT of Delhi)
(Criminal Appeal No. 2613 of 2014)
02 May 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the High Court was right in holding that a
licensed stamp vendor falls within the ambit of a public servant for
the purposes of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and whether
the conviction of the appellant-licensed stamp vendor for offences
punishable u/ss.7, 13(1)d, 13(2) of the 1988 Act was sustainable.
Headnotes†
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c) – Public servant –
Stamp vendors, if public servants – Appellant-licensed
stamp vendor, apprehended for selling Rs.10/- stamp paper
at Rs.12/- – Trial court held the appellant guilty for offences
punishable u/ss.7, 13(1)d, 13(2) – High Court holding that the
stamp vendor is a public servant for the purpose of PC Act,
upheld the conviction – Sustainability:
Held: Not sustainable – Stamp vendors across the country,
by virtue of performing an important public duty and receiving
remuneration from the Government for the discharge of such
duty, are public servants within the ambit of s.2(c)(i) – Appellant-
licensed stamp vendor was eligible for receiving discount on
the purchase of stamp papers owing to the license that he
was holding – Discount is traceable to and is governed by
the 1934 Rules framed by the State Government – Thus, the
appellant could be said to be “remunerated by the government”
for the purposes of s.2(c)(i) – Appellant was discharging a
duty in which both the State and the public have an interest,
thus, falls within the ambit of a public servant – However, the
prosecution failed in establishing the allegation of demand
for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof in a trap laid
beyond reasonable doubt, thus presumption u/s.20 does not
arise – Conviction and sentence of the appellant for the offences
* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 65
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
u/s.7 and 13(1)(d) rw s.13(2) cannot be sustained, and thus,
set aside – Delhi Province Stamp Rules, 1934. [Paras 52, 55,
56-58, 63, 64, 67, 69]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c) – “Public servant” –
Definition of – Legislative intent of the statute:
Held: Legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public
servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing growing
menace of corruption in government and semi-government
departments – Definition of “public servant” should be given a wide
and purposive construction so as to advance the object underlying
the statute – In construing the definition of “public servant” the
Court is required to adopt a purposive approach as would give
effect to the intention of the legislature. [Paras 12, 68.1]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c)(i) – Public
servant – Stamp vendors, if public servants – Interpretation
of ‘Remuneration’ – Meaning of ‘Commission’:
Held: For the stamp vendor to be a public servant u/s.2(c)(i), two
conditions to be fulfilled are that he is to be remunerated by the
Government through fees or commission, and such remuneration
is for the performance or discharge of a public duty – In terms of
the 1934 Rules, when a licensed vendor procures stamps from the
treasury at a discounted rate which is lower than their face value,
and subsequently sells them to purchasers at their face value,
the difference between the two amounts constitutes the vendor’s
remuneration – Discount serves as a form of remuneration and
operates as a commercial incentive, enabling the vendor not only
to recoup the purchase amount but also to earn a commission
in the nature of the differential amount between the procurement
cost and the face value, hence, the discount is the only form of
commission – Government remunerates a stamp vendor as he is
facilitating the accessibility of stamps on behalf of the Government,
and thus the role being performed by licensed stamp vendor is
nothing short of a highly important public duty, essential for ensuring
the efficient collection of revenue on behalf of the State – Term
“commission” as used and understood in the context of s.194H
of the 1961 Act is not stricto sensu similar to its usage in s.2(c)
(i) – Terms “fees or commission” must be construed so as to
give full effect to the definition and the other provisions of the
statute – Structure of the definition reduces the emphasis on the
66 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
strictness of the relationship between the Government and the
public servant, while placing greater focus on the performance of
a public duty – Delhi Province Stamp Rules, 1934 – Income Tax
Act, 1961 – s.194H. [Paras 19, 26, 28, 33, 41, 42]
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c) – “Public servant” –
Determination of status of public servant – Public duty as
the determinant:
Held: It is the nature of duty being discharged by a person which
assumes paramount importance when determining whether such
person falls within the ambit of the definition of public servant
as defined under the PC Act – Primary test of qualification
for inclusion in the definition of “public servant” is whether the
concerned person is performing any public duty – Once the nature
of performance of duties gets crystallized, any person remunerated
by the Government for the performance of any public duty or who
holds an office by virtue of which he is authorized or required to
perform any public duty, is a “public servant” within the meaning
of the term defined u/s.2(c). [Paras 45, 46, 68.2]
Interpretation of statutes – Rule of interpretation:
Held: Every interpretation of statute must be undertaken by
considering the statute in its entirety, the prior state of the law,
other statutes in pari materia, the general scope and purpose
of the legislation, and the mischief that the legislature intended
to address – It is essential not only to consider the words used
but also to examine the statement of objects and reasons.
[Paras 43, 44]
Case Law Cited
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad & Ors. v. Ahmedabad
Stamp Vendors Association (2014) 16 SCC 114; State of Gujarat v.
Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah [2020] 9 SCR 330 : (2020) 20 SCC
360; State of M.P. v. Ram Singh [2000] 1 SCR 579 : (2000) 5 SCC
88; M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India [1979] 3 SCR 254 : (1979) 3
SCC 431; C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India [1997] 1 SCR 107
: (1997) 9 SCC 477; Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of
Delhi) [2023] 2 SCR : 997 (2023) 4 SCC 731; P. Satyanarayana
Murthy v. State of A.P. (2015) 10 SCC 152; Vedivelu Thevar v.
State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; State of Madhya
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 67
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
Pradesh v. Balveer Singh [2025] 2 SCR 836 : 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 390 – referred to.
Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors Association v. Union of India, 2002
SCC OnLine Guj 135; Roorkee Stamp Vendor Association v. State
of Uttarakhand, 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 3764; Kerala State Stamp
Vendors Association v. Office of the Accountant-General, 2005
SCC OnLine Ker 672; G. Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka,
2021 SCC OnLine Kat 15332 – referred to.
List of Acts
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Delhi Province Stamp Rules,
1934; Income Tax Act, 1961; Stamp Act, 1899; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Trap by Anti-Corruption Branch; Stamp vendor; Public servant; Public
duty; Demand of bribe; Mode of remuneration; Commission; Master-
servant relationship; Principal-agent relationship; Phenolphthalein
smeared notes; Turned solution of sodium carbonate pink;
Remuneration; Definition of “public servant”; Offer to pay by the
bribe-giver; Licensed stamp vendor; Stamp vendors, if public
servants; Discount; Purchase of stamp papers; Remunerated by
government; Demand for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof
in trap laid; Legislative intent of statute; Curbing growing menace
of corruption in government and semi-government departments;
Purposive construction; Interpretation of ‘Remuneration’; Meaning of
‘Commission’; Determination of status of public servant; Public duty as
determinant; Manner of appointment; Mode of remuneration; Primary
test of qualification; Interpretation of statutes; Rule of interpretation.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2613 of 2014
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2014 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLA No. 348 of 2013
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
S.K.Rungta, Sr. Adv., Prashant Singh, Neeraj Kumar Sharma,
Ms. Ishani, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal.
68 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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Advs. for the Respondent:
Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Mrs. Chitrangda
Rashtaravara, Ms. Shagun Thakur, Aaditya Shankar Dixit, Ms. Satvika
Thakur, Ishaan Sharma.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*
A. FACTUAL MATRIX ............................................................ 2
B. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT ................................................... 4
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT ........ 6
D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT .... 9
E. ISSUE OF CONSIDERATION ............................................ 10
F. ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 11
i. Legislative intent behind the definition of “public
servant” under Section 2(c) of the PC Act .............. 11
ii. Stamp Vendors are “Public Servants ....................... 17
a. Interpretation of ‘Remuneration’ in light of the
Delhi Province Stamp Rules, 1934 ..................... 18
b. Meaning of ‘Commission’ under Section 194H of
the 1961 Act and Section 2(c)(i) the PC Act ....... 24
iii. Public Duty as the determinant of status of Public
Servant .......................................................................... 29
iv. Legality of appellant’s conviction ............................. 32
G CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 42
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 69
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
1. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 348 of 2013 (“impugned
judgment”) by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by
the appellant herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order
dated 30.01.2013 passed by the Special Judge in Complaint Case
No. 11 of 2009 holding the appellant herein guilty of the offence under
Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 respectively (for short, “the PC Act”).
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
2. As per the case of the prosecution, on 09.12.2003, the complainant
went to the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri, Delhi to purchase
a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-. The appellant, a licensed stamp vendor,
made a demand of Rs. 12/- for a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-. Against
the excess demand of Rs. 2/-, the complainant lodged a written
complaint with the Anti-Corruption Branch (for short, “ACB”). Pursuant
to the said complaint, a trap was laid by the ACB. The complainant
was handed over one GC note of Rs. 10/- and one GC note of
Rs. 2/-, smeared with phenolphthalein powder, by the Raid Officer.
The complainant alongwith the raiding party left for the Office of
the Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri, Delhi. After reaching there, when the
complainant asked for a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-, the appellant again
made a demand of Rs. 12/-. The complainant gave the smeared
GC notes to the appellant who accepted them with his right hand.
At the signal of the panch witness, the raiding party arrived at the
spot. The appellant was apprehended. The wash of his hand turned
the solution of sodium carbonate pink and the notes were allegedly
recovered from the register kept for maintaining the records of the
stamp papers.
2.1 Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed in
the court of Special Judge (Anti-Corruption Brach), Delhi. The
Special Judge framed charges against the appellant for the
offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with
Section 13(2) of the PC Act respectively. The appellant denied
the charges and claimed to be tried.
2.2 In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined nine
witnesses, of whom four are crucial for the adjudication of the
matter at hand:
70 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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i. Complainant (PW-1);
ii. Panch witness (PW-4);
iii. Raid Officer (PW-6);
iv. Investigating Officer (PW-9)
2.3 The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral as well as the
documentary evidence on record, held the appellant guilty of
the offences with which he was charged and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and
fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence punishable under Section 7
of the PC Act and rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
year and fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence punishable under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The
sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
B. IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
3. The pivotal issue that fell for the consideration of the High Court
was “whether a stamp vendor is a public servant for the purposes
of the PC Act or not.”
3.1 The High Court answered the aforesaid question in the
affirmative. It held that ensuring access to stamp papers, which
are indispensable for legal transactions, falls within the scope of
‘performance of a public duty’. The said public duty i.e., vending
of the stamps, is a licensed activity regulated under the statutes
governing the sale of judicial and non-judicial stamp papers.
It further held that the fact that stamp vendors purchase these
papers at a discounted rate before selling them to the public
does not diminish the public nature of the duty they perform. The
High Court added that in terms of Explanation 1 to Section 2
of the PC Act, it is not necessary for the stamp vendor to be
‘appointed’ by the Government in order to be a public servant.
3.2 The High Court also adverted to the Delhi Province Stamp
Rules, 1934 (for short, “the 1934 Rules”) and observed that
Rule 28 of the 1934 Rules stipulates the conditions governing
the grant of license to a stamp vendor and violation of the said
rule would amount to an illegal act. Further, Rule 28(xx) states
that the remuneration to the vendor in the form of a discount is
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 71
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
allowed from time to time by the orders of the local Government.
The High Court further took note of Rule 34 which provides for
remuneration to stamp vendors by entitling the licensed vendor
of stamps to discount on the amount of purchase.
3.3 Further, the High Court analysed the question whether any
“remuneration, fees or commission” was being paid to the
stamp vendors by the Government. In other words, whether the
discount availed by the stamp vendor at the time of purchase
of stamps from the treasury could be said to be ‘commission’
paid for the purpose of performing duty in terms of Section
2(c)(i) of the PC Act. The Court observed that the 1934 Rules
clearly indicate the nature of the remuneration paid to a
stamp vendor. The Court termed the said discount as a fee
for performing the task of a licensed agent of the Government.
Further, from the reading of Rule 34(ii) and 34(iii) of the 1934
Rules respectively, the Court reached the conclusion that what
is paid as commission to the stamp vendors is a discount at the
given rate on the stamps purchased and the same is treated
as a commission.
3.4 Lastly, the High Court considered the decision of the High
Court of Gujarat in Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors Association
v. Union of India, reported in 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 135,
relied upon by the appellant to fortify his submission that
once the stamp papers are purchased by the vendor from the
treasury, there is complete ownership of the stamp papers
with the vendors. The High Court held that the said decision
is not applicable to the facts of the case in the same way as
it was rendered in the context of Section 194H of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 (for short, “the 1961 Act”) and the meaning of
‘commission’ was not considered in the light of Section 2(c)(i)
of the PC Act.
3.5 Thereafter, the High Court proceeded to look into the evidence
on record to ascertain the correctness of the finding of the
guilt. The High Court noted that the panch witness had been
consistent as regards his statement about the appellant having
accepted the tainted money. In this context, the Court observed
that if the appellant had not demanded excess Rs. 2/-, there
was no occasion to accept it in the first place.
72 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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3.6 As regards the recovery of GC notes – whether those were
recovered from possession of the appellant or from the
register lying on his table, the Court observed that the wash
of the appellant’s hand did turn pink, and both the GC notes
were found, even if not directly from the appellant, then too
certainly the notes were found placed on the register. Further,
the testimony of the Raid Officer, that it was the panch witness
who pointed out that money accepted by the appellant was lying
on his register, was found to be reliable and trustworthy. The
panch witness also stated that the accused made an entry in
the register after accepting the money. The High Court was of
the view that the evidence of the complainant corroborated by
the evidence of the Raid Officer established the culpability of
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
4. Mr. S. K. Rungta, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that the prosecution instituted against the
appellant under the PC Act itself was not maintainable. It was argued
that at best the prosecution could have been under the Indian Stamp
Act, 1899 (for short, “the 1899 Act”) alongwith the 1934 Rules,
as these comprehensively regulate the sale of stamp papers by
licensed vendors and constitute a complete code for offences related
to stamps. The license of the appellant was cancelled in terms of
Section 69 of the 1899 Act read with Rule 29 of the 1934 Rules.
He submitted in arguendo that, the said cancellation was one of
the consequences of alleged demand of excess amount of Rs. 2/-.
Hence, even if the appellant would have been found guilty under the
framework of the 1899 Act, the maximum possible sentence would
have been significantly lower than what the Trial Court has imposed
in the present case.
4.1 Mr. Rungta further submitted that a bare perusal of Section 2(c)
of the PC Act reveals that a ‘public servant’ has a co-relation
with the service or office under the Central Government, State
Government or the local authority. He argued that the definition
is exhaustive and a licensed stamp vendor does not fall in
any of the clauses. Therefore, the appellant cannot be said to
be in service or in office of the Central or State Government.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 73
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
Further, Mr. Rungta invited the Court’s attention to Section 7
of the PC Act, prior to the amendment of 2018 and submitted
that the provision deals with acceptance of any gratification
for showing any favour or disfavour to any person in relation
to an official act. To support his submission, he argued that an
excess amount of Rs. 2/- could not be said to be the motive or
reward for showing favour or disfavour with Central Government
or State Government.
4.2 The second limb of Mr. Rungta’s submission was that the
prosecution had failed to prove the demand and acceptance
of an excess amount of Rs. 2/- for sale of stamp paper of face
value of Rs. 10/-. He submitted that the panch witness failed to
support the case of prosecution of demand of Rs. 12/- thereby
rendering the arrest memo, search and seizure memo also
doubtful. Further, the Investigating Officer admitted that the
time of arrest of the appellant was 7:15 PM, however, the raid
was conducted around 3:45 PM.
4.3 He further submitted that there are glaring inconsistencies in
the testimony of the panch witness and the complainant as
regards the recovery of the GC notes. The High Court in the
impugned judgment expressed doubts on the recovery of the
GC notes since the seizure memo and other documents were
drawn up only later at the office of the ACB. He submitted that
even the bottle containing the sodium carbonate solution was
sealed later at the Office of the ACB.
4.4 Mr. Rungta also highlighted a few mitigating circumstances
for the purpose of reducing the sentence awarded by the Trial
Court, more particularly, the fact that the appellant was only
19 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence.
4.5 In such circumstances referred to above, he prayed that there
being merit in the present appeal, the same may be allowed and
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court may
be set aside and the appellant herein may be acquitted of the
charges levelled against him. Lastly, Mr. Rungta highlighted a
few of the mitigating circumstances for the purpose of reducing
the sentence of awarded by the Trial Court, more particularly
the fact that the appellant was only 19 years of age at the time
of the commission of the offence.
74 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
5. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, the learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the respondent State, on the other hand, submitted
that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have
been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment.
She submitted that the High Court has rightly taken the view that
the licensed stamp vendor is a public servant for the purposes
of the PC Act. She further submitted that the 1934 Rules, more
particularly Rule 34 therein makes it abundantly clear that what is
paid to the vendors by the Government is remuneration in the form
of discount. It was argued that the term “remunerated” occurring in
Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act should be given a meaningful
interpretation so as not to frustrate the object of the PC Act. She
further argued that a stamp vendor cannot get away with his liability
under the PC Act by arguing that what is paid by the Government
is in the form of a discount and not remuneration.
5.1 The learned A.S.G. submitted that the reliance placed by
the appellant on the decision of the Division Bench of the
High Court of Gujarat in the case of Ahmedabad Stamp
Vendors Association (supra), as affirmed by this Court
in Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad & Ors. v.
Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors Association, reported in
(2014) 16 SCC 114, is totally misconceived and is of no avail
to the appellant. She argued that the said decision was in
the context of Tax Deducted at Source on “commission or
brokerage” under the contract of agency. In other words, the
said decision was considered only in the context of Section
194H of the 1961 Act.
5.2 She contended that the relationship between the Government
and the stamp vendors is that of principal and agent. The
learned A.S.G. further submitted that the High Court was right
not only in saying that the stamp vendors are public servants
for the purposes of the PC Act but even otherwise on merits
also, the High Court rightly affirmed the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court.
5.3 In such circumstances referred to above, the learned A.S.G.
prayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may
be dismissed.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 75
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
E. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having
gone through the materials on record, the following two questions
fall for our consideration:-
a. Whether the High Court was right in holding that a licensed
stamp vendor falls within the ambit of a public servant for the
purposes of the PC Act?
b. If the answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative,
then whether the conviction of the appellant herein on merits
is sustainable?
F. ANALYSIS
i. Legislative intent behind the definition of “public servant”
under Section 2(c) of the PC Act
7. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we deem it absolutely necessary to look into the backdrop of the PC
Act. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that, the repealed Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act 1947”), was enacted
with the avowed object and purpose of effectively preventing bribery
and corruption. The PC Act which repeals and replaces the 1947
Act provides for a very wide definition of the term “public servant”
in clause (c) of Section 2.
8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, attached to the Bill by
which the PC Act was introduced by the legislature, throws light on
the intention of the legislature in providing a very comprehensive
definition of the words “public servant”. It gives the background in
which the legislation was enacted. The PC Act, which contains a
much wider definition of “public servant”, was brought in force to
purify the public administration. Para 3 of the Statement of Objects
and Reasons reads thus:
“3. The Bill, inter alia, envisages widening the scope of the
definition of the expression ‘public servant’, incorporation
of offences under Sections 161 to 165-A of the Penal
Code, 1860, enhancement of penalties provided for
these offences and incorporation of a provision that the
order of the trial court upholding the grant of sanction
76 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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for prosecution would be final if it has not already been
challenged and the trial has commenced. In order to
expedite the proceedings, provisions for day-to-day trial
of cases and prohibitory provisions with regard to grant
of stay and exercise of powers of revision on interlocutory
orders have also been included.”
9. The appellants in State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai
Shah, reported in (2020) 20 SCC 360, referred to the notes on
clauses of Prevention of Corruption Bill dated 20.02.1987 to clarify
the legislative intent behind the statute. The relevant extract has
been reproduced hereinbelow:
“36. Our attention was also drawn to the notes on clauses of
Prevention of Corruption Bill dated 20-2-1987. Clause 2 of
the Notes on Clauses in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary,
Part II, Section 2, clarifies the legislative intent, wherein it
was commented as under:
“2. This clause defines the expressions used in
the Bill. Clause 2(c) defines “public servant”. In the
existing definition the emphasis is on the authority
employing and the authority remunerating. In the
proposed definition the emphasis is on public duty.
The definition of “election” is based on the definition
of this expression in the Penal Code, 1860.”
(emphasis supplied)”
10. Under the repealed 1947 Act, the definition of “public servant” was
restricted to public servants as defined in Section 21 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”). In order to curb bribery and
corruption not only in government establishments and departments
but also in other semi-governmental authorities and bodies and their
departments where the employees are entrusted with public duty,
a comprehensive definition of “public servant” was introduced in
Section 2(c) of the PC Act.
11. When the legislature has used such a comprehensive definition of
“public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing
growing corruption in government and semi-government departments,
it would be appropriate not to limit the contents of the definition
clause by a construction which would be against the spirit of the
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 77
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
statute. The definition of “public servant”, therefore, deserves a
wide and purposive construction. In construing the definition of
“public servant” in Section 2(c) of the PC Act, the Court is required
to adopt a purposive approach as would give effect to the intention
of the legislature.
12. In the aforesaid context, we deem it appropriate to refer to the
decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Ram Singh, reported in
(2000) 5 SCC 88, wherein this Court observed as follows:-
“9. The menace of corruption was found to have enormously
increased by the First and Second World War conditions.
Corruption, at the initial stages, was considered confined
to the bureaucracy which had the opportunities to deal
with a variety of State largesse in the form of contracts,
licences and grants. Even after the war the opportunities
for corruption continued as large amounts of government
surplus stores were required to be disposed of by the public
servants. As a consequence of the wars the shortage of
various goods necessitated the imposition of controls and
extensive schemes of post-war reconstruction involving
the disbursement of huge sums of money which lay in
the control of the public servants giving them a wide
discretion with the result of luring them to the glittering
shine of wealth and property. In order to consolidate and
amend the laws relating to prevention of corruption and
matters connected thereto, the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 was enacted which was amended from time
to time. In the year 1988 a new Act on the subject being
Act 49 of 1988 was enacted with the object of dealing
with the circumstances, contingencies and shortcomings
which were noticed in the working and implementation of
the 1947 Act. The law relating to prevention of corruption
was essentially made to deal with the public servants,
not as understood in common parlance but specifically
defined in the Act.
10. The Act was intended to make effective provisions for
the prevention of bribery and corruption rampant amongst
the public servants. It is a social legislation intended to curb
illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to
78 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Dealing
with the object underlying the Act this Court in R.S. Nayak
v. A.R. Antulay [(1984) 2 SCC 183 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 172]
held: (SCC p. 200, para 18)
“18. The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows,
to make more effective provision for the prevention
of bribery and corruption. Indisputably, therefore, the
provisions of the Act must receive such construction
at the hands of the court as would advance the object
and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not
defeat it. If the words of the statute are clear and
unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to
give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in
the provision. The question of construction arises only
in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of
the words used in the statute would be self-defeating.
The court is entitled to ascertain the intention of the
legislature to remove the ambiguity by construing
the provision of the statute as a whole keeping in
view what was the mischief when the statute was
enacted and to remove which the legislature enacted
the statute. This rule of construction is so universally
accepted that it need not be supported by precedents.
Adopting this rule of construction, whenever a question
of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two
views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty
of the court to adopt that construction which would
advance the object underlying the Act, namely, to
make effective provision for the prevention of bribery
and corruption and at any rate not defeat it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. What is relevant to note from the aforesaid is that the PC Act was
enacted after the repeal of the 1947 Act with the object of dealing
with the circumstances, contingencies and shortcomings which were
noticed in the working and implementation of the 1947 Act. The law
relating to prevention of corruption was essentially made to deal with
the public servants, not as understood in common parlance but as
specifically defined in the PC Act.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 79
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
14. While holding that a deemed university would fall within the ambit
of the PC Act, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Mansukhbhai
Kanjibhai Shah (supra) observed that it falls upon the courts to
interpret provisions of an anti-corruption legislation in a manner to
strengthen the fight against corruption. It was further added that in
case two views are possible, the court should accept the one that
seeks to eradicate corruption over the one which seeks to perpetuate
it. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“25. However, we are concerned herein with interpreting
the provisions of the PC Act. There is no dispute that
corruption in India is pervasive. Its impact on the nation
is more pronounced, due to the fact that India is still a
developing economy. Presently, it can be stated that
corruption in India has become an issue which affects all
walks of life. In this context, we must state that although
anti-corruption laws are fairly stringent in India, the
percolation and enforcement of the same are sometimes
criticised as being ineffective. Due to this, the constitutional
aspirations of economic and social justice are sacrificed
on a daily basis. It is in the above context that we need
to resolve the issues concerned herein.
26. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh
[Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC
64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666],
this Court observed : (SCC p. 100, para 68)
“68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses
a grave danger to the concept of constitutional
governance, it also threatens the very foundation of
Indian democracy and the rule of law. The magnitude
of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the
concept of a socialist secular democratic republic.
It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins
all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights,
chokes development and undermines justice, liberty,
equality, fraternity which are the core values in our
Preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the Court
is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted
and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen
80 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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the fight against corruption. That is to say in a
situation where two constructions are eminently
reasonable, the Court has to accept the one that
seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks
to perpetuate it.
xxx
44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act
was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and
corruption, but also to make the same applicable
to individuals who might conventionally not be
considered public servants. The purpose under
the PC Act was to shift focus from those who are
traditionally called public officials, to those individuals
who perform public duties. Keeping the same in
mind, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant State, it cannot be stated
that a “deemed university” and the officials therein,
perform any less or any different a public duty, than
those performed by a university simpliciter, and the
officials therein.”
(Emphasis supplied)
ii. Stamp Vendors are “Public Servants”
15. In light of the observations made by this Court in Ram Singh
(supra) and Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai (supra), we now proceed
to assess whether a stamp vendor comes within the purview of a
“public servant” as defined under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. The
provision reads thus:
“(c) “public servant” means, -
(i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or
remunerated by the Government by fees or commission
for the performance of any public duty;”
16. A person would be a public servant under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC
Act if he is:
1. in the service of the Government; or
2. in the pay of the Government;
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 81
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
3. remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of
any public duty.
17. All three categories are independent of each other. There may be
cases where more than one of the aforesaid categories are applicable
and “or” may be read as “and”, however, the present case does not
warrant such reading.
18. In the present factual matrix, for the appellant to be a public servant
under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, two conditions will have to be
fulfilled:
1. First, whether he is remunerated by the Government through
fees or commission; and
2. Secondly, whether such remuneration is for the performance
or discharge of a public duty.
a. Interpretation of ‘Remuneration’ in light of the Delhi Province
Stamp Rules, 1934
19. To arrive at a decision on the first aspect, what is required to be
determined is whether the discount received by the appellant is
remuneration in the terms of the expression “remunerated by the
Government by fees or commission for the performance of any
duty” under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. To determine whether the
appellant was being remunerated by the Government, we must make
a reference to the 1934 Rules. Rule 1(f) defines the expression,
“licensed agent”, whereas, Rule 1(g) along with Rule 22 defines the
term “vendor”. The same reads thus:-
“(f) the expression “Licensed Agent” means and includes
every person who, for the time being holds a licence
granted under these rules, to sell stamps, but does not
include a specially licensed agent or an ex-officio agent,
as such, though an ex-officio agent may, if duly licensed,
be also a licensed agent. The expression “licence” means
a licensed agent’s license;”
“(g) the term “vendor” includes an ex-officio agent, a
licensed agent and a specially licensed agent”
xxx
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22. Vendors – There will be two classes of agent, namely –
(a) ex-officio agent as vendor, defined in rule I(e).
(b) licensed or specially licensed agent as defined in rule
I(f), (g) & (h).”
Rule 26 stipulates that the Collector or any other officer empowered
by the local Government can grant license for the sale of stamps.
20. Rule 2 stipulates that the Controller of Stamps is responsible for
supplying stamps that are required by the local Government. The
Controller of Stamps supplies stamps on the request of treasury
officers. As per Rule 3, the district treasury has been constituted as
a local depot and the sub-treasury has been constituted as a branch
depot for the custody and sale of stamps.
21. Rule 17 mandates that utmost care must be taken to ensure that no
licensed vendor is hindered from obtaining stamps from treasuries.
Furthermore, it stipulates that vendors must be permitted to procure
supplies on any day and at any hour during treasury working hours,
without unnecessary delay.
22. Further, Rule 28 states the conditions which every license granted
under the rules is subject to. Rule 28(vii) prescribes that a vendor
is bound to sell stamps on immediate payment permitted by his
license. Further, he shall not demand or accept for any stamp any
consideration exceeding the value of such stamp. Rule 28(xiii) also
mandates that the vendor shall make corresponding entries in his
vend register and get the entry attested by the purchaser. Upon
filling up of the register, the vendor has to deliver the same to the
Collector or any other officer deputed to receive the same.
23. Lastly, Rule 28(xx) mandates that the remuneration to the vendor
shall be in the form of discount allowed from time to time under the
orders of the local Government. In furtherance, Rule 34 states the
rule for remuneration of vendors, under the heading “Commission
allowed on Court-fee stamps”. It states that every licensed vendor
of court-fee stamps shall be entitled to discount at the rate of 1%
on stamps upto Rs. 100 in a single transaction purchased by him,
however, the total value of stamps shall neither be less than Rs. 10/-
nor in excess of a multiple of Rs. 10/-. The said rule is reproduced
hereinbelow:
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 83
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
“(xx) The remuneration to the vendor shall be in the form
of discount allowed from time to time under the orders of
the local Government.”
24. The 1934 Rules indicate that a licensed vendor, under the rules obtains
stamps from the treasury and the Rules empower him to procure
the stamps without any wait or delay. He is entitled to a discount
on the value of stamps at the time of purchase. The remuneration
envisaged under Rule 28(xx) alongwith Rule 34 of the 1934 Rules
is in the form of ‘discount’ or ‘commission’ under the orders of the
local Government.
25. In terms of the 1934 Rules, when a licensed vendor procures stamps
from the treasury at a discounted rate which is lower than their face
value, and subsequently sells them to purchasers at their face value,
the difference between the two amounts constitutes the vendor’s
remuneration. For instance, if a stamp vendor purchases a stamp
with a face value of Rs. 100/- at a one percent discount, he pays
Rs. 99/-. In return, he sells it to the purchaser for Rs. 100/-, i.e.,
the face value of the stamp. Thus, the one percent discount by the
orders of the local Government effectively becomes the vendor’s
remuneration, representing the margin between the procurement
cost and the sale price. The rules neither envision nor indicate any
other form of remuneration.
26. The difference between the procurement price and the sale price is
by and large because of the scheme devised by the Government i.e.,
the 1934 Rules. The remuneration being received by the licensed
vendor is on the strength of the license that the vendor is holding.
Although, it is true that the liability of the stamp vendor to pay the
price less the discount is not dependent or contingent upon the sale
of the stamp papers yet the remuneration remains contingent on the
order of the local Government under Rule 28(xx) of the 1934 Rules.
27. Assuming, that no such discount was provided and the licensed
vendors were required to purchase stamps at their face value and
sell them at the same value, there would be no financial incentive
for the licensed vendors to engage in such transactions. In such a
scenario, the vendor would merely recover the amount expended
on the purchase of the stamps, without any margin of profit. The
discount, therefore, serves as a form of remuneration and operates
as a commercial incentive, enabling the vendor not only to recoup
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the purchase amount but also to earn a commission in the nature of
the differential amount between the procurement cost and the face
value. Hence, the discount is the only form of commission.
28. At this stage, we deem it appropriate to refer to the object behind
the stamp duty. It is important to underscore that the object of the
1899 Act, along with its provisions, must be interpreted in light of
the interest of the Government in ensuring adequate remuneration
to licensed stamp vendors. While examining the relevant provisions,
it is pertinent to ask—why does the Government find it necessary
to remunerate a licensed stamp vendor at all?
29. The 1899 Act is a fiscal enactment, enacted with the primary objective
of securing revenue for the State through the imposition of stamp
duties on certain instruments. This underlying purpose is clearly
reflected in Section 3 of the 1899 Act. Section 5 further bolsters
the object by stating that where an instrument deals with several
distinct matters, the total stamp duty payable would be equal to the
combined duty that would apply if each matter were covered by a
separate instrument. In furtherance of Section 5, Section 6 states
that where duties chargeable under the different descriptions under
Schedule I are different, the instrument shall be chargeable with the
highest of them.
30. Sections 13 and 14 stipulate the mode of stamping respectively,
Section 15 reinforces the effect of non-compliance of the preceding
provisions and deems it unstamped. Section 17 provides that all
instruments chargeable with duty and executed by any person in
India shall be stamped before or at the time of execution. Non-
compliance of Section 17 is penalised under Section 62. Section 33
provides that every person who has authority to receive evidence
shall impound an instrument which is, in their opinion, chargeable with
duty but appears to be not duly stamped. The procedure laid down
by the statute to be followed after such impounding also ensures
that there is payment of stamp duty and the exchequer does not
incur any revenue loss.
31. Section 35 is of particular significance to the issue before this Court
as it renders instruments which are not duly stamped inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose and imposes a prohibition on such
instruments from being acted upon, registered, or authenticated.
However, the bar is removed on payment of duty and the penalty.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 85
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
The Collector, again, by powers vested in him under Section 40 is
authorised to levy penalty. Section 42 reinforces that the purpose
of stamping is in payment of duty, as once the payment of duty and
a penalty is complete, the instrument is admissible.
32. The common thread running across the above-mentioned provisions
is that the Government desires that the holder of the instrument
pays appropriate stamp duty. To fulfil this objective, the Government
ensures there is sufficient availability of stamps through licensed
stamp vendors. It is for this reason the Government remunerates
a stamp vendor as he is facilitating the accessibility of stamps on
behalf of the Government, and thus the role being performed by
licensed stamp vendor is nothing short of a highly important public
duty, essential for ensuring the efficient collection of revenue on
behalf of the State.
b. Meaning of “Commission” under Section 194H of the 1961
Act and Section 2(c)(i) the PC Act
33. We may test the case of the appellant from another standpoint.
The appellant by relying on Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors (supra),
which was affirmed by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax,
Ahmedabad (supra), submitted that the stamp vendors are not
agents of the State Government. It was submitted that the purchase
of stamps by the vendor from the treasury results in the transfer of
ownership to the vendor, thereby precluding the characterization
of the relationship as one of principal and agent. Consequently,
the discount on the purchase of the stamps cannot be said to be
commission neither in terms of Section 194H of the 1961 Act nor in
terms of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. The appellant’s submission
although, at first glance, appears persuasive, but it does not
withstand scrutiny.
34. The High Court of Gujarat in Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors (supra)
held that in spite of the restrictions on a licensed stamp vendor under
the relevant rules, the transactions would still be a sale and not one
between a principal and agent. There is no gainsaying that although
the Government has imposed restrictions on the licensed stamp
vendors by way of the relevant rules qua the manner of carrying on
the business yet the vendors are required to purchase the stamps
on payment of price less the discount on principal-to-principal basis.
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35. The decision rendered by the Gujarat High Court in Ahmedabad
Stamp Vendors (supra) was also looked into by the High Court of
Uttarakhand in the case of Roorkee Stamp Vendor Association
v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 3764.
The High Court, while dealing with an identical issue – namely,
whether the amount received by stamp vendors from treasury,
upon the subsequent sale of the stamps to purchasers is by way
of holding a position of an agent of the treasury, adopted the
reasoning assigned by the Gujarat High Court. The High Court of
Kerala in Kerala State Stamp Vendors Association v. Office of
the Accountant-General, reported in 2005 SCC OnLine Ker 672,
in agreement with the findings of Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors
(supra), took a corresponding view that the licensed stamp vendors
are not agents of the Government and are independent dealers in
stamps, though they are subject to the relevant rules in regards of
purchase and sale of stamps.
36. The definition of “public servant” cannot be understood devoid of the
context in which it came to be incorporated and the manner in which
it has been subsequently interpreted by this Court as elucidated in
the preceding section of this judgment.
37. The heart of the definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c)(i) of
the PC Act lies in the expressions “remunerated by the Government”
and “for the performance of any public duty”, and not in the mode
of remuneration, such as “fees or commission”. The ‘commission’
referred in “remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for
the performance of public duty” is not analogous to the ‘commission’ in
Section 194H of the 1961 Act. The terms “fees” and “commission” are
merely indicative of the mode of remuneration and not determinative
of the position held by a person. Their presence or absence does
not alter the core question as to whether a person is remunerated
by the Government for the performance of any public duty, which
remains the central consideration under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.
38. The interpretation of a definition should not only avoid being repugnant
to the context but it should also be interpreted to achieve the purpose
which is sought to be served by the statute. A construction which
would defeat or may likely defeat the purpose of the Act has to be
ignored and not accepted. A definition, like any other word in a statute,
has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 87
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
39. The definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c)(i) can be said
to have three parts, as they are disjunctive: first, a person who is
in the service of the Government; secondly, a person who is in the
pay of the Government; thirdly, a person who is remunerated by
fees or commission for the performance of any public duty. The
expression “remunerated” in the third part has to be read in context
and in line with the expressions in the first and the second part i.e.,
“in the service” and “in the pay”. The three key expressions, “in the
service”, “in the pay” and “remunerated” by the Government belong
to the same genus and have the same flavour. In the first two parts,
a person is rendering his services for the Government which implicitly
means discharging a public duty. Whereas, in the third part, even
though a person is not rendering his services for the Government but
is being remunerated for discharging a public duty. In this context,
the terms “fees or commission” must be construed so as to give full
effect to the definition and the other provisions of the statute.
40. Further, the term “commission” as used and understood in the context
of Section 194H of the 1961 Act is not stricto sensu similar to its
usage in Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. When a person is in service
of the Government, as is contemplated under the first part of Section
2(c)(i), he is said to be in a master-servant relationship where the
employer employs the person on the basis of salary. Whereas, in
the second part, a person may not be a regular employee but is
receiving salary from his master. A five-Judge Bench of this Court
in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, reported in (1979) 3 SCC
431, although in the context of Section 21, Twelfth, of the IPC, has
interpreted the word ‘pay’ as implying that a person is getting salary,
compensation, wages or any amount of money yet a relationship of
master-servant need not exist in all cases.
41. Further, as the master-servant or principal-agent relationship has
already been envisaged under the first part, the legislature could
not have intended to address it again under the third part. The
structure of the definition reduces the emphasis on the strictness of
the relationship between the Government and the public servant,
while placing greater focus on the performance of a public duty. It
is important to note that, the first two parts imply that the individual
is rendering services directly for the Government. Whereas, the last
part suggests that even where the services are not rendered ‘for’
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the Government, the Government may nevertheless remunerate the
person for performing a public duty.
42. Where the wording of a statutory provision indicates that the
legislature has consciously attributed varying degrees of significance
to different interpretative elements such as the nature of the
relationship or the duty performed, the courts are obliged to adhere to
that legislative determination and interpret the provision in a manner
that reflects the intended statutory scheme. While interpreting a
statute, it is essential not only to consider the words used but also
to examine the Statement of Objects and Reasons, as it provides
the background against which the legislation was enacted. The
legislature introduced a comprehensive definition of “public servant”
with the intent to punish and curb the menace of corruption. In such
circumstances, it would be improper to construe the definition in a
manner that limits its scope, thereby defeating the very essence
and purpose of the statute.
43. It is an important rule of interpretation that every interpretation of a
statute must be undertaken by considering the statute in its entirety,
the prior state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general
scope and purpose of the legislation, and the mischief that the
legislature intended to address.
iii. Public Duty as the determinant of status of Public Servant
44. We now proceed to consider the case of the appellant on the
second aspect of the definition of a public servant i.e., whether
the remuneration received by a licensed stamp vendor is for the
performance or discharge of a public duty. As we have discussed in
the preceding section, it is the nature of duty which is the determining
factor in deciding whether a person qualifies to be a public servant
and not the manner of appointment or mode of remuneration. The
primary test of qualification for inclusion in the definition of “public
servant” in the third part of Section 2(c)(i) is whether the concerned
person is performing any public duty. The commonality across the sub-
clauses of Section 2(c) is that all the persons therein are performing
a ‘public’ duty. Section 2(b) defines “public duty” as follows:
(b) “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which
the State, the public or the community at large has an
interest.”
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 89
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
45. Once the nature of performance of duties gets crystallized, any person
remunerated by the Government for the performance of any public
duty or who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorized or
required to perform any public duty, is a “public servant” within the
meaning of the term defined under Section 2(c).
46. This Court in Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah (supra), had held that
the emphasis under Section 2(c) of the PC Act is on the public duty
performed by him and not on the position held by an individual. The
relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may
observe that the emphasis is not on the position held by
an individual, rather, it is on the public duty performed by
him/her. In this regard, the legislative intention was not to
provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are covered,
rather a general definition of “public servant” is provided
thereunder. This provides an important internal evidence
as to the definition of the term “university”.
xxx
44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not
only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption,
but also to make the same applicable to individuals who
might conventionally not be considered public servants.
The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus from
those who are traditionally called public officials, to those
individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same in
mind, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant State, it cannot be stated that a “deemed
university” and the officials therein, perform any less or
any different a public duty, than those performed by a
university simpliciter, and the officials therein.”
(Emphasis supplied)
47. In G. Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2021
SCC OnLine Kat 15332, the petitioner therein was working as
a project manager in a society registered under the provisions of
the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, whose principal
object was to develop skills in construction and to undertake civil
construction works assigned by the Government. On receipt of a
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complaint of possession of disproportionate assets as against the
known sources of his income, an FIR was registered. The petitioner
sought quashing of the FIR on the ground that respondent-authority
does not have the power to register a case against the petitioner as
he is not a public servant. The High Court held that having regard
to the nature of work carried on by the petitioner he would fall within
the definition of the word “public duty” as defined under the PC Act.
Hence, even if an individual does not qualify as a public servant under
the PC Act, they may still fall within its ambit if they are engaged
in the discharge of any public duty. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“13. From the reading of the definition of the word ‘public
servant as found in the P.C. Act, it is very clear that a person
who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorized
or required to perform any public duty, and any person
or employee of any institution if it has been receiving or
if it has received any financial assistance from the State
or Central Government, shall be considered as a public
servant. The explanation to Section 2(c) of the P.C. Act
would further go to show that such a person may be
appointed by the Government or not. Therefore, a public
servant need not be a Government/civil servant, but a
Government/civil servant is always a public servant.
xxx
20. Be that as it may, having regard to the fact that the
Nirmithi Kendra in which the petitioner is employed has
been receiving funds from the State and the Central
Government and taking into consideration the definition of
the word ‘public servant’ as found in the P.C. Act, it cannot
be but said that the petitioner is a public servant. Even if
a person is not a public servant, but by virtue of his office
if he is discharging public duty, then he is covered under
the ambit of the P.C. Act.
21. Corruption in our country is a growing menace and
P.C. Act being a welfare legislation is required to be
interpreted keeping in mind the object and spirit of the
statute. In furtherance of the fight against corruption a
broad interpretation to the provisions of this statute is
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 91
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
required to be given and the arms of this Act is required
to be extended to the maximum. The offences under the
P.C. Act can be invoked not only against a public servant
but also against a person, who by virtue of his office has
been discharging ‘public duty’[...]”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. The case of the appellant has tested positive on both aspects of
the definition of a public servant under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC
Act. The 1934 Rules envisage that the nascent discount eventually
matures into a form of remuneration. Further, the purpose of securing
stamp duty fortifies the motive behind the efforts of the Government
to remunerate stamp vendors. Thus, the appellant, at the relevant
time, was being remunerated by the Government. Undoubtedly, the
appellant was discharging a duty in which both the State and the
public have an interest, which, nonetheless, brings him within the
ambit of a public servant as defined under the PC Act.
iv. Legality of appellant’s conviction
49. We shall now consider whether the prosecution successfully
discharged its burden of establishing its case against the appellant
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(b) respectively beyond reasonable doubt.
The oral evidence of the complainant reveals that on 09.12.2003,
after lodging the complaint at the ACB office, at about 2:45 PM,
he proceeded with the raiding team to the Office of Sub-Registrar,
Janakpuri. At about 3:45 PM, he attempted to purchase a stamp paper
of Rs. 10/- from the appellant, who demanded Rs. 12/-, stating that
it was his usual charge. As per the directions of the Raid Officer, the
complainant then handed over the smeared GC Notes from his shirt
pocket, which the appellant accepted with his right hand. At this point,
the complainant failed to recollect as to where the appellant had kept
the money thereafter. He added that the ACB officials apprehended
the appellant, and the Raid Officer took a wash of the right hand of
the appellant, which changed the colour of the solution.
49.1 At this stage, the Public Prosecutor sought to cross-examine
the complainant, alleging that as the complainant was resiling
from his earlier statement he be declared as a hostile witness.
During the cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor,
92 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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the complainant revealed further details by stating that the
Raid Officer and Investigating Officer (IO) had recorded all
proceedings at the spot. The Raid Officer had instructed the
panch witness to stay close to the complainant, listen to the
conversation, observe the transaction, and give a pre-assigned
signal if a demand was made by the appellant. He further
added that when the complainant handed over the smeared
GC Notes, the appellant stamped the back of the stamp paper
and made an entry in his register. The panch witness then
gave the signal, and the raiding team arrived and recovered
the GC Notes from the appellant’s register.
49.2 The Raid Officer testified that on 09.12.2003, he received
a complaint alleging that a stamp vendor was selling stamp
papers of the value Rs. 10/- for Rs. 12/-. After explaining the
procedure of the raid, he instructed the complainant and the
panch witness to stay close and tender the excess amount
of Rs. 2/- only if demanded. The panch witness was to signal
completion of transaction by moving his hand over his head.
He stated that the IO and driver stayed behind while the rest
proceeded to the Office of Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri. At 4 PM,
the panch witness gave a signal, and the raiding team rushed
to the spot. The panch witness pointed out that the money
accepted was lying on the appellant’s register. After the seizure,
the witness called the IO and handed over the copy of the
raid report, seizure memos, exhibits, and the appellant. In his
cross-examination, the panch witness deposed that he did not
hear the conversation regarding the demand and payment of
the excess Rs. 2/-. He admitted that the currency notes were
lying on the register when he reached the spot and were not
recovered from the body or clothes of the accused.
49.3 The IO deposed that after leaving the ACB office, he stayed
behind while the Raid Officer, the complainant, the panch
witness and others proceeded for the raid. At around 7:15 PM,
the Raid Officer called him to the location and handed over
the documents. In cross-examination, the witness admitted
that the seizure memo does not mention that an attachie,
sale register, and various stamp papers were seized from the
appellant’s seat. He also admitted that he was not present
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 93
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
when the appellant was apprehended and searched by the
Raid Officer. The seizure memo was prepared by him after
the Raid Officer handed over the site to him as the IO, and
he was unable to say when the raid got concluded. He further
deposed that the seizure memo pertaining to the currency
notes records the time of seizure as 4:15 PM.
49.4 Following this, the panch witness in his examination-in-chief
deposed that on 09.12.2003, he was deputed as a panch
witness in the ACB. He, alongwith the complainant, Raid
Officer, and other ACB officials left for the Sub-Registrar Office,
Janakpuri. The Raid Officer had directed him to stay close to
the complainant and overhear the conversation with the stamp
vendor. At this stage, the prosecutor sought permission to
cross-examine him. On being cross-examined, he stated that
the GC Notes of Rs. 10/- and Rs. 2/- were recovered from the
accused but he could not recall whether he had informed the
Raid Officer about any demand for Rs. 12/- instead of Rs. 10/-
for a stamp paper. In his cross-examination by the counsel for
the appellant, he reiterated that he does not recollect whether
the appellant demanded for Rs. 12/- for a stamp paper of
Rs. 10/-. He admitted that he was very close to the complainant
at the time of the transaction.
50. In C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India reported as (1997) 9
SCC 477, this Court, although interpreting the term “accept” in the
context of the 1947 Act, observed that “accept” means to take or
receive with a consenting mind. In contrast, “obtain” was understood
to imply securing or gaining something as a result of a request or
effort. In both instances, a demand or request by the receiver is
a prerequisite for establishing an offence under Sections 7 and
13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
51. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money, by itself, is
insufficient to establish the charges against an accused under the
PC Act. To sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the
Act respectively, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that
the public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be
a bribe. The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand for
a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7
of the PC Act.
94 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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52. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731,
categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the demand by
the public servant have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in
issue for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the
PC Act. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer
by bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an
offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The
relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:
“88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public
servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without
there being any demand from the public servant and the
latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of
the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand
by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand
and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the
demanded gratification which in turn is received by the
public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case
of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification
emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under
Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-
giver and the demand by the public servant respectively
have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue.
In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
gratification without anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii),
respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the
Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be
an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is
accepted by the public servant which would make it an
offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant
when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a
payment made which is received by the public servant,
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 95
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)
(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
53. It was further explained by this Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy v.
State of A.P., reported in (2015) 10 SCC 152, as follows:
“23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the
gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably
the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any
amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery
thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would
thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under
these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the
prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification
would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the
person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of
the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.”
(Emphasis supplied)
54. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that
mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a
public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient
to establish an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act
respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal
gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt
or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing
or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.
55. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the bribe-giver”
where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the
mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence
under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates
that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be
communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to meeting of
minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance
to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and
cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the
offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification.
96 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
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In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-
giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as
regards the factum of offer of bribe.
56. By applying the abovementioned principles to the evidence on
record, we are of the considered view that, having regard to material
inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant and the testimony
of the panch witness, the allegation of demand by the appellant
herein does not emerge clearly, let alone being proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
57. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a wholly reliable witness, the
court faces no difficulty in reaching a conclusion, it may convict or
acquit solely on the basis of such testimony, provided it is free from
any suspicion of interestedness, incompetence, or subordination.
Similarly, in the case of a wholly unreliable witness, the court
again faces no ambiguity in discarding the testimony. The real
challenge arises when the witness is neither wholly reliable nor
wholly unreliable. In such situations, the court must proceed with
caution and seek corroboration in material particulars, whether
through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court’s duty to act on
the testimony of a single witness arises when it is satisfied, upon
a careful perusal of the testimony, that it is free from all taints and
suspicions. [See: Vedivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC
OnLine SC 13; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 390]
58. Although, it cannot be said that the complainant did not support
the prosecution’s case at all, yet there were lapses on his part in
disclosing significant facts alongwith material inconsistencies between
his testimony and that of the panch witness. The testimony of the
complainant and the Raid Officer reveal that the panch witness was
instructed to accompany the complainant so as to enable the raiding
team to apprehend the appellant as soon as he makes a demand
for illegal gratification. The panch witness admitted that he was in a
close proximity to the complainant and the appellant at the time of
transaction. The panch witness further deposed that there was no
other person on the counter of the appellant and thus the possibility
of any exchange of communication between the complainant and
the appellant being not heard properly by the panch witness is also
negligible.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 97
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
59. The necessity and desirability of a panch witness is particularly to
be aware of the transactions and to facilitate in carrying out the raid.
On being questioned about a demand of Rs. 12/- being made by the
appellant, the panch witness lacked recollection on whether he had
informed the Raid Officer about any demand for Rs. 12/- instead of
Rs. 10/-. Further, the Raid Officer deposed that he did not hear the
conversation regarding the demand and acceptance of Rs. 2/-. The
prosecution did not examine any other witness on the allegation of
demand by the appellant.
60. Further, the panch witness, when confronted with a specific query
regarding the demand, deposed that he could not recollect whether
the appellant had demanded Rs. 12/- for a stamp paper valued at
Rs. 10/-. He also did not indicate the presence of any implied demand.
61. We also find ourselves compelled to express doubt regarding
the unexplained delay of approximately three hours between the
apprehension and seizure of the appellant and the calling of the IO
to the spot. According to the complainant and the Raid Officer, they
arrived at the Office of the Sub-Registrar at around 3:45 PM, and
the Raid Officer received the pre-arranged signal from the panch
witness at approximately 4:00 PM. The seizure memo of the currency
notes shows the time of seizure as 4:15 PM. However, the IO stated
that he was called to the scene by the Raid Officer only at 7:15 PM.
Further, the seizure memo of the stamp papers and sale register do
not mention the time of seizure.
62. Further, we are conscious of the fact that only two currency notes
were recovered, both of which had been smeared with phenolphthalein
powder. Notably, even accepting the prosecution’s case for the sake
of argument, the appellant was lawfully entitled to receive Rs. 10/-
for the stamp paper, irrespective of any demand for bribe. Since,
the Rs. 10/- note itself was tainted it becomes difficult to determine
whether the change in the colour of the solution was triggered by the
handling of the Rs. 10/- note or the Rs. 2/- note. Hence, the mere
turning of the solution pink cannot, by itself, establish the acceptance
of illegal gratification.
v. Presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act
63. Insofar as the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is
concerned, such presumption is drawn only qua the offence under
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Sections 7 and 11 respectively and not qua the offence under
Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The presumption is contingent upon
the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification to the effect that the
gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as
contemplated under Section 7 of the PC Act. Such proof of acceptance
can follow only when the demand is proved.
64. In that case, the prosecution evidence alone cannot be considered
for the purpose of coming to the conclusion. The evidence led by the
prosecution and, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if
any, are also required to be considered. It is then to be seen as to
whether the total effect of the entire evidence led before the court
is of a nature by which the only conclusion possible was that the
public servant accepted the amount. If the answer is in affirmative,
then alone it can be held that the prosecution established the case
beyond reasonable doubt.
65. Undoubtedly, the presumption under Section 20 arises once it is
established that the public servant accepted the gratification. However,
in determining whether such acceptance occurred, the totality of the
evidence led at the trial must be appreciated. The evidence led by the
prosecution, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any,
the entire record is required to be considered. Only if the cumulative
effect of all the evidence is such that the sole possible conclusion is
that the public servant accepted the gratification can it be said that
the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
66. On examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that
the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt,
the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the ACB.
In such circumstances, there is no question of a presumption under
Section 20. Consequently, we find ourselves compelled to conclude
that it would be entirely illegal to uphold the conviction of the appellant
under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.
G. CONCLUSION
67. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached the following
conclusion:
67.1 The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public
servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing the
growing menace of corruption. Keeping this intention of the
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 99
Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
legislature in mind, we are of the view that the definition of
“public servant” as defined under the PC Act should be given a
purposive and wide interpretation so as to advance the object
underlying the statute.
67.2 It is the nature of duty being discharged by a person which
assumes paramount importance when determining whether
such a person falls within the ambit of the definition of public
servant as defined under the PC Act.
67.3 Stamp vendors across the country, by virtue of performing
an important public duty and receiving remuneration from the
Government for the discharge of such duty, are undoubtedly
public servants within the ambit of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.
67.4 In the case at hand, the appellant was eligible for receiving
discount on the purchase of stamp papers owing to the
license that he was holding. Further, the discount is traceable
to and is governed by the 1934 Rules framed by the State
Government. Thus, the appellant, without a doubt, could be
said to be “remunerated by the government” for the purposes
of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.
67.5 Further, the prosecution has failed in establishing the allegation
of demand for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof
beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction of the
appellant for the offences under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read
with Section 13(2) of the PC Act cannot be sustained and is,
thus, liable to be set aside.
68. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
conviction and sentence of the accused, as awarded by the Trial
Court and affirmed by the High Court is set aside.
69. Bail bond(s), if any, shall stand discharged.
70. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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