Supreme Court of India
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 656
- Decided
- 29 September 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
The exemption under Section 178(2) is valid, the acquisition remains lawful, and lack of rehabilitation does not invalidate the acquisition; the Land Pooling Scheme cannot be applied retrospectively.
Summary
The case concerned the expansion of the SAS (Nagar) Mohali township, where land for sectors 81, 88 and 89 was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The State of Punjab invoked Section 178(2) of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 to exempt the acquired land from the provisions of Section 14 and Chapters VIII, X and XII of that Act. The appellants challenged the exemption, argued that the acquisition was invalid for non‑compliance with the 1995 Act, and contended that the lack of rehabilitation and the prospective Land Pooling Scheme made the acquisition unlawful. The Supreme Court held that the exemption was valid, the acquisition was not void for any procedural lapse, and rehabilitation is not a condition precedent to a valid acquisition; the Land Pooling Scheme could not be applied retrospectively. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed and the acquisition proceeded, with the Court directing the Collector to refer any compensation claims to a civil court.
Issues considered
- Whether the exemption of the land from the provisions of Section 14 and Chapters VIII, X and XII of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995, via the notification dated 10‑02‑2004 under Section 178(2), is legally infirm.
- If the exemption is invalid, whether the land acquisition is rendered void for non‑compliance with the 1995 Act.
- Whether the absence of rehabilitation measures makes the acquisition illegal and whether the prospective Land Pooling Scheme can be applied to the acquisition.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 18, s. 23(1), s. 4, s. 6
- Punjab Housing Development Board Act
- Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952
- Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995s. 14, s. 178(2), s. 56(5), s. Chapter VIII, s. Chapter X, s. Chapter XII
- Punjab Urban Estate (Development and Regulation) Act
Subjects
land acquisitionexemptionSection 178rehabilitationLand Pooling Schemepublic purposecompensationurban developmentPunjab Regional and Town Planning Act
Judgment
[2010] 12 S.C.R. 163
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 8431 of 2010)
SEPTEMBER 29, 2010
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, R.M. LODHA AND T.S. THAKUR,
JJ.]
Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development
Act, 1995 - ss. 178(2) and 14 - Exemption notification under . C
s. 178(2) - Validity of - Expansion of existing township of SAS
(Nagar) Mohali - Acquisition of land for sectors 81, 88 and
89 - Issuance of notification dated 10. 02. 2004 under Section
178(2) - Exemption of land under acquisition from the
provisions of Section 14 and Chapters VIII, X and XII - D
Legality of - Held: Does not suffer from any legal infirmity -
Notification was issued keeping in view large public interest
and planned development of the area - Compliance with the
provisions of 1995 Act was not practical because township
witnessed phenomenal growth over the years - Also E
notification was never challenged before High Court in writ
petition filed by expropriated owners - Thus, acquisition under
challenge not rendered bad for non-compliance with the
provisions of the Act - Re-habilitation of owners is not an
essential requirement for a valid acquisition of property - F
Land pooling scheme cannot be made applicable to the
acquisition of land acquired from expropriated owners -
Scheme is only prospective in operation - It cannot be
introduced after the acquisition and even allotment process
is over - Direction issued to Collector to make reference to G
civil court for determination of reasonable compensation
payable to owners, if owners make applications for reference
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss.4, 6, 18, and 23(1) -Punjab
Urban Estate (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964 -
163 H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A Punjab Housing Development Board Act, 1972 -
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 300-A - Eminent Domain
- Urban development - Town planning - Notifications -
Exemption notification dated 10.02.2004 - lnterprotation of
States - Liberal construction.
B
SAS (Nagar) Mohali was identified for planned
development by addition of sectors 53 to 81. This was
much prior to the enactment of the Punjab Regional and
Town Planning and Development Act, 1995. In the first
phase, sectors 53 to 75 were developed under the
C provisions of the Punjab Urban Estate (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1964 and the Punjab Housing
Development Board Act, 1972. The land for these sectors
was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. To
further extend the township, the land was acquired for
D sectors 76 to 80. 10% of the land owners challenged the
acquisition on the ground that the provisions of the 1995
Act were not complied with. The High Court stayed the
dispossession of the owners. The Government invoked
its powers under Section 178(2) of the 1995 Act and
E exempted the areas falling under sectors 76 to 80 from
the provisions of Section 14 and Chapters VIII, IX and XII
of the Act. The landowners in Jasmer Singh v. State of
Punjab and Anr., CWP No.29 of 2004 challenged the
exemption notification. The High Court dismissed the writ
F petition. In appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the order.
In the third phase, acquisition proceedings for
development of sectors 81, 88 and 89 were initiated. A
preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act
proposed an area of 417.39 acres in sector 81 and 688.89
G acres in sectors 88 and 89 for acquisition. The
Government again invoked the provisions of Section
178(2) of the 1995 Act in regard to the land notified for '
development of sectors 81, 88 and 89. A notification
dated 10.02.2004 exempted the land falling in the said
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 165
ORS.
sectors from the provisions of Section 14 and Chapters A
VIII, X and XII of the 1995 Act. Aggrieved, the appellants-
expropriated owners filed writ petitions challenging the
preliminary Notification dated 23.01.04 issued under
Section 4 of the Act and the declaration dated 18.01.05
issued under Section 6 of the Act; the constitutional B
validity of section 23(1) of the Act, and the Punjab New
Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952. The High Court
upheld the impugned enactments as also the notifications
issued under the Act. Therefore, the appellants filed the
instant appeals. c
The questions which arose for consideration in the
instant appeals are whether the exemption of the land
under acquisition from the provisions of Section 14 and
Chapters VIII, X and XII of the 1995 Act, in terms of the
notification dated 10th February, 2004 issued under D
Section 178(2) of the 1995 Act suffers from any legal
infirmity; whether the acquisition under challenge is
rendered bad for non-compliance with the provisions of
the Act; and whether the absence of any rehabilitation
E
measures renders the acquisition legally bad, if not,
whether the 'Land Pooling Scheme' could be made
applicable to the acquisition of the land acquired from the
appellants.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court F
HELD: 1.1 The exemption of the land under
acquisition from the provisions of Section 14 and
Chapters VIII, X and XII of the Punjab Regional and Town
Planning and Development Act, 1995 in terms of G
notification dated 10.02.2004 issued under Section 178(2)
of the said 1995 Act does not suffer from any legal
infirmity. [Para 16 and 31] [181-C; 189-D]
H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A 1.2 Section 178(2) of the Act, empowers the
Government to grant exemption from the operation of the
Act on the twin grounds of hardship and expediency. For
the Government to exercise its power of exemption on
the ground of expediency two requirements must be
B satisfied viz. (i) that circumstances exist which render it
expedient to grant the exemption and (ii) the Government
upon a consideration of those circumstances forms an
opinion that it is expedient to do so. The latter
requirement is more in the nature of a subjective
C satisfaction of the Government while the former is
dependant on objective consideration of the
circumstances that are germane. Once the existence of
circumstances that are relevant to the exercise of the
power of exemption are found to exist, the formation of
D the opinion by the Government about the expediency of
granting an exemption is a matter on which the court
would be slow to interfere unless the decision is shown
to be a colourable exercise or vitiated by any extraneous
motive or consideration. The term 'expedient' appearing
E in Section 178 of the 1995 Act has not been defined. [Para
27) [186-F-G; 187 -A-CJ
State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas G. Pabri and Ors. (1975) 1
SCC 138; Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82
F - referred to.
Black's Law Dictionary- referred to.
1.3 The power of exemption reserved in favour of
Government under Section 178 of the 1995 Act is also
G intended to relieve hardship arising from the operation of
the Act. It is intended to enable the Government to deal
with situations in which circumstances independent of
the question of hardship render it expedient to do so by
granting exemption. Therefore, a liberal construction has
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 167
ORS.
to be placed upon the provisions of Section 178(2) so A
that exercise of power for good and bona fide reasons
is not defeated. [Para 30) [189-8-C]
1.4 The notification dated 10.02.2004 granting
exemption was never challenged in the writ petitions filed 8
by the appellants. There is no foundation laid in the
petitions by the appellants for them to contend that the
exemption notification was vitiated either because of lack
of authority or misdirection by the Government in
exercise of its power under Section 178(2) of the 1995 c
Act. The High Court noticed the said aspect. It is difficult
to appreciate how the issue regarding the validity of the
exemption granted by the Government could be raised
by the writ petitioners before the High Court or argued
impromptu by the appellants before this Court. Any 0
attempt to raise the question regarding validity of the
exemption notification fails on that ground alone. [Paras
17 and 18] [181-G-H; 182-A-D]
1.5 None of the circumstances mentioned in the
notification are irrelevant or extraneous to the exercise E
of the power of exemption vested in the Government
under Section 178(2) of the Act. It is significant that Mohali
was identified for planned development by addition of
sectors 53 to 81 even before the Punjab Regional and
Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 came into F
force. The proposed development was to be carried out
under the provisions of Punjab Urban Estate
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1964 and Punjab
Housing Development Board Act, 1972. Initially the plan
was limited to the addition of Sectors 53 to 81 but the third G
phase comprised not only development of Sector 81
which was a part of the original plan but also included
sectors 88 and 89. [Para 24) [184-G-H; 185-A-B]
H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
•
A 1.6 It is evident from the notification that compliance
with the provisions of the 1995 Act was found to be
impracticable primarily because of the tremendous
pressure on land in and around Mohali for housing
purposes especially because the township witnessed
B phenomenal growth over the years. The notification
rightly stated that if immediate steps were not taken to
develop the outskirts of the township it would lead to
large scale unplanned and haphazard mushrooming of
housing colonies and commercial establishments in the
C area. Delay in the finalization of the outline Master Plan,
comprehensive master plan and a town planning scheme,
thus, had the potential of frustrating the very purpose
underlying the legislation that is aimed at better planning,
regulation, development and use of land in the planning
D areas. The Government was in that view well within its
power to evaluate the options available to it, making a
choice and taking appropriate action to prevent any such
disorganized and haphazard development. In as much as
the Government did so and decided to invoke its powers
E under Section 178(2) of the Act, it committed no illegality.
On the contrary, the Government by taking timely action
prevented a situation where the area around the
township of Mohali would have on account of
tremendous pressure for conversion of land to non-
F agricultural use cleveloped into a large slum as is the
bane of many other cities in the country where statutory
authorities charged with duties of urban development
failed to keep pace with the housing needs of the
populace. The Government prevented such haphazard
G and unplanned development even in sectors 76 to 80 by
exempting the land falling in the said sectors from the
operation of the provisions of the 1995 Act. The said
exemption was assailed by the land owners but upheld
not only by the High Court but even by this Court in
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 169
ORS.
appeal. That the power of exemption could be exercised A
in situations similar to the one in hand, thus, stands
amply established. (Para 25] (185-C-H; 186-A-B]
1.7 It is not the cumbersome and time-consuming
process alone that led to the issue of the exemption B
notification. It was a realistic assessment of the ground
realities requiring urgent action that made adherence to
the letter of law impracticable. The Government was of
the opinion that failure to take immediate action for
developing these sectors would lead to unplanned and· c
haphazard construction activities in the area. It was the
cumulative effect of all the circumstances referred to in
the notification that led to the issue of the exemption
notification. [Para 26] [186-D-E]
· 1.8 Nearly 96% of the landowners have already· D
accepted the compensation and either accepted the
acquisition proceedings or given up the challenge to the
validity thereof. The fact that allotments in favour of
different institutions have already been made cannot be
E
ignored nor can a prestigious project like the one at hand
be scuttled at this stage. [Para 31] (189-D-E]
2.1 Once the exemption granted by the Government
to the land falling in sectors 81, 88 and 89 is upheld, the
question of striking down the land acquisition F
proceedings on the ground that the provisions of the
1995 Act were not complied with does not survive. [Para
32] (189-G-H]
2.2 The validity of the acquisition proceedings have G
not been challenged on any ground that may have been
available to the appellants by reference to the Land
Acquisition Act. Neither before the High Court nor before
this Court was it argued that the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act were not followed in letter and spirit, while H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 12 S.C.R.
A acquiring the land in question. [Para 32] [189-H; 190-A-
B]
State Of Punjab And Others vs Sanjeet Singh Grewal
And Others 2007 (8) SCR 1 - distinguished.
B
2.3 The instant case relates to the acquisition that is
being made on the basis of an expansion plan formulated
before the 1995 Act came into force . The land under
acquisition in the instant cases is covered by a
C notification under Section 56(5) of the 1995 Act, which
declares SAS Nagar (Mohali) as a local planning area. It
is apparent that the Notification dated 06.03.2000 gave a
sufficient basis for the Government to initiate
proceedings for the acquisition of land needed for the
proper expansion of the township. [Paras 33, 34 and 35]
0 [191-E-G; 193-F]
2.4 The appellant submitted that the notifications
were issued without notice to the landowners and others
to file their objections. There is no merit in the contention
E either. The notification was not assailed before the High
Court in the writ petitions filed by the appellants.
Therefore, it is not open to the petitioner to argue that the
notification suffered from any illegality. No factual
foundation was laid in the writ petition, thus, it cannot be
F said that the notification was issued without following the
procedure prescribed for the purpose and without
considering the objections received from different
quarters. [Paras 35 and 36] [193-F-H; 194-A-B]
G Jasmer Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. CWP No. 29
of 2004 - referred to.
3.1 Article 300-A of the Constitution rests on the
doctrine of eminent domain and guarantees a
H constitutional right against deprivation of property save
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 171
ORS.
by authority of law. It mandates that to be valid the A
deprivation of property must be by authority of law. In the
instant case, deprivation of property was by the authority
of law, for it is common ground that the property owned
by the appellants was acquired in terms of the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is a validly B
enacted piece of legislation. The provisions of Land
Acquisition Act invoked by the State for the acquisition
under challenge provides for payment of compensation
equivalent to the market value of the property as on the
date of the preliminary Notification apart from other C
benefits like solatium for the compulsory nature of the
acquisition, additional compensation and interest etc. The
sum total of all these amounts constitutes a reasonable
compensation for the land acquired from the
expropriated owners. Neither Article 300-A of the D
Constitution nor the Land Acquisition Act does make any
measures for rehabilitation of the expropriated owners a
condition precedent for compulsory acquisition of land.
In the absence of any such obligation arising either
under Article 300-A or under any other statutory E
provision, rehabilitation of the owners cannot be treated
as an essential requirement for a valid acquisition of
property. The appellants were right in not suggesting that
rehabilitation of the oustees was an essential part of any
process of compulsory acquisition so as to render illegal F
any acquisition that is not accompanied by such
measure. [Para 38] [194-D-H; 195-A-B]
New Reviera Coop Housing Society and Anr. v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. 1996 (1) SCC 731; Chameli G
Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. 1996 (2) SCC 549 -
referred to.
3.2 To the credit of the State of Punjab, it has
H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A formulated a Land Pooling Scheme which is owner-
friendly and provides greater incentives for the owners
to readily give up their lands whenever the same are
needed for a public purpose. However, difficulty arises
on account of the fact that the scheme formulated and
B circulated by the Government in terms of its letter dated
5th September, 2008 is only prospective in its operation.
The scheme envisages a kind of public-private
partnership in the development of areas involving
acquisition of large extents of land. Not only that, in order
C that the scheme works effectively, the authorities for
whom acquisition is being made will have to take a
broader initiative at the appropriate stage to make
provision for allocation to the owners of what is due to
them under the scheme. This can be done only when an
D acquisition is tailored according to the scheme. The
scheme cannot be introduced after the acquisition and
even allotment process is over. A mechanical extension
of the scheme to acquisitions that have since become
final cannot help. Any such attempt would be a potential
E recipe for considerable confusion and resultant litigation.
In the completed acquisitions no provision regarding
allocation to the owners was made. It is also not feasible
at this point of time to super impose the Land Pooling
Scheme on the acquisition under challenge and make a
F provision for allocation to the owners in the sectors that
are under development or those that have already been
developed. The extent of area available in other sectors
for such allotment and allocation is itself a matter
regarding which there is no material. That apart, even
G when the number of appellants is limited, any direction
for rehabilitation based on a retrospective operation of the
scheme would deprive owners of the benefit of such
scheme only on account of their acceptance of the
acquisition proceedings. The submission that this Court
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 173
ORS.
could confine the benefit of retrospective application of A
the scheme to the appellants only cannot be accepted.
[Para 42) [198-C-H; 199-A-C]
Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority
and Others 2010 (6 ) SCR 29 - referred to. B
3.3 The respondents fairly submitted that the State
Government would have no objection to the appellants
being relegated to a reference to the civil court for
determination of the compensation due to them since C
others who have not challenged the acquisition have
secured such references. This is a reasonable offer
which would ensure that the applicants do not suffer on
account of the pending litigation, or their failure to make
applications within the time available to them. Therefore,
0
it is directed that if the appellants make applications
under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for reference
of their claims for higher compensation before the
Collector, Land Acquisition within the stipulated period,
the Collector would make a reference to the competent
civil court for determination of the compensation payable E
to the appellants. [Paras 43 and 44) [199-D-H; 200-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
(1975) 1 sec 138 Referred to Para 28
F
(2000) 5 sec 82 Referred to Para 29
2007 (8 ) SCR 1 Distinguished Para 32
1996 (1) sec 131 Referred to Para 38
G
1996 (2) sec 549 Referred to Para 38
2010 (6 ) SCR 29 Referred to Para 39
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8431 of 2010. H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment & Order dated 26.09.2006 of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R P No. 312 of
2006 and CWP No. 9060 of 2005.
WITH
B Civil Appeal No. 8432 of 2010.
J.L. Gupta, Tarun Gupta and S. Janani for the Appellants.
Gopal Subramaniu, S.G., Amrendra Saran, ASG Rachana
Joshi lssar, Ajay Pal, Nidhi Tewari for the Respondents.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. These two appeals by special leave raise common
0 questions of law and shall stand disposed of by this common
judgment. The appeals arise out of two separate orders both
dated 26.9.2006 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana whereby C.W.Ps. Nos.9060 of 2005 and 9083 of
2005 filed by the appellants have been dismissed. The
E petitioners had in those petitions challenged the validity of a
Notification dated 23.1.2004 issued under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act and a declaration dated 18.1.2005 issued
under Section 6 thereof. Constitutional validity of Section 23(1)
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and Punjab New Capital
(Periphery) Control Act, 1952 was also assailed by them on
F several grounds which failed to find favour with the High Court
who upheld not only the constitutional validity of the impugned
enactments but also the notification issued under the Land
Acquisition Act. The present appeals assail the correctness of
the view taken by the High Court.
G
3. The facts giving rise to the controversy have been set
out at length by the High Court in the lead judgment under
challenge delivered in C.W.P. No. 9060 of 2005. The same
need not, therefore, be set out again except to the extent it is
H absolutely necessary to do so. Suffice it to say that the writ
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 175
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
petitioners-appellants before us are expropriated owners of A
different parcels of land situate in Village Chilla, Tehsil Mohali,
District Ropar, in the State of Punjab an upcoming township
situate on the outskirts of the city of Chandigarh, which has over
the years seen rapid growth as a residential and urban estate.
In the first phase of the expansion of the township sectors 53 B
to 75 were taken up for development under the provisions of
Punjab Urban Estate (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964
and Punjab Housing Development Board Act, 1972; and the
land needed for these sectors acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. c
4. In due course the Government started the process of
acquisition of land for sectors 76 to 80 also with a view to
extending further the urban estate of Mohali. A large extent of
1274 acres of land was notified for acquisition in this phase of
extension and development. The respondents assert that while D
a majority of the land owners did not find fault with the
proceedings, some of the owners representing around 10% of
the total area notified for acquisition, questioned the same, in
writ petitions filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
One of the grounds urged in the said petitions was that unless E
and until a master plan, a regional plan or a town planning
scheme was finalized under the Punjab Regional and Town
Planning and Development Act, 1995 no acquisition of land
could be undertaken by the Government or its agencies. Interim
orders staying the acquisition proceedings were also issued F
by the High Court in the said petitions apart from orders by
which dispossession of the petitioner-owners was stayed.
These orders created serious hurdles for the implementation
of the 2nd phase of the development and extension of Mohali
township. The government was of the view that legal G
impediments in the acquisition of a small percentage of the total
area could not be allowed to adversely affect the entire plan
which was meant to meet the urgent housing requirements of
the people of Punjab. The Government therefore invoked its
powers under Section 178(2) of the Punjab Regional and Town H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 12 S.C.R.
A Planning and Development Act, 1995 and exempted the areas
falling under sectors 76 to 80 from the provisions of Section
14 and those contained in Chapters VIII, IX and XII of the said
Act.]
8 5. The exemption notification referred to above was
challenged by the aggrieved owners in CWP No.29 of 2004
Jasmer Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. which was
dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on 26th
September, 2007. The High Court held that the exercise of
powers vested with the Government under Section 178(2) of
C the Act was neither mala fide nor otherwise vitiated by any
illegality. The High Court noted that Mohali was an existing
township and its development and expansion had been planned
much before the promulgation of the 1995 Act, which
development could be carried out by, if necessary exempting
D the area required for such development from the provision of
the said Act. Exercise of the power of exemption under Section
178 (2) of the 1995 Act was therefore held to be perfectly
justified. The correctness of the view taken by the High Court
was challenged by the writ petitioners before this Court but
E unsuccessfully.
6. Acquisition proceedings for development of sectors 81,
88 and 89 which comprised the third phase of the development
were then initiated by the Collector, Land Acquisition, Mohali.
F While 417.39 acres of land was acquired in sector 81, an area
of 688.89 acres of land was acquired in sectors 88 and 89. A
declaration under Section 6 in relation to the said extent of land
was also issued on 18.1.2005. To ensure that the acquisition
process is free from any impediments the Government once
G again invoked the provisions of Section 178(2) of the Punjab
Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 in
regard to the land notified for development of sectors 81, 88
and 89. A notification dated 10th February, 2004 issued in that
regard exempted the land falling in the said sectors from the
provisions of Section 14 and those contained in Chapters VIII,
H X and XII of the said Act.
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 177
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
7. Aggrieved by the acquisition proceedings the.appellants A
filed writ petitions No. 9060 of 2005 and CWP No. 9083 of
2005 in the High Court challenging the preliminary Notification
and the declaration issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, apart from challenging the vires of Section
23(1) thereof. The writ petitions also assailed the constitutional B
validity of Punjab New Capital (Periphery) Control Act, 1952.
By the lead judgment impugned in these appeals the High
Court repelled the challenge mounted by the writ petitioners and
declared that the notifications under challenge did not suffer
from any illegality whatsoever. It also upheld the constitutional c
validity of the provisions of the Punjab New Capital (Periphery)
Control Act, 1952 and Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act. Hence the present appeals.
8. We may before proceeding any further refer to a few
more facts which have a bearing on the controversy in these D
appeals. The extent of land that remains the subject matter of
these appeals after withdrawal by three of the appellants in C.A.
No. 9924/2007 is limited to just about 20 acres of land out of
a total extent of 417.39 acres notified for acquisition in Sector
81. The respondents have on affidavit stated that owners of E
nearly 96% of the total area acquired by them have already
received the compensation determined in their favour. The
affidavit further states that compensation payable to those who
continue to pursue their challenge to the acquisition in these
appeals has been determined at Rs.5.96 crores + 6.43 crores F
totaling to Rs.12.39 crores.
9. The other aspect that is noteworthy is that out of the total
extent of 417.39 acres acqLTired in Sector 81 c.rn extent of
363.89 acres, stands allotted by the respondents to different G
institutions for them to set up their establishments in what is
described as "Knowledge City" in the State of Punjab. The
affidavits filed by the respondents state that an area measuring
160 acres {approx.) has been allotted/earmarked in favour of
Indian Institute of Science, Education and Research (llSER)
H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A under the Ministry of Human Resources Development,
Government of India, New Delhi. Similarly an area measuring
35 acres (approx.) has been allotted to Institute of Nano
Science and Technology (INST) under the Ministry of Science
and Technology, Govt. of India, New Delhi. An area measuring
B 35 acres has been allotted to National Agro Bio Technology
Institute (NABI) under the Department of Science & Technology,
Govt. of India, New Delhi. For Bio-Processing Unit under the
Department of Science & Technology, Govt. of Punjab an area
measuring 15 acres has been set apart/allotted, while a large
c area measuring 83.89 acres has been earmarked/allotted. to
Bio-Technology Park under the Department of Science &
Technology, Govt. of Punjab. Similarly an area measuring 70
acres has been allotted to Indian School of Business under the
Department of Higher Education, Govt. of Punjab.
D 10. Appearing for the appellants Mr. Gupta learned senior
counsel made a three-fold submission before us. Firstly, he
contended that acquisition of land in terms of the impugned
notifications was illegal in as much as the provisions of Punjab
Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 had
E not been complied with before issuing the said notifications.
He argued that although a notification under Section 56(5) of
the Act is stated to have been issued on 6th March, 2001 the
same was not sufficient to validate the acquisition in as much
as the notification in question was itself invalid having been
F issued without following the procedure prescribed under
Section 56(5) and without affording any opportunity to the land
owners to file their objections.
11. Secondly, he contended that the notification dated 10th
G February, 2004 issued under Section 178 (2) of the Act
whereby the area falling in Sectors 81, 88 and 89 was exempt
from the provisions of Section 14 and Chapters VIII, X and XII
was also illegal and unsustainable. He contended that the
reasons underlying the said notification were not germane to
the exercise of powers reserved in favour of the Govt. by the
- H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 179
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
said provisions. Mr. Gupta urged that the State could not A
exempt an area from the provisions of the Act on the ground
that the 'prospective allottees' would face undue hardship or
that the procedure prescribed under the 1995 Act was
cumbersome and time-consuming.
B
12. It was lastly contended by Mr. Gupta that the lands
acquired from the ownership of the appellants were their only
source of livelihood. Compulsory acquisition thereof without any
provision for rehabilitation of the expropriated owners was not
only constitutionally impermissible but unfair and unreasonable, C
argued the learned counsel. He submitted that realizing the
hardships which the ousted owners face in case agricultural
lands are acquired without an adequate provision for their
rehabilitation the Government has formulated what is called
'Land Pooling Scheme' and circulated the same under
Revenue and Rehabilitation Department's letter dated 5th D
September, 2008. He urged that though the said scheme was
made operative only prospectively, the benefit thereof could be
extended to the appellants also to reduce the hardships which
they would face without adequate measures for their
rehabilitation. It was contended that a large area of nearly 57 E
acres was available with the respondents even at present and
which could be utilized for the rehabilitation of the appellants
by allotting commercial sites in their favour to enable them to
eke out their livelihood.
F
13. On behalf of the respondents it was contended by Mr.
Gopal Subramaniam, that the High Court was justified in
dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. There was,
according to him, no illegality in the notification issued under
the Land Acquisition Act nor was any such point raised before G
the Writ Court or before this Court for that matter. It was
submitted that the notification under Section 56(5) of the Act
had been issued after following the prescribed procedure which
included consideration of the objections received from different
quarters to the declaration of Mohali as a 'Local Planning Area'.
H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A He urged that the petitioner/appellants had not assailed the
validity of the said notification and cannot now be allowed to
do so at this belated stage. So also the validity of the
notification issued under Section 178(2) of the Act
aforementioned was not challenged in the writ petition filed by
B the appellants. Any attempt to challenge the validity of the said
notification at this stage was, therefore, futile.
14. The absence of a challenge apart from the notification
did not, according to Mr. Subramaniam, even otherwise suffer
from any legal infirmity. The Government having applied its mind
C to the question of exemption of the area from the provisions of
the 1995 Act was fully justified in issuing the exemption
notification for good and valid reasons enumerated therein. A
similar notification issued in regard to sectors 76 to 80 was on
analogous grounds assailed before the High Court by the
D landholders in Jasmer Singh v. State of Punjab. The challenge
was repelled by the High Court and even this Court in a further
appeal. The appellants cannot, therefore, find fault with the
notification issued in regard to the adjacent sectors 81, 88 and
89 which gives analogous reasons for exemption to what has
E already been held to be both relevant and adequate, in Jasmer
Singh's case.
15. As regards the question of rehabilitation of the
expropriated land owners, Mr. Subramaniam, submitted that
F rehabilitation was not a recognized right either under the
Constitution or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
Any beneficial measures taken by the Government are,
therefore, guided only by humanitarian considerations of
fairness and equity towards the land owners. The benefit of such
G measures is however subject to the satisfaction of all such
conditions as may be stipulated by the Government in regard
thereto. The policy relied upon by the appellants being only
prospective cannot be made retrospective by a judicial order
to cover acquisitions that have since long been finalized. Mr.
Subramaniam contended that although the appellants/owners
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 181
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
have been adequately compensated for the land acquired from A
their ownership by paying them handsome compensation, yet
the State would not oppose any direction for a reference to the
Civil Court for determination of reasonable compensation to the
appellants, if they are otherwise dissatisfied with the amount
determined in their favour. B
16. The following questions fall for our determination:
(1) Whether the exemption of the land under acquisition
from the provisions of Section 14 and Chapters VIII, X and
XII of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and C
Development Act, 1995 in terms of notification dated 10th
February, 2004 issued under Section 178(2) of the said
Act suffers from any legal infirmity?
(2) If the answer to question No.1 be in the affirmative D
whether the acquisition under challenge is rendered bad
for non-compliance with the provisions of the Act
aforementioned; and
(3) Whether the absence of any rehabilitation measures
renders the acquisition in question legally bad. If not, E
whether the 'Land Pooling Scheme' can be made
applicable to the acquisition of the land acquired from the
appellants.
We shall deal with the questions ad seriatim. F
Re: Question No.1
17. We may before dealing with this question on its merits,
point out that notification dated 10th February, 2004 granting
exemption was never challenged in the writ petitions filed by G
the appellants. There is no foundation laid in the petitions by
the appellants for them to contend that the exemption notification
was vitiated either because of lack of authority or misdirection
by the Government in exercise of its power under Section
178(2) of the Town Planning & Development Act 1995. The High H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A Court has noticed this aspect in the following paragraph of its
judgment:
"Still further, since the factual situation with regard to the
issuance of the notification under section 178 of the 1995
Act granting exemption from the application of provisions
B
of the 1995 Act is admitted by the petitioners it is not open
to them to challenge the acquisition on the ground that
there is violation of the 1995 Act, without at least laying
challenge to the notification granting exemption."
C 18. In the light of the above we find it difficult to appreciate
how the issue regarding the validity of the exemption granted
by the Government could be raised by the writ petitioners
before the High Court or argued impromptu by the appellants
before us. Any attempt to raise the question regarding validity
D of the exemption notification must therefore fail on that ground
alone. Since, however, Mr. Gupta took great pains to make his
submissions on the subject we may as well deal with the same.
19. Section 178 of Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
E Development Act, 1995 deals with exemptions and may be
extracted:
"Section 178:
EXEMPTION :- (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to the
F operational constructions.
(2) Where the State Government is of the opinion that
operation of any of the provisions of this Act causes any
undue hardship or circumstances exist which render it
expedient so to do, it may, subject to such terms and
G
conditions as it may impose, by general or special order,
exempt class or persons or areas from all or any of the
provisions of the Act."
20. A plain reading of sub-section (2) above would show
H that the State Government is empowered to exempt any class
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 183
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
of persons or areas from all or any of the provisions of the Act A
in cases where in the opinion of the State Government the
operation of any such provisions would either cause undue
hardship or the grant of exemption is otherwise expedient.
According to the respondents the power to exempt was in the
present case exercised by the Government not only because B
it was expedient to do so, but also because it was necessary
to avoid hardship to the allottees. The notification sets out the
circumstances in which the exercise of power was found
necessary by the Government. It states that SAS Nagar (Mohali)
was planned to include sectors 53 to 81 long before the coming c
into force of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Act, 1995. Sectors 53 to 75 were developed in
the first phase after acquiring the land required for the same
under the Land Acquisition Act. This was followed by
acquisition of land for sectors 76 to 80 which further extended D
the township to meet the ever increasing housing needs of the
people of Punjab.
21. The exemption notification then refers to a decision
taken in a meeting held on 25th August, 1995 whereunder the
existing township was to be further extended by addition of a E
few more sectors. Sectors 80, 81, 88 and 89 were in pursuance
of the said decision taken up for development after obtaining
approval of the competent authority. A preliminary Notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act proposed an area
of 417.39 acres in sector 81 and 688.89 acres in sectors 88 F
and 89 for acquisition.
22. The exemption notification goes on to state that
acquisition of land for sectors 76 to 80 started by the
Government was challenged by the landowners mainly on the
ground that the provisions'of the Town Planning & Development G
Act, 1995 were not complied with. The High Court of Punjab
and Haryana had in these petitions stayed the dispossession
of the owners while granting liberty to the respondents to
proceed with the matter subject to the final orders of the Court.
H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A The notification finally makes a reference to the fact that Mohali
has recorded the highest rate of growth of population of Class
I cities giving rise to considerable increase in the demand for
housing, in turn giving rise to haphazard development in the area
if planned development of the sectors in question is not
s immediately taken up and plots made available to the allottees.
The Government was, in the above backdrop, of the opinion
that it was expedient to exempt the areas falling in sectors 81,
88 and 89 from the operation of Section 14 and those
contained in Chapters VIII, X and XII of Punjab Regional and
C Town Planning and Development Act, 1995. It was also of the
opinion that the prospective allottees would suffer hardship in
case the Government does not grant exemption to the areas
falling in the above sectors from the provisions referred to
above.
D 23. The operative portion of the exemption notification
reads:
"In exercise of the powers conferred upon the State
Government under Section 178(2) of the Punjab Regional
E and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 and
keeping in view larger public interest and planned
development of the area, the State Government hereby
exempts the areas falling under Sector 81, 88 and 89
being developed as expansion of existing township of SAS
F Nagar (Mohali) from the operation of provisions of Section
14 and consequently of the uncomplied provisions in
Chapter VIII, X and XII, i.e. Section 56 to 60, 70 to 78 and
91 to 138 of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Act, 1995."
G 24. None of the circumstances referred to above is, in our
opinion, irrelevant or extraneous to the exercise of the power
of exemption vested in the Government under Section 178(2)
of the Act. What is significant is that Mohali was identified for
planned development by addition of sectors 53 to 81 even
H before the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 185
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Development Act, 1995 came into force. The proposed A
development was to be carried out under the provisions of
Punjab Urban Estate (Development and Regulation) Act, 1964
and Punjab Housing Development Board Act, 1972. It is true
that initially the plan was limited to the addition of sectors 53
to 81 but the third phase with which we are concerned B
comprised not only development of sector 81 which was a part
of the original plan but also included sectors 88 and 89.
25. It is also evident from the notification that compliance
with the provisions of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning C
and Development Act, 1995 was found to be impracticable
primarily because of the tremendous pressure on land in and
around Mohali for housing purposes especially because the
township has witnessed phenomenal growth over the years. The
notification in our opinion rightly stated that if immediate steps
were not taken to develop the outskirts of the township it would D
lead to large scale unplanned and haphazard mushrooming of
housing colonies and commercial establishments in the area.
Delay in the finalization of the outline Master Plan,
comprehensive master plan and a town planning scheme thus
had the potential of frustrating the very purpose underlying the E
legislation that is aimed at better planning, regulation,
development and use of land in the planning areas. The
Government was in that view well within its power to evaluate
the options available to it, making a choice and taking
appropriate action to prevent any such disorganized and F
haphazard development. In as much as the Government did so
and decided to invoke its powers under Section 178(2) of the
Act, it committed no illegality. On the contrary, the Government
has by taking timely action prevented a situation where the area
around the township of Mohali would have on account of G
tremendous pressure for conversion of land to non-agricultural
use developed into a large slum as is the bane of many other
cities in the country where statutory authorities charged with
duties of urban development have failed to keep pace with the
housing needs of the populace. It is noteworthy that the H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A Government had prevented such haphazard and unplanned
development even in sectors 76 to 80 by exempting the land
falling in the said sectors from the operation of the provisions
of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development
Act, 1995. The said exemption was assailed by the land owners
B but upheld not only by the High Court but even by this Court in
appeal. That, the power of exemption could be exercised in
situations similar to the one in hand thus stands amply
established.
26. The contention of Mr. Gupta that just because the
C formulation of master plans and town planning schemes takes
time cannot be a good ground for the Government to grant
exemption from the operation of the statutory provisions may
be unexceptionable for the law must be allowed to take its
course howsoever cumbersome and time-consuming the
D process may be. But it is not the cumbersome and time-
consuming process alone that has led to the issue of the
exemption notification. It was a realistic assessment of the
ground realities requiring urgent action that made adherence
to the letter of law impracticable. The Government was of the
E opinion that failure to take immediate action for developing
these sectors will lead to unplanned and haphazard construction
activities in the area. It was the cumulative effect of all the
circumstances referred to in the notification that led to the issue
of the exemption notification.
F
27. We need to remember that Section 178(2) empowers
the Government to grant exemption from the operation of the
Act on the twin grounds of hardship and expediency. For the
Government to exercise its power of exemption on the ground
G of expediency two requirements must be satisfied viz. (i) that
circumstances exist which render it expedient to grant the
exemption & (ii) the Government upon a consideration of those
circumstances forms an opinion that it is expedient to do so.
The latter requirement is more in the nature of a subjective
H satisfaction of the Government while the former is dependant
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 187
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
on objective consideration of the circumstances that are A
germane. Once the existence of circumstances that are relevant
to the exercise of the power of exemption are found to exist
the formation of the opinion by the Government about the
expediency .of granting an exemption is a matter on which the
Court would be slow to interfere unless the decision is shown B
to be a colourable exercise or vitiated by any extraneous
motive or consideration. The term 'expedient' appearing in
Section 178 of the Act has not been defined. Black's Law
Dictionary, however, assigns the expression 'expedient' the
following meaning: c
"Appropriate and suitable to the end in view -Whatever is
suitable and appropriate in reasons for the
accomplishment of a specified object."
28. The term 'expedient' has fallen for interpretation before D
this Court in several cases. In the State of Gujarat v. Jamnadas
G. Pabri and Ors. (1975) 1 SCC 138 this Court was
interpreting the provisions of Section 303A of the Panchayats
Act as amended by Gujarat Panchayats (Amendment) Act 8
of 1974. The question was whether satisfaction of the State E
Government as to the expediency of holding elections for the
reconstitution of a Panchayat was amenable to judicial review.
Sarkaria J. speaking for the Court observed:
" .. "'.°': .. An analysis of Section 303-A(1) would show that
F
before a declaration referred to in that sub-section can be
made, two requirements must be fulfilled: (1) existence of
a situation by reason of disturbances in the whole or any
part of the State; (2) the satisfaction of the State
Government relatable to such a situation, that it is not
expedient to hold elections for the reconstitution of a G
Panchayat on the expiry of its term. The first requirement
is an objective fact and the second is an opinion or
inference drawn from that fact. The first requirement, if
disputed, must be established objectively as a condition
precedent to the exercise of the power. The second is a H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and is
not justiciable. Once a reasonable nexus between such
satisfaction and the facts constituting the first requirement
is shown, the exercise of the power by the Government,
not being colourable or motivated by extraneous
B considerations, is not open to judicial review. Thus the
question that could be objectively considered by the Court
in this case was: Did a situation arising out of disturbances
exist in the State of Gujarat on the date of the impugned
notification?"
c Dealing with the word 'expedient' appearing in Section
303A this Court observed:
"....... Again, the word "expedient" used in this provision, ·
has several shades of meaning. In one dictionary sense,
D "expedient" (adj.) means "apt and suitable to the end in
view", "practical and efficient"; "politic"; "profitable";
"advisable", "fit, proper and suitable to the circumstances
of the case". In another shade, it means a device
"characterised by mere utility rather than principle,
E conducive to special advantage rather than to what is
universally right" (see Webster's New International
Dictionary)."
The Court declared that Section 303A had been designed to
enable the Government to get over a difficult situation
F surcharged with dangerous potentialities, and that the Court
must construe the aforesaid phrases in keeping with the context
and object of the provision in their widest amplitude.
29. In Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82
G this Court had another opportunity to interpret the term
'expedient' appearing in Section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958. The Court held that the word is to be
interpreted keeping in view the context and the object of the
provisions in widest amplitude, and that while dealing with the
H question of grant of probation under the Act a duty was cast
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 189
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
on the Court to take into account the circumstances of the A
case including the nature of the offence and form an opinion
whether it is suitable and appropriate for accomplishing a
specified object that the offender can be released on probation
of good conduct.
B
30. Power of exemption reserved in favour of Government
under Section 178 of the Town Planning and Development
Act, 1995 is also intended to relieve hardship arising from the
operation of the Act. It is intended to enable the Government
to deal with situations in which circumstances independent of C
the question of hardship render it expedient to do so by
granting exemption. A liberal construction has, _therefore, to
be placed upon the provisions of Section 178(2) so that
exercise of power for good and bona fide reasons is not
defeated.
' i D
31. In the totality of the above circumstances we ansvyer
question No.1 in the negative. We need to remember that
nearly 96% of the landowners have already accepted the
compensation and either accepted the acquisition
proceedings or given up the challenge to the validity thereof. E
So also the fact that allotments in favour of different institutions
have already been made cannot be ignored nor can a
prestigious project like the one at hand be scuttled at this
stage.
Re: Question No.2 F
32. In the light of what we have said while dealing with
question no.1 above, we consider it unnecessary to discuss
in detail the merits of the contentions urged by the learned
counsel for the parties in regard to this question. We say so G
because once the exemption granted by the Government to
the land falling in sectors 81, 88 and 89 is upheld the question
of striking down the land acquisition proceedings on the
.ground that the provisions of the 1995 Act were not complied
with does not survive. It is important to note that the validity of H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A the acquisition proceedings have not been challenged on any
ground that may have been available to the appellants by
reference to the Land Acquisition Act. Neither before the High
Court nor before us was it argued that the provisions of the
Land Acquisition Act were not followed in letter and spirit,
B while acquiring the land in question. All that Mr. Gupta argued
was that the case at hand was covered by the decision of this
Court in Sanjeet Singh's case (supra). We have carefully gone
through that decision but find the same to be clearly
distinguishable. That was a case where the Government had
c issued notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act for the public purpose of setting up of a new township of
Anandgarh. Several writ petitions filed before the High Court
challenged the said notifications alleging that the same had
been issued in violation of Punjab Regional and Town Planning
D and Development Act, 1995. One of the arguments that was
urged was that the site for setting up of a new town had to be
first selected by the Board constituted under the Act
aforementioned and since no such selection process had been
undertaken by the Board the entire process of acquisition was
E vitiated. The High Court accepted that contention and quashed
the notifications holding that the selection of the site itself not
being in accordance with the 1995 Act, acquisition based on
any such selection was not legally permissible. In an appeal
filed by the State of Punjab before this Court the question
whether the site for a new township could be selected by the
F Government or by the Town Planning Authority was debated at
length. This Court affirmed the view taken by the High Court
and observed:
"In the instant case the provisions of Section 56 were
G completely ignored and without declaring the planning area
by notification in the Official Gazette, and without following
the procedure laid down therein. In the instant case, the
State never called upon the Board to select a site, and
instead a New Town Planning and Development Authority
H was constituted under Section 31 of the Act which
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 191
ORS. [TS. THAKUR, J.]
arrogated to itself the powers and functions of the Board A
to select a site and make a recommendation to the State
Government, and later moved the Government for
acquisition of land under Section 42 of the Act. All these
actions were in complete breach of the mandatory
provisions of Section 56 of the Act, and therefore void. B
Hence it is held that the declaration of the planning
area, a site for a new town, was never validly made by the
competent authority after following the prescribed
procedure and, therefore, there was in law no validly
selected site for a new town, nor a validly declared planning C
area. Consequently, there was no justification for
acquisition of land to set up a new town. The public
purpose stated in the impugned notifications was non-
existent in view of the fact that there was no planning area
validly declared by the competent authority for the D
development of which any land was required. Section 42
which provided for acquisition of land under the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act could not, therefore, be
invoked."
E
33. The facts in the present case are totally different. In the
case at hand we are not dealing with the establishment of new
city or township. We are also not dealing with a case where a
request for acquisition of land is made by the Town Planning
Authority under Section 42 of the Act. We are on the contrary F
dealing with a case where the acquisition is being made on
the basis of an expansion plan formulated before the 1995 Act
came into force.
34. That apart, unlike the case of Sanjeet Singh's the land
under acquisition in these cases is covered by a notification G
under Section 56(5) of the 1995 Act, which declares SAS
Nagar (Mohali) as a local planning area. The relevant part of
the notification is in the following words:
H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 12 S.C.R.
A "Punjab Government
Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development
Board
NOTIFICATION
B
Dated 06.03.2000
No.12/2/2000-4MU. 1/732 For the organized development
of Sahibzada Ajit Singh Nagar (SAS Nagar) by formulation
of a Master Plan, the Punjab Regional and Town Planning
c and Development Board had under Section 56(1) of
Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act,
1995 issued notification no. 6/21 /95-4mu-1 /3030 dated
01.07.1996 alongwith Drawing no. DTP (SAS Nagar)
1148/96 dated 07.04.1996 for the proposed declaration
D of the dame as a Notified planning area.
As per the above notice published under Section
56(4) of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Act, 1995, objections and suggestions from
E any person, State government or any department of Central
Government or local authority, or any other representative
of any other organization on the same. Written objectins
or suggestions could be raised on any part of the
notification for declaring local planning area, within 60
F days from the date of publication of the Notification on any
aspect of the matter to the Member/Secy. Punjab Regional
and Town Planning and Development Board, SCO 63-64,
Sector 17-C, Chandigarh.
In the meeting of Committee dated 16th October,
G 1998 which had been constituted for the scrutiny of
objections and suggestions so received to the above
Notification, were analyzed and considered. It was felt by
the Committee that all the objections and suggestions were
frivolous and as such they should be rejected. Accordingly
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 193
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
the Committee recommend to Regional Town Planning and A
Development Board that the Board may reject the
suggestions and objections which has been raised and
declare the same as a local planning area under Section
56(5) of Act.
B
The Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Board in its Meeting held on 15th
November, 1999 at Chandigarh approved the
recommendation Committee after considering the same.
The Board also rejected the objections and suggestions · C
received relating to the declaration of Local Planning Area,
SAS Nagar. The Board under Section 56(5)(a) and (b) of
the above Act also granted approval for the declaration of
the same as a local planning area as also the name it local
planning area SAS Nagar.
D
The Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Board in accordance with the above
mentioned decision declares the local planning area SAS
Nagar under Section 56(a)&(b) in consonance with Punjab
Regional and Town Planning and Development Act 1995. E
It shall be named as Local Planning Area SAS Nagar. The
boundaries of the local planning are as under."
35. It is manifest that the above gave a sufficient basis for
the Government to initiate proceedings for the acquisition of F
land needed for the proper expansion of the township.
36. A feeble attempt was made by learned counsel for the
appellants to assail the validity of the notification. It was
submitted that the same had been issued without notice to the
landowners and others to file their objections. We, however, see G
no merit in that contention either. It is noteworthy that the
notification in question was not assailed before the High Court
in the writ petitions filed by the appellants. It is not, therefore,
open to the petitioner to argue that the notification suffered from
any illegality. No factual foundation having been laid in the writ H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A petition we have no hesitation in rejecting the contention that
notification was issued without following the procedure
prescribed for the purpose and without considering the
objections received from different quarters. We may recall that
in Jasmer Singh' case (supra) the High Court had distinguished
B acquisitions for a new town from those meant for the extension
of the existing township of Mohali and held that Sanjeet Singh's
case (supra) had no application to the later case. That view was
affirmed by this Court in appeal and the acquisition for
extension of Mohali upheld.
c 37. Question no.2 is also, in the light of the above,
answered in the negative.
Re: Question No 3.
0 38. Article 300-A of the Constitution rests on the doctrine
of eminent domain and guarantees a constitutional right against
deprivation of property save by authority of law. It mandates that
to be valid the deprivation of property must be by authority of
law. That such deprivation in the present case is by the authority
E of law was not disputed, for it is common ground that the
property owned by the appellants has been acquired in terms
of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is a
validly enacted piece of legislation. It is also not in dispute that
the provisions of Land Acquisition Act invoked by the State for
the acquisition under challenge provides for payment of
F compensation equivalent to the market value of the property as
on the date of the preliminary notification apart from other
benefits like solatium for the compulsory nature of the
acquisition, additional compensation and interest etc. The sum
total of all these amounts undoubtedly constitutes a reasonable
G compensation"for the land acquired from the expropriated
owners. Neither Article 300-A of the Constitution nor the Land
Acquisition Act make any measures for rehabilitation of the
expropriated owners a condition precedent for compulsory
acquisition of land. In the absence of any such obligation arising
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 195
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
either under Article 300-A or under any other statutory provision, A
rehabilitation of the owners cannot be treated as an essential
requirement for a valid acquisition of property. We must, in
fairness to Mr. Gupta mention that he did not suggest that
rehabilitation of the oustees was an essential part of any
process of compulsory acquisition so as to render iilegal any B
acquisition that is not accompanied by such measure. He did
not pitch his case that high and in our opinion rightly so. The
decisions of this Court in New Reviera Coop Housing Society
and Anr. v. Spebial Land Acquisition Officer and Ors. 1996
(1) SCC 731 and Ctiameli Singh and Ors. v. State of UP. and c
Anr. 1996 (2) SCC 549 have repelled the contention that
rehabilitation of the property owners is a part of the right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution so as to render
any compulsory acquisition for public purpose bad for want of
any such measures. In New Reviera's case (supra) this Court
0
held that if the State comes forward with a proposal to provide
alternative sites to the owners, the Court can give effect to any
such proposal by issuing appropriate directions in that behalf.
But a provision for alternative sites cannot be made a condition
precedent for every acquisition of land. In Chameli Singh's case
(supra) also the Court held that acquisitions are made in E
exercise of power of eminent domain for public purpose, and
that individual right of ownership over land must yield place to
the larger public good. That acquisition in accordance with the
procedure sanctioned by law is a valid exercise of power
vested in the State hence cannot be taken to deprive the right F
to livelihood especially when compensation is paid for the
acquired land at the rates prevailing on the date of publication
of the preliminary notification. There is thus no gainsaying that
rehabilitation is not an essential requirement of law for any
compulsory acquisition nor can acquisition made for a public G
purpose and in accordance with the procedure established by
law upon payment of compensation that is fair and reasonable
be assailed on the ground that any such acquisition violates the
right to livelihood of the owners who may be dependant on the
land being acquired from them. H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A 39. What Mr. Gupta contended was that the State
Government had formulated a Land Pooling Scheme for
rehabilitation of the oustees, benefit whereof could be extended
to the appellants. He urged that the policy formulated by the
State was in consonance with the observations made by this
s Court in Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development
Authority and Others where this Court had clearly recognized
the need for taking corrective measures to reduce the hardship
which the landowners suffer on account of absence of any
ameliorative schemes. He urged that while the scheme already
c framed substantially conforms to what this Court has suggested
in the above judgment, the same is prospective in its operation.
This Court could, argued the learned counsel, make the scheme
applicable to the appellants specially when the respondents are
in a position to give redress to the appellants by allotting
residential and commercial sites in other sectors developed in
0
and around Mohali.
40. In Bondu Ramaswamy's case relied upon by Mr.
Gupta this Court noted the frequent complaints and grievances
made in regard to the prevailing system of acquisition
E governed by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. One of the areas
in which this Court noticed dissatisfaction among the
landowners is the absence of any rehabilitatory measures. This
Court noted that several avenues for providing rehabilitation
and economic security to landowners were available such as
F provision for employment, allotment of alternative lands, housing
and safe opportunities for investment of compensation amount
to generate stable income. The acquisitions were for that
purpose classified by this Court into the following three
categories:
G
(i) Acquisitions for the benefit of the general
public or in national interest. This will include
acquisitions for roads, bridges, water supply
projects, power projects, defence
establishments, residential colonies for
H
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 197
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
rehabilitation of victims of natural calamities. A
(ii) Acquisitions for economic development and
industrial growth. This will include acquisitions
for Industrial Layouts/Zones, corporations
owned or controlled by the State, expansion 8
of existing industries, and setting up Special
Economic Zones.
(iii) Acquisitions for planned development of
urban areas. This will include acquisitions for
formation of residential layouts and C
construction of apartment blocks, for
allotment to urban middle class and urban
poor, rural poor etc.
41. The Court observed that in order to ensure a smooth o
and litigation-free acquisition, beneficial to all concerned it was
necessary to evolve tailor-made schemes to make acquisitions
more acceptable to the landowners. This Court observed:
"In the preceding para, we have touched upon matters that
may be considered to be in the realm of government policy. E
We have referred to them as acquisition of lands affect the
vital rights of farmers and give rise to considerable
litigations and agitations. Our suggestions and
observations are intended to draw attention of the
government and development authorities to some probable F
solutions to the vexed problems associated with land
acquisition, existence of which can neither be denied nor
disputed, and to alleviate the hardships of the land owners.
It may be possible for the government and development
authorities to come up with better solutions. There is also G
a need for the Law Commission and the Parliament to
revisit the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is more than
a century old. There is also a need to remind Development
Authorities that they exist to serve the people and not vice
versa. We have come across development authorities H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A which resort to 'developmental activities' by acquiring
lands and forming layouts, not with the goal of achieving
planned development or provide plots at reasonable costs
in well formed layouts, but to provide work to their
employees and generate funds for payment of salaries.
B Any development scheme should be to benefit the society
and improve the city, and not to benefit the development
authority. Be that as it may."
42. To the credit of the State of Punjab we must say that it
has formulated a Land Pooling Scheme which is owner~friendly
C and provides greater incentives for the owners to readily give
up their lands whenever the same are needed for a public
purpose. Difficulty, however, arises on account of the fact that
the scheme formulated and circulated by the Government in
terms of its letter dated 5th September, 2008 is only prospective
D in its operation. The scheme envisages a kind of public-private
partnership in the development of areas involving acquisition
of large extents of land. Not only that in order that the scheme
works effectively the authorities for whom acquisition is being
made will have to take a broader initiative at the appropriate
E stage to make provision for allocation to the owners of what is
due to them under the scheme. This can be done only when
an acquisition is tailored according to the scheme. The scheme
cannot be introduced after the acquisition and even allotment
process is over. A mechanical extension of the scheme to
F acquisitions that have since become final cannot help. Any such
attempt would be a potential recipe for considerable confusion_
and resultant litigation. In the completed acquisitions no
provision regarding allocation to be made to the owners has
been made. It is also not, in our opinion, feasible at this point
G of time to super impose the Land Pooling Scheme on the
acquisition under challenge and make a provision for allocation
to the owners in the sectors that are under development or those
that have already been developed. The extent of area available
in other sectors for such allotment and allocation is itself a
H matter regarding which there is no material before us. That
AMARJIT SINGH & ORS. v. STATE OF PUNJAB & 199
ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
apart even when the number of appellants before us is limited, A
any direction for rehabilitation based on a retrospective
operation of the scheme would deprive owners of the benefit
of such scheme only on account of their acceptance of the
acquisition proceedings. Last but not the least is the fact that
the observations made in Bondu Ramaswamy's case B
regarding the desirability of providing for rehabilitatory
measures, may not strict sense apply in the present case where
. the acquisition in question has been made for setting up a
knowledge city in sector 81 of SAS Nagar (Mohali) in public
and indeed national interest. The argument that this Court could c
confine the benefit of retrospective application of the scheme
to the appellants only has not for all these reasons appealed
to us.
43. Mr. Gopal Sybramaniam, hoY{ever, fairly submitted that
the State Government would have no objection to the appellants D
before us being relegated to a reference to the Civil Court for
determination of the compensation due to them since others
who have not challenged the acquisition have secured such
references. He urged that although no applications have been
made by the appellants seeking reference to the Civil Court for E
determination of this just compensation due to them, and
although the time period within which such applications could
be made has expired the respondent would have no objection
to the petitioners being permitted to make such applications
and direct that on such applications being made the Collector F
shall make a reference to the Civil Court for determination of
the compensation payable to the owners. That is, in our opinion,
a reasonable offer which would ensure that the applicants do
not suffer on account of the pending litigation, or their failure to
make applications within the time available to them. . G
44. In the result while we answer question No.3 in the
negative and consequently dismiss these appeals, we direct
that if the appellants make applications under Section 18 of the
Land Acquisition Act for reference of their claims for higher
compensation before the concerned Collector Land Acquisition H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 12 S.C.R.
A within a period of six weeks from today the Collector shall make
a reference to the competent Civil Court for determination of
the compensation payable to the appellants. The Reference
Court shall on receipt of the reference expedite the disposal
of the same. No costs.
B
K.K.T Appeals dismissed.
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