AMRESH SHRIVASTAVAversusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS.

                  [2025] 4 S.C.R. 488 : 2025 INSC 417

                         Amresh Shrivastava
                                 v.
                 The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
                     (Civil Appeal No. 10590 of 2024)
                                01 April 2025
           [Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Dispute arose as to whether the power exercised by Appellant
       in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing a Land Settlement
       Order- a quasi-judicial order u/s.57(2) of Madhya Pradesh Land
       Revenue Code, 1959, could be considered of a nature that would
       warrant disciplinary proceedings against him. The questions for
       consideration were (i) whether the chargesheet issued to appellant
       by Respondent-State fell within the scope of observations carved
       out by this Court in K.K. Dhawan case; and (ii) Whether inordinate
       unexplained delay in issuance of the chargesheet (in this case
       14 years) was in itself a ground for quashing the chargesheet
       issued to the appellant.

                                 Headnotes†
       Disciplinary proceedings – Against Revenue Officer – For
       wrongful quasi-judicial order – Disciplinary proceedings,
       if warranted – Inordinate unexplained delay in issuance of
       chargesheet – Effect of – Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
       Code, 1959 – Judges Protection Act, 1985:
       Held: In K.K. Dhawan case, this Court carved out six situations
       where the government is not precluded from taking disciplinary
       actions for violation of the Code of Conduct; and further observed
       that mere technical violations or the fact that an order is wrong,
       if not falling under the said six enumerated instances, does not
       warrant disciplinary actions – The enumerated instances are
       however only a guide and not meant to be mandatorily adhere
       to without exception – In the present case, the charges alleged
       against the Appellant in the chargesheet fall under the category
       of a wrongful order, which does not appear to have been
       influenced by extraneous factors or any form of gratification – It

* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                              489

      Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.


     appears that the order has been passed in good faith, without any
     indication of dishonesty – The power exercised by the Appellant
     in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the order of Land
     Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that would
     warrant disciplinary proceedings against him – As to the second
     question, regarding whether delay is a ground for stopping the
     departmental proceedings at the stage of the chargesheet itself,
     suffice it to say that this varies from case to case – However, in
     the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in
     initiating departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct
     being within the knowledge of the department, but still no
     departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go in
     favour of the employee – However, there may be cases where
     the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the
     misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based
     on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as
     extraneous influences and gratifications – In such cases, such a
     delay, by itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation
     of the process of departmental proceedings. [Paras 15, 16, 17]

                              Case Law Cited
     Union of India and others v. K.K. Dhawan [1993] 1 SCR 296 :
     (1993) 2 SCC 56; Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India
     and Others [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 87 : (1999) 7 SCC 409; Krishna
     Prasad Verma through Lrs. v. State of Bihar and Others [2019] 12
     SCR 861 : (2019) 10 SCC 640; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani
     Singh and Another (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 738; P.V. Mahadevan v.
     MD, T.N. Housing Board [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 474 : (2005) 6 SCC
     636 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Judges Protection Act, 1985; Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue
     Code, 1959.

                              List of Keywords
     Tehsildar; Quasi-judicial order; Land settlement; Chargesheet;
     Unexplained delay; Disciplinary action; Negligent acts; Undue
     favour; Malafides; Extraneous influence; Incorrect quasi-judicial
     orders.
490                                                           [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10590 of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 30.04.2019 in WA No. 212
       of 2018 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       Devadutt Kamat, Sr. Adv., Arjun Garg, Abhinav Shrivastava, Aakash
       Nandolia, Ms. Kriti Gupta, Ms. Sagun Shrivastava, Shivang Rawat,
       Ms. Amrita Kumari.
       Advs. for the Respondents:
       Bhupendra Pratap Singh, D.A.G., Sarad Kumar Singhania, Amit
       Sharma, Sunny Choudhary.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       Augustine George Masih, J.

1.     This appeal challenges the judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by
       the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at
       Gwalior (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) whereby
       the High Court allowed the Writ Appeal filed by the Respondents,
       reversing the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 26.04.2017,
       which quashed the chargesheet dated 29.04.2011 issued to
       the Appellant. As a result, the disciplinary proceedings and the
       chargesheet were revived.
2.     Facts in instant case are that the Appellant was appointed as
       Naib Tehsildar on 15.06.1981 and was promoted to Tehsildar on
       31.12.1991. Between July 1993 and September 1998, he was posted
       as Tehsildar in Gwalior district, where he performed various functions,
       including quasi-judicial duties. An application filed by Kuber Singh and
       Madho Singh, sons of Suraj Singh for settlement of land measuring
       1.500 Hect. of survey no. 1123/Min-3 situated in Village Barua. After
       issuing notice, no objections were received. The gram panchayat was
       consulted and passed a resolution stating that the applicants were
       cultivating the land and had no objections to the settlement in their
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                         491

      Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.


     favour. Following the procedure as prescribed under the rules as
     also the statement of the Patwari, the said application was allowed
     subject to certain conditions. Appellant as a quasi-judicial authority
     passed a land settlement order dated 26.06.1997. The said order
     was not challenged and the same attained finality.
3.   After a significant delay, a Show Cause Notice dated 21.09.2009 was
     issued to the Appellant by the Collector of District Gwalior. The notice
     alleged that the land settlement was granted to ineligible persons
     in an illegal manner, contrary to the rules. It further stated that the
     mutation order led to the land being sold, which originally vested in
     the State Government, causing undue benefit to the parties due to
     negligence and carelessness in duty.
     3.1 Subsequently, Chargesheet dated 29.04.2011 was issued to
         the Appellant by the Commissioner, Gwalior stating that he had
         executed the land settlement in Survey No. 1123/min-3 illegally,
         which was indicative of dishonesty.
4.   When the chargesheet was issued to him after 13 years, the Appellant
     challenged it by filing Writ Petition No. 7114/2011 before the High
     Court of Madhya Pradesh on 19.10.2011, seeking protection under
     the provisions of the Judges Protection Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred
     to as “JPA 1985”). He asserted that he had exercised his powers
     under Section 57(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,
     1959. He argued that the Orders were issued in exercise of quasi-
     judicial functions. He further contended that inordinate delay, without
     any conclusion of extraneous influence or misconduct, should bar
     departmental proceedings.
5.   The learned Single Judge decided the Writ in favour of the Appellant,
     quashing the chargesheet and setting aside the disciplinary
     proceedings initiated solely on the ground of delay, with their being
     no explanation thereto for such delay.
6.   Assailing the order passed by learned Single Judge. The Respondent
     No.1 (hereinafter referred to as “respondent-State”) preferred a Writ
     Appeal, which was allowed. The Division Bench while allowing the
     appeal, held that an officer who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
     powers exercising negligently or recklessly, or in order to confer
     undue favour on a person, is not acting as a judge. In situations
     where a government officer acts negligently or fails to meet the
492                                                          [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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       prescribed conditions essential for exercising statutory powers,
       thereby conferring undue favor on a party and compromising their
       reputation for integrity, good faith, or devotion to duty, departmental
       proceedings can be initiated if disciplinary action is not taken for
       violating the conduct rules.
       6.1 The Division Bench relied on the decision of this Court in Union
           of India and others vs. K.K. Dhawan.1 Consequently, the Order
           of the Single Judge was set aside, reviving the chargesheet,
           while also directing for the completion of the departmental
           inquiry expeditiously.
7.     Learned Senior Advocate and Counsels for the Appellant assailed
       the Impugned Judgment on the ground that the chargesheet issued
       against the Appellant would not fall within the ambit and scope of
       the decision in K.K. Dhawan (supra) which was relied on by the
       Division Bench for setting aside the order passed by the learned
       Single Judge. He contended that the Respondent-State’s allegations
       in the Show Cause Notice and Chargesheet merely suggested that
       the order was wrong and not in accordance with law. There were no
       allegations of extraneous influence, bribery, or gratification.
8.     To substantiate his argument, the Appellant relied upon the decision of
       this Court in Virendra Kumar Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh &
       Others, wherein a revenue officer in similar facts and circumstances
       from the State of Madhya Pradesh was made to face departmental
       proceedings after an inordinate delay against an order passed by
       him in exercise of his powers as a Tehsildar.
       8.1 This Court had ruled that in absence of allegations of extraneous
           influence, departmental proceedings should not be initiated
           merely because a quasi-judicial order was incorrect.
       8.2 The Appellant on this basis, submits that the charges against
           the said officer were similar to those made against the Appellant
           and also the stand taken by the Respondents before the High
           Court, the judgment of this Court would apply in full force.
9.     Further reliance was also placed upon the judgment of this Court
       in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India and Others,2


1    (1993) 2 SCC 56
2    (1999) 7 SCC 409
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                       493

       Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.


     where this Court had held the quasi-judicial officer’s error in
     judgment does not automatically imply misconduct or favouritism.
     Disciplinary action requires clear evidence of extraneous influence
     beyond mere legal mistakes to avoid undermining judicial
     independence. Similarly, in case of Krishna Prasad Verma through
     Lrs. vs. State of Bihar and Others,3 this Court clarified that while
     wrong orders by judicial officers should not automatically lead to
     disciplinary action unless there are allegations of misconduct based
     on extraneous influences. The remedy under such circumstances
     would be available to the parties concerned to avail all the remedies
     available under law. It was further reiterated that unless there
     are clear cut allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences,
     gratification of any kind etc., disciplinary proceedings should not
     be initiated merely on the basis that a wrong order has been
     passed by the judicial officer or merely on the ground that the
     judicial order is incorrect.
10. Counsel for the Appellant argues that the 14 -year delay in issuing
    the chargesheet is excessive and unexplained. This significant delay
    supports the claim that the departmental inquiry should not continue
    at such a late stage.
11. Accordingly, employee should not be made to suffer, which means
    that prompt action must be taken by the department. At the very
    outset, counsel states that in cases where an order has been passed
    in exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the statutory remedy available
    against that order should be pursued unless it was passed under
    extraneous considerations and there is reasonable justification or
    material to support such a conclusion. He accordingly prayed for
    the present appeal to be allowed.
12. Counsel for the Respondent-State, on the other hand, has vehemently
    opposed the present appeal and supported the Impugned Order
    passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
    It is their contention that the Appellant while exercising his powers
    as a Tehsildar, is a Revenue Officer, and therefore a quasi-judicial
    officer is bound by the statute. The mandate of the statute, therefore,
    need to be followed and given effect, which has not been done by
    the Appellant. What is expected from him is to at least determine


3   (2019) 10 SCC 640
494                                                             [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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       the eligibility of the person for the grant of settlement. A licence
       was not given to the officer to pass illegal orders in contravention to
       provisions of law which would indicate dishonesty. Counsel for the
       Respondent-State is unable to address the delay in the issuance of
       the chargesheet. However, he has submitted that time should not be
       considered a factor in such matters where departmental proceedings
       are initiated against an employee. He was unable to provide any
       material evidence suggesting extraneous considerations or influences
       that would place this case outside the protection afforded by the law
       as settled by this Court. Counsel based on the above prayed for
       dismissal of the appeal.
13. We have considered the submissions made by the counsels for
    both the parties.
14. The facts as have been narrated above are not in dispute. Two
    aspects which need to be considered are:
       (1)   Whether the chargesheet issued to the Appellant by the
             Respondent-State would fall within the scope of observations
             that have been carved out by this Court in K.K. Dhawan case
             (supra)?
       (2)   Whether inordinate unexplained delay in issuance of the
             chargesheet (in this case 14 years) would in itself be a ground
             for quashing the chargesheet issued to the appellant?
15. As regards the first question in K.K. Dhawan case (supra), this
    Court carved out the following situations where the government is
    not precluded from taking disciplinary actions for violation of the
    Code of Conduct: -
             "(i)   Where the officer had acted in a manner as would
                    reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or
                    devotion to duty;
             (ii)   If there is prima facie material to show recklessness
                    or misconduct in the discharge of his duty;
             (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of
                   a Government servant;
             (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the
                  prescribed conditions which are essential for the
                  exercise of the statutory powers;
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                         495

      Amresh Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.


           (v)   if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party;
           (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive however,
                small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said
                long ago “though the bribe may be small, yet the
                fault is great.”
     After carving out the above exceptions, this Court proceeded to
     further observe that mere technical violations or the fact that an order
     is wrong, if not falling under the above enumerated instances, does
     not warrant disciplinary actions. It was further reiterated that each
     case depends on its facts, and absolute rules cannot be postulated.
     The above instances as referred and reproduced hereinabove, are
     thus only a guide and not meant to be mandatorily adhere to without
     exception.
16. In the present case, we are of the considered view that the charges
    alleged against the Appellant in the chargesheet fall under the
    category of a wrongful order, which does not appear to have been
    influenced by extraneous factors or any form of gratification. It appears
    that the order has been passed in good faith, without any indication
    of dishonesty. Furthermore, the facts outlined in the Show Cause
    Notice do not suggest any such impropriety. The power exercised by
    the Appellant in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the order
    of Land Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that
    would warrant disciplinary proceedings against him. The decision
    relied upon by the Counsel for the Appellant as mentioned above,
    supports this view. Consequently, the first question is answered in
    favor of the Appellant.
17. As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a ground
    for stopping the departmental proceedings at the stage of the
    chargesheet itself, suffice it to say that this varies from case to
    case. However, in the instant case where there is unexplained
    inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings despite the
    alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department,
    but still no departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must
    go in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases where
    the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the
    misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on
    material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous
    influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself
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       would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process
       of departmental proceedings.
18. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of this court
    in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Another, 4
    wherein the court noted that there was no reason to interfere with
    the quashing as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after 12
    years of delay. A reference should also be made to the decision of
    this Court in P.V. Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing Board,5 where
    it has been reiterated that continuing the departmental proceedings
    after an undue delay would be unjust, causing unnecessary mental
    distress and damaging the reputation of the employee for the mistakes
    committed by the department in initiating disciplinary proceedings.
19. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and the Impugned
    Judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the
    High Court is set aside and consequently the order dated 26.04.2017
    passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored.
20. There shall be no order as to costs.
21. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose




4   (1990) Supp. 1 SCC 738
5   (2005) 6 SCC 636