ANIL MISHRAversusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.

          [2024] 3 S.C.R. 385 : 2024 INSC 189

                        Anil Mishra
                             v.
                    State of U.P. & Ors.
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1335 of 2024)
                        01 March 2024
  [Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]

                    Issue for Consideration
Whether High Court was justified in setting aside the entire
proceedings of the case against the accused on the basis of a
Settlement Agreement where the complainant in the FIR was not
made a party.

                           Headnotes
During the pendency of the trial, a Settlement Agreement was
executed between the accused persons, i.e. Respondent Nos.
2 to 4; and one of the victims i.e. Respondent No.5 – Trial
Court on considering the said agreement rejected the same by
observing that (i) chargesheet has been filed under Sections
147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC of which Section(s) 147,
148, 149, 364 of the IPC are non-compoundable in nature;(ii)
the FIR was lodged by the Appellant yet he was not made a
party to the Settlement Agreement; and (iii) the Appellant had
filed objections to the Settlement Agreement – Aggrieved,
an application was filed by the accused persons before the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC – High Court set aside
entire proceedings.
Held: Appellant herein is (i) an injured victim qua the alleged
offence; and (ii) the original complainant in the FIR. Appellant
neither entered into any settlement with the accused persons nor
was courting any such idea. This Court, in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down the principles governing the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by High Courts
vis-à-vis quashing of an FIR, criminal proceedings or complaint.
In Gian Singh, this Court inter alia held that the High Court must
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceedings; or continuation
of the criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process
of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim
386                                                             [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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       and the wrongdoer; and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
       is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end; and if the
       answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High
       Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
       proceedings. In the present case, High Court has certainly erred
       by quashing the FIR and the criminal proceedings. The High
       Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured victim and
       original complainant was not a party to the Settlement Agreement
       and nor was agreeable to such a course of action. Accordingly,
       the Impugned Order neither secured the ends of justice nor
       prevented an abuse of process of law, thus the Impugned Order
       was erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down in Gian
       Singh. [Paras 11 and 12].

                                Case Law Cited
            Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, [2012] 8 SCR 753 :
            (2012) 10 SCC 303 - relied on.

                                  List of Acts
       Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

                               List of Keywords
       Quashing under Section 482 CrPC; Settlement Agreement;
       Settlement and compromise; Complainant not party to
       Settlement Agreement; Exercise of jurisdiction under Section
       482 CrPC- Principles; Contrary to the interest of justice; Securing
       the ends of justice; Prevention of abuse of process of law; Non
       compoundable.

                              Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1335
       of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 06.04.2023 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.38114 of 2022
                           Appearances for Parties
       Konark Tyagi, Adv. for the Appellant.
       Yasharth Kant, Mrs. Anamika Agarwal, Ms. Sonal Kushwah, Rajesh
       Kumar, Navank Shekhar Mishra, Ms. Vimal Sinha, Aviral Kashyap,
       Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                        387

                    Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.


                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Order
1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present appeal is arising out of order dated 06.04.2023 passed
     by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (the “High Court”) in
     an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
     1973 (“CrPC”) bearing number 38114 of 2022, titled ‘Jitendra
     Mishra @ Sanjay and Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.’ (the
     “Impugned Order”).
3.   The facts of the case reveal that the Appellant herein lodged a First
     Information Report on 07.08.1999 bearing number 966 of 1999 under
     Section(s) 364, 147, 148, 149 & 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
     (“IPC”) against Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (the “Accused Persons”)
     alleging inter alia that (i) the Appellant and Respondent No. 5 were
     beaten-up and accordingly, injured by Accused Persons who were
     wielding guns, rifles, revolvers and pistols; and (ii) Respondent No.
     5 was further abducted by the Accused Persons (the “FIR”).
4.   The matter was investigated by the police and thereafter a charge-
     sheet was filed against the Accused Persons qua offences under
     Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC (the “Chargesheet”).
     Pursuant to the filing of the Chargesheet, Ld. Civil Judge, Junior
     Division, Tirwa, District, proceeded to take cognizance of the offences
     and inter alia issued process to the Accused Persons; and rejected
     objections filed by the Accused Persons vide order(s) dated (a)
     29.11.1999; and (b) 18.04.2000 in Criminal Cases No. 1265 of 1999
     and 1264 of 1999 (the “Summoning Order”).
5.   Aggrieved, the Accused Persons preferred (i) a criminal revision
     petition assailing inter alia the Summoning Order (the “Revision
     Petition”); and (ii) an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking the
     quashing of the Chargesheet before the High Court (the “Quashing
     Petition”). Pertinently, vide an order dated 28.05.2010, the High
     Court dismissed both (i) the Revision Petition; and (ii) the Quashing
     Petition (the “1st HC Order”).
6.   Thereafter, the Appellant preferred an application before the Chief
     Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad (the “Trial Court”) for issuance of
     non-bailable warrants (“NBWs”) against Accused Persons. Vide an
388                                                           [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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       order dated 17.01.2020, the Trial Court ordered the issuance of non-
       bailable warrants. On 28.09.2022, during the pendency of the trial
       before the Trial Court, the Accused Persons brought a settlement
       agreement dated 28.09.2022 executed inter alios the Accused
       Person(s) and Respondent No. 5 (the “Settlement Agreement”) to
       the notice of the Trial Court. Accordingly, an application was preferred
       by the Accused Persons under Section 482 CrPC before the High
       Court seeking quashing of the proceedings emanating from the
       FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement (the “1st Settlement
       Application”). However, vide an order dated 23.12.2022 in the 1st
       Settlement Application, the High Court directed the Trial Court to
       consider the Settlement Agreement; and pass appropriate order(s)
       within a period of 1 (one) month (the “2nd HC Order”).
7.     Pursuant to the 2nd HC Order, Trial Court considered the Settlement
       Agreement; and vide an order dated 23.01.2023, the Trial Court
       observed inter alia that (i) the Chargesheet has been filed under
       Sections 147, 148, 149, 323 and 364 of the IPC of which Section(s)
       147, 148, 149, 364 are non-compoundable in nature; (ii) the FIR
       was lodged by the Appellant herein who was an injured person,
       yet wasn’t made a party to the Settlement Agreement; and (iii) that
       the Appellant had filed an objection to the Settlement Agreement.
       Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid the Trial Court rejected the
       Settlement Agreement (the “Underlying Order”).
8.     Aggrieved by Underlying Order, another application was preferred by
       the Accused Persons before the High Court under Section 482 of the
       CrPC seeking the quashing of (i) the FIR; and (ii) the proceeding(s)
       emanating from the FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement
       (the “2 nd Settlement Application”). The High Court vide the
       Impugned Order allowed the 2nd Settlement Application. The operative
       paragraph(s) of the Impugned Order are reproduced as under:
            “On behalf of the applicant, this application is filed under
            Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of Case No. 1288 of 2003,
            Case Crime No. 966 of 1999 under Section 364, 147, 148,
            149, 323 I.P.C., Police Station Kotwali Farrukhabad: District
            Farrukhabad which is under consideration of court of Learned
            Chief Judicial Magistrate, Farrukhabad on the ground that
            the entire proceeding should be cancelled on the basis of
            the agreement dated 28-09-2022 between the parties.
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                           389

                    Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.


           Learned Counsel for the applicants and opposite party No.
           3 states that a settlement agreement has been reached
           between the parties on date 28-09-2022 in which it is
           mentioned that a First Information Report was lodged by
           the complainant against unknown people. The complainant
           has not taken the name of any accused in his statement
           under Section 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. It has also been
           mentioned in the said agreement that the mutual relations
           between the two parties have become quite cordial and
           there is no dispute of any kind left between them. The
           attested copy of the said agreement has been attached
           to this application as Annexure 4.
           Learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. Md. Nadeem,
           learned counsel for opposite party number 3, have stated
           that they want disposal of the present case and do not want
           to pursue this issue further, hence the entire subsequent
           proceedings should be set aside. In support of his
           argument he cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
           Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
           Anr. 2014 Law Suit (SC) 202, Yogendra Yadav & Ors.
           v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., Dimpey Gujral W/o Vivek
           Gujral & Ors. v. Union Territory & Ors. and drawn the
           attention of the Court towards the said judgments.
           Hearing the learned counsel for the parties and the learned
           Additional Government Advocate and examining the file
           and after considering the above precedents of the Hon’ble
           Supreme Court, this application submitted under Section
           482 CrPC is eligible to be accepted.
           Accordingly, this application is accepted and the entire
           proceedings of the above mentioned case are set aside.”
9.   The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant has
     submitted that the Appellant is an injured victim of the alleged offence;
     and also, is the original complainant in relation to the FIR. Accordingly,
     it has been vehemently contended before us that the High Court erred
     in law as well as in facts by allowing the 2nd Settlement Application. It
     was also submitted before us that the Impugned Order suffers from
     perversity and illegality on account of the fact that it fails to consider
     that the Appellant i.e., the original complainant, was neither a party
390                                                            [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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       to the Settlement Agreement nor was amenable to such a course
       of action. In this context, it was submitted that the High Court ought
       not to have exercised its jurisdiction under 482 CrPC in favour of
       the Accused Persons.
10. On the other hand, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Accused
    Persons has submitted that the Accused Persons entered into a
    settlement / compromise with Respondent No. 5 i.e., the principal
    victim who was allegedly abducted, and accordingly, once Respondent
    No. 5 had settled the matter, there was no justifiable cause to continue
    criminal proceedings against the Accused Persons. Thus, it was
    submitted that the Impugned Order, was a well-reasoned order, that
    warrants no interference from this Court.
11. We have heard the counsel(s) appearing on behalf of the parties and
    perused the record. Admittedly and undisputedly, the Appellant herein
    is (i) an injured victim qua the alleged offence; and (ii) the original
    complainant qua the FIR. Furthermore, from the materials placed on
    record and the arguments advanced, it can safely be concluded that
    the Appellant neither entered into any settlement with the Accused
    Persons nor was courting any such idea. Accordingly, in view of the
    aforesaid circumstances, we fail to understand how the High Court
    proceeded to quash the FIR; and the proceedings emanating thereof
    in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. This Court in
    Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 authoritatively
    laid down principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under
    Section 482 CrPC by High Courts vis-à-vis quashing of an FIR,
    criminal proceeding or complaint. The same is reproduced as under:
            “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
            can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court
            in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
            exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
            from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
            the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
            is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has
            to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in
            such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
            prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
            power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or
            FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
[2024] 3 S.C.R.                                                            391

                    Anil Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors.


           have settled their dispute would depend on the facts
           and circumstances of each case and no category can
           be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
           the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
           gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
           mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
           etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
           victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.
           Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
           impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
           victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
           special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
           the offences committed by public servants while working
           in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
           quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.
           But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
           predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for
           the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
           from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
           or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
           matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
           where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
           and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
           category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
           proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
           between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
           conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
           criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
           and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
           him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
           complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
           other words, the High Court must consider whether it would
           be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
           with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
           proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
           despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
           the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
           it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and
           if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
392                                                          [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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            the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
            the criminal proceeding.”
12. Thus, it is our considered opinion that the High Court has certainly
    erred by quashing (i) the FIR; and (ii) the criminal proceeding(s)
    emanating from the FIR on the basis of the Settlement Agreement.
    The High Court failed to notice that the Appellant i.e., an injured
    victim; and original complainant was not a party to the Settlement
    Agreement and nor was agreeable to such a course of action.
    Accordingly, we find that Impugned Order neither secured the ends
    of justice nor prevented an abuse of process of law, thus we find
    that the Impugned Order was erroneous and contrary to principles
    laid down in Gian Singh (Supra).
13. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is accordingly allowed,
    and the Impugned Order is set aside. The proceedings emanating
    from FIR i.e., Case No. 1288 of 2003, stand restored to the file of
    the Trial Court, with a direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the
    same expeditiously, preferably, within a period of one year, in view
    of the fact that the FIR pertains to the year 1999.
14. Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.


       Headnotes prepared by:                               Result of the case:
       Adeeba Mujahid, Hony. Associate Editor                 Appeal allowed.
       (Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)