ANKHIM HOLDINGS PVT. LTD. & ANR.versusZAVERI CONSTRUCTION PVT. LTD.

           [2026] 3 S.C.R. 28 : 2026 INSC 137

            Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
                          v.
             Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 779 of 2026)
                        04 February 2026
      [J.B. Pardiwala and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]


                     Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in saying that the proceedings
held by the Arbitral Tribunal on the seven relevant dates, i.e., from
17.03.2022 to 25.08.2022 were liable to be declared as nullity on
the premise that those proceedings were undertaken during the
period of moratorium u/s.14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016.

                            Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.11, s.15(2), s.15(3),
s.17 and s.37 – The appellants and respondent (now under
liquidation) entered into a partnership firm to develop and
construct an SRA project – Dispute arose between them – The
High Court appointed an arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes
and differences between the parties – The NCLT admitted
the respondent to CIRP and imposed a moratorium u/s.14 of
IBC – Meanwhile, various applications were filed by both the
appellants and respondent under provisions of the Act, 1996
before the Arbitral Tribunal and the High Court – Pursuant
thereto, various orders were passed by the Arbitral Tribunal
and the High Court – The High Court by its impugned judgment
and order appointed substitute arbitrator to adjudicate the
disputes and differences between the appellants and the
respondent – However, the High Court proceeded to observe
the all proceedings undertaken by the Arbitral Tribunal
between 26.09.2019 and 26.08.2022 respectively being hit by
the moratorium could be said to be a nullity – Correctness:
Held: Since the appointment in the case at hand was made in
terms of the Act, 1996, the original provision applicable to the
appointment of the arbitrator would be s.11 of the Act, 1996 – The
position of law as regards s.11 is well settled – It affords the Court
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   Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


     with a very limited scope essentially requiring the Court only to
     make prima facie finding that an arbitration agreement exists –
     The High Court could be said to have travelled beyond its vested
     jurisdiction including by subsuming jurisdictions expressly made
     unavailable to it including s.37 of the Act, 1996 – Having regard
     to the plain language of sub-section (2) and sub-section (4) of
     s.15 respectively, the High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction while
     taking the view that the proceedings held by the Arbitral Tribunal
     between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 are a nullity because of the
     operation of moratorium – The proper and legal course for the
     High Court acting u/s.15(2) of the Act, 1996, should have been
     to appoint a substitute arbitrator to continue from the existing
     stage of the proceedings – The impugned part of the judgment
     rendered by the High Court could be said to have resulted in
     a situation where the arbitration proceedings would have to be
     restarted de novo and the same would have a direct impact on
     the sale of flats made pursuant to the s.17 orders of the Tribunal –
     This could be both inequitable and inefficient – Thus, the part
     of the impugned order by which the High Court declared the
     proceedings undertaken between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 as
     a nullity deserves to be interfered with and is hereby set aside.
     [Paras 34, 35, 37, 44-46]

                              Case Law Cited
     Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and
     Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re [2023] 15 SCR
     1081 : (2024) 6 SCC 1 – followed.
     Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India
     Ltd. & Anr. [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 96 : (2006) 6 SCC 204; Official
     Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee [1969] 3 SCR 92 : 1968
     SCC Online SC 103 – relied on.
     Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman
     Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Shailesh Dhairyawan v.
     Mohan Balkrishna Lulla [2015] 12 SCR 70 : (2016) 3 SCC 619 –
     referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Constitution of India;
     Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
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                              List of Keywords
      Home-buyers; Jurisdiction; Section 11(6) of Arbitration and
      Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2) of Arbitration and Conciliation
      Act, 1996; Section 15(3) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996;
      Section 14 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Minimal
      Judicial Intervention; Self-Contained Code; Doctrine of Nullity;
      SRA Project; Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process; Third-Party
      Rights; Article 142 of Constitution; Substitute Arbitrator.

                             Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 779 of 2026
      From the Judgment and Order dated 12.04.2024 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Bombay in CAP(L) No. 30650 of 2023

                          Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant(s):
      Ashim Sood, Saahil Memon, Senu Nizar, Ekansh Gupta, Kartikeya
      Jaiswal, Prateek Kundu, Karan Kumar, Ms. Pallavi Pratap.
      Adv. for the Respondent(s):
      Tushar Mehta, S.G., Sanjay Kapur, Surya Prakash, Ms. Shubhra
      Kapur, Ms. Santha Smruthi, Shakti Kanta Pattanaik, Santosh Kumar.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Order

1.    Leave granted.
2.    This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the
      High Court of Bombay dated 12.04.2024 in Commercial Arbitration
      Petition (L) No. 30650/2023 by which the petition filed by the appellants
      herein before the High Court under Section 15(2) of the Arbitration
      and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Act, 1996”) came to be
      disposed of by substituting the earlier Arbitrator appointed by the High
      Court, however, with a rider that the arbitral proceedings that took
      place on seven particular dates, i.e., from 17.03.2022 to 25.08.2022
      could be said to be a nullity as those proceedings were undertaken
      at the time when the respondent company was under a moratorium
      as envisaged under Section 14 of the IBC, 2016.
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     Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


3.    The short facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarized as
      under:-
      (i)    The appellants and respondent (now under liquidation) entered
             into a partnership firm named “M/s Anmol Alliance” to develop
             and construct an SRA project of Andheri Shiv Shakti CHS
             Limited admeasuring 4514 square metres along with 203
             tenements standing thereon situated at CTS No. 195(pt) and
             825(pt), Ambivali Village at Indira Nagar, Jay Prakash Road,
             Andheri (West), Mumbai.
      (ii)   It appears that disputes cropped up between the appellants
             and the respondent. In such circumstances, the appellants
             preferred an application under Section 9 of the Act, 1996,
             i.e., Commercial Arbitration Petition No.347/2019 against the
             respondent. Pursuant to the filing of Section 9 petition, an
             interim arrangement was worked out and based on the same,
             the parties proceeded with the project.
      (iii) On 09.07.2019, the Bombay High Court passed an order in
            Commercial Arbitration Petition No.347/2019 referred to above
            accepting the minutes of order recording them as consent terms
            between the parties.
      (iv) The High Court proceeded to appoint Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.N.
           Patel (former Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court) to act as
           the Arbitrator to arbitrate the disputes and differences between
           the parties.
      (v)    It appears from the materials on record that on 26.09.2019,
             the NCLT Mumbai passed an order in Company Petition (I.B.)
             No.411/2019 admitting the respondent to CIRP and imposing
             a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC.
      (vi) On 03.11.2020, the appellants filed I.A. No.(L) 6167/2020 under
           Section 9 of the Act, 1996, before the High Court whereby they
           sought to restrain the RP of the respondent from obstructing
           the sale of certain flats and further sought permission to sell
           those flats in the light of the consent terms recorded in the
           order dated 09.07.2019 referred to above. The RP filed its
           written submissions to oppose the reliefs which were prayed
           for in I.A.(L) 6167/2020 referred to above.
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      (vii) On 14.10.2021, the appellants preferred one another Section
            9 petition, i.e., I.A. No.(L) 24302/2021 seeking permission to
            execute the agreement for sale with respect to flat numbers
            1001, 1302 and 704, respectively.
      (viii) On 15.03.2022, the High Court passed an order in I.A. No.(L)
             24302/2021 and I.A. No.(L) 6167/2020 respectively referred to
             above recording a finding that the Interim Resolution Professional
             had become functus officio and no order for liquidation was
             passed by the NCLT.
      (ix) The High Court proceeded to dispose of the Section 9 petitions
           while granting liberty to the appellants herein to move the
           applications under Section 17 of the Act, 1996, before the
           Arbitrator.
      (x)   In pursuance of the order dated 15.03.2022 referred to above,
            the appellants herein preferred Section 17 applications on
            17.03.2022 before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator proceeded to
            pass an order, scheduling the hearing for Section 17 applications.
      (xi) On 25.03.2022, the respondent preferred an application under
           Section 16 of the Act, 1996, seeking to challenge the jurisdiction
           of the Arbitral Tribunal on the ground of the moratorium under
           Section 14 of the IBC.
      (xii) By order dated 29.03.2022, the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the
            Section 16 application referred to above, filed by the IRP of
            the respondent, seeking stay of the arbitration proceedings in
            light of the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC.
      (xiii) On 29.03.2022, by a separate order, the Arbitral Tribunal
             proceeded to pass an order in I.A. No.(L) 24302/2021, permitting
             the appellants herein to execute agreements for sale in respect
             of flat numbers 1001, 1302 and 704 respectively.
      (xiv) On 20.04.2022, the Arbitral Tribunal passed an order in I.A.
            No.(L) 6167/2020, permitting the appellants to sell the flat
            numbers 907 and 908 respectively.
      (xv) In pursuance of the orders dated 29.03.2022 and 20.04.2022
           respectively, the appellants between July, 2022 and February,
           2023 entered into agreements for sale with third parties for the
           flat numbers 907, 908, 1001, 1302 and 704 respectively. While
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     Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


           we were recording the facts as aforesaid, the learned counsel
           appearing for the appellants brought to our notice that these
           flats referred to above have not been sold.
4.    On 26.08.2022, the NCLT proceeded to pass an order in I.A.
      No.2278/2020 initiating liquidation proceedings against the
      respondent.
5.    On 24.04.2023, the respondent through the Liquidator filed a
      Statement of Defence. On 24.04.2023, the Arbitral Tribunal passed
      an order directing the Liquidator to seek clarification from the High
      Court in respect of the continuation of the Arbitration proceedings.
6.    On 25.08.2023, the High Court passed an order dismissing I.A.
      No.(L) 14336/2023 filed by the Liquidator seeking a declaration that
      the disputes between the parties were non-arbitrable.
7.    On 11.10.2023, the Arbitral Tribunal passed an order terminating the
      arbitration proceedings.
8.    On 01.11.2023, the appellants herein filed Commercial Arbitration
      Petition No.30650/2023 before the High Court seeking appointment
      of substitute Arbitrator and for extension of time for passing arbitral
      award.
9.    The High Court by its impugned judgment and order appointed
      Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.M. Savant (Retired Judge of the Bombay High
      Court) as sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes and differences
      between the appellants and the respondent. However, the High Court
      proceeded to observe the all proceedings undertaken by the Arbitral
      Tribunal between 26.09.2019 and 26.08.2022 respectively being hit
      by the moratorium could be said to be a nullity.
10. The relevant observations of the High Court read thus:-
           “14] The submission of Ms. Singhania, by relying upon
           Section 12 prescribing timeline for completion of IRP and
           her submission that the CIRP shall be completed within
           the period of 180 days and since there is no extension
           sought by the RP, it has come to end, do not deserve
           any consideration in light of the proviso to sub section (4)
           of Section 14. The effect of proviso is crystal clear, that
           the order of moratorium shall have effect till completion
           of CIRP, but during the CIRP period, if the adjudicating
           authority approves the resolution plan under sub section
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      (1) of Section 31, or if it passes the order of liquidation
      under Section 33, the moratorium shall ceased to have
      effect, either from the date of such approval or liquidation
      order, as the case may be.
      The order passed by the NCLT on 26.08.2022 clearly
      indicates that since resolution plan could not be approved,
      and CoC resolved to liquidate the company, the Liquidator
      is appointed under Section 34 and a fresh moratorium is
      declared to have commenced under Section 33 (5).
      15] In the wake of aforesaid situation, which emerges
      from the facts placed before me, the moratorium imposed
      under Section 14 by order dated 26.09.2019, continued
      to be in operation till 26.08.2022, when it is declared to
      cease to have its effect and the company is put into fresh
      moratorium under Section 33(5) of the IBC, by the NCLT.
      After this date, the ongoing arbitration proceedings which
      were in abeyance can continue, but all those which are
      held between 26.09.2019 and 26.08.2022, are hit by
      the moratorium, and this remains the position, despite
      this Court on 15.03.2022 permitting its revival, as it was
      misled to believe that on 15.03.2022, the IP has become
      functus officio. It is in fact only on 26.08.2022, the Tribunal
      appointed the Liquidator and directed him to proceed
      with the process of liquidation in the manner laid down
      in Chapter 3 of Part II of the IBC, 2016, when the Interim
      Application filed by the RP for liquidation of the Corporate
      Debtor was allowed.
      16] It is for the aforesaid reason, the proceedings held by
      the Arbitral Tribunal on the 7 dates i.e. from 17.03.2022 to
      25.08.2022, are liable to be declared as nullity, but needless
      to state that the proceedings can be revived before the
      substituted arbitrator, as now there is no embargo in
      continuing the arbitration proceedings and by conferring
      the liberty upon the parties to revive its application and by
      permitting the arbitral tribunal to pass appropriate orders
      thereupon including application filed under Section 17
      by the Petitioner, I deem it appropriate to substitute the
      Arbitrator who has terminated the proceedings.”
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   Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


11. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellants are here
    before this Court with the present appeal.

     SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS :-
12. Mr. Ashim Sood, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants
    would submit that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
    under Section 15(2) of the Act, 1996, could not have declared the
    proceedings undertaken by the Arbitral Tribunal between 17.03.2022
    and 25.08.2022 as a nullity on the ground that those proceedings
    were undertaken while the respondent was under a moratorium under
    Section 14 of the IBC. He would submit that all that was required
    was to substitute the Arbitrator.
13. He would further submit that the jurisdiction of the High Court under
    Section 15(2) of the Act, 1996, is circumscribed compared to the
    jurisdiction that may be exercised under Section 11 of the Act, 1996.
14. Mr. Sood invited our attention to the language employed under sub-
    section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, 1996. He laid much emphasis on
    the expression “a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according
    to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator
    being replaced”.
15. By relying on the expression referred to above, Mr. Sood would
    submit that the powers of the Court under Section 15(2) of the Act
    must be defined with reference to the Court’s powers under Section
    11 of the Act, 1996.
16. To fortify the aforesaid submission, he placed reliance on the decision
    of this Court in the case of Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex
    Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 204.
17. Thereafter, Mr. Sood invited our attention to sub-section (4) of Section
    15 of the Act, 1996. Relying on the same, he would submit that the
    plain reading of the provision itself makes it clear that any order or
    ruling of the Arbitral Tribunal prior to the replacement of an Arbitrator
    under Section 15 would not be rendered invalid, solely because
    of some change in the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless
    otherwise agreed between the parties.
18. Mr. Sood submitted that if what has been held by the High Court
    is to be given effect, it will have its own implications in so far as all
    those flats which have already stood transferred to the third parties.
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19. In the last, Mr. Sood submitted that the High Court in exercise of its
    jurisdiction under the Act, 1966, could not have nullified orders which
    it had otherwise no jurisdiction to consider. In this context, the learned
    counsel relied on the decision of this Court in Official Trustee v.
    Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, reported in 1968 SCC Online SC 103.
20. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
    that there being merit in the appeal, the same may be allowed
    appropriately.

      SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SBI :-
21. Mr. Tushar Mehta, the leaned Solicitor General assisted by the
    learned counsel, Mr. Sanjay Kapur appeared for the State Bank
    of India. According to Mr. Mehta, the flats referred to above were
    mortgaged with the Bank. In such circumstances, Mr. Mehta would
    submit that the interest of the Bank be protected.
22. At this stage, Mr. Sood, on instructions from his client, made a
    statement that the flats which have been referred to above were
    never mortgaged with the State Bank at any point of time. There
    was no charge of the Bank over those flats.

      SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR :-
23. We also heard Mr. Santosh Kumar, the learned counsel appearing
    for the Liquidator. According to the learned counsel for the Liquidator,
    no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been
    committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order.
24. He would submit that the High Court is justified in taking the view
    that all the proceedings/transactions which took place between
    17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022, i.e., during the moratorium period could
    be said to be a nullity.
25. He seeks to rely upon the provisions of Section 14(4) of the IBC
    including the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the IBC.

      ANALYSIS :-
26. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
    having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
    falls for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified
    in saying that the proceedings held by the Arbitral Tribunal on the
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                             37

   Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


     seven relevant dates, i.e., from 17.03.2022 to 25.08.2022 were liable
     to be declared as nullity on the premise that those proceedings
     were undertaken during the period of moratorium under Section 14
     of the IBC.
27. We must look into the provisions of Section 15 of the Act, 1996.
    Section 15 reads thus:-
           “15. Termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator.—
           (1) In addition to the circumstances referred to in section 13
           or section 14, the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate—
                (a) where he withdraws from office for any reason; or
                (b) by or pursuant to agreement of the parties.
           (2) Where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a
           substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the
           rules that were applicable to the appointment of the
           arbitrator being replaced.
           (3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where an
           arbitrator is replaced under sub-section (2), any hearings
           previously held may be repeated at the discretion of the
           arbitral tribunal.
           (4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an order or
           ruling of the arbitral tribunal made prior to the replacement
           of an arbitrator under this section shall not be invalid solely
           because there has been a change in the composition of
           the arbitral tribunal.”
28. A bare perusal of Section 15 referred to above indicates that Section
    15(2) is not a standalone provision and should be read with Section
    15(3) and Section 15(4) respectively.
29. Section 15(2) states that when mandate of an arbitrator is terminated
    under Section 14, a substitute arbitrator has to be appointed. It
    further states that such an appointment must be made according
    to the rules that were made applicable to the appointment of the
    arbitrator being replaced.
30. Further, Section 15(3) provides the course of action after the arbitrator
    has been replaced under sub-section (2). The essential ingredients
    of the provision are thus:-
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      i.     Any hearing previously held may be repeated;
      ii.    The repetition of the hearing is at the discretion of the arbitral
             tribunal;
      iii.   However, such repetition of the hearing is subject to the
             agreement between the parties;
      If the parties agree for repetition of hearing, the term “may” transforms
      into “shall”. Whereas, if the parties agree for non-repetition of hearing,
      the term “may” transforms into “shall not”. In case the parties fail to
      arrive at a conclusion, the arbitral tribunal would decide whether the
      hearing already conducted before his substitution would be repeated.
31. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity, we deem it appropriate
    to state that the parties can come to an agreement on the question
    of re-hearing either prior to the stage of substitution being reached
    or after the arbitrator has been substituted.
32. At this stage, we must look into the dictum as laid by this Court in
    Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra). In the said case, this Court
    held that under Section 15(2) of the Act, 1996, the appointment of
    the substitute Arbitrator must be in accordance with the original
    agreement or provision applicable to the appointment of the Arbitrator
    at the initial stage.
33. We quote the relevant observations made by this Court in Yashwith
    Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra):-
             “4. In our view, the learned Chief Justice and the Division
             Bench have rightly understood the scope of Section 15 of
             the Act. When the arbitrator originally appointed in terms
             of the arbitration agreement withdrew for health reasons,
             the Managing Director, as authorised originally by the
             arbitration agreement, promptly appointed a substitute
             arbitrator. It is true that in the arbitration agreement there
             is no specific provision authorising the Managing Director
             to appoint a substitute arbitrator if the original appointment
             terminates or if the originally appointed arbitrator withdraws
             from the arbitration. But, this so-called omission in the
             arbitration agreement is made up by the specific provision
             contained in Section 15(2) of the Act. The withdrawal
             of an arbitrator from the office for any reason is within
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   Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


           the purview of Section 15(1)(a) of the Act. Obviously,
           therefore, Section 15(2) would be attracted and a substitute
           arbitrator has to be appointed according to the rules that
           are applicable for the appointment of the arbitrator to be
           replaced. Therefore, what Section 15(2) contemplates is an
           appointment of the substituted arbitrator or the replacing of
           the arbitrator by another according to the rules that were
           applicable to the appointment of the original arbitrator
           who was being replaced. The term “rules” in Section
           15(2) obviously referred to the provision for appointment
           contained in the arbitration agreement or any rules of
           any institution under which the disputes were referred to
           arbitration. There was no failure on the part of the party
           concerned as per the arbitration agreement, to fulfil his
           obligation in terms of Section 11 of the Act so as to attract
           the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of
           the Act for appointing a substitute arbitrator. Obviously,
           Section 11(6) of the Act has application only when a
           party or the person concerned had failed to act in terms
           of the arbitration agreement. When Section 15(2) says
           that a substitute arbitrator can be appointed according to
           the rules that were applicable for the appointment of the
           arbitrator originally, it is not confined to an appointment
           under any statutory rule or rule framed under the Act or
           under the scheme. It only means that the appointment
           of the substitute arbitrator must be done according to
           the original agreement or provision applicable to the
           appointment of the arbitrator at the initial stage. We are
           not in a position to agree with the contrary view taken by
           some of the High Courts.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

34. Since the appointment in the case at hand was made in terms of
    the Act, 1996, the original provision applicable to the appointment
    of the arbitrator would be Section 11 of the Act, 1996.
35. The position of law as regards Section 11 is well settled. It affords
    the Court with a very limited scope essentially requiring the Court
    only to make prima facie finding that an arbitration agreement exists.
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36. The High Court could be said to have travelled beyond its vested
    jurisdiction including by subsuming jurisdictions expressly made
    unavailable to it including Section 37 of the Act, 1996.
37. Having regard to the plain language of sub-section (2) and sub-
    section (4) of Section 15 respectively referred to above, we are in
    agreement with the submission of Mr. Sood, the learned counsel
    appearing for the appellants that the High Court exceeded in its
    jurisdiction while taking the view that the proceedings held by the
    Arbitral Tribunal between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 are a nullity
    because of the operation of moratorium.
38. In Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and
    Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, a
    five-Judge Bench of this Court held that:-
          “92. The Arbitration Act is a self-contained code inter
          alia with respect to matters dealing with appointment of
          arbitrators, commencement of arbitration, making of an
          award and challenges to the arbitral award, as well as
          execution of such awards. [ Pasl Wind Solutions (P) Ltd. v.
          GE Power Conversion (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 7 SCC 1 :
          (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 702; Kandla Export Corpn. v. OCI
          Corpn., (2018) 14 SCC 715 : (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 664].
          When a self-contained code sets out a procedure, the
          applicability of a general legal procedure would be impliedly
          excluded. [Subal Paul v. Malina Paul, (2003) 10 SCC 361].
          Being a self-contained and exhaustive code on arbitration
          law, the Arbitration Act carries the imperative that what is
          permissible under the law ought to be performed only in the
          manner indicated, and not otherwise. Accordingly, matters
          governed by the Arbitration Act such as the arbitration
          agreement, appointment of arbitrators and competence
          of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction have to
          be assessed in the manner specified under the law. The
          corollary is that it is not permissible to do what is not
          mentioned under the Arbitration Act. Therefore, provisions
          of other statutes cannot interfere with the working of the
          Arbitration Act, unless specified otherwise.”
                                                (Emphasis supplied)
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   Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


39. We may refer to the decision in Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v.
    Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine
    SC 2578, wherein while dealing with an application seeking review
    of appointment of arbitrator made after extending the mandate of
    the arbitrator twice, the High Court directed the arbitrator not to
    continue the arbitral proceedings. This was in view of the fact that
    the arbitrator was appointed as a President of the State Consumer
    Dispute Redressal Commission. The Court held that when an arbitrator
    is unable to act owing to recusal, the proper course would be to
    invoke Section 15(2) and appoint a substitute arbitrator to continue
    from the existing stage of the proceedings. The observations of
    the Court succinctly capture that substitution preserves continuity,
    and prior proceedings remain valid unless either party objects. The
    observations read thus:-
           “16. Once the High Court had accepted the existence of
           a valid arbitration agreement and appointed an arbitrator,
           its later interference on the same question of the validity
           of Clause 25 amounted, in substance, to an appeal
           disguised as supervisory review. If the arbitrator had
           become unable to act owing to recusal or disqualification,
           the proper course was to invoke Section 15(2) and appoint
           a substitute arbitrator to continue from the existing stage
           of the proceedings.
           17. Sections 15(1) and 15(2) clearly provide that an
           arbitrator’s mandate terminates upon withdrawal or by
           agreement of the parties, and that a substitute arbitrator must
           be appointed following the same procedure as the original
           appointment. The judgments in Yashwith Constructions (P)
           Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd.36, ACC Ltd. v.
           Global Cements Ltd.37, and Union of India v. Pradeep Vinod
           Construction Company38, reaffirm that such substitution
           preserves continuity, and prior proceedings remain valid
           unless either party objects. In light of the same, the High
           Court’s decision to suspend the arbitration altogether, instead
           of ordering substitution, was contrary to settled law. The
           exercise of jurisdiction therefore calls for correction under
           Article 136 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the impugned
           judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)
42                                                           [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


40. The aforesaid dictum of law makes it clear that where the Act, 1996,
    provides procedures for assailing orders, or prohibits such orders of
    a Tribunal from being assailed, then no alternate procedure can be
    adopted by a court whose jurisdiction derives from a provision of the
    Act, 1996, itself. Section 37 of the Act, 1996, provides for appeals
    against orders under Section 17 of the Act, 1996, and also against
    orders accepting pleas under Section 16 of the Act, 1996, though
    orders rejecting Section 16 applications are not subject to judicial
    interference under the Act, 1996.
41. Following the dictum as laid in Interplay (supra), it would be
    impermissible for a court acting under Section 15(2) to adopt a
    procedure whereby it exercises jurisdiction barred to it by the Act,
    1996 as has occurred in the present case: (i) the High Court has
    set aside an order rejecting an application under Section 16 – which
    the Act, 1996, does not countenance in any provision; (ii) the High
    Court has set aside Section 17 orders but not in a proceeding under
    Section 37; and (iii) the High Court has set aside further procedural
    orders, which again is not a power vested in any court exercising
    jurisdiction under the Act, 1996.
42. We also find merit in the submission of Mr. Sood that the High Court
    is not empowered to nullify orders which it had no jurisdiction to
    consider. In this context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision
    of this Court in Official Trustee (supra). The relevant observations
    read thus:-
          “15. From the above discussion it is clear that before a
          Court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular
          matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit
          brought but must also have the authority to pass the orders
          sought for. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction
          in relation to the subject-matter of the suit. Its jurisdiction
          must include the power to hear and decide the questions
          at issue, the authority to hear and decide the particular
          controversy that has arisen between the parties…

               x              x               x                x
          17.[…]The jurisdiction conferred on the court under
          Section 34 is a limited jurisdiction. Under that provision,
          the court has not been conferred with overall jurisdiction
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                          43

   Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd.


           in matters arising under a Trust deed. The statute has
           prescribed what the court can do and inferentially what it
           cannot do. From the fact that the court has been conferred
           power to grant only certain reliefs it follows as a matter
           of law that the court has been prohibited from granting
           any other relief.[…]

                    X           x              x              x
           29. From whatever angle we may examine the validity of
           the order made by Ramfry, J., it appears clear to us, that
           the said order was outside the jurisdiction of the learned
           judge. It was not merely a wrong order, or an illegal order,
           it was an order which he had no competence to make. It
           is not merely an order that he should not have passed but
           it is an order that he could not have passed and therefore
           a void order.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

43. There is no doubt that the High Court assumed and exercised
    power which has clearly not been conferred by the Act, 1996, more
    particularly, wherein the statute itself envisages minimal judicial
    intervention.
44. We are of the view that the proper and legal course for the High
    Court acting under Section 15(2) of the Act, 1996, should have been
    to appoint a substitute arbitrator to continue from the existing stage
    of the proceedings. The impugned part of the judgment rendered
    by the High Court could be said to have resulted in a situation
    where the arbitration proceedings would have to be restarted de
    novo and the same would have a direct impact on the sale of flats
    made pursuant to the Section 17 orders of the Tribunal. This could
    be both inequitable and inefficient. This Court has time and again
    said that the object of speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration
    would best be subserved by a substitute arbitrator continuing at
    the point at which the earlier arbitrator has left off. [See: Hindustan
    Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2005
    SCC OnLine SC 2578; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna
    Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619]
44                                                          [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


45. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the part of the
    impugned order by which the High Court declared the proceedings
    undertaken between 17.03.2022 and 25.08.2022 as a nullity deserves
    to be interfered with.
46. In the result, this appeal succeeds in part. The impugned order to
    the extent it says that the proceedings held by the Arbitral Tribunal
    on the seven dates, i.e., from 17.03.2022 to 25.08.2022, are a nullity
    is hereby set aside.
47. Considering the long lapse of time and also the fact that third party
    rights have been created (home buyers rights have come into play)
    we, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution
    of India declare these transactions to be lawfully valid.
48. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court stands modified
    to the aforesaid extent.
49. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
50. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

      Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.




      †
          Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan