Supreme Court of India
ANNA WAMAN BHALERAOversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1114
- Decided
- 12 September 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's rejection of the anticipatory bail, finding that the gravity of the allegations and the necessity of custodial interrogation justified the denial despite the delay.
Summary
The appellants, a former Circle Officer and Talathi, were accused of certifying mutation entries based on forged documents that facilitated an illegal property transfer between 1996 and 1998. An FIR was lodged in 2019 and the appellants filed anticipatory bail applications, which received intermittent interim protection but were finally rejected by the Bombay High Court in July 2025. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in denying anticipatory bail and whether the six‑year delay in disposing of the applications violated Articles 14 and 21. It held that the seriousness of the allegations, alleged abuse of official position, and the need for custodial interrogation outweighed the delay, and therefore the High Court's rejection was upheld. The Court also issued sweeping directions for High Courts to dispose of bail and anticipatory bail applications within two months, emphasizing the constitutional imperative of expeditious resolution of liberty‑related matters.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the anticipatory bail applications of the appellants.
- Whether the prolonged delay in disposing of the anticipatory bail applications infringes the appellants' constitutional rights under Articles 14 and 21.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 438
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 34, s. 420, s. 463, s. 464, s. 465, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471
- Maharashtra Land Revenue Codes. 15(2)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the anticipatory bail applications of the appellants; issue of inordinate delay by Courts in deciding the bail and anticipatory bail applications. Headnotes† Directions by Supreme Court – Bail/Anticipatory bail of – Constitution of India – Arts.14, 21: Held: 1.1 High Courts to ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before the subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within two months from the date of
Subjects
Bail applicationsAnticipatory bail applicationsBail applications not to be kept pending indefinitelyInordinate/prolonged delay in disposal of bail applications/anticipatory bail applicationsArticles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of IndiaExpeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applicationsCustodial interrogation essentialPersonal libertyAnticipatory bail rejectedLong delay in initiation of proceedingsAlleged abuse of official positionMutation entries certifiedMutation entries cancelledForged documentsIllegal transfer of ownership of immovable property
Judgment
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 982 : 2025 INSC 1114
Anna Waman Bhalerao
v.
State of Maharashtra
(Criminal Appeal No. 4004 of 2025)
12 September 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the anticipatory
bail applications of the appellants; issue of inordinate delay by
Courts in deciding the bail and anticipatory bail applications.
Headnotes†
Directions by Supreme Court – Bail/Anticipatory bail
applications – Time-bound disposal of – Constitution of
India – Arts.14, 21:
Held: 1.1 High Courts to ensure that applications for bail and
anticipatory bail pending before them or before the subordinate
courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously,
preferably within two months from the date of filing, except in cases
where delay is attributable to the parties themselves – Suitable
mechanisms and procedures be devised by High Courts to avoid
accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and
ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. [Para 18]
1.2 High Courts shall issue necessary administrative directions to
subordinate courts to prioritise matters involving personal liberty
and to avoid indefinite adjournments. [Para 18]
1.3 Investigating agencies are also expected to conclude
investigations in long pending cases with promptitude so that neither
the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of
undue delay. [Para 18]
1.4 A copy of this judgment be circulated to all High Courts for
immediate compliance and prompt administrative action. [Para 18.1]
Anticipatory bail – Rejection of, when justified – FIR pertaining
to the events of 1996-98 was filed in 2019 alleging that the
* Author
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 983
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
appellants (Circle Officer and Talathi in the Revenue Department
at the relevant time) in their official capacity, certified the
mutation entries on the basis of forged documents, thereby
facilitating the illegal transfer of ownership of the immovable
property – Appellants filed anticipatory bail applications before
Sessions Court, eventually rejected – Before the High Court,
the anticipatory bail applications remained pending from 2019
wherein interim protection was granted from time to time,
however, the same were finally rejected by the impugned
judgment in 2025 – Justification:
Held: Impugned judgment rejecting the anticipatory bail
applications, affirmed – Although there was a long delay in the
initiation of proceedings, the gravity of the allegations, the alleged
abuse of official position, and the prima facie findings of the High
Court that custodial interrogation is necessary cannot be diluted
merely on the ground of delay – Even in a case based largely on
documentary evidence, custodial interrogation may be essential to
trace the chain of transactions, ascertain complicity, and prevent
further suppression or tampering of records – Moreover, the
appellants, despite enjoying interim protection for nearly six years,
did not extend due cooperation to the investigation – Impugned
judgement not interfered with. [Paras 14, 19]
Constitution of India – Arts.14, 21 – Prolonged delay in
disposal of bail/anticipatory bail applications, denial of
justice – Anticipatory bail applications filed by the appellants
before High Court in 2019 remained pending and were finally
rejected by the impugned judgment in 2025:
Held: Inordinate delay in the disposal of the appellants’ applications
for anticipatory bail by the High Court, deprecated – Applications
affecting personal liberty particularly bail and anticipatory bail ought
not to be kept pending indefinitely for years – The grant or refusal
of bail, anticipatory or otherwise, is ordinarily a straightforward
exercise, turning on the facts of each case – Therefore, there is no
justification for deferring decision-making – In matters concerning
liberty, bail courts must be sensitive and ensure that constitutional
ethos is upheld – Prolonged delay in disposal not only frustrates
the object of Code of Criminal Procedure, but also amounts to
a denial of justice, contrary to the constitutional ethos in Arts.14
and 21. [Paras 15, 17]
984 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Siddaram Satlingappa Mehtre v. State of Maharashtra [2010] 15
SCR 201 : (2011) 1 SCC 694; Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union
of India [2017] 12 SCR 358 : (2018) 11 SCC 1; Rajesh Seth v.
State of Chhattisgarh, SLP (Crl) 1247/2022; Sanjay v. The State
(NCT of Delhi) & Another, SLP (Crl.) No. 5675 of 2022; Rajanti
Devi v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1595; Satendra
Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr. (2022) 10
SCC 51; Sumit Subhaschandra Gangwal & Another v. the State of
Maharashtra & Another, SLP (Crl.) No. 3561/2023; Kavish Gupta v.
State of Chhattisgarh, SLP (Crl.) No. 16025/2023 with SLP (Crl.)
No. 16047/2023; Mahatab Ali v. State of West Bengal & Anr., SLP
(Criminal) Diary No. 60183/2024; Ashok Balwant Patil v. Mohan
Madhukar Patil & Ors. Etc., SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 1540/2024; Amol
Vitthal Vahile v. The State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.
545/2024; Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani [2024] 9 SCR
257 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2453 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Maharashtra Land Revenue Code; Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Bail applications; Anticipatory bail applications; Bail applications
not to be kept pending indefinitely; Inordinate/prolonged delay in
disposal of bail applications/anticipatory bail applications; Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; Expeditious disposal of bail
and anticipatory bail applications; Custodial interrogation essential;
Personal liberty; Anticipatory bail rejected; Long delay in initiation
of proceedings, Alleged abuse of official position; Mutation entries
certified; Mutation entries cancelled; Forged documents, Illegal
transfer of ownership of immovable property.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4004 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.07.2025 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in ABA No. 1790 of 2019
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 985
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
With
Criminal Appeal No. 4005 of 2025
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ardhendhumauli Kumar Prasad, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Phanse,
Kaustubh Patil, Ms. Preet Phanse, Ms. Vidhi Pankaj Thaker,
Prastut Mahesh Dalvi.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted in both the SLPs.
2. Both these criminal appeals arise from a common judgment dated
04.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay1 in
Anticipatory Bail Application Nos.1790 of 2019 and 1844 of 2019,
whereby the appellants’ applications seeking pre-arrest bail in
connection with F.I.R. No. 30/2019, came to be dismissed.
3. Based on a complaint lodged by one Vikas Narsingh Vartak, FIR
No. 30/2019 was registered on 26.01.2019 at Arnala Sagari Police
Station, District Palghar, Maharashtra against Mahesh Yashwant
Bhoir and others, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 463,
464, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 474 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 18602.
3.1. In the complaint, it was alleged that the complainant’s father,
Narsingh Govind Vartak died on 29.01.1978. Out of his five
brothers, four had died, and one Harihar Govind Vartak was
still alive. It was further alleged that the land bearing Survey
No. 29, Hissa No. 1 (Old) and Survey No. 233, Hissa No.1(A)
(New), admeasuring 1.46 hectares situated at Village Agashi,
was jointly owned by Narsingh Govind Vartak, Hari Govind
Vartak, Mahadev Govind Vartak, Parshuram Govind Vartak,
1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 For short, “IPC”
986 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Raghunandan Govind Vartak, Harihar Govind Vartak, along
with Purushottam Manohardas Shah, Amrutlal Manohardas
Shah, and Kantilal Manohardas Shah, and their names stood
recorded in the revenue records.
3.2. On 13.05.1996, a Power of Attorney was purportedly executed
in favour of Vijay Anant Patil (A2) by Narsingh Govind Vartak,
and his brothers, and another Power of Attorney was executed
in favour of Rajesh Kamat (A3) by the Shahs. On the strength
of these Powers of Attorney, on 18.05.1996, a sale deed was
executed by A2 and A3 in favour of Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir
(A1) for a consideration of Rs.8 lakhs. Mutation Entry Nos.
15177 and 15180 were recorded in 1996 on the basis of this
sale deed.
3.3. At the relevant point of time, the present appellants were
serving as Circle Officer and Talathi respectively in the Revenue
Department of the State of Maharashtra. Subsequently, a
revision application was filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer,
Bhiwandi seeking cancellation of the said mutation entries, and
by order dated 30.09.1998, Mutation Entry Nos. 15177 and
15180 were accordingly cancelled.
4. The appellants were not initially named in the FIR. They were later
arraigned as Accused Nos. 5 and 6 on allegations that, in their
official capacity, they had certified the said mutation entries on the
basis of forged documents, thereby facilitating the illegal transfer
of ownership of the immovable property. Apprehending arrest, they
preferred Anticipatory Bail Application Nos.561 and 562 of 2019
before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Vasai3. By order
dated 06.06.2019, the Sessions Court granted interim protection
to them. However, upon hearing both sides, the Sessions Court,
by order dated 21.06.2019, rejected their applications. Aggrieved,
the appellants approached the High Court by filing Anticipatory
Bail Application Nos. 1790 and 1844 of 2019, in which, interim
protection was granted from time to time. Finally, by the impugned
judgment dated 04.07.2025, the High Court rejected the anticipatory
bail applications, but granted interim protection for a period of four
week, which expired on 01.08.2025. Thereafter, the appellants have
preferred the present appeals before this Court.
3 For short, “the Sessions Court”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 987
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted
that the appellants were originally not named in the subject F.I.R
and there is a prima facie case for grant of anticipatory bail in their
favour. On 16.08.2019 and 22.08.2019, the High Court granted interim
protection, which was periodically extended and lastly continued by
the impugned order dated 04.07.2025 for a further period of four
weeks, expiring on 01.08.2025.
5.1. It was contended that the appellants, who were serving as
Circle Officer and Talathi respectively at the relevant time and
have since retired, acted purely in their official capacity while
certifying mutation entries on the basis of a registered sale
deed presented before them. They had no role in the creation
or execution of the alleged forged powers of attorney or sale
deed, nor any direct link with the subsequent transfer in favour
of A1. There is also no allegation of personal gain, dishonest
intention, or conspiracy. The only act attributed to them is
certification of mutation entries on the strength of facially valid
documents.
5.2. It was urged that in the absence of material to show knowledge
of forgery, dishonest inducement, or collusion, the essential
ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 463, 467, 468,
and 471 IPC are not attracted. Mere administrative endorsement,
without fraudulent intent, cannot amount to cheating or forgery.
The appellants neither created nor used forged documents, nor
induced any person to part with property. At best, the allegations,
even if taken at face value, may constitute a procedural lapse in
discharge of official duties, which does not give rise to criminal
liability.
5.3. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the very mutation
entries in question (Nos. 15177 and 15180) had been cancelled
by the Sub-Divisional Officer as far back as 30.09.1998. Once
annulled by a competent authority, those entries stood nullified
ab initio, leaving no continuing illegality or consequence. Thus,
no enduring wrongful gain or loss can be attributed to the
appellants.
5.4. It was further submitted that the FIR was lodged after an
unexplained delay of over 20 years from the alleged incident
of 1996. The complainant, being aware of the cancellation in
988 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
1998, remained silent for two decades. Such extraordinary delay
gravely prejudices the appellants’ right to a fair investigation and
defence, particularly as the allegations relate to administrative
acts performed in official capacity long ago. The delay
undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s case.
5.5. It was also urged that the entire case rests on documentary
evidence already in existence. Custodial interrogation of
the appellants, retired government officers with no criminal
antecedents, is neither necessary nor justified. Furthermore,
they are willing to cooperate with the investigation and furnish
all documents as required.
5.6. In support, reliance was placed on Siddaram Satlingappa
Mehtre v. State of Maharashtra 4 , wherein this Court
emphasised that anticipatory bail is intended to protect personal
liberty where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
accused will neither abscond nor misuse the concession of bail.
5.7. Accordingly, it was contended that the appellants have been
falsely implicated, that no offence is made out on the basis of
the FIR or the material on record, and that custodial arrest would
serve no purpose. Without considering these factors, the High
Court erred in rejecting the applications for anticipatory bail.
Therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside
and the appeals be allowed.
6. We have heard the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants and perused the record.
7. It appears that the original owners of the subject property, namely
the Shahs and the Vartaks, had expired between 1969 and 1990.
Nevertheless, powers of attorney were purportedly executed in the
names of the deceased persons, on the basis of which a sale deed
dated 18.05.1996 came to be executed in favour of Mahesh Yashwant
Bhoir (A1). Relying on the said sale deed, the mutation entries were
certified by the appellants (A5 and A6).
8. The FIR pertains to events of 1996-98 and the allegation against the
appellants is that, on the strength of forged and fabricated documents,
4 (2011) 1 SCC 694
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 989
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
fraudulent entries were made in the mutation register, facilitating
the illegal transfer of ownership. Initially, their names did not find
place in the FIR, however, they were subsequently, arraigned as A5
and A5. At the relevant point of time, the appellants were serving
as Circle Officer and Talathi, and they retired from service in 2013
and 2019 respectively. The FIR itself was lodged after a delay of
more than 20 years from the alleged incident, and no departmental
proceedings were initiated against the appellants either during their
service or after retirement. It is not in dispute that their anticipatory
bail applications remained pending before the High Court from
2019, and were finally dismissed by the impugned judgment dated
04.07.2025, though they continued to enjoy interim protection until
01.08.2025. It is also undisputed that the mutation entries certified
by the appellants had already been cancelled by the Sub-Divisional
Officer on 30.09.1998.
9. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that
the prosecution is vitiated by extraordinary and unexplained delay.
The complainant, having knowledge of the cancellation as early as
1998, remained silent for two decades. By the time, FIR No. 30 of
2019 was lodged on 26.01.2019, the mutation entries stood annulled,
leaving no subsisting illegality or wrongful gain. It was urged that
the only role attributed to the appellants is certification of mutation
entries in their official capacity, based on documents that appeared
facially valid. They had no involvement in the creation or execution
of the alleged forged powers of attorney or sale deed, nor did they
derive any personal benefit or act in collusion with the co-accused.
The appellants retired with unblemished records, and there are no
criminal antecedents against them.
10. It was the contention of the State before the High Court that A1 was
the direct beneficiary of the fraudulent transaction founded upon
forged powers of attorney. The appellants (A5 and A6), instead of
adhering to their statutory obligations under Section 15(2) of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, certified the mutation entries
thereby facilitating the transfer of immovable property. It was further
alleged that despite enjoying interim protection since 2019, the
appellants failed to cooperate with the investigation and prolonged
the proceedings.
11. We find that the High Court rightly noted that the alleged powers of
attorney were executed in 1996 long after the death of the original
990 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
owners and that the sale deed dated 18.05.1996 executed on the
strength of such documents, is prima facie vitiated, with A1 appearing
to be the direct beneficiary of such a transaction. The High Court
further observed that the appellants, while serving in the Revenue
Department, ignored their statutory duties and facilitated the mutation
in favour of A1, and hence, their conduct cannot be brushed aside
as a mere procedural lapse.
12. We are conscious of the fact that whether the appellants shared any
criminal intent or abetted the acts of A1 is a matter for trial, and any
conclusive finding at this stage would be inappropriate. However,
while considering anticipatory bail, this Court must balance the liberty
of individuals against the legitimate requirements of investigation.
13. The plea that the mutation entries were cancelled in 1998, though
noted, does not efface the appellants’ alleged role in certifying those
entries in the first place – a matter that must be adjudicated at trial.
14. Although there has been a long delay in the initiation of proceedings,
the gravity of the allegations, the alleged abuse of official position, and
the prima facie findings of the High Court that custodial interrogation
is necessary, cannot be diluted merely on the ground of delay.
Even in a case based largely on documentary evidence, custodial
interrogation may be essential to trace the chain of transactions,
ascertain complicity, and prevent further suppression or tampering
of records. Moreover, the appellants, despite enjoying interim
protection for nearly six years, did not extend due cooperation to the
investigation. In these circumstances, we see no reason to interfere
with the judgement under challenge.
15. Apart from the relief of anticipatory bail, a significant issue that arises
for consideration herein is the inordinate delay in the disposal of the
appellants’ applications for anticipatory bail by the High Court. The
record discloses that the applications remained pending for several
years without any final adjudication, although interim protection was
extended to the appellants from time to time, including even after
the dismissal of the applications, until 01.08.2025. It is true that the
appellants themselves did not suffer prejudice, having continued to
enjoy interim protection. Nevertheless, this Court has consistently
underscored, in a long line of decisions, that applications affecting
personal liberty – particularly bail and anticipatory bail – ought not to
be kept pending indefinitely. The grant or refusal of bail, anticipatory
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 991
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
or otherwise, is ordinarily a straightforward exercise, turning on the
facts of each case. There is, therefore, no justification for deferring
decision-making and allowing a sword of Damocles to hang over the
applicant’s head. In matters concerning liberty, bail courts must be
sensitive and ensure that constitutional ethos is upheld. While docket
explosion remains a chronic challenge, cases involving personal
liberty deserve precedence.
16. In this context, we may refer to the following decisions of this Court.
In Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India5, Justice R. F. Nariman
while adverting to the Magna Carta in the context of pre-arrest bail,
observed as under:
“15. The provision for bail goes back to Magna Carta
itself. Clause 39, which was, at that time, written in Latin,
is translated as follows:
“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped
of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled,
or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will
we proceed with force against him, or send others to
do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals
or by the law of the land.”
It is well known that Magna Carta, which was wrung out
of King John by the Barons on 15-6-1215, was annulled
by Pope Innocent III in August of that very year. King
John died one year later, leaving the throne to his 9 year
old son, Henry III. It is in the reign of this pious King and
his son, Edward I, that Magna Carta was recognised by
kingly authority. In fact, by the Statutes of Westminster
of 1275, King Edward I repeated the injunction contained
in Clause 39 of Magna Carta. However, when it came
to the reign of the Stuarts, who believed that they were
kings on earth as a matter of divine right, a struggle
ensued between Parliament and King Charles I. This
led to another great milestone in the history of England
called the Petition of Right of 1628. Moved by the hostility
to the Duke of Buckingham, the House of Commons
5 (2018) 11 SCC 1
992 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
denied King Charles I the means to conduct military
operations abroad. The King was unwilling to give up
his military ambition and resorted to the expedient of a
forced loan to finance it. A number of those subject to the
imposition declined to pay, and some were imprisoned;
among them were those who became famous as “the
Five Knights”. Each of them sought a writ of habeas
corpus to secure his release. One of the Knights, Sir
Thomas Darnel, gave up the fight, but the other four
fought on. The King’s Bench, headed by the Chief Justice,
made an order sending the Knights back to prison. The
Chief Justice’s order was, in fact, a provisional refusal
of bail. Parliament being displeased with this, invoked
Magna Carta and the Statutes of Westminster, and thus
it came about that the Petition of Right was presented
and adopted by the Lords and a reluctant King. Charles
I reluctantly accepted this Petition of Right stating, “let
right be done as is desired by the petition”. Among other
things, the petition had prayed that no free man should
be imprisoned or detained, except by authority of law.
16. In Bushell’s case [Bushell’s case, 1670 Vaughan 135 :
124 ER 1006] , decided in 1670, Sir John Vaughan, C.J.
was able to state that : (ER p. 1007)
“The writ of habeas corpus is now the most usual
remedy by which a man is restored again to his
liberty, if he have been against law deprived of it.”
Despite this statement of the law, one Jenkes was
arrested and imprisoned for inciting persons to riot in
a speech, asking that King Charles II be petitioned to
call a new Parliament. Jenkes went from pillar to post in
order to be admitted to bail. The Lord Chief Justice sent
him to the Lord Chancellor, who, in turn, sent him to the
Lord Treasurer, who sent him to the King himself, who,
“immediately commanded that the laws should have their
due course”. (See Jenke’s case [Jenke’s case, (1676) 6
How St Tr 1189] , How St Tr at pp. 1207 & 1208). It is
cases like these that led to the next great milestone of
English history, namely, the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 993
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
This Act recited that many of the King’s subjects have
been long detained in prison in cases where, by law, they
should have been set free on bail. The Act provided for a
habeas corpus procedure which plugged legal loopholes
and even made the King’s Bench Judges subject to
penalties for non-compliance.
17. The next great milestone in English history is the Bill
of Rights, 1689, which was accepted by the only Dutch
monarch that England ever had, King William III, who
reigned jointly with his wife Queen Mary II. It is in this
document that the expression “excessive bail ought not
to be required…” first appears in Chapter 2 Clause 10.
18. What is important to learn from this history is that
Clause 39 of the Magna Carta was subsequently
extended to pre-trial imprisonment, so that persons
could be enlarged on bail to secure their attendance for
the ensuing trial. It may only be added that one century
after the Bill of Rights, the US Constitution borrowed
the language of the Bill of Rights when the principle of
habeas corpus found its way into Article 1 Section 9 of
the US Constitution, followed by the Eighth Amendment
to the Constitution which expressly states that, “excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. We may
only add that the Eighth Amendment has been read into
Article 21 by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh
Kumar v. State [Rajesh Kumar v. State, (2011) 13 SCC
706 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 836] at paras 60 and 61.”
16.1. In Rajesh Seth v State of Chhattisgarh6, the petitioner filed
an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C seeking anticipatory
bail, along with an I.A. seeking ex-parte ad-interim protection.
On 17.01.2022, while admitting the application, the High Court
directed it to be listed for final hearing ‘in due course’. Aggrieved
thereby, the petitioner approached this court contending that
till date, the matter had neither been listed for hearing nor
any order passed on the plea for interim protection during
6 SLP (Crl) 1247/2022
994 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the pendency of the anticipatory bail application. This Court
observed as under:
“When a person is before the Court and that too
in a matter involving personal liberty, least what is
expected is for such a person to be given the result
one way or the other, based on the merit of his case
and not push him to a position of uncertainty or be
condemned without being heard, when it matters.
When an application for anticipatory bail was listed
before the learned Single Judge, which was also
accompanied by an application for ad-interim relief,
the learned Judge should have decided the same one
way or the other, so far as the ad-interim prayer or
should have taken up for consideration after giving
some reasonable time to the State. Even if admitted,
the learned Judge should have listed the same for
final disposal on a specific date, keeping in view
the nature of relief sought in the matter. Not giving
any specific date, particularly in a matter relating
to anticipatory bail, is not a procedure which can
be countenanced. We are of the considered view
that this type of indefinite adjournment in a matter
relating to anticipatory bail, that too after admitting
it, is detrimental to the valuable right of a person.”
16.2. In Sanjay v. The State (NCT of Delhi) & another7, the
application for bail was filed on 24.05.2022, but was posted
to 31.08.2022 without granting any interim protection. Taking
note of this circumstance, this Court held as under:
“We are of the considered view that in a matter
involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to
pass orders in one way or other taking into account
the merits of the matter at the earliest.”
…..
7 SLP (Crl.) No. 5675 of 2022
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 995
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
“At any rate, posting an application for anticipatory
bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated.”
16.3. In Rajanti Devi v. Union of India8, this Court noted that the
Patna High Court had heard the anticipatory bail application
and reserved judgment on 07.04.2022. However, the judgment
came to be delivered only on 04.04.2023. Thus, the matter
remained pending for nearly one year after the conclusion
of arguments. This Court expressed strong displeasure that
an anticipatory bail petition could be kept pending for such
an inordinate period and underscored the importance of the
expeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applications.
The following paragraphs are apposite in this regard:
“5. Though, we are very much alive about the
magnitude of the bail applications being filed and
heard by the Courts at all levels, we cannot be
oblivious to the delay which takes place in the disposal
of the Bail applications. This Court, time and again,
has expressed great concern about the delay taking
place in the disposal of the bail applications and has
issued guidelines from time to time.
7. In a recent decision in the case of Satendra
Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
and Anr., (2022) 10 SCC 51, this Court has directed
to dispose of the bail applications in two weeks.
The said direction read as under: -
“100.11. Bail applications ought to be
disposed of within a period of two weeks
except if the provisions mandate otherwise,
with the exception being an intervening
application. Applications for anticipatory
bail are expected to be disposed of within
a period of six weeks with the exception of
any intervening application.”
8. Despite the aforestated guidelines/directions
having been issued by this Court from time to time,
8 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1595
996 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
it appears that the cases like the present one, keep
on happening and the bail applications are not being
heard expeditiously and if heard, are not being
decided within the stipulated time period.
9. In view of the above, it is directed that all the courts
shall scrupulously follow the directions/ guidelines
issued by this Court in the aforestated decisions.”
16.4. In Sumit Subhaschandra Gangwal & another v. the State
of Maharashtra & another9, this Court while dealing with
the issue relating to the inordinate delay in passing the order,
observed as follows:
“6. ...This Court has consistently right from the case
of Niranjan Singh and Another v. Prabhakar Rajaram
Kharote and Others, (1980) 2 SCC 559, held that
detailed elaboration of evidence has to be avoided
at the stage of grant/rejection of bail/anticipatory bail.
We do not appreciate such a lengthy elaboration of
evidence at this stage.
7. Another factor that needs to be noted is that though
the order was reserved on 25.01.2023, the learned
Single Judge of the High Court has pronounced the
order on 01.03.2023 i.e. after a period of one month
and one week.
8. It is always said that in the matters pertaining to
the liberty of citizens, the Court should act promptly.
In our view, such an inordinate delay in passing an
order pertaining to liberty of a citizen is not in tune
with the constitutional mandate.”
16.5. In Kavish Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh10, this Court had
occasion to consider the interim order passed by a Single
Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court on an application for
anticipatory bail filed by the petitioner – accused in respect
of offences under sections 420, 467, 468, 409, 471 and 34
9 SLP (Crl.) No. 3561/2023
10 SLP (Crl.) no. 16025/2023 with SLP (Crl.) No. 16047/2023
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 997
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
IPC. By the said order, while the matter was taken up for
consideration and the case diary was also called for, instead
of fixing a specific date for further hearing, the Court directed
that the case be listed “in its chronological order”. The operative
observation in the order reads as follows:
“1. This Court held and reiterated that decisions on
anticipatory bail applications / bail applications, are
concerned with the liberty and therefore, shall be taken
up and disposed of, expeditiously. On 21.02.2022 in
SLP (Crl) No.1247/2022, a Bench of three Judges
of this Court reiterated the same view. Virtually, this
Court deprecated the practice of admitting the bail
applications and thereafter deferring decisions on it
unduly. The case on hand reveals recurrence of such
a situation despite the repeated pronouncements of
this Court on very issue. In the case on hand, the
petitioner who is accused No.1 in F.I.R. No.218/2023
of Police Station Vidhan Sabha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
registered under Section 420 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Later, Sections 467,
468, 409 and 471, IPC were also added.
3. The aforestated order would reveal that on
06.12.2023, the matter was taken up for consideration
and after hearing the petitioner, it was admitted and
the case Diary was called for. At the same time, its
discernible from the order that the case was not
specifically posted to any date. What was ordered was
to list the matter in its chronological order. When the
matter would be placed before the Court for further
consideration, in such circumstances, is nothing but
a matter of guess.
4. We have no hesitation to hold that such an order
sans definiteness in the matter relating to anticipatory
bail/regular bail, that too after admitting the matter,
would definitely delay due consideration of the
application and such an eventuality will be detrimental
to the liberty of a person. It is taking into account
such aspects that this Court held that such matters
pertaining to personal liberty shall be taken up and
998 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
decided at the earliest. It is a matter of concern that
despite repeated orders, the same situation continues.
5. Hence, we request the learned Single Judge of the
High Court to dispose of the pending anticipatory bail
application, pending adjudication before him, on its
own merits and in accordance with law, expeditiously
and preferably within a period of four weeks from the
receipt/production of this Order. Till such time, we
grant interim protection from arrest to the petitioner.”
16.6. In Mahatab Ali v. State of West Bengal & Anr.11, the petitioner
therein, had been in custody for over one year and eleven
months. The High Court noted that only eight out of 43 charge-
sheeted witnesses had been examined, and that there was no
likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future. The State
opposed the bail application, citing the recovery of a gun and six
rounds of ammunition from the petitioner, coupled with forensic
evidence linking the ammunition to the bullet recovered from the
body of the deceased. It was further urged that the petitioner’s
bail had been rejected on two earlier occasions. The High Court,
however, held that prolonged incarceration without conclusion
of trial amounted to a violation of the accused’s fundamental
right to speedy trial and personal liberty. This Court affirmed
the said view, observed as follows:
“When there is a huge filing and pendency of the bail
applications, we wonder why regular bail applications
and anticipatory bail applications are being heard
by the Division Bench of this High Court especially
when in case of all other High Courts, the bail matters
are being heard by the learned Single Judges. The
question is whether two Hon’ble Judges of the High
Court should be devoting time for dealing with regular
bail applications.
We, therefore, direct the Registrar (Judicial) of the
High Court of Calcutta to place on record a report why
regular bail applications/anticipatory bail applications
are being heard by the Division Bench. He is directed
11 SLP (Criminal) Diary No. 60183/2024
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 999
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
to furnish the data of bail applications and anticipatory
bail applications filed in 2024 and pendency of such
applications as of today”.
16.7. In Ashok Balwant Patil v. Mohan Madhukar Patil & Ors.
Etc.12, the application for anticipatory bail remained undecided
for a period of more than four years. This Court, taking note
of the inordinate delay in considering the application, held as
follows:
“4. We are amazed with the speed in which the
application for anticipatory bail is considered by the
High Court of Bombay.
5. Initially, an ad interim anticipatory bail was granted
to the respondent(s) accused on 10.04.2019. The
matter came to be adjourned from time to time only
observing that on account of paucity of time, the
Court is not in a position to hear the matter. The only
effective order that is passed is on 17.10.2022, on
which day the time was given to the prosecution to
place on record the material in support of their case.
6. No doubt, that the liberty of a citizen is a most
important factor. However, at the same time, the
consideration of an application for permanent bail
on merits is also necessary. We, therefore, request
the High Court to take up the matter expeditiously
and decide the same finally within a period of one
month from today.”
16.8. In Amol Vitthal Vahile v. The State of Maharashtra13, the
accused, having remained in custody for over seven years,
preferred a bail application before the Bombay High Court.
The High Court, however, without entering into the merits of
the application, directed the applicant to approach the trial
court for bail. Aggrieved thereby the accused preferred a
criminal appeal before this Court. By a previous order dated
12 SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 1540/2024 dated 25.01.2024
13 Criminal Appeal No. 545/2024
1000 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
29.01.2024, this Court expressed concern over the failure of
the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate the bail
application on merits, and observed as follows:
“3. Needless to state that Article 21 of the Constitution
of India is the soul of the Constitution as the liberty of
a citizen is of paramount importance. Not deciding the
matter pertaining to liberty of a citizen expeditiously
and shunting away the matter on one or the other
ground would deprive the party of their precious
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
4. We have come across various matters from the
High Court of Bombay where the bail/anticipatory
bail applications are not being decided expeditiously.
6. We, therefore, request the Hon’ble the Chief Justice
of the High Court of Bombay to convey our request
to all the learned Judges exercising the criminal
jurisdiction to decide the matter pertaining to bail/
anticipatory bail as expeditiously as possible.”
16.9. This Court in Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani14
emphasized that anticipatory bail under section 438 is, inter
alia, a remedial provision safeguarding personal liberty, and
traced the evolution of the concept of anticipatory bail in the
following paragraphs:
“D. Analysis
(i) Evolution of the concept of anticipatory bail
23. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short
“the 1898 Code”) did not contain any specific provision
analogous to Section 438CrPC. In Amir Chand v.
Crown [Amir Chand v. Crown, 1949 SCC OnLine
Punj 20], the question before the Full Bench was
whether Section 498 of the 1898 Code empowered
the High Court or the Court of Session to grant bail
to a person who had not been placed under restraint
14 2024 INSC 669 : (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 1 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2453
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1001
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
by arrest or otherwise. The Full Bench answered the
reference as under: (SCC OnLine Punj)
“… The very notion of bail presupposes some
form of previous restraint. Therefore, bail cannot
be granted to a person who has not been
arrested and for whose arrest no warrants have
been issued. Section 498, Criminal Procedure
Code, does not permit the High Court or the
Court of Session to grant bail to anyone whose
case is not covered by Sections 496 and 497,
Criminal Procedure Code. It follows, therefore,
that bail can only be allowed to a person who
has been arrested or detained without warrant
or appears or is brought before a court. Such
person must be liable to arrest and must
surrender himself before the question of bail can
be considered. In the case of a person who is not
under arrest, but for whose arrest warrants have
been issued, bail can be allowed if he appears
in Court and surrenders himself. No bail can be
allowed to a person at liberty for whose arrest
no warrants have been issued. The petitioners
in the present case are, therefore, not entitled
to bail. The question referred to the Full Bench
is, therefore, answered in the negative.”
(emphasis supplied)
24. Under the 1898 Code, the concept of anticipatory
or pre-arrest bail was absent and the need for
introduction of a new provision in CrPC empowering
the High Court and Court of Session to grant
anticipatory bail was pointed out by the 41st Law
Commission of India in its Report dated 24-9-1969. It
observed thus in Para 39.9 of the said Report (Vol. I):
“Anticipatory bail
39.9. The suggestion for directing the release of
a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly
1002 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
known as “anticipatory bail”) was carefully
considered by us. Though there is a conflict
of judicial opinion about the power of a court
to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is
that there is no such power under the existing
provisions of the Code. The necessity for
granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because
sometimes influential persons try to implicate
their rivals in false causes for the purpose of
disgracing them or for other purposes by getting
detained in jail for some days. In recent times,
the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency
is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from
false cases, where there are reasonable grounds
for holding that a person accused of an offence
is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his
liberty while on bail, there seems no justification
to require him first to submit to custody, remain
in prison for some days and then apply for bail.”
We recommend the acceptance of this
suggestion. We are further of the view that
this special power should be conferred only on
the High Court and the Court of Session, and
that the order should take effect at the time of
arrest or thereafter.
In order to settle the details of this suggestion,
the following draft of a new section is placed
for consideration:
‘497-A. (1) When any person has a reasonable
apprehension that he would be arrested on an
accusation of having committed a non-bailable
offence, he may apply to the High Court or
the Court of Session for a direction under
this section. That Court may, in its discretion,
direct that in the event of his arrest, he shall be
released on bail.
(2) A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence
against that person shall, while taking steps
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1003
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
under Section 204(1), either issue summons or
a bailable warrant as indicated in the direction
of the court under sub-section (1).
(3) If any person in respect of whom such a
direction is made is arrested without warrant
by an officer in charge of a police station on an
accusation of having committed that offence,
and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at
any time while in the custody of such officer to
give bail, such person shall be released on bail.’
We considered carefully the question of laying
down in the statute certain conditions under
which alone anticipatory bail could be granted.
But we found that it may not be practicable to
exhaustively enumerate those conditions; and
moreover, the laying down of such conditions
may be construed as prejudging (partially at any
rate) the whole case. Hence we would leave it
to the discretion of the court and prefer not to
fetter such discretion in the statutory provision
itself. Superior courts will, undoubtedly, exercise
their discretion properly, and not make any
observations in the order granting anticipatory
bail which will have a tendency to prejudice the
fair trial of the accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. The suggestion made by the Law Commission
was, in principle, accepted by the Central Government
which introduced Clause 447 in the Draft Bill of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970 with a view to
confer express power on the High Court and the Court
of Session to grant anticipatory bail. The said clause
of the Draft Bill was enacted with certain modifications
and became Section 438CrPC.
26. The Law Commission, in Para 31 of its 48th
Report (1972), made the following comments on the
aforesaid clause:
1004 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“31. Point (vi)— Provision for grant of anticipatory
bail.—The Bill [CrPC Bill, Cl. 447.] introduces
a provision for the grant of anticipatory bail.
This is substantially in accordance with the
recommendation made by the previous
Commission [ 41st Report, Vol. 1, pp. 320-
321, Para 39.9.]. We agree that this would be
a useful addition, though we must add that it
is in very exceptional cases that such a power
should be exercised.
We are further of the view that in order to ensure
that the provision is not put to abuse at the
instance of unscrupulous petitioners, the final
order should be made only after notice to the
Public Prosecutor. The initial order should only
be an interim one. Further, the relevant section
should make it clear that the direction can be
issued only for reasons to be recorded, and
if the court is satisfied that such a direction is
necessary in the interests of justice.
It will also be convenient to provide that notice
of the interim order as well as of the final orders
will be given to the Superintendent of Police
forthwith.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. Section 438CrPC reads thus:
“438. Discretion for grant of bail to person
apprehending arrest.—(1) Where any person
has reason to believe that he may be arrested on
accusation of having committed a non-bailable
offence, he may apply to the High Court or
the Court of Session for a direction under this
section that in the event of such arrest he shall
be released on bail; and that Court may, after
taking into consideration, inter alia, the following
factors, namely—
(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation;
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1005
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
(ii) the antecedents of the applicant
including the fact as to whether he has
previously undergone imprisonment on
conviction by a court in respect of any
cognizable offence;
(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee
from justice; and
(iv) where the accusation has been made
with the object of injuring or humiliating
the applicant by having him so arrested,
either reject the application forthwith or issue an
interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail:
Provided that, where the High Court or, as
the case may be, the Court of Session, has
not passed any interim order under this sub-
section or has rejected the application for
grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an
officer in charge of a police station to arrest,
without warrant the applicant on the basis of
the accusation apprehended in such application.
(1-A) Where the Court grants an interim order
under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause
a notice being not less than seven days’
notice, together with a copy of such order to
be served on the Public Prosecutor and the
Superintendent of Police, with a view to give
the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity
of being heard when the application shall be
finally heard by the Court,
(1-B) The presence of the applicant seeking
anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time
of final hearing of the application and passing
of final order by the Court, if on an application
made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court
considers such presence necessary in the
interest of justice.
1006 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session
makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may
include such conditions in such directions in the
light of the facts of the particular case, as it may
think fit, including—
(i) a condition that the person shall make
himself available for interrogation by a
police officer as and when required;
(ii) a condition that the person shall not,
directly or indirectly, make any inducement,
threat or promise to any person acquainted
with the facts of the case so as to dissuade
him from disclosing such facts to the court
or to any police officer;
(iii) a condition that the person shall not
leave India without the previous permission
of the court;
(iv) such other condition as may be
imposed under sub-section (3) of Section
437, as if the bail were granted under that
section.
(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without
warrant by an officer in charge of a police
station on such accusation, and is prepared
either at the time of arrest or at any time while
in the custody of such officer to give bail, he
shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate
taking cognizance of such offence decides that
a warrant should be issued in the first instance
against that person, he shall issue a bailable
warrant in conformity with the direction of the
court under sub-section (1).
(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any
case involving the arrest of any person on
accusation of having committed an offence
under sub-section (3) of Section 376 or Section
376-AB or Section 376-DA or Section 376-DB
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1007
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
28. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying the Bill for introducing Section 438
in CrPC indicates that the legislature felt that it
was imperative to evolve a device by which an
alleged accused is not compelled to face ignominy
and disgrace at the instance of influential people
who try to implicate their rivals in false cases. The
purpose behind incorporating Section 438 in CrPC
was to recognise the importance of personal liberty
and freedom in a free and democratic country.
A careful reading of this section reveals that the
legislature was keen to ensure respect for the
personal liberty of individuals by pressing in service
the age-old principle that an individual is presumed
to be innocent till he is found guilty by the court.
[See: Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra [Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State
of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 514] .]
29. In the context of anticipatory bail, this Court,
in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre [Siddharam
Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011)
1 SCC 694: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514], discussed the
relevance and importance of personal liberty as under:
(SCC pp. 718-19 & 721, paras 36-37, 43 & 49-50)
“36. All human beings are born with some
unalienable rights like life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness. The importance of these natural
rights can be found in the fact that these are
fundamental for their proper existence and no
other right can be enjoyed without the presence
of right to life and liberty. Life bereft of liberty
would be without honour and dignity and it
would lose all significance and meaning and
the life itself would not be worth living. That is
why “liberty” is called the very quintessence of
a civilised existence.
37. Origin of “liberty” can be traced in the ancient
Greek civilisation. The Greeks distinguished
1008 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
between the liberty of the group and the liberty of
the individual. In 431 BC, an Athenian statesman
described that the concept of liberty was the
outcome of two notions, firstly, protection of
group from attack and secondly, the ambition
of the group to realise itself as fully as possible
through the self-realisation of the individual by
way of human reason. Greeks assigned the duty
of protecting their liberties to the State. According
to Aristotle, as the State was a means to fulfil
certain fundamental needs of human nature and
was a means for development of individuals’
personality in association of fellow citizens so
it was natural and necessary to man. Plato
found his “republic” as the best source for the
achievement of the self-realisation of the people.
***
43. A distinguished former Attorney General for
India, M.C. Setalvad in his treatise War and Civil
Liberties observed that the French Convention
stipulates common happiness as the end of
the society, whereas Bentham postulates the
greatest happiness of the greatest number as the
end of law. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution
averts to freedom and it enumerates certain
rights regarding individual freedom. These rights
are vital and most important freedoms which lie
at the very root of liberty. He further observed that
the concept of civil liberty is essentially rooted
in the philosophy of individualism. According to
this doctrine, the highest development of the
individual and the enrichment of his personality
are the true function and end of the State. It is
only when the individual has reached the highest
state of perfection and evolved what is best in
him that society and the State can reach their
goal of perfection. In brief, according to this
doctrine, the State exists mainly, if not solely, for
the purpose of affording the individual freedom
and assistance for the attainment of his growth
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1009
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
and perfection. The State exists for the benefit
of the individual.
***
49. An eminent English Judge, Lord Alfred
Denning observed:
‘By personal freedom I mean freedom of every
law abiding citizen to think what he will, to say
what he will, and to go where he will on his
lawful occasion without hindrance from any
person…. It must be matched, of course, with
social security by which I mean the peace and
good order of the community in which we live.’
50. An eminent former Judge of this Court,
Justice H.R. Khanna in a speech as published
in 2 IJIL, Vol. 18 (1978), p. 133 observed that
‘liberty postulates the creation of a climate
wherein there is no suppression of the human
spirits, wherein, there is no denial of the
opportunity for the full growth of human
personality, wherein head is held high and there
is no servility of the human mind or enslavement
of the human body.’ ”
30. In Kartar Singh [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899 : (1994) 2
SCR 375], a Constitution Bench of this Court held
that there is no constitutional or fundamental right
to seek anticipatory bail. In the said case, this Court
was called upon to consider the constitutional validity
of sub-section (7) of Section 20 of the Terrorists and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. The
Constitution Bench also looked into the validity of
Section 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P.
Amendment) Act, 1976 which deleted the operation
of Section 438CrPC in the State of Uttar Pradesh
with effect from 28-11-1975. In the aforesaid context,
Ratnavel Pandian, J. speaking for himself and on
behalf of four other Judges observed as under : (SCC
pp. 698-700, paras 326-27 & 329)
1010 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“326. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana
in Bimal Kaur [Bimal Kaur Khalsa v. Union of
India, 1987 SCC OnLine P&H 918 : AIR 1988
P&H 95 : PLR (1988) 93 P&H 189 : 1988 Cri
LJ 869] has examined a similar challenge as
to the vires of Section 20(7) of TADA Act, and
held thus : (SCC OnLine P&H para 108)
‘108. In my opinion Section 20(7) is intra
vires the provision of Article 14 of the
Constitution in that the persons charged
with the commission of terrorist act fall
in a category which is distinct from the
class of persons charged with commission
of offences under the Penal Code and
the offences created by other statutes.
The persons indulging in terrorist act
form a member of well organised secret
movement. The enforcing agencies find it
difficult to lay their hands on them. Unless
the police is able to secure clue as to who
are the persons behind this movement, how
it is organised, who are its active members
and how they operate, it cannot hope to
put an end to this movement and restore
public order. The police can secure this
knowledge only from the arrested terrorists
after effective interrogation. If the real
offenders apprehending arrest are able to
secure anticipatory bail then the police shall
virtually be denied the said opportunity.’
327. It is needless to emphasise that both
Parliament as well as the State Legislatures
have got legislative competence to enact any law
relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure. No
provision relating to anticipatory bail was in the
old Code and it was introduced for the first time
in the present Code of 1973 on the suggestion
made of the Forty-first Report of the Law
Commission and the Joint Committee Report.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1011
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
It may be noted that this section is completely
omitted in the State of Uttar Pradesh by Section
9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Uttar
Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act 16 of
1976) w.e.f. 28-11-1975. In the State of West
Bengal, proviso is inserted to Section 438(1) of
the Code w.e.f. 24-12-1988 to the effect that no
final order shall be made on an application filed
by the accused praying for anticipatory bail in
relation to an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term
of not less than seven years, without giving the
State not less than seven days’ notice to present
its case. In the State of Orissa, by Section 2
of Orissa Act 11 of 1988 w.e.f. 28-6-1988, a
proviso is added to Section 438 stating that no
final order shall be made on an application for
anticipatory bail without giving the State notice
to present its case for offence punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for
a term of not less than seven years.
***
329. Further, at the risk of repetition, we may add
that Section 438 is a new provision incorporated
in the present Code creating a new right. If that
new right is taken away, can it be said that the
removal of Section 438 is violative of Article 21.
InGurbaksh Singh [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC
(Cri) 465 : (1980) 3 SCR 383] , there is no
specific statement that the removal of Section
438 at any time will amount to violation of Article
21 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. The aforesaid decision was discussed in the course
of the hearing of this case for the limited proposition
that there is no constitutional or fundamental right
1012 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to seek anticipatory bail. Section 438CrPC is just a
statutory right.
32. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia [Gurbaksh Singh
Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 465 : (1980) 3 SCR 383] , a Constitution
Bench of this Court (speaking through Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, C.J., as his Lordship then was)
undertook an extensive analysis of the provision of
anticipatory bail. This Constitution Bench decision
can be termed as a profound and passionate essay
on how personal liberty under the Constitution can
be consistent with needs of investigations and why
this Court should avoid any generalisation that would
take away the discretion of the courts dealing with
a new set of facts in each case. Y.V. Chandrachud,
C.J. observed thus : (SCC pp. 575 & 579-81, paras
8, 12 & 14-15)
“8. … Attendant upon such investigations, when
the police are not free agents within their sphere
of duty, is a great amount of inconvenience,
harassment and humiliation. That can even
take the form of the parading of a respectable
person in handcuffs, apparently on way to a
court of justice. The foul deed is done when
an adversary is exposed to social ridicule
and obloquy, no matter when and whether a
conviction is secured or is at all possible. It is
in order to meet such situations, though not
limited to these contingencies, that the power
to grant anticipatory bail was introduced into
the 1973 Code.
***
12. … The legislature conferred a wide discretion
on the High Court and the Court of Session to
grant anticipatory bail because it evidently felt,
firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the
conditions under which anticipatory bail should
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1013
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
or should not be granted and secondly, because
the intention was to allow the higher courts in
the echelon a somewhat free hand in the grant
of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. That is
why, departing from the terms of Sections 437
and 439, Section 438(1) uses the language that
the High Court or the Court of Session “may, if it
thinks fit” direct that the applicant be released on
bail. Sub-section (2) of Section 438 is a further
and clearer manifestation of the same legislative
intent to confer a wide discretionary power to
grant anticipatory bail. It provides that the High
Court or the Court of Session, while issuing a
direction for the grant of anticipatory bail, “may
include such conditions in such directions in the
light of the facts of the particular case, as it may
think fit”, including the conditions which are set
out in clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (2). …
***
14. Generalisations on matters which rest on
discretion and the attempt to discover formulae
of universal application when facts are bound
to differ from case to case frustrate the very
purpose of conferring discretion. No two cases
are alike on facts and therefore, courts have
to be allowed a little free play in the joints
if the conferment of discretionary power is
to be meaningful. There is no risk involved
in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court
of Session and the High Court in granting
anticipatory bail because, firstly, these are
higher courts manned by experienced persons,
secondly, their orders are not final but are open
to appellate or revisional scrutiny and above all
because, discretion has always to be exercised
by courts judicially and not according to whim,
caprice or fancy. On the other hand, there is a
risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which
anticipatory bail may be allowed because life
1014 [2025] 9 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
throws up unforeseen possibilities and offers
new challenges. Judicial discretion has to be
free enough to be able to take these possibilities
in its stride and to meet these challenges. …
15. … While laying down cast-iron rules in a
matter like granting anticipatory bail, as the
High Court has done, it is apt to be overlooked
that even Judges can have but an imperfect
awareness of the needs of new situations. Life
is never static and every situation has to be
assessed in the context of emerging concerns
as and when it arises.”
17. In light of the foregoing discussion and the precedents cited, certain
clear principles emerge. Applications concerning personal liberty
cannot be kept pending for years while the applicants remain under
a cloud of uncertainty. The consistent line of authority of this Court
makes it abundantly clear that bail and anticipatory applications must
be decided expeditiously on their own merits, without relegating the
parties to a state of indefinite pendency. Prolonged delay in disposal
not only frustrates the object of Code of Criminal Procedure, but also
amounts to a denial of justice, contrary to the constitutional ethos
reflected in Articles 14 and 21.
18. We accordingly issue the following directions:
a) High Courts shall ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory
bail pending before them or before the subordinate courts under
their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within
a period of two months from the date of filing, except in cases
where delay is attributable to the parties themselves.
b) High Courts shall issue necessary administrative directions to
subordinate courts to prioritise matters involving personal liberty
and to avoid indefinite adjournments.
c) Investigating agencies are expected to conclude investigations
in long-pending cases with promptitude so that neither the
complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of
undue delay.
d) Being the highest constitutional fora in the States, High Courts
must devise suitable mechanisms and procedures to avoid
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1015
Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
accumulation of pending bail / anticipatory bail applications
and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance.
In particular, bail and anticipatory bail applications shall not be
kept pending for long durations without passing orders either
way, as such pendency directly impinges upon the fundamental
right to liberty.
18.1. The Registrar (Judicial) of this Court shall circulate a
copy of this judgment to all High Courts for immediate
compliance and prompt administrative action.
19. In fine, both appeals fail, and the impugned judgment of the High
Court rejecting the anticipatory bail applications is affirmed. However,
we clarify that the appellants shall be at liberty to apply for regular bail
before the competent court, and if such an application is made, it shall
be considered on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations
made by the High Court or by this Court in these appeals.
20. With the aforesaid directions and observations, the Criminal Appeals
are dismissed.
21. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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