Holding

A notification under Section 12 of the Army Act that permits women to join a corps cannot be supplemented by executive policies restricting the number of women, and recruitment must be based on a common merit list without gender‑based reservation.

Summary

The petitioners, two female candidates who ranked higher than a male candidate in the JAG Short Service Commission selection, challenged a notification that allotted only three vacancies for women against six for men, alleging violation of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. The Court examined whether, after a notification under Section 12 of the Army Act permitting women to join the JAG branch, the Union of India could impose additional limits through policy or administrative instructions, and whether the recruitment policy was truly gender‑neutral. It held that Section 12 authorises only the inclusion of women in specified corps and does not empower the executive to restrict the number of women officers, making the reservation of seats for men unconstitutional. The Court further declared that a common merit list must be prepared, as the selection criteria for men and women are identical, and that the policy of allocating at least 50 % of vacancies to women is a permissible corrective measure, not gender‑specific discrimination. Consequently, the petition was granted, directing the respondents to induct the female petitioners in the next JAG course and to publish a combined merit list.

Issues considered

Whether the Union of India may, by policy or administrative instruction, restrict the number of women officers inducted into a corps after a notification under Section 12 of the Army Act has permitted such induction.
Whether the current recruitment policy for the JAG course is ‘gender‑neutral’ or ‘gender‑specific’ within the meaning of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Army Act, 1950s. 12
Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.15, s. Art.16, s. Art.19, s. Art.33
Women’s Reservation Act, 2023

Headnote

Issue for Consideration (i) Whether after allowing induction of women in a particular corp or branch under section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, can the Respondents by way of a policy and/or administrative instruction restrict the number of women candidates joining the said branch; (ii) Whether the India with regard to enrolment of women in JAG course is ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-specific’. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Arts.14, 15, 16, 33 – Army Act, 1950 – s.12 – A notification u/s.12 of the Army Act, 1950 was issued for the

Subjects

Article 14 of ConstitutionArticle 15 of ConstitutionArticle 16 of ConstitutionRight to equalityGender neutralityInduction of women in JAGArmyIndirect discriminationCommon merit listAdmission deniedArmed forcesInternal administration instructionsGender discriminationConstitution and government policy towards womenMeritWaiver of fundamental rights

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1241 : 2025 INSC 954

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr.
v.
The Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (C) No. 772 of 2023)
11 August 2025
[Dipankar Datta and Manmohan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether after allowing induction of women in a particular
corp or branch under section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, can the
Respondents by way of a policy and/or administrative instruction
restrict the number of women candidates joining the said branch; (ii)
Whether the current policy of Union of India with regard to enrolment
of women in JAG course is ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-specific’.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Arts.14, 15, 16, 33 – Army Act, 1950 –
s.12 – A notification u/s.12 of the Army Act, 1950 was issued for
the JAG Scheme 31st Course, qua Short Service Commission
(‘SSC’) Course for Law Graduates – The said notification allows
induction of women in JAG, and notified three vacancies
for female candidates as against six vacancies for male
candidates – The notification, further, provides for separate
merit list for male and female candidates – In the instant case,
Petitioner No.2 (Female) who was ranked 4th with 477 marks
(Female Merit List) and Petitioner No.1 (Female) who was
ranked 5th with 447 marks (Female Merit List) denied admission
in preference to one male candidate who secured third rank
with 433 marks in the male merit list – The Petitioners through
this Writ petition sought to declare the aforesaid notification
as ultra vires Arts.14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution, further
publication of a common merit list irrespective of sex of the
candidate so as to give effect to ‘gender-neutral’ policy of
recruitment in JAG branch – Correctness:
Held: Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution form a
string of constitutional rights which firmly guarantee the right to
equality – The said Articles supplement each other and recognize
the right to equality of opportunity to all the citizens in matters

* Author
1242 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

relating to public employment irrespective of religion, race, caste,
place of birth or sex/gender – Article 33 of the Indian Constitution
carves out an exception to the aforesaid right to equality insofar
as it empowers Parliament to modify the Fundamental Rights
in their application to members of the Armed Forces – It needs
to be emphasised that such restrictions or abrogation must be
made by law passed by Parliament – It is by virtue of the power
conferred by Article 33 of the Indian Constitution that Parliament
has enacted the Army Act, 1950 – Section 12 of the Army Act,
1950 restricts the Fundamental Right of females to join the Indian
Army, except in such corps, department, branch or other body
forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular Army
as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf – Upon a harmonious reading of
Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 of the Indian Constitution and Section
12 of the Army Act, 1950, no woman is eligible for employment
in the regular Army, except in such corps, department, branch
or other body forming part of, or attached to any portion of the
regular Army as the Central Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf – Under Section 12 of
the Army Act, 1950, the Respondents had issued notifications on
30.01.1992 (published on 15.02.1992) and 31.12.1992 making
women eligible for appointment as SSC officers in the ten streams,
including JAG – Accordingly, SSC appointments for women in
the above ten (10) streams are limited to Combat Support Arms
and Services and not to Combat Arms like Artillery, Armoured
Division and Mechanised Infantry – Consequently, this Court is
of the view that once the Army permits women officers to join any
corps, department or branch forming a part of the regular Army,
it cannot impose an additional restriction with regard to ‘extent
of induction’ of women officers in the said corps, department or
branch — as Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 does not empower
it to do so – Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the
impugned notification to the extent that it provides for only three
(03) vacancies for female candidates, whereas six (06) vacancies
have been notified for male candidates is violative of Articles 14,
15 and 16 as well as Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 – Though
men and women candidates during the JAG selection procedure
appear before separate boards, yet as the selection criteria and
testing parameters of the fifteen (15) Officer Like Qualities are
identical, this Court is of the view that combined merit list ought
to be prepared. [Paras 39-41, 44-47, 83, 113]
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1243

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Constitution of India – Articles 14, 15, 16 – Army Act,
1950 – s.12 – Respondent No. 1 placed reliance on Internal
Administration Instruction dated 11.11.2011, which empowers
Service Headquarters to issue appropriate administrative
instruction on induction of women officers including the
extent of inclusion – Reliance was also placed on policy on
induction (Army HQ Policy) dated 14.03.2012, which prohibits
posting/attachment of women officers with Infantry battalions –
Correctness:
Held: Internal Administration Instruction dated 11.11.2011 and
policy on induction dated 14.03.2012 are untenable in law as they
are contrary to the statutory Notification issued under Section 12
of the Army Act 1950 and there is no legal backing for the same
in the Constitution or the Army Act, 1950 – Any restriction qua
the ‘extent of induction’ cannot be imposed by an administrative
instruction or policy decision of the executive as Parliament has
not conferred this right upon the executive under the Army Act,
1950 – Further, the Respondent’s reliance on an internal order
that was published thirteen (13) years ago is erroneous as similar
argument to treat women separately in the armed forces on the
basis of apparent physiological limitations, physical capability to
engage in combat and hygiene conditions has been rejected by
this Court in Babita Puniya. [Paras 51-53]

Constitution of India – Waiver of Fundamental Rights –
Whether permissible – Respondent No.3 submitted that once
the Petitioners had participated in the selection process and
failed to secure a suitable rank for appointment against the
vacancies so notified, they are deemed to have waived their
right to challenge the selection process:
Held: It is settled law that it is not open to the Respondent-Union
of India to contend that a person is not entitled to enforce his/her
Fundamental Rights, in particular his/her Right to Equality, because
he/she has waived it – It is always open to an aggrieved person to
challenge any policy or notification or statutory provision by filing a
writ petition under Article 226 or under Article 32 on the grounds that
it violates his/her Fundamental Rights – It is pertinent to mention
that the marks obtained by the candidates (both male and female)
were not placed in the public domain by the Respondent-Union of
India and it is only in course of this proceeding that the marks were
disclosed; hence, the Petitioners cannot be expected to know of
1244 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the illegality that crept in the process of selection before presenting
the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. [Paras 69, 70]

Words & Phrases – ‘Gender neutral’ and ‘Gender-specific’ –
Distinction – Whether the current policy of Union of India with
regard to enrolment of women in JAG course is ‘gender-neutral’
or ‘gender-specific’:
Held: ‘Gender-neutral’ in ordinary parlance means that no
discrimination shall be made between candidates on the basis of
gender or sex of an individual – The expression ‘gender-neutral’
is normally misunderstood and often thought to be synonyms with
the expression ‘gender-equality’ – A simple analogy to address the
difference would be that when an employer hires the same number
of men and women, it would be deemed to be following the policy of
‘gender-equality’; on the other hand, if the employer hires the best
candidate for the job regardless of gender/sex, it would be deemed
to be following the policy of ‘gender-neutrality’ – Consequently,
the concept of gender-neutrality does not just prohibit sex based
classification but it ensures that the most meritorious candidate
is selected for the job – Also, the principle of ‘gender-neutrality’ in
service does not preclude or limit deployment in any operational area
or role – The distinction between the two concepts, namely, ‘gender-
neutral’ and ‘gender-equal’ is well known to the Respondents and
the Respondents have accepted and implemented the ‘Gender-
Neutral Policy’ as against ‘gender-equal’ policy – On facts, held,
that male and female JAG officers do not have distinct cadres with
different conditions of service and the true meaning of concept
of ‘gender-neutrality’ and 2023 recruitment policy is that Union of
India shall recruit the most meritorious candidates in JAG branch
irrespective of their sex/gender as the primary job of this branch
is to give legal advice and conduct cases, but to ‘correct the past’
and to ‘compensate the women for their previous non-enrolment’,
the Union of India shall allocate not less than 50% of the vacancies
to women candidates. [Paras 88-90, 92, 114]

Constitution of India – Articles 14, 15, 16 – Army Act, 1950 –
s.12 – Whether Present Recruitment Policy leads to Indirect
Discrimination:
Held: To determine whether the recruitment policy is genuinely
gender-neutral or not, one has to look beyond formal level of
evaluation and take additional factors such as ‘impact’ or ‘effect’ into
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1245

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

account – Therefore, ‘genuine’ gender-neutrality lies in addressing
disparate effects of laws/policy/practice which appear to be facially
fair or equal – In Lieutenant Colonel Nitisha, this Court has held that
indirect discrimination is closely tied to the substantive concept of
equality and the focus in anti-discrimination enquiry has switched
from looking at the intentions or motive of the discriminator to
examining whether a rule, formally or substantively, ‘contributes to
the subordination of a disadvantaged group of individuals’ – It needs
to be clarified that the use of the terms ‘indirect discrimination’ is
not to refer to discrimination, which is remote, but is, instead, as
real as any other form of discrimination – The practice challenged
in the present petition results in indirect indiscrimination – The
practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates
has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which has been
historically discriminatory to women candidates – The result of
such practice is confinement of women candidates, irrespective
of their performance/merit, in their gendered category, thereby
being destructive of not just the Constitutional scheme under
Articles 15 and 16, but also of the concept of ‘gender-neutrality’
and ‘merit’ – Accordingly, despite their performance, the meritorious
women candidates are not being selected only due to their gender.
[Paras 93, 95, 98]
Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14, 15,16 – Constitution
and Government Policy towards Women – Discussed.
[Paras 72-82]

Case Law Cited
R. Viswan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1983] 3 SCR 60 :
(1983) 3 SCC 401; Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala [1999]
1 SCR 1121 : (1999) 3 SCC 422; K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; Basheshar Nath v.
Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Another
[1959] Supp. 1 SCR 528 : 1958 SCC OnLine SC 7; Gopika Nair
& Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., SLP (C) 3293/2023; Lieutenant
Colonel Nitisha and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [2021] 4 SCR
633 : (2021) 15 SCC 125 – relied on.
Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya & Ors. [2020] 3
SCR 833 : (2020) 7 SCC 469 – referred to.
Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of Bombay, ILR 1953 Bom
842; Babita Puniya v. Secretary & Anr., 2010 SCC OnLine Del
1116 – referred to.
1246 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Action Travail des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway Co.,
1987 SCC OnLine Can SC 37 : (1987) 1 SCR 1114; Taylor v.
Taylor (1875) 1 Ch.D.426; Nazir v. King Emperor, AIR 1936
PC 253 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Global Gender Gap Report, 2024; The Oxford Handbook of The
Indian Constitution; Article by C. Raj Kumar, The Times of India
dated January 7, 2025; How India Scaled MT G20 The Inside
Story of the G20 Presidency by Mr. Amitabh Kant.

List of Acts
Constitution of India, 1950; Army Act, 1950; Women’s Reservation
Act, 2023.

List of Keywords
Article 14 of Constitution; Article 15 of Constitution; Article 16
of Constitution; Right to equality; Gender neutrality; Induction
of women in JAG; Army; Indirect discrimination; Common merit
list; Admission denied; Armed forces; Internal administration
instructions; Gender discrimination; Constitution and government
policy towards women; Merit; Waiver of fundamental rights.

Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
772 of 2023
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Adv., Mandeep Kalra, Ms. Anushna
Satapathy, Ms. Radhika Jalan, Ms. Widaphi Lyngdoh, Yashas J,
Ms. Shweta Singh, Vaibhav Yadav, Paras Mohan Sharma,
Ms. Shefali Tripathi, Ms. Radhika Narula, Rishabh Lekhi, Vishal
Sinha, Ms. Ishita Chowdhury.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv., Mukesh Kumar
Maroria, Ms. Shagun Thakur, Kartikay Agarwal, Chitvan Singhal,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1247

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Raman Yadav, Ms. Sonali Jain, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Purnendu
Bajpai, Mukesh Kumar Singh, Dr. Dinesh Rattan Bhardwaj, Irshad
Ahmed, Mahesh Singh, Dr. Ashutosh Garg, Samarth Mohanty,
Abhisth Kumar, Pankaj Kumar Sharma, Ms. Vernika Tomar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Para Nos.
Primary issue .................................................................... 1
Arguments on behalf of Petitioners .................................. 2-7
Arguments on behalf of Respondent No.3 ........................ 8-10
Arguments on behalf of Union of India and Army ............. 11-24
Rejoinder ........................................................................... 25-31
Additional Arguments on behalf of the Respondents ....... 32-36
Order dated 08th May 2025 ............................................... 37
Reasoning .......................................................................... 38-110
Since notification issued under Section 12 of Army Act,
1950 permits women to join JAG, their number cannot be
restricted in the manner sought to be done ...................... 38-50
Circulars of 11th November 2011 and 14th March 2012 are
untenable in law ................................................................... 51-54
Argument that JAG Branch consists of primarily combatants
is misconceived .................................................................. 55-58
Field parity has been institutionalised ............................... 59-61
Argument that women officers are not posted where contact
with enemies is likely, has no basis .................................. 62-68
No waiver of fundamental rights ....................................... 69-71
Constitution and Government policy towards women ....... 72-82
Impugned notification is unconstitutional as it reserves
double the number of vacancies for males ....................... 83
1248 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

The professed policy of enrolment is gender-neutral and not
gender-specific ................................................................... 84-87
Distinction between gender-neutral and gender-equal ..... 88-92
Present recruitment policy leads to indirect discrimination ... 93-99
As the nature of tests of male and female candidates is
similar, a combined merit list ought to be prepared .......... 100-103
Constitutionally valid interpretation of the 2023 recruitment
policy implemented w.e.f. 2024 .......................................... 104
Merit-based selection will improve efficiency of JAG ........ 105-110
Conclusion .......................................................................... 111-118

Judgment

Manmohan, J.

PRIMARY ISSUE
1. The primary issue that arises for consideration in the present case is
whether Respondent-Union of India after having issued a Notification
under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 allowing induction of women
in the Judge Advocate General (‘JAG’) branch could have denied
admission to Petitioner No.2 (Ms.Astha Tyagi), who has achieved the
fourth (4th) rank with 477 marks and Petitioner No.1 (Ms. Arshnoor
Kaur), who has achieved (5th) rank with 447 marks in the merit list of
women candidates in preference to Mr. Himanshu Panwar who has
secured third rank with 433 marks in the merit list of men candidates,
but has obtained lesser marks than the female candidate placed at
Serial No.10 in the Females Merit List in pursuance to the notification
dated 18th January, 2023 for the JAG Scheme 31st Course, qua Short
Service Commission (‘SSC’) Course for Law Graduates (impugned
notification) on the grounds that the said Notification provides for
separate merit list for male and female candidates and provides for
only three (03) vacancies for female candidates, as against six (06)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1249

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

vacancies for male candidates. It is pertinent to mention here that
the Petitioners have sought not only a declaration that the impugned
Notification is ultra vires Articles 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Constitution,
but also publication of a common merit list irrespective of sex of the
candidate and implementation of a real and effective ‘gender-neutral’
policy of recruitment in the JAG branch instead of the subsequent
intake policy of the Respondents of having men and women officers
in the ratio of 50:50, which has been branded by the Respondents
as ‘gender-neutral’.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS
2. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel for the Petitioners
stated that the selection criteria for male and female candidates in the
JAG branch were not separate as they were assessed on identical
parameters. Only few indicators such as physical attributes were
different. He pointed out that the Service Selection Board (“SSB”)
procedure for male and female candidates is identical in content,
structure and evaluation, including the fifteen (15) Officer Like Qualities.
The relevant portion of the procedure and testing parameters of the
Officer Like Qualities considered by the SSB and the conduct thereof
for recruitment to the Indian Armed Forces is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“…. Note:
1. Each candidature is tested for the above mentioned
15 OLQs.
2. There are mainly three people who test candidates
for 15 OLQs they are: -
(a) Psychologist.
(b) Ground Testing Officer (GTO).
(c) Interviewing Officer.
Three officers are well trained in their fields to
undertake the task. They independently interact
with candidates to assess them for possessing the
15 OLQs.
The Psychologists do not physically interact with the
candidates but assess them on the answers given
by them.
1250 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

CONDUCT OF SSB

DAY ACTIVITY TEST TEST PROCEDURE REMARKS
CONDUCTED AND REASON FOR
TEST

Stage 1: This is a coarse filter. The aim is to retain only those candidates who
have the potential and fit to undergo detailed testing for four days. The Stage
1 selection system includes the following:

DAY Stage I 1. Intelligence 1. Intelligence Test Common
1 Screening Test Test for Men
This is a simple
(Intelligence and
2. Picture test of logic /
Test) Women
Perception analytical aptitude
Candidates
and based on which an
Discussion intelligence rating
Test ranging from I to V
is rewarded

2. Picture
Perception and
Discussion Test

Picture is flashed
for 30 seconds.
The candidates
have to broadly
note down seven
basis parameters
viz number of
characters, age,
sex, mood, action
relating to past,
present and future
for each character
in one minute.
Time for story
writing is four
minutes. The key
to performing well
in this test is the
accuracy of their
perception.

Discussion Test

In this phase batch
is divided into
different groups.
Strength of group
is around 15
candidates.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1251

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Each candidate
narrates his
individual written
story verbatim.
Subsequently,
in Part-II all the
candidates have to
discuss amongst
themselves and
achieve a common
consensus about
the characters
and theme of
the story. In this
phase, candidates
are evaluated
on their power
of expression,
clarity of language
(both grammatical
and logical),
confidence,
participation,
and their ability
to accept and
integrate others’
ideas.
Candidates who successfully clear Stage 1 proceed to Stage 2, which is
based on their individual performance in Stage 1, as well as the administrative
and logistical capacity of the selection center.

The stage-II tests comprise of three different techniques, namely the
psychological tests, group tasks and personal interview. It is emphasized that
in all the three techniques the assessment is of your personality which is
based on specified 15 OLQs (Officer Like Qualities).

DAY Stage-II The Tests conducted: Common
2 Psychological Psychological for Men
Test Test. i. Thematic and
Apperception Test Women
It is a test of your The (TATs) – 60 items: Candidates
mind. Candidate’s psychologist
answers are does not 12 Pictures including
required to be interact with one blank are
natural responses candidate shown. Candidates
and not nor does he are asked to write a
preconceived. know them by story around what
their physical led to the situation,
appearance what is going on
or attribute. and what would be
He assess the likely outcome.
personality Each Picture is
merely through shown
1252 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the inputs for 30 seconds
which and candidates are
candidates asked to write it in
give. 4 minutes. In the
blank side, they
have to think a
picture of their own
choice and write a
story around that.
ii. Word
Appreciation
Test (WATs) – 60
items:
In this test, a
series of 60 words
are shown to the
candidates one
after another for
15 seconds each.
The candidate is
required to write
down the first
thought or idea that
comes to his mind.
iii. Situation Reaction
Test (SRTs) – 60
items
This test consists
of 60 routine
life situations
regarding day
to day activities.
The situations are
printed in a booklet
and the candidate
is asked to write
his/her reactions
by completing the
sentences, as to
how they would
feel, think and act
in these situations.

iv. Self-Description
Test (SD).

Candidate is
asked to write
five separate
paragraphs on
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1253

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

each context about the
opinion of his parents/
guardian, friends,
teachers/superiors.

Aim of these tests is
to check for 15 OLQs
by Psychologists
independently

Day Stage-II GTO 1. Group 1. Group Discussion Common
3&4 Test Discussion (GD): for Men
(GD): and
Two topics of Women
2. Group common interest Candidates
Planning (social issues and
Exercise current events) are
(GPE) discussed.

3. Progressive It is an informal
Group Task discussion and not
(PGT) a debate. Each
topic is allotted 20
4. Snake/ minutes each. No
Group definite conclusion
Obstacle is required to be
Race deduced. There
5. Lecturette is no standard
answer.
6. Half Group
Task (HGT) Done: To assess
communication
7. Individual skills, ability to
Obstacles express opinions,
Task (IOT) and listen to
others.
8. Command
Task 2. Group Planning
Exercise (GPE):
9. Final
Group Task It comprises of
five stages viz.,
explanation of the
model, reading of
the narrative by
GTO, five minutes
for self-reading
by candidates,
10 minutes for
individual written
solutions and 20
minutes for group
discussion.
1254 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Narration of the
group solution and
definite conclusion
is required.
Done: To evaluate
problem-solving
abilities, logical
thinking, and
teamwork.
3. Progressive
Group Task (PGT)
It is the first
outdoor task. A set
of four obstacles
with progressively
increasing level of
difficulties are to
be completed in
40 to 50 minutes.
Structures. Helping
material and load
are provided to the
group.
Done: To assess
teamwork,
leadership,
determination, and
physical stamina.
4. Snake/Group
Obstacle Race
In this task the
group is pitched
against each other
over a set of six
obstacles with a
snake like load to
carry.
Done: To assess
physical stamina,
coordination, and
teamwork.
5. Lecturette
It is an individual
task and the
candidate is
required to give a
short talk to the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1255

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

group. Three
minutes are
allowed to prepare
any chosen topic
from the 3-4 given
in the Lecturette
Cards for the talk.
Done: To evaluate
communication
skills, clarity of
thought, and
ability to present
information.
6. Half Group Task
(HGT)
It has one
obstacle similar
to progressive
group task with
helping material
and load to be
carried. Group is
divided into two
Sub Groups and
assigned the same
obstacle in turn in
such a way that
when one group is
working, the other
one is not allowed
to watch it. Time
allotted to each
sub group is 15
minutes.
Done: To assess
leadership,
delegation, and
ability to work
under pressure.
7. Individual
Obstacles Task
(IOT)
A set of 10
obstacles is set
to be tackled
individually.
Obstacles are
numbered from
one carries.
1256 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Each individual
is given three
minutes.

(In certain
instances, female
candidates may
be permitted
to complete 8
obstacles instead
of the full 10.
However, they
retain the option
to attempt the
remaining 2
obstacles, and
marks will be
awarded for
those obstacles
upon successful
completion.
Additionally,
candidates
may repeat
any obstacle,
provided that
all 10 obstacles
are completed
before attempting
again. It is further
stipulated that
the marking
scheme is
uniform for both
male and female
candidates. A
female candidate
who completes
8 obstacles shall
not be granted
marks equivalent
to those awarded
to a male
candidate who
completes all 10
obstacles. This
provision ensures
the integrity
of the testing
process, making
it Gender Neutral.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1257

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Done: To assess
physical fitness,
determination, and
problem-solving
skills.
8. Command Task:
Each individual
is nominated as
commander for
one task consisting
of one obstacle
similar to be
Progressive Group
Task Time given in
15 minutes.
Done: To assess
leadership
potential, ability to
take charge, and
motivate others.
9. Final Group Task
(FGT).
Task consisting
of one obstacle
similar to the
Progressive Group
Task. Time given to
complete this task
is 15-20 minutes
May include
scenarios involving
problem-solving,
decision-making,
and teamwork.
GTOs closely
observe the
way a candidate
participates in
various tasks
and builds a
personality
profile.
DAY Stage-II Interview Tested for 15 OLQs Common
2-4 Interview for Men
The interviews are and
Conc The interviewing normally conducted in Women
urre officer discusses the afternoon by the Candidates
ntly by way of Interviewing Officer
1258 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

questions and (IO), who
answers the is also one
opportunities you of the three
had in your life assessors. The
and the positive interviews will
or otherwise carry on from
benefit you have day 1 to day 4.
derived from Each candidate
them. It is a test is interviewed
of your heart. only once and
The interviewing is informed
officer is fairly about it well in
senior and advance. The
experienced atmosphere
in the armed throughout
forces. While he the interview
interacts with is relaxed and
you he discerns informal. The
whether you questions are
have the qualities generally based
required to be on everyday
an army officer. experience.
What you have
done till date
with regard to
your academics,
competitive
exams, your
achievements in
extracurricular
activities, your
interests in
life, sports
you play, your
feelings for your
parents, friends,
teachers and
society at large,
your general
knowledge and
awareness and
your physical and
mental fortitude
are all important
faces of his
assessment.

DAY Stage-II Confirmation Common
5 Conference test to select for Men
or reject the and
The three candidate Women
assessors have Candidates
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1259

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

individually
carried out their
assessment.
However,
there is no
discussion as
sharing of facts
of assessment
between
them not any
results of your
performance is
known to them or
anybody else at
the beginning of
the conference.
For the final
result on the
performance of a
candidate all the
three assessors
and all members
of the board
must interact
as also meet
the candidate
in person.
Thus, we have
the final board
conference.
During this,
this individual
assessments are
discussed and
a candidate’s
plus points and
weak qualities
are deliberated
upon in detail.
All aspects of a
candidate are
analyzed to see
if he/she has the
required qualities
to be trained to
become a good
armed forces
officer.

……”
1260 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

3. He emphasised that the Ministry of Defence in its Press Release
dated 17th March 2023 affirmed that employment in the Indian Armed
Forces is ‘gender-neutral’ and that there is no distinction in testing,
deployment or working conditions. The relevant portion of the Press
Release is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“Employment in Indian Armed Forces is gender neutral.
There is no distinction in the deployment and working
conditions of male and female soldiers in the arms and
services in which they serve. The postings are as per
organizational requirements and employment is as per
qualifications and service qualitative requirements.”
4. He also stated that the Union of India had repeatedly stated in its
counter affidavit that the selection process for JAG is ‘gender-neutral’
and is based purely on merit. In support of his contention, he relied
on para 25 of the counter affidavit which is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“25…...The process of shortlisting of candidates for
SSB is done on a gender neutral common cut off
marks obtained by the candidates in CLAT PG Exam.
Secondly the process of Stage I during SSB verily forms
part of a scientifically approved testing process by the
DIPR (Defence Institute of Psychological Research) which
is a premier National Institute responsible for creation and
sustenance of Selection process of Indian Armed Forces….
The process of merit formulation is based on Directorate
General Recruiting/Recruiting ‘A’ policy No 58538/
Recruiting P&C dated 31 Mar 2004 which has the approval
of the competent authority on whose behalf the Directorate
carries out selection of officers for Indian Army wherein
candidates are placed in order of merit purely based
on the marks obtained by them at the SSB.”
(emphasis supplied)

5. Thus, according to him, there is no rational basis to treat men
and women separately in JAG and any such attempt would be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. He stated that reference
to any ‘operational and functional requirements’ is baseless and not
supported by any justifiable reason or empirical data.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1261

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

6. He submitted that reserving additional seats for men in any public
examination is not permissible and violative of Articles 14, 15 and
16 of the Constitution. The relevant portions of Articles 14, 15 and
16 of the Constitution are reproduced hereinbelow: -
14. Equality before law. —The State shall not deny to
any person equality before the law or the equal protection
of the laws within the territory of India.
15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth— (1) The State shall
not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

xxx xxx xxx
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for women and children…...
16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment— (1) There shall be equality of opportunity
for all citizens in matters relating to employment or
appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be
ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State…..”
7. He submitted that seats can only be reserved for women in view of
Article 15(3). The other seats must be kept unreserved and filled
up exclusively through merit. In support of his submission, he relied
upon Dattatraya Motiram More Vs. State of Bombay, ILR 1953
Bom 842, wherein it has been held as under: -
“…...In our opinion, if that was the object of enacting art.
15(3), then art. 15(3) need not have been enacted at all
because if the special provision for women contemplated
by art. 15(3) were only those provisions which did not
discriminate against men, then no proviso to art. 15(1) was
necessary. Article 15(3) is obviously a proviso to art. 15(1)
and proper effect must be given to the proviso. It is true that
in construing a proviso one must not nullify the section itself.
A proviso merely carves out something from the section
1262 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

itself, but it does not and cannot destroy the whole section.
The proper way to construe art. 15(3) in our opinion is that
whereas under art. 15(1) discrimination in favour of men
only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of
art. 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible
and when the State does discriminate in favour of women
it does not offend against art. 15(1). Therefore as a result
of the joint operation of art. 15(1). and art. 15(3) the State
may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it
may not discriminate in favour of men against women……”

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.3
8. Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
Respondent No.3 pointed out that on 24th July, 2023, the instant writ
petition had been filed by the Petitioners, after having participated in
the selection process and having failed to secure a spot in the woman’s
merit list (ranked 4th and 5th) dated 14th July, 2023 for appointment
against the vacancies notified for JAG branch of the Indian Army,
31st Course, October, 2023, inter-alia on the ground that notification
was discriminatory as the vacancies notified for men were greater
(6) than those notified for women (3). He submitted that once the
Petitioners had participated in the selection procedure and failed
to secure a suitable rank for appointment against the vacancies so
notified, they are deemed to have waived their right to challenge
the selection procedure.
9. He stated that Respondent No.3 a successful candidate having
secured the 6th rank in the men’s merit list dated 21st July 2023, was
not made a party to the said writ petition.
10. He contended that Respondent No.3, who had bona fide participated
in the selection process and succeeded therein, was now on the
verge of losing the opportunity to join the Army for no fault of his. He
prayed that this Court may take a sympathetic view as Respondent
No.3 has now become overage and is not eligible to participate in
any further recruitment examination for the JAG branch.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF UNION OF INDIA AND ARMY
11. At the outset, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor
General (‘ASG’) fairly handed over marks of all the candidates (male
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1263

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

and female) as per merit list who had appeared in SSC (JAG-31)
Course. The mark lists are reproduced hereinbelow:-

MERIT LIST : SSC (JAG)-31 (MEN) COURSE (OCT 2023)
Vacancy as per Notification – 06
Merit Roll No Name DoB SSB
MARKS

1. 900525 SURYA DEV SINGH 27/12/1997 548
BHANDARI

2. 900023 AKASH 12/10/1998 485

3. 900039 HIMANSHU PANWAR 17/08/1998 433
4. 900482 PATH MEHTA 27/12/1999 431
5. 900130 RAJAS JANI 12/8/1996 425
6. 900096 SUNEET SINGH 8/12/1996 424
7. 900188 SOURABH SHUKLA 24/07/1997 404
8. 900020 AABID KHAN 28/03/1998 395
9. 900423 SANEER SINGH 4/10/1998 394
DAHIYA
10. 900216 UJJUAL SINGH 22/06/1998 392
11. 900123 HARSH KUMAR 29/05/1999 392
12. 900476 AMIT CHOUDHARY 14/10/1997 385
13. 900248 RITIK SHARMA 9/11/1998 382
14. 900613 SHAMS SIDDIQUI 23/08/1996 378
15. 900608 SHAMAL SANGAM 10/7/1998 374
16. 900332 ADEET SRIVASTAVA 6/12/1998 373
17. 900107 PUNEET JANGID 1/4/1999 369
18. 900094 ABHISHEK KANDWAL 25/02/1999 368
1264 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

MERIT LIST : SSC (JAG)-31 (WOMEN) COURSE (OCT 2023)

Vacancy as per Notification - 03

Merit Roll No Name DoB SSB
MARKS

1. 950016 VANISHA UPADHYAY 31-Mar-98 494

2. 950089 CATHERINE JIMMY 1-Dec-98 492

3. 950153 AMANATBIR KAUR 23-Feb-98 490

4. 950023 ASTHA TYAGI 27-Jul-99 477

5. 950245 ARSHNOOR KAUR 6-Nov-96 447

6. 950209 DEEKSHA TRIPATHI 19-Jul-97 447

7. 950145 SAMYUKTA MENON 30-May-97 446

8. 950007 LAVANYA YADAV 30-Aug-98 444

9. 950415 RASHMI KUMARI 23-Sep-00 438

10. 950114 SHRUTI PATHAK 2-Jul-96 437

11. 950057 NANDANI ANAND 21-Jan-99 429

12. 950077 SAUMYA KATARA 11-Jan-98 424

13. 950284 AISHWARYA SETHI 6-Aug-99 423

14. 950249 HIMANSHI CHOUHAN 13-Oct-98 421

15. 950477 KAJAL RAI SADANA 10-Jun-99 407

16. 950485 KAMNA CHOPRA 6-Jun-97 406

17. 950433 ANUSHRI SANTOSH 14-Jun-00 405
SHUKLA

18. 950159 VAISHALI TOMAR 19-Oct-97 402

19. 950033 PRIYANKA GOYAL 14-Sep-96 401

20. 950039 POOJA JANGRA 15-Jul-98 397
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1265

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

21. 950461 NEHA RATHORE 16-Feb-97 396
22. 950357 KIRANDEEP KAUR 5-Aug-97 392
23. 950168 RHYTHM SINGH 10-Jan-97 385
THAKUR
24. 950131 SHIVANI PATEL 18-Dec-98 366

12. Learned ASG submitted that maintenance of defence forces is a
sovereign function and it is up to the Service Headquarters to decide
the induction of Women Officers, including the ‘extent of induction’,
so as to ensure that fighting efficiency, combat effectiveness and
functionality of Armed Forces are maintained. She contended that all
JAG Officers are combatants and there is a likelihood of all of them
being deployed in combat. In support of her contention, learned ASG
relied upon Union of India’s Policy on Induction and Employment of
Women in Armed Forces dated 11th November 2011. The relevant
portion of the said Policy is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“2. Respective Services Headquarters will issue appropriate
administrative instruction on induction of women officers
including the extent of induction, so as to ensure that
fighting efficiency, combat effectiveness and functionality
of the Armed Forces are maintained.”
13. She emphasised that the services in Indian Army cannot be compared
with any other services, be it public or private. According to her,
determination of vacancies is based on war time requirement to
maintain optimal functional and operational need and thus, the same
is gender-specific and not ‘gender-neutral’.
14. She stated that initially Women JAG Officers on commissioning were
being posted in JAK LI (Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry) Regiment
Centre for a period of twelve (12) weeks only. She emphasised that
at that time i.e. in 1992 training of Women Officers for the combat
role was not a part of their induction and employment in the Indian
Army as it was not a permanent cadre. She stated that it was only
subsequently in 2008 that the Women Officers of JAG branch were
brought on par with male officers for grant of permanent commission.
15. She further contended that despite bringing Women Officers at par
with Male Officers for consideration of Permanent Commission,
1266 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

there was no change in its policy of not posting the Women Officer
in Combat Arms due to the peculiar requirement of Indian Army.
She emphasised that it is a conscious decision of the Government
of India to restrict the employment of Women Officers from being
posted in frontline combat deployment where contact with the enemy/
hostiles is likely. She stated that Women Officers are not posted to
Rashtriya Rifles Battalions and isolated posts engaged in conduct
of active operations, including Counter Insurgency Operations.
She stated that in view of Army HQ Policy dated 14th March 2012,
Women Officers of JAG Department, among others, do not undergo
the attachment with Infantry battalions [which is for a period of
eighteen (18) months]. She pointed out that at any given point of
time, approximately fifteen (15) JAG Male Officers are attached to
various infantry battalions to perform the combat duties. By way of
example, she stated that during Operation Pawan and Operation
Vijay, JAG’s Department officers were actively deployed alongside
Infantry Units. The relevant portion of administrative instruction dated
14th March 2012 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“ ADM INSTRS ON INDUCTION AND EMP OF WOs IN
ARMY
1. Reference Govt of India MoD letter No. 671/2009-
D(AG) dated 11 Nov 2011 regarding policy on
Induction and Employment of Women in Armed
Forces, copy enclosed.
2. In accordance with Para 2 of ibid Govt letter, Adm
Instrs on induction and employment of WOs are as
under:
(a) Tenure. 10 years extendable by 4 years with a
special provision for release on completion of
05th year of service, subject to approval of Army
HQ. During extended tenure, can be permitted
to seek release to take up civil jobs, pursuing
higher education, starting own business/joining
family business.
(b) Substantive Promotions
(i)Time based substantive promotions as
SSCOs to the ranks of Capt., Maj. And lt.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1267

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Col. on completion of 02, 06 and 13 years of
reckonable commissioned service. Mandatory
courses for grant of substantive ranks including
promotional exams as applicable to PC Offrs
will be applicable.
(ii) WOs commissioned in AEC & JAG will be
considered for PC in 10th yr. subject to passing
JAG Deptt. exam in case of JAG WOs.
(c) Physical Standards As per existing policy issued
by MT Dte.
(d) Adjustment of Seniority Adjustment of seniority
to the extent of shortfall in training vis-à-vis PC
offrs will be made at the time of grant of first
substantive rank of Capt.
(e) Leave

(i) Annual : 60 days
Leave
(ii) Casual : 20 days
Leave
(iii) Maternity : 180 days (for each
Leave confinement subject
to maximum of two
confinements/two
surviving children).
(iv) Child Care : Presently under
Leave consideration with
PPOC; will be added
subsequently on
implementation.

(f) Peace/Field Tenure As applicable to male
SSCOs
(g) Compassionate Posting Posting to be carried out
by MS Branch keeping in view career profile and
1268 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

org interest. Compassionate/spouse postings to
be managed as per extant policy.
(h) Field/CI No attachment with Inf units as
applicable to male SSCOs of ASC, AOC, JAG,
AEC, EME and Int. Corps.
(j) Posts to be Held While in Fd/CI Ops Area WOs
while being posted in fd/ CI ops areas should
tenant Regt/ Staff/ Adm/ Instrs appointments
in all situations except in frontline combat
deployment where contact with the enemy/
hostiles is likely. WOs would not be posted to
RR bns and isolated posts engaged in conduct
of active ops incl CI ops.
5. MS Branch will disseminate the extant Compassionate/
Spouse Posting Policy as mentioned in Para 4(g) above to
the environment in the interest of transparency, objectivity
and fair play.
6.These Admn. Instrs may be disseminated to the unit
level for strict compliance.”
16. She stated that subsequently, on revision of Policy on attachment
of Women Officers and to bring them on par with Male Officers, the
attachment period of Women JAG Officers in JAK LI Regimental
Centre was discontinued and their attachment in combat support
arms for seventy-eight (78) weeks was approved. The same is
provided vide IHQ of MoD (Army) dated 16th December 2022 and
12th February 2023. The policies dated 16th December 2022 and 12th
February 2023 are reproduced hereinbelow:-

A) Policy dated 16th December, 2022

“Tele:23333521 Apvl & Plans Br/Apvl-2
HQ ARTRAC
Room No 740
A Wing, Sena Bhawan
New Delhi-110011
PC-A/41006/YO Att (WOs) 16 Dec 2022
GS/MT-11
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1269

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

HQ ARTRAC/APPROVAL & PLANS BRANCH
APVL-2 (Erstwhile MT-11)
ADM INSTRUCTIONS ON POST COMMISSIONING
ATT FOR WOMEN OFFRS (WOs)
1. Pl ref:-
(a) MT Dte letter No A/41006/GS/MT-11 dated 22
May 1996.
(b) MT Dte letter No A/41006/GS/MT-11 11 Oct
2011.
(c) AG (Pers) letter No 32318/Misc/AG/PS-2 (a)
dated 14 March 2012.
(d) MT Dte letter No A/1410006/YO- Att (JAG)/GS/
MT-11 dated 05 Nov 2014.
(e) MS 9 Note no 04490/MS Policy dated 15 Jul
2022.
(f) MT-11 Noting No. PC-A/41006/YO att (Int) GS/
MT-11 dt 03 Dec 22.
2. The proposal for Att on Post Commissioning trg
modules for WOs has been analysed and has been
approved by the competent auth vide ref at 1 (f) on
03 Dec 22. The new att period will be at par with
the Male Offrs. Details are as under:-
(a) Att For WOs of ASC/AOC/EME. WOs of ASC/
AOC/EME will be att with parent units in fd loc
for the pd at par with male offrs of respective
arm/services.
(b) Regt Orientation for WOs of JAG Branch.
One week Regt Orientation at IML to be done as
part of YO’s course, without any change in the
course curriculum based on letter No A/41006/
YO-Att (JAG)/MT-11.
(c) Att with JAKLI RC of WOs of JAG Branch. In
view of new att being at par with male offrs, att
at JAKLI RC for 12 Weeks will be discontinued.
1270 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(d) Att of WOs of Int Corps. Int Corps WOs will
be att being at par with male offrs, for a period
of 52 weeks for SSCOs & 78 weeks for Reg
Offrs with Engrs/Sigs/AAD unit in fd.
(e) Approved Att Period. Approved att period for
the WOs of the Int Corps & JAG Branch is as
under:-

Ser Arm/ Engrs/Sigs Comd Total Remarks
No Service AAD Units HQ (in
of WOs in Fd (in (JAG Weeks)
weeks) Br) (in
weeks)
(a) Int 52 - 52 52 Weeks/1
Corps Yr Att for
WOs SSCOs
(SSOs)
(b) Int 78 - 78 78 Weeks/
Corps 1.5 Yrs for
WOs Reg Offrs
(Reg
Offrs)
(c) JAG 78 26 104 Total Att Pd
Branch will be 104
All WOs Weeks/2 Yrs

3. For info and necessary action pl.

Sd-X-X-X
(Sanjeev Tyagi)
Col
Col Apvl-2
For MGGS (Apvl & Plans)”

B) Policy dated 12th Feb 2023

“Tele:25018823 Integrated Headquarters of MoD
(Army)
Military Secretary’s Branch/MS-8B
South Block, New Delhi-110011
35393/WO/Policy/ 12 Feb 2023
MS 8B
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1271

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

POST COMMISSION ATTACHMENT OF WOMEN
OFFICERS (WOs)
1. Refer HQ ARTRAC/Approval & Plans Br/Apvl-2
letter No PC-A/41006/YO Att (WOs) GS/MT-11 dt 16
Dec 2022 and even No dt 06 Feb 2023 (copy encl)
2. HQ ARTRAC vide its letter u/r has been informed
about post commission att/posting of WOs getting
commissioned in Services, Int and JAG Br. The policy
will be implemented wef the next passing out course
from OTA, Chennai i.e, 29 Apr 2023. The detls are
as under:-
(a) WOs of ASC/AOC/EME WOs of ASC/AOC/EME
will have initial posting with respective parent
units in fd loc.
(b) WOs of Int & JAG Br. Approved attachment
period for WOs of Int Corps and JAG Br is as
under:-

S Arm/ Engrs/ Comd Total Remarks
No Service Sigs/ AAD HQ (weeks)
Units in Fd (JAG
(Weeks) Br)
(i) Int Corps 52 NA 52 52 weeks/
(SSCOs) 1 Yr
(ii) JAG Br 78 26 104 104 weeks/
(All WOs) 2 Yrs

3. Regt Orientation for WO of ASC/AOC/EME and
Int Corps will be as per existing instructions. Regt
orientation for JAG Br commissioned WOs will be
conducted at IML for one week duration as part of
YO’s course.
4. For info and necessary action please.

Sd-X-X-X
(MS Tomar)
Lt Col
AMS 8B
For Military Secretary”
1272 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

17. She submitted that the policy of the Government of India in not posting
the Women Officers in Infantry battalion has not been interfered
with by any Court of Law. In fact, the same has been upheld by the
High Court of Delhi vide its order dated 12th March 2010 passed in
Babita Puniya vs. Secretary & Anr., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1116,
wherein it has been held as under: -
“45. The Air Force after due sanction of the President of
India itself brought a policy into force for recruitment of
women. Similarly, the Army also recruited women though
there was no such policy decision as in the Air Force.
Thus, the policy decision was that women personnel should
be recruited in certain areas of operation of the Armed
Forces which are not in combat and other such services.
As to whether women ought to be recruited or not into the
Armed Forces and if so then in which areas of operation,
does fall within policy domain. There are countries which
have given opportunity to women even in combat areas
but there are social and cultural ethos which vary from
country to country. There has been continued debate and
analysis on induction of women in Armed Services even
in India. Thus, we are clearly of the view that it is not for
the Court to decide as to which areas of operation of the
Armed Forces should women be employed.”
18. She stated that the same has been upheld also by this Court
vide its order dated 17th February 2010 in Secretary, Ministry of
Defence vs. Babita Puniya & Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 469, wherein it
has been held as under: -
“74. Courts are indeed conscious of the limitations which
issues of national security and policy impose on the
judicial evolution of doctrine in matters relating to the
Armed Forces. For this reason, we have noticed that the
engagement of women in the Combat Arms has been
specifically held to be a matter of policy by the judgment
[Babita Puniya v. Ministry of Defence, 2010 SCC OnLine
Del 1116 : (2010) 168 DLT 115]of the Delhi High Court
and which is not in question in the present appeals…..”
19. She stated that it was in 2012 when accretion of two hundred
and fifty four (254) officers in JAG branch was sanctioned, it was
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1273

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

decided to induct Men and Women Officers in 70:30 ratio keeping
in view the functional requirement of Army from the perspective of
its operational preparedness and requirement of officers in Infantry/
Combat Battalions. This, according to her, broadened the base of
Officers of the rank of Lieutenant, Captain and Field/Acting Major
in combat arms enabling the organization for making officers
commissioned in the combat arms available for training/sharpening
and enhancing their skills in courses like commando course/Young
Officer’s course and other all arms courses without disturbing the
actual strength of the combat arms. Thus, she contended that the
requirement of vacancies in the JAG Department is gender specific
as it is a military necessity.
20. She stated that functioning of JAG branch cannot be seen in isolation
as mere legal advisors to military commanders during peace time.
She contended that JAG branch officials are combatant personnel,
who play an important role in operational preparedness of the Army
as they constitute a reserve for mobilisation.
21. She contended that from 2024 onwards, the intake of Men and
Women Officers in JAG branch has been recommended by a Study
Team of senior experts and senior officers at 50:50 ratio to bring
in gender parity in the JAG branch. The said Study Team’s 2023
report, which has been approved by the competent authority (and
brought into effect from 2024), has recommended that JAG branch
offers an ideal opportunity to have a ‘Gender-Neutral Entry’. The
relevant portion of the said 2023 report, handed over by learned
ASG during the hearing, is reproduced hereinbelow: -
“General
1. The history of women in the military is one that ex-
tends over 4000 years into the past, through a vast
number of cultures and nations. Women have played
many roles in the military, from ancient warrior women,
to the women currently serving in conflicts like the
Russia-Ukraine War. Indian women have often been
on the battlefield, Rani Durgawati of Gondwana and
Chand Bibi of Ahmednagar (during Akbar’s period),
Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi during the First War of In-
dependence in 1857, are a few examples of women
fighters from our history.
1274 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

2. The Indian experience of women in armed forces
as officers has been for about 79 yrs. They were
inducted as Medical Officers Cadre in 1943 and have
served with dedication and distinction. Induction of
women officers (WOs) in other branches of the three
Services started only in 1992 and now in year 2022
we have come a long way.

Background
3. In the background of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
orders dated 17 Feb 2020 and 22 Sep 2021 granting
PC to WOs and allotment of vacancies in NDA, there
is a need to holistically analyse the fallout of these
orders and formulate measures to include review of
cadre strength, modes of entry, service conditions etc.
In line with this, the extant study was ordered by AGs
Branch, IHQ of MoD (Army) and needs to carry out a
holistic appraisal of induction and employment of WOs
in Indian Army, post commencement of induction of
women cadets in NDA and grant of PC to WOs……

Scope of Study
6. Mandate of the Study Group. Study Group was
required to give its recommendations on the under
mentioned issues: -
(a) No of WOs as part of the overall officer cadre
in the existing Arms & Services where WOs
are being commissioned (less AMC/ADC/MNS).
(b) Identifying arm/service-wise billets/ appointments
in units/ HQs/ establishments, based on
functional requirements.
(c) Proposed yearly induction pattern (for next 10
years) through various entries to achieve desired
optimal strength of WOs, in consonance with
the desirable Regular to Support cadre ratio.
(d) Feasibility of extending entry types to women
candidates and determination of vacancies in
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1275

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

PCTAs, keeping in view the desirable Regular
to Support cadre structure.
(e) Grant of PC to SSC WOs while ensuring Regular
to Support cadre structure.
(f) Any other issue, which may emerge during
conduct of study and is felt critical in overall
cadre management planning.

xxx xxx xxx

11. The Operational Context. India is surrounded by
states inimical to our interests along the immediate
neighborhood. This implies that our Army is
mandated to maintain operational readiness to
undertake conventional operations along Northern
and Western Borders. Given the proxy war waged
by our Western adversary and the insurgency
movements in various parts of the Country, there
is 24x7 commitment of large quantum of forces
including Rashtriya Rifles (RR), Assam Rifles (AR)
units in addition to regular units and formations. All
Arms and Services are also required to contribute
large number of officers to RR and AR battalions.
Hence, there are major challenges with employment
of women in all ranks in our Army, unlike some of
the Western armed forces based on large scale
reservists.

xxx xxx xxx

15. Optimal Cadre Strength of Each Arm/Service.
(a) The optimal cadre strength of WOs in the ten
Arms & Services has been arrived at by using
three different approaches, as under: -
(i) Considering the functional capacity of each
Arm/ Service to absorb WOs considering
their role and employment towards
enhancing operational effectiveness.
1276 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(b) Considering the requirement of male officers to
man certain CT-II billets where WOs cannot be
employed/ are not being employed presently.
(c) Considering the ratio of women in World armies
with special reference to Asian countries.

xxx xxx xxx

21. Increase of Women Strength. The process for any
further increase should commence only once the
turbulence and career management issues post grant
of PC to women have matured and the number of
WOs who are unwilling to continue in service have
retired with all consequential benefits due to them.
Also, measures to make Short Service entry more
attractive are on the anvil. Only once these issues
have stabilized and their impact has been analysed
should the intake be calibrated/ increased.”
22. Therefore, she submitted that the induction and employment of
Women Officers in Indian Army, including JAG branch, has been
a progressive process keeping in view the Army’s operational
preparedness. According to her, to say that the policy of intake of
Men and Women Officers from 2012 to 2023 in the ratio of 70:30 or
now being 50:50 is discriminatory and volatile of Fundamental Rights
would not only be incorrect but would also transgress into the domain
of the executive which is the only competent and sole authority for
deciding the intake of Men and Women Officers in Indian Army.
23. She emphasised that as both male and female candidates are
assessed separately and independently, there cannot be a common
SSB Merit list.
24. She contended that the aspect of gender integration in the defence
services is an evolving process and is calibrated to the operational
needs and is subject to periodic review and studies. The intake
policies have evolved progressively from 70:30 ratio to 50:50 from
2024. This, according to her, is aligned with cadre health and
deployment restrictions, which is not arbitrary. She lastly stated that
any imposition of this Court’s own understanding of the concept of
parity or neutrality without factoring in operational imperatives would
undermine both command and control of the Army.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1277

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

REJOINDER
25. Learned senior counsel for the Petitioners contended that the
Respondents were misleading this Court by representing that being
a combatant is a pre-requisite for all JAG Officers as there is a
likelihood of all of them being deployed in combat.
26. He stated that the Union of India’s reliance on letter dated 14th
March 2012 issued by Adjutant General of the Indian Army as a
policy decision of the Union of India not to employ women officers in
frontline combat deployment is misplaced. He stated that the letter
does not have any statutory force and, in any event, cannot override
provisions of the Constitution and decisions of this Court.
27. He also contended that the stereotypes about psychological,
intellectual, and physical attributes in the letter dated 14th March
2012 reflect an outdated ‘15th century thought process’ of the
Respondents regarding how war and combat takes place in the
information age. According to him, any letter/standing instruction
which restricts women officers based on gendered assumptions is
ipso facto unconstitutional.
28. He further stated that the argument that men JAG officers undertake
eighteen (18) months’ attachment with infantry units and that similar
attachment is not done for women JAG officers is completely
unsubstantiated as no supporting documents have been filed to this
effect. Further, just based on the plausibility of a potential combat
deployment of any women officer, the same cannot be used as
a justification to deny equal opportunities. If this reason is taken
forward, the same can be made a basis to deny recruitment of
women across all non-combat positions in the armed forces, which
is baseless.
29. He pointed out that as of 2021, a statistic published by the Ministry
of Defence, Govt. of India, showed that the miniscule percentage of
women in the forces were as follows : 0.56% (Indian Army), 1.08%
(Indian Air Force), 6.5% (Indian Navy). He further stated that the
Respondents have presented a vague example of “one of the officers”
out of a total of approximately two hundred and eighty five (285)
officers as a Combatant Personnel, without specifying his place of
posting despite the fact that Operations Vijay and Pawan extended
across multiple regions, including Jammu & Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana
1278 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

and Himachal Pradesh. Furthermore, there is a complete absence of
details regarding the specific roles and responsibilities undertaken by
the officers in question. A mere reference to participation in operations,
without disclosing the nature of duties or the geographical area of
deployment, is insufficient. He pointed out that similar feats have
been achieved by women JAG Officers as under:
“A. List of JAG Women Awardees
a. Jyoti Sharma:
In 2019, Lieutenant Colonel Jyoti Sharma created history
when she was appointed as the first woman officer from the
Judge Advocate General (JAG) department of the Indian
Army to be deployed for a mission in a foreign country.
In November 2019, Lt Col Sharma was inducted with the
Government of Seychelles as a military legal expert.
b. Major Radhika Sen
In May 2024, Major Sen received the prestigious United
Nations Military Gender Advocate of the Year Award.
B. Achievements of other Women Officials:
• Captain Shiva Chouhan was posted at Siachen
Glacier, the world’s highest battlefield, which
demands extreme physical and mental endurance.
The deployment, by its very nature, contradicts the
notion that women are unfit for extreme terrain or
operational mobilisation.
• Group Captain Shaliza Dhami became the first
woman officer to command a frontline combat unit
in the IAF. Command of such units is inherently
mobilisation-oriented, involving high-stakes readiness
and strategic execution.
• Captain Abhilasha Barak was commissioned in 2022
as the first woman combat aviator in the Indian Army.
Her induction into the Army Aviation Corps, which
functions directly under combat conditions, nullifies
the argument that women cannot be deployed in
operationally intensive roles.”
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1279

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

30. He stated that if the aim is to ensure gender integration and allow this
to be an ‘evolving process’ where women officers are commissioned
in equal numbers in the armed forces, the impugned action devolves
the process one hundred (100) steps backwards when it should be
marching ahead.
31. In conclusion, learned senior counsel for Petitioners submitted
that even the 2024 Policy of Recruitment though labelled as
‘gender-neutral’ by the Respondents, was ‘in practice and in effect’
discriminatory towards women candidates. He prayed that since this
Court was examining the policy of recruitment in depth in the JAG
branch and the prayer clause in the writ petition was broadly worded,
it would be appropriate for this Court to expound the law and to give
an interpretation of the 2024 Recruitment Policy in accordance with
the Constitution of India and the Army Act, 1950.

ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
32. After the arguments had concluded and judgment had been reserved,
the parties filed their ‘Written Submissions’. The Respondent-Union
of India subsequently filed ‘Additional Written Submissions’ and
thereafter a ‘Final Arguments Note’. Since the Additional Written
Submissions and the Note contained additional arguments, the
matter was listed for further arguments.
33. During the course of further hearing, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned
ASG submitted that Article 33 of the Constitution of India provides
for power of Parliament to modify the Fundamental Rights for the
Armed Forces of Union of India. She submitted that in pursuance of
the said power, Parliament had enacted Section 12 of the Army Act,
1950 which specifically stipulates ineligibility of females for enrolment
or employment. Since considerable emphasis was laid on Article 33
of the Constitution and Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, the same
are reproduced hereinbelow:-
A. Article 33 of the Constitution of India
“33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred
by this Part in their application to Forces, etc.
Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the
rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to,-
1280 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(a) the members of the Armed Forces; or
(b) the members of the forces charged with the
maintenance of public order; or
(c) persons employed in any bureau or other organization
established by the State for purposes of intelligence
or counter intelligence; or
(d) persons employed in, or in connection with, the
telecommunication systems set up for the purposes
of any force, bureau or organization referred to in
clauses (a) to (c), be restricted or abrogated so as
to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and
the maintenance of discipline among them.

B. Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950
“12. Ineligibility of females for enrolment or
employment.—No female shall be eligible for enrolment
or employment in the regular Army, except in such corps,
department, branch or other body forming part of or
attached to any portion of, the regular Army as the Central
Government, may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specific in this behalf:
Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall
affect the provisions of any law for the time being in force
providing for the raising and maintenance of any service
auxiliary to the regular Army or any branch thereof in
which females are eligible for enrolment or employment.”
34. Consequently, according to her, women can be inducted in the Army
only by way of notification of the Central Government. She stated
that Government of India issued notification dated 30 th January
1992 vide Gazette Notification SRO – 11 dated 15th February 1992
and Notification dated 31st December 1992, issued vide Gazette
Notification SRO -1 dated 23rd January 1993, vide which women
became eligible for induction into ten (10) arms and services issued.
She, however, submitted that despite allowing induction of women in
a particular corp or branch under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950,
the Respondents can restrict the number of women candidates joining
the said branch by way of a policy or administrative instruction under
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1281

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

the guise of extent of induction. She emphasised that Union of India
is authorised to impose restriction on Fundamental Rights beyond
Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950.
35. In this hearing, it transpired that Petitioner No.2 (Ms. Aastha Tyagi),
during the pendency of the present petition, had been selected and
was working as a Trainee Officer in Indian Navy JAG-SSC. Therefore,
learned counsel for the Petitioners stated that he was under instruction
not to seek any relief qua Petitioner No.2 in the present proceedings.
The said statement was taken on record.
36. At that stage, Mr. Rana Mukherjee, learned senior counsel for
Respondent No.3 stated that since Petitioner No.2, namely, Aastha
Tyagi, had expressed her unwillingness to join the JAG branch of
the Indian Army, i.e., for the 31st Course, it would be proper for this
Court to adopt a lenient and a compassionate view with regard to the
two seats which had been kept vacant vide this Court’s order dated
04th August, 2023 and allow the Respondent No.3 and Petitioner
No.1-Ms. Arshnoor Kaur, to join the course in the two vacant seats.

ORDER DATED 08TH MAY 2025
37. After hearing the additional arguments, judgment was reserved on
08th May, 2025 and the following order was passed:-
“1. Arguments concluded.
2. Judgment reserved.
3. Prima facie, we are satisfied with the case set up by
the petitioner no.1 Arshnoor Kaur.
4. Accordingly, we direct the respondents to initiate
whatever action is required for the purpose of her induction
in the next available training course for being commissioned
in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Department of
Indian Army.”

REASONING
SINCE NOTIFICATION ISSUED UNDER SECTION 12 OF ARMY
ACT, 1950 PERMITS WOMEN TO JOIN JAG, THEIR NUMBER
CANNOT BE RESTRICTED IN THE MANNER SOUGHT TO BE
DONE
1282 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

38. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the
view that the primary issue that arises for consideration is whether
after allowing induction of women in a particular corp or branch
under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, can the Respondents by
way of a policy and/or administrative instruction restrict the number
of women candidates joining the said branch.
39. This Court is of the view that Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian
Constitution form a string of constitutional rights which firmly guarantee
the right to equality. The said Articles supplement each other and
recognize the right to equality of opportunity to all the citizens in
matters relating to public employment irrespective of religion, race,
caste, place of birth or sex/gender. Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination
on the ground of gender/sex, but clause (3) of Article 15 enables
the State to make “any special provision for women and children”.
40. Article 33 of the Indian Constitution carves out an exception to the
aforesaid right to equality insofar as it empowers Parliament to
modify the Fundamental Rights in their application to members of the
Armed Forces. But such modification is subject to Parliament by law
determining the permissible extent to which any of the Fundamental
Rights may be restricted or abrogated in their application to members
of the Armed Forces. The effect of Article 33 is to enable Parliament
to limit or abrogate the Fundamental Rights in their application to the
members of the Armed Forces. It needs to be emphasised that such
restrictions or abrogation must be made by law passed by Parliament.
41. It is by virtue of the power conferred by Article 33 of the Indian
Constitution that Parliament has enacted the Army Act, 1950. Section
12 of the Army Act, 1950 restricts the Fundamental Right of females
to join the Indian Army, except in such corps, department, branch or
other body forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular
Army as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf. In other words, the eligibility of women
for enrolment or engagement in the regular Army is conditional on a
notification being issued by the Central Government in terms of the
enabling provision of Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950.
42. Since Article 33 is an exception to Fundamental Rights, this Court
is of the view that any Act passed by Parliament under the said
power would have to be strictly construed/interpreted. Accordingly,
restrictions on the Fundamental Rights must be found in the Army
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1283

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Act, 1950 itself. Consequently, the extent to which restrictions
can be imposed on Articles 14, 15 and 16 has to be clearly ‘spelt
out’ in Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 and the Union of India is
authorised to impose restrictions on these Fundamental Rights only
to the extent of Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 and no more. This
Court in R. Viswan and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., (1983)
3 SCC 401 has in the context of Section 21 of the Army Act, 1950
held as under: -
“7…...Parliament was therefore within its power under
Article 33 to enact Section 21 laying down to what extent
the Central Government may restrict the Fundamental
Rights under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 19 (1), of
any person subject to the Army Act, 1950, every such
person being clearly a member of the Armed Forces.
The extent to which restrictions may be imposed on the
Fundamental Rights under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of
Article 19 (1) is clearly indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of Section 21 and the Central government is authorised
to impose restrictions on these Fundamental Rights only
to the extent of the Rights set out in clauses (a), (b) and
(c) of Section 21 and no more…..”
43. The aforesaid conclusion applies with equal vigour to Section 12 of
the Army Act, 1950.
44. Upon a harmonious reading of Articles 14, 15, 16, 33 of the Indian
Constitution and Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, this Court is of
the view that no women is eligible for employment in the regular
Army, except in such corps, department, branch or other body
forming part of, or attached to any portion of, the regular Army as
the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf.
45. Under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950, the Respondents had issued
notifications on 30th January 1992 (published on 15th February 1992)
and 31st December 1992 making women eligible for appointment as
SSC officers in the following ten (10) streams:-
i. Army Postal Service;
ii. Judge Advocate General’s Department;
iii. Army Education Corps;
1284 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

iv. Army Ordinance Corps (Central Ammunition Depots and Material
Management);
v. Army Service Corps (Food Scientists and Catering Officers);
vi. Corps of Signals;
vii. Intelligence Corps;
viii. Corps of Engineers;
ix. Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering;
x. Regiment of Artillery.
46. Accordingly, SSC appointments for women in the above ten (10)
streams are limited to Combat Support Arms and Services and not
to Combat Arms like Artillery, Armoured Division and Mechanised
Infantry. Neither the Petitioners nor this Court is insisting that Women
be enrolled in Artillery, Armoured Division and Mechanised Infantry
as they are not the corp or branch of the Army where the Central
Government has by notification permitted the women to join.
47. Consequently, this Court is of the view that once the Army permits
women officers to join any corps, department or branch forming a
part of the regular Army, it cannot impose an additional restriction
with regard to ‘extent of induction’ of women officers in the said
corps, department or branch—as Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950
does not empower it do so.
48. Further, on 26th September 2008, the Respondents issued a circular
envisaging the grant of Permanent Commission prospectively to SSC
Women Officers in the JAG Department and the Army Education
Corps. Subsequently, on 25th February 2019, the Respondents granted
Permanent Commission to SSC Women Officers in the remaining
eight (08) arms. This Court in Babita Puniya (supra) has held that
the grant of Permanent Commission to all ten (10) streams (including
JAG) is ‘is a step forward in recognizing and realizing the right of
women to equality of opportunity in the Army’.
49. Also, while making women officers eligible for appointment in such
streams, no notification has been published in the official gazette
laying down the ‘extent of induction’. It is settled law that ‘when a
power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must
be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance
are forbidden’ [See: Taylor Vs. Taylor : (1875) 1 Ch.D.426, Nazir Vs.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1285

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

King Emperor : AIR 1936 PC 253, Babu Verghese Vs. Bar Council
of Kerala : (1999) 3 SCC 422]. Accordingly, there is no basis to say
that women can be appointed ‘only up to a certain extent’ in such
streams.
50. Consequently, this Court is of the view that once the Service
Headquarters decides to induct women officers in a particular branch
or corp by way of a Notification under Section 12 of the Army Act,
1950, it cannot restrict their numbers and/or make a reservation for
male officers by way of a policy or administrative instruction under
the guise of ‘extent of induction’. Accepting the submission of the
Respondents would amount to ‘setting at naught’ the Notification
issued under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950.

CIRCULARS OF 11TH NOVEMBER 2011 AND 14TH MARCH 2012
ARE UNTENABLE IN LAW
51. As far as the reliance on Internal Administration Instruction dated
11th November 2011 and policy on induction dated 14th March 2012
are concerned, the same are untenable in law as they are contrary
to the statutory Notification issued under Section 12 of the Army Act
1950 and there is no legal backing for the same in the Constitution
or the Army Act, 1950.
52. As held hereinabove, any restriction qua the ‘extent of induction’
cannot be imposed by an administrative instruction or policy decision
of the executive as Parliament has not conferred this right upon the
executive under the Army Act, 1950.
53. Further, the Respondent’s reliance on an internal order that was
published thirteen (13) years ago is erroneous as similar argument to
treat women separately in the armed forces on the basis of apparent
physiological limitations, physical capability to engage in combat
and hygiene conditions has been rejected by this Court in Babita
Puniya, (supra) in paragraphs 65 to 70. The relevant portion of the
said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“65. ….

xxx xxx xxx
69. The submissions advanced in the note tendered to
this Court are based on sex stereotypes premised on
assumptions about socially ascribed roles of gender
1286 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

which discriminate against women…... Reliance on
the “inherent physiological differences between men and
women” rests in a deeply entrenched stereotypical
and constitutionally flawed notion that women are
the “weaker” sex and may not undertake tasks that
are “too arduous” for them. Arguments founded on the
physical strengths and weaknesses of men and women
and on assumptions about women in the social context of
marriage and family do not constitute a constitutionally
valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women
officers.….
70. These assertions which we have extracted bodily from
the written submissions which have been tendered before
this Court only go to emphasise the need for change in
mindsets to bring about true equality in the Army.….”
(emphasis supplied)

54. This Court is of the view that the legal position has undergone a
substantive transformation pursuant to the Babita Puniya (supra)
judgment, which upholds the right to equal opportunity and mandates
non-discriminatory consideration for Permanent Commission,
irrespective of gender. Also, if reliance is placed on the said policy,
any grant of Permanent Commission to women officers under
its provisions would stand vitiated, as Clause 2(a) of the policy
explicitly limited the induction of women officers to a tenure of ten
years. Consequently, not only is Clause 2(a) of the said instruction
inapplicable, but all other clauses of the said instruction and policy
are redundant and inapplicable.

ARGUMENT THAT JAG BRANCH CONSISTS OF PRIMARILY
COMBATANTS IS MISCONCEIVED
55. The Respondents’ argument that JAG branch consists of ‘exclusively
combatant personnel’ as they constitute a reserve for mobilisation is
misconceived as it runs contrary to the directions of this Court and
all policy decisions of the Respondents itself which have crystallised
the right of women to form part of all Combat Support Arms and
Services, to exclusion of ‘Combat Arms’ and recognised the right of
women to be treated as equals in all aspects of their employment
in the Army.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1287

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

56. This Court is of the view that the acceptance of the stand of the
Respondents would lead to exclusion of women officers from all
streams of the Army and have the consequence of allowing 100%
reservation for men in all streams on the ground that all posts in
the Army are Combatant posts. The same would also be inherently
unconstitutional and contrary to Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950 and
the Union of India’s stand of ‘evolving process of gender integration
of women’.
57. Consequently, as stated by the Respondents, the services in the
Army are classified into three broad categories: (i) Combat Arms; (ii)
Combat Support Arms; and (iii) Services. By their very nature, the
above ten (10) streams (including JAG) in which women are eligible
for appointment as SSC officers form part of the ‘Combat Support
Arms’ or the ‘Services’ category and not ‘Combat Arms’. Thus,
the contention of the Union of India that JAG officers are primarily
combatants and a reserve for mobilisation is not entirely correct.
58. Also, with a strength of over 1.4 million active, 2.1 million reserve and
1.3 million paramilitary personnel and with only about two hundred
and eighty five (285) JAG officers, it is an extreme stretch to claim
that because there may be JAG deployment at the time of war,
women ought to be excluded. This Court is further of the view that
there is no bar to such an off-chance deployment, but this still does
not provide a rationale to prevent JAG women from being inducted.

FIELD PARITY HAS BEEN INSTITUTIONALISED
59. While it is true that JAG male officers were initially posted with
Infantry Battalions for a period of two (2) years for regular officers
and one (1) year for SSC officers, it was modified to one and a half
(1.5) years for both regular officers and SSC officers by way of policy
dated 02nd May 2017.
60. JAG Women Officers were not sent for attachment with Infantry
battalions as per policy dated 14th March 2012.
61. However, subsequently, the policy relating to attachment of JAG
Women Officers with other corp or branches of the Army were brought
‘at par with the Male Officers’ by way of policies dated 16th December
2022 and 12th February 2023, as extracted hereinabove. They are
now trained under identical operational conditions, including logistics,
terrain and regimental structure. These admissions effectively
1288 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

dismantle the argument that only male officers receive “essential”
exposure. Field parity has already been institutionalised.

ARGUMENT THAT WOMEN OFFICERS ARE NOT POSTED WHERE
CONTACT WITH ENEMIES IS LIKELY, HAS NO BASIS
62. The argument that women officers are not deployed for counter-
insurgency or in counter terror forces such as Rashtriya Rifles and
Assam Rifles or are not attached to Infantry Units as they are not
expected to discharge the role of combatants in case of armed
conflicts has no legislative sanction/basis.
63. There is also no restriction on appointment of women in departments
in other Armed Forces which are ejusdem generis on the ground
that these posts are combative in nature. In fact, the Air Force has
continually opened new combat air force roles for women as fighter
pilots, helicopter pilots, etc.
64. It does not stand to reason that when women officers like Captain
Ojaswita Shree of the elite Parachute Air Defence Unit, Major
Dwipannita Kalita of highly specialised airbone medical unit of the
Indian Army and Flight Lieutenant Shivangi Singh (Pilot of Rafale
Jet) of the Indian Air Force can operate behind enemy lines with all
expected risks, why women officers in times of emergency cannot
be deployed for counter-insurgency or in counter-terror forces or
attached to Infantry/Artillery Units.
65. This is supported by the fact that the Indian Army entrusts women
officers with complex tasks, such as transporting convoys of 30 to
50 vehicles through militant-prone areas in Leh, Srinagar, Udhampur
and the North-East. For instance, Major Gopika Bhatti commanded
a convoy from Leh to Pathankot in 2010, overseeing Junior
Commissioned Officers and Jawans, managing logistics, arms, and
ammunition.
66. Women officers like Colonel Anshu Jamwal have also been actively
involved in UN Peacekeeping missions since 2004, serving in
combat zones like Syria, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Congo and Israel,
further illustrating their capability to perform in high-risk, operational
environments. Consequently, in the opinion of this Court, there
exists no legal or operational bar, express or implied, that restricts
deployment based on gender at peace locations.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1289

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

67. This Court understands that people always fear change. But as Bill
Gates, Microsoft co-founder famously said ‘people feared electricity
when it was invented. Didn’t they’.
68. Further, no one is suggesting, including this Court, that women
officers, once they are recruited in the Army, need special treatment
in the form of relaxed standards/criteria. This Court is only observing
that if women candidates are more meritorious than men in the JAG
entrance exam, then merit must be given a chance. If the women
officers do not conform the discipline or match up to standards
prescribed or expected of them, the Army shall be at liberty to act
as they would with regard to the ‘errant’ or ‘inefficient’ or ‘unfit’ male
officers in accordance with law.

NO WAIVER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
69. It is settled law that it is not open to the Respondent-Union of India to
contend that a person is not entitled to enforce his/her Fundamental
Rights, in particular his/her Right to Equality, because he/she has
waived it. It is always open to an aggrieved person to challenge any
policy or notification or statutory provision by filing a writ petition
under Article 226 or under Article 32 on the grounds that it violates
his/her Fundamental Rights. In K.S. Puttaswamy Vs. Union of
India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, it has been held that Part III of the Indian
Constitution which embodies Fundamental Rights is part of the wider
notion of securing the vision of justice of the Founding Fathers and as
a matter of doctrine, the rights guaranteed are not capable of being
waived. This Court also in Basheshar Nath Vs. Commissioner of
Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Another, 1958 SCC OnLine
SC 7 has held as under:-
“68. It is suggested that if a person, after waiving his
fundamental right to property and allowing the State to incur
heavy expenditure in improving the same, turns round and
claims to recover the said property, the State would be put
to irreparable injury. Firstly, no such occasion should arise,
as the State is not expected to take its citizens’ property or
deprive them of their property otherwise than by authority
of law. Secondly, if the owner of a property intends to give
it to the State, the State can always insist upon conveying
to it the said property in the manner known to law. Thirdly,
other remedies may be open to the State — on that I am
1290 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

not expressing any opinion — to recover compensation
or damages for the improvements bona fide made or the
loss incurred, having regard to the circumstances of a
particular case. These considerations, in my view, are of
no relevance in considering the question of waiver in the
context of fundamental rights. By express provisions of the
Constitution, the State is prohibited from making any law
which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution. The State is not, therefore, expected to
enforce any right contrary to the constitutional prohibition
on the ground that the party waived his fundamental right.
If this prohibition is borne in mind, no occasion can arise
when the State would be prejudiced. The prejudice, if any,
to the State would be caused not by the non-application
of the doctrine of waiver but by its own action contrary to
the constitutional prohibition imposed on it.”
70. It is pertinent to mention that the marks obtained by the candidates
(both male and female) were not placed in the public domain by the
Respondent-Union of India and it is only in course of this proceeding
that the marks were disclosed; hence, the Petitioners cannot be
expected to know of the illegality that crept in the process of selection
before presenting the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.
71. Consequently, Respondent No.3’s submission that the Petitioners
have waived their rights to challenge the impugned Notification is
untenable in law and that too when the violation of Fundamental
Rights in the present instance is egregious.

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS WOMEN
72. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, this Court will have to examine
as to what is the constitutional mandate and the policy of the
government with regard to status of women.
73. It is settled law that Articles 15 and 16 read together prohibit
direct discrimination between members of different sexes. No less
favourable treatment can be meted out to women on gender-based
criterion which would favour the opposite sex. The constitutional
mandate is infringed only where the females would have received
same treatment with males, but for their sex. However, Articles 14,
15 and 16 do not prohibit special treatment of women.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1291

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

74. As stated hereinabove, Article 15(3), which additionally allows
the State to make special provisions for women, has largely been
interpreted as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination or
what has been described as ‘positive discrimination’. However, in
some judgments like Dattatraya Motiram More vs. State of Bombay
(supra), Article 15(3) has been interpreted as a part of the equality
provisions as a whole, so that the differential treatment authorised
by this Article is not an exception, but a part of equality.
75. According to ‘The Oxford Handbook of The Indian Constitution’
there are three very different approaches to the question of gender
difference and equality namely: protectionist, sameness and
compensatory. In the first approach, women are understood as
different from men—more specifically, as weaker, subordinate, and in
need of protection. In the name of protecting women, this approach
often serves to reinforce their subordinate status.
76. The second approach is an equal treatment or sameness approach.
In this approach, women are understood as the same as men—that
is to say, for the purposes of law, they are the same and must be
treated the same. In this approach, any legislation or practice that
treats women differently from men is seen to violate the equality
guarantees.
77. In the third approach, women are understood as a historically
disadvantaged group, and as such, in need of compensatory or
corrective treatment. In this approach, rules or practices that treat
women differently from men can be upheld, if such rules or practices
are designed to improve the position of women. Proponents of this
compensatory approach attempt to illustrate how the ostensibly
‘gender-neutral’ rules of the formal equality approach are not gender-
neutral at all—but rather, based on male standards and values. In
such a model, women will only qualify for equality to the extent that
they can conform to these male values and standards. Thus, the
compensatory approach argues that gender differences must be
considered in order to produce substantive equality for women.
78. Women make up slightly less than half (48.4%) of India’s population
but contribute less than a fifth (18%) of GDP, per world Economic
Forum’s (WEF) 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, which also shows
that purely in terms of gender gap in economic participation, India
ranks 142nd among 146 countries. In terms of overall gender gap –
1292 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

which also includes education, political participation and health and
survival – India stands at 129th out of 146 countries. [See: Article by
C. Raj Kumar, The Times of India dated January 7, 2025].
79. Consequently, the Government of India has in pursuit of creating a
more inclusive society, in the last decade implemented a series of
proactive policies and programmes aimed at empowering women
across various spheres. Key initiatives such as the Women’s
Reservation Act 2023 reflect the commitment to tangible action.
The Act 2023, a landmark in India’s legislative landscape, seeks to
enhance women’s representation in political spheres, ensuring their
voices contribute significantly to decision-making processes.
80. In fact, India celebrated its 75th Republic Day on January 26, 2024,
displaying the prowess of its armed forces and cultural richness and
‘Nari Shakti’. With the themes of ‘Viksit Bharat’ and ‘Bharat – Loktantra
ki Matruka’, the 75th Republic Day parade was women-centric.
81. Recently, India’s presidency of The Group of Twenty (G20), inspired
by vision of an Amritkaal where Nari Shakti (the power of women),
endeavoured to shift the global focus from old UN terminology
of gender equality and women’s development to women-led
development. India’s presidency of G20 was celebrated for negotiating
impactful outcomes centered on global empowerment of women.
Mr. Amitabh Kant (India’s G20 Sherpa) in his recent book “How
India Scaled MT G20 The Inside Story of the G20 Presidency” has
written as under:-
“Instead of viewing women solely as recipients of
opportunities, there was a fundamental shift towards
recognizing their role as leaders and changemakers. This
wasn’t merely a rhetorical adjustment, but a call to action
necessitating concrete policies that positioned women
at the forefront of decision-making processes, thereby
challenging and transforming existing systems. This was
evident at the G20 tables, where discussions emphasized
the need for women to lead the discourse and shape the
socio-economic landscape. To create a world where women
wield substantial influence, recognized the importance of
moving beyond inclusion to active participation….
However, promoting women-led development faced
significant challenges. Many countries insisted on UN
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1293

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

terminology like ‘gender equality’ and argued against
women-led development. Our push for women-led
development met severe resistance, but through ambitious,
aggressive, forward-looking negotiations, we saw women-
led development through.….
…...The NDLD (‘New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration’)
underscored the essential role of gender equality and female
leadership, emphasizing how empowering women and
girls could accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda.
India’s comprehensive strategy rested on four key pillars:
• The first, ‘Enhancing Economic and Social
Empowerment’, aimed to break down barriers
hindering women’s progress and ensure equal access
to resources.
• The second, ‘Bridging the Gender Digital Divide’,
focused on providing women with equitable
opportunities in the digital world.
• ‘Driving Gender-Inclusive Climate Action’ recognized
the unique challenges climate change poses for
women and incorporated a gender-sensitive approach
to climate initiatives.
• Last, ‘Securing Women’s Food Security, Nutrition, and
Well-Being’ addressed crucial aspects of women’s
health, emphasizing access to nutritious food and
healthcare.
These pillars formed a multi-faceted approach, showcasing
a holistic strategy for the global empowerment of women.”
82. Consequently, the constitutional mandate and the national as well as
international policy of the Government of India is to ensure that women
are not discriminated in any manner and a more inclusive society is
created by enhancing representation of women in all spheres of life.

IMPUGNED NOTIFICATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
RESERVES DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF VACANCIES FOR MALES
83. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the impugned notification
to the extent that it provides for only three (03) vacancies for female
1294 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

candidates, whereas six (06) vacancies have been notified for male
candidates is violative of Articles 14, 15 and 16 as well as Section 12
of the Army Act, 1950.

THE PROFESSED POLICY OF ENROLMENT IS GENDER-
NEUTRAL AND NOT GENDER-SPECIFIC
84. Another issue that arises for consideration is whether the current
policy of Union of India with regard to enrolment of women in JAG
course is ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-specific’.
85. As fairly pointed out by the learned ASG, a study team of senior
experts and senior officers in 2023 has examined afresh the ratio
of men and women in various branches of Indian Army to be
introduced with effect from the year 2024. The said study team’s
2023 report which has been approved by the competent authority
at the highest level has recommended that JAG branch offers an
ideal opportunity to have a ‘gender-neutral entry’. The annexure to
‘Holistic appraisal of induction and employment of women officers in
Indian Army post commencement of induction of women cadets in
NDA and grant of PC to women officers’ – (2023 report) succinctly
sums up its recommendation with regard to enrolment of women in
JAG branch as under:-
“JAG Dept
Appts. JAG presently consists of 75 WOs in the cadre str
of 285. The study gp feels that like AEC, JAG also offers
an ideal opportunity to have a gender-neutral entry.
A functional capacity of 142 WOs, has therefore been
recommended in the JAG Dept. Summary of functional
capacity is att as Annexure.”
86. Even in the counter affidavit filed by the Union of India in the present
case, it has been repeatedly stated that the selection process for JAG
is ‘gender-neutral’. In addition to para 25 of the counter affidavit as
pointed by learned senior counsel for the Petitioner and as quoted
hereinabove, in para 12 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated,
“That with regard to the statement made in para 4 to the petition, under
reply, it is stated that the Indian Army carries out an absolutely
fair, gender-neutral selection process for both Men and Women
candidates appearing for any of the officer entries. There are no
quotas for caste, creed, region, religion and place of birth. Right from
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1295

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

the step of accepting applications based on the merit of exam filter,
educational qualifications, testing process and degree of difficulty
for various tests, all steps involved in the selection process are
fair and gender neutral...…”
87. Consequently, the professed policy of the Respondents of enrolment/
recruitment in JAG branch is ‘gender-neutral’ and not ‘gender-
specific’ as contended by the Respondents during the course of
oral arguments.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN GENDER-NEUTRAL AND GENDER-
EQUAL
88. This Court is of the view that the expression ‘gender-neutral entry’
in the 2023 policy (which has been accepted and implemented by
the Respondents from 2024) is of significant import. ‘Gender-neutral’
in ordinary parlance means that no discrimination shall be made
between candidates on the basis of gender or sex of an individual.
The expression ‘gender-neutral’ is normally misunderstood and often
thought to be synonyms with the expression ‘gender-equality’.
89. A simple analogy to address the difference would be that when an
employer hires the same number of men and women, it would be
deemed to be following the policy of ‘gender-equality’; on the other
hand, if the employer hires the best candidate for the job regardless
of gender/sex, it would be deemed to be following the policy of
‘gender-neutrality’.
90. Consequently, the concept of gender-neutrality does not just prohibit
sex based classification but it ensures that the most meritorious
candidate is selected for the job. Also, the principle of ‘gender-
neutrality’ in service does not preclude or limit deployment in any
operational area or role.
91. It is pertinent to mention that during the hearing of Gopika Nair
& Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors., SLP (C) 3293/2023 relating to
the challenge of reservation for men in the Army Dental Corps, the
Respondents gave an undertaking to make the selection by applying
‘gender-neutral formula’ and by not restricting the entry of women
candidates to fifty per cent (50%) vacancies. The orders dated 11th
April 2023 and 08th May, 2023 in Gopika Nair (supra) case are
reproduced herein below:-
1296 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Order dated 11th April, 2023:
“Prima facie, we are of the view that the stand of the
respondent is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. Whereas the male candidates who have rank till
2394 are permitted to participate in the selection process,
in so far as the female candidates are concerned, the
cut-off rank is 235.
2. It is sought to be argued by Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned
Additional Solicitor General that this is on the ground
of various exigencies which are peculiar to the defence
services. It is submitted that taking into consideration this
aspect in the present selection process, only 10 per cent
seats are reserved for female candidates.
3. We find that an anomalous situation has arisen due to
such a stand. Whereas a male candidate who is 10 times
less meritorious than a female candidate is permitted to
appear in the selection process, a female candidate who
is 10 times meritorious than a male candidate is deprived
from being participating in the selection process.
4. Though, we have expressed readiness to hear the matter
finally, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for
the Union of India submits that taking into consideration
wider ramification, the matter will have to be heard at length.
He submits that the entire selection process is stalled
thereby depriving the service of dental surgeon to which
are necessary for the establishment of the defence service.
5. Prima facie, we find that depriving the highly meritorious
female candidates from participating in the selection
process is putting the clock in reverse direction. Leave
aside giving preferential treatment to the female as
envisaged under Article 15 of the Constitution of India,
the stand of the respondent-Union of India is violative
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, inasmuch as it
deprives a meritorious female to compete and permits
much less meritorious male to participate in the selection
process.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1297

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

6. In any event, learned Additional Solicitor General, on
instructions, has expressed willingness to conduct the
interviews of the present petitioners whose ranking in the
NEET (MDS) - 2022 is much below 235.
7. It is further stated that interview will be conducted within
two weeks.
8. List this matter on 03.05.2023.
9. We request the learned Additional Solicitor General
to place before us the result of the petitioners’ interview
alongwith the results of the interview of the other candidates.
10. Needless to state that after the interview of the
petitioners are conducted, the respondent would be free
to declare the results.”

Order dated 08th May, 2023:
“1. Shri K.M. Nataraj, learned Additional Solicitor General
(“ASG” for short) states that all the petitioners herein as
well as the petitioners before the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh were
interviewed by the respondents. As per the result sheet, three
of the female candidates find place in the list of 27 persons.
2. It is submitted that the said three female candidates
would be appointed as per their position in the select list
of first 27 candidates.
3. It is submitted that insofar as three seats reserved for
female category are concerned, they would be filled by
the female candidates as per their merit after the first 27
candidates are appointed.
4. It is further submitted that since there are other vacancies,
three more male candidates would be accommodated.
5. Learned ASG further submits that hereinafter the selection
would be made by applying gender neutral formula.
6. In that view of the matter, we find that the grievance of
the petitioners stands satisfied.
1298 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

7. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.
8. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.”
92. Consequently, the distinction between the two concepts, namely,
‘gender-neutral’ and ‘gender-equal’ is well known to the Respondents
and the Respondents have accepted and implemented the ‘Gender-
Neutral Policy’ as against ‘gender-equal’ policy.

PRESENT RECRUITMENT POLICY LEADS TO INDIRECT
DISCRIMINATION
93. Though the study report recommends a ‘gender-neutral’ entry in
JAG branch, yet it paradoxically recommends an intake ratio of 50%
(Men) and 50% (Women) for JAG branch with effect from year 2024
till year 2032 or till the time 50:50 cadre ratio is achieved whichever
is earlier.
94. This Court is of the view that the actual practice of recruiting equal
number of male and female candidates in JAG branch, though neutral
in form, is anything but gender-neutral in application and practice.
The policy, as per the evidence and empirical data before this Court
in the form of marks obtained by the candidates, shows that it has
adverse impact on women who are more meritorious than the male
candidates.
95. In fact, to determine whether the recruitment policy is genuinely
gender-neutral or not, one has to look beyond formal level of
evaluation and take additional factors such as ‘impact’ or ‘effect’ into
account. Therefore, ‘genuine’ gender-neutrality lies in addressing
disparate effects of laws/policy/practice which appear to be facially
fair or equal.
96. In Lieutenant Colonel Nitisha and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.,
(2021) 15 SCC 125, this Court has held that indirect discrimination
is closely tied to the substantive concept of equality and the focus in
anti-discrimination enquiry has switched from looking at the intentions
or motive of the discriminator to examining whether a rule, formally
or substantively, ‘contributes to the subordination of a disadvantaged
group of individuals’. It needs to be clarified that the use of the terms
‘indirect discrimination’ is not to refer to discrimination, which is
remote, but is, instead, as real as any other form of discrimination.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1299

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

While evolving a framework to assess claims of indirect discrimination,
this Court in Nitisha (supra) has held as under:
“70. A study of the above cases and scholarly works
gives rise to the following key learnings. First, the doctrine
of indirect discrimination is founded on the compelling
insight that discrimination can often be a function, not of
conscious design or malicious intent, but unconscious/
implicit biases or an inability to recognise how existing
structures/institutions, and ways of doing things, have
the consequence of freezing an unjust status quo. In
order to achieve substantive equality prescribed under
the Constitution, indirect discrimination, even sans
discriminatory intent, must be prohibited.
71. Second, and as a related point, the distinction between
direct and indirect discrimination can broadly be drawn on
the basis of the former being predicated on intent, while
the latter is based on effect (US, South Africa, Canada).
Alternatively, it can be based on the fact that the former
cannot be justified, while the latter can (UK). We are of
the considered view that the intention effects distinction
is a sound jurisprudential basis on which to distinguish
direct from indirect discrimination. This is for the reason
that the most compelling feature of indirect discrimination,
in our view, is the fact that it prohibits conduct, which
though not intended to be discriminatory, has that effect.
As the Canadian Supreme Court put it in Ontario HRC
[Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons Sears
Ltd., 1985 SCC OnLine Can SC 75 : (1985) 2 SCR 536] ,
requiring proof of intention to establish discrimination
puts an “insuperable barrier in the way of a complainant
seeking a remedy”. [Ontario Human Rights Commission v.
Simpsons Sears Ltd., 1985 SCC OnLine Can SC 75, para
14 : (1985) 2 SCR 536, para 14] It is this barrier that a
robust conception of indirect discrimination can enable
us to counteract.
72. Third, on the nature of evidence required to prove
indirect discrimination, statistical evidence that can
establish how the impugned provision, criteria or practice
1300 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

is the cause for the disproportionately disadvantageous
outcome can be one of the ways to establish the play
of indirect discrimination. As Professor Sandra Fredman
notes:“Aptitude tests, interview and selection processes,
and other apparently scientific and neutral measures might
never invite scrutiny unless data is available to dislodge
these assumptions.” [ Sandra Fredman, Discrimination
Law at p. 187] Consistent with the Canadian Supreme
Court›s approach in Fraser [Joanne Fraser v. Attorney
General of Canada, 2020 SCC 28 (Can SC)] , we do not
think that it would be wise to lay down any quantitative
thresholds for the nature of statistical disparity that must
be established for a claimant to succeed. Equally, we
do not think that an absolutist position can be adopted
as to the nature of evidence that must be brought
forth to succeed in a case of indirect discrimination.
The absence of any statistical evidence or inability to
statistically demonstrate exclusion cannot be the sole
ground for debunking claims of indirect discrimination.
This was clarified by the European Court of Human
Rights in a case concerning fifteen Croatians of Roma
origin claiming racial discrimination and segregation in
schools with Roma-only classes. In assessing the claims
of the fifteen Croatians, the court observed that indirect
discrimination can be proved without statistical evidence
[Orsus v. Croatia, 2010 ECHR 337, para 153] . Therefore,
statistical evidence demonstrating patterns of exclusion,
can be one of the ways to prove indirect discrimination.
73. Fourth, insofar as the fashion in which the indirect
discrimination enquiry must be conducted, we think that the
two-stage test laid down by the Canadian Supreme Court
in Fraser [Joanne Fraser v. Attorney General of Canada,
2020 SCC 28 (Can SC)] offers a well-structured framework
of analysis as it accounts for both the disproportionate
impact of the impugned provision, criteria or practice on
the relevant group, as well as the harm caused by such
impact. It foregrounds an examination of the ills that indirect
discrimination seeks to remedy.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1301

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

74. Fifth and finally, while assessing the justifiability of
measures that are alleged to have the effect of indirect
discrimination, the Court needs to return a finding on
whether the narrow provision, criteria or practice is
necessary for successful job performance. In this regard,
some amount of deference to the employer/defendant›s
view is warranted. Equally, the Court must resist the
temptation to accept generalisations by defendants
under the garb of deference and must closely scrutinise
the proffered justification. Further, the Court must also
examine if it is possible to substitute the measures with
less discriminatory alternatives. Only by exercising such
close scrutiny and exhibiting attentiveness to the possibility
of alternatives can a court ensure that the full potential of
the doctrine of indirect discrimination is realised and not
lost in its application.”
97. Further, this Court in Nitisha (supra) has referred with approval
the judgment of The Supreme Court of Canada, in Action Travail
des Femmes v. Canadian National Railway Co. [Action Travail des
Femmes v. Canadian National Railway Co., 1987 SCC OnLine Can
SC 37 : (1987) 1 SCR 1114] wherein it analysed the claim of woman
seeking equal employment opportunities in the National Railroad
Company. In echoing the mutually reinforcing consequences of
direct and indirect discrimination within organisational structures
as a systemic feature, the Court noted [Id. at SCR p. 1139] : (SCC
OnLine Can SC)
“… systemic discrimination in an employment context
is discrimination that results from the simple operation
of established procedures of recruitment, hiring and
promotion, none of which is necessarily designed to
promote discrimination. The discrimination is then
reinforced by the very exclusion of the disadvantaged group
because the exclusion fosters the belief, both within and
outside the group, that the exclusion is a result of “natural
forces”, for example, that women “just can’t do the job”…
To combat systemic discrimination, it is essential to create
a climate in which both negative practices and negative
attitudes can be challenged and discouraged.”
1302 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

98. Keeping the above noted analytical framework in consideration,
this Court is of the opinion that the practice challenged in the
present petition results in indirect indiscrimination. The practice
of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the
effect of perpetuating the status quo, which has been historically
discriminatory to women candidates. The result of such practice is
confinement of women candidates, irrespective of their performance/
merit, in their gendered category, thereby being destructive of not
just the Constitutional scheme under Articles 15 and 16 as noted
hereinabove, but also of the concept of ‘gender-neutrality’ and
‘merit’. The evidence of the disparate treatment is writ large in
the form of the merit list produced before this Court, as per which
the female candidates have overwhelmingly outscored their male
counterparts. It is pertinent to mention that Respondent No.3
though placed at Serial No.6 in the mens merit list has obtained
less marks than the female candidate placed at Serial No.10 in
the female’s merit list. Accordingly, despite their performance, the
meritorious women candidates are not being selected only due to
their gender.
99. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the present case,
indirect discrimination is real and is caused by a facially neutral
50:50 criteria by not taking into consideration the underlying effect
of the said criteria.

AS THE NATURE OF TESTS OF MALE AND FEMALE CANDIDATES
IS SIMILAR, A COMBINED MERIT LIST OUGHT TO BE PREPARED
100. The argument that there is a distinction between JAG women and
JAG men on the basis that they give separate SSBs and have
separate merit lists is contrary to facts as there is no evidence to
show that nature of tests is different in the separate SSBs. On the
contrary, it is the Union of India’s own stand in the counter affidavit
that they have maintained the neutrality of the examination process.
101. Upon a perusal of the record, this Court is of the view that though
men and women during the JAG selection procedure appear before
separate boards, yet the selection criteria for male and female
candidates are not separate and only few indicators such as physical
attributes are different. The conduct of separate SSBs for men
and women are a necessity due to the nature of tests involved,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1303

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

which require close intensive physical interactions. Both male and
female candidates are assessed on identical parameters. The mere
existence of separate boards, however, does not extend to separate
treatment of men and women candidates in law. This is apparent
from the procedure and testing parameters of the fifteen (15) Officer
Like Qualities considered by the SSB (as extracted hereinabove) for
recruitment to the Indian Armed Forces.
102. It is pertinent to mention that male and female JAG officers do not
have distinct cadres with different conditions of service. Further, in
terms of the policy dated 20th July 2006 dealing with SSC appointment
of women, combined merit lists are prepared for men and women
in case of seniority for SSC Non-Technical and Technical members.
103. Consequently, this Court is of the view that similar combined merit
list ought to be prepared.

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID INTERPRETATION OF THE 2023
RECRUITMENT POLICY IMPLEMENTED W.E.F. 2024
104. This Court is of the opinion that if the 2023 Policy is read with the
mandate of law, it means that Union of India shall recruit the most
meritorious candidates in JAG branch irrespective of their sex/gender,
but to ‘compensate the women for their previous non-enrolment’, the
Union of India has decided to allocate at least 50% of the vacancies
to women candidates. This intent is apparent from the 2023 policy
when it states that the Indian Army has decided to increase the
number of Women Officers in JAG branch from current 75 to 142 by
allocating at least 50% of the seats in JAG branch to Women Officers.

MERIT-BASED SELECTION WILL IMPROVE EFFICIENCY OF JAG
105. This Court is also of the view that the understanding of 2023 policy
as implemented by the Respondents is not only untenable in law
as after allowing women to join Combat Support Arms and Services
there can be no reservation category for ‘male’ or ‘men’, but also
contrary to facts as no explanation has been offered by the Union of
India as to why gender-based vacancy allocation is necessary for a
legal branch where the duties, training and performance expectations
are identical for all officers regardless of gender.
106. Admittedly, the JAG Department falls under the Adjutant General’s
branch which majorly performs administrative duties. As per
1304 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

clause 33 of Defence Service Regulations 1987 (‘DSR’), “the JAG
is the legal adviser to the Chief of the Army Staff in matters of
military, martial and (in its fighting service aspect) international law.
He also assists the Adjutant General in matters relating to discipline
involving application of military law”. JAG is the ‘Nodal Legal Agency’
for single point contact with the institutionalized judicial system
as well as advise on all legal matters pertaining to the Army. The
legal matters in addition to those covered by the Army Act, 1950,
Regs for the Army, Special Powers Act, International Laws and
Conventions agreed by the Government of India for the Indian
Army and special laws invoked by the Government for the Army
also includes Charter of Trades and Tariff Laws formally agreed
upon by the Government pertaining to the Army. The legal advice
has to be within the framework of the Constitution of India and
its amendments thereof as on the date and day of promulgation.
Consequently, the submission of the Respondents that being a
combatant is a pre-requisite to be a JAG officer is incompatible
with the job description of JAG officers.
107. Apart from the Army, the JAG’s Department is present in the following
other branches of the Armed Forces:-
i. Air Force;
ii. Navy;
iii. Border Security Force;
iv. Central Armed Police Forces;
v. Coast Guard [known as ‘Assistant Commandant (Law)];
vi. National Security Guard (known as ‘Judge Attorney).
108. In none of the aforesaid branches, the enrolment of women candidates
is restricted on the ground of operational efficiency.
109. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that female candidates
have been outperforming their male counterparts in the entrance
examination for judicial services. For instance, in Delhi Judicial
Service, during the period 2019 to 2023, the female candidates have
been outperforming their male counterparts. From being 50% in
2019 batch, the number of female Judicial Officers in 2023 batch is
nearly double the male Judicial Officers. The details of total number
of male and female Judicial Officers appointed in Delhi Judicial
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1305

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

Service during the last three Delhi Judicial Service Recruitment
Examinations are as under:-

DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE

Name of the Year of Number Number Total
Examination Appointment of Male of Female Candidates
Judicial Judicial Selected
Officers Officers

Delhi Judicial 2019 63 (Out of 63 (Out of 126
Service which 06 which 01
Examination officers have officer had
2018 resigned) resigned)

Delhi Judicial 2021 22 (Out of 28 50
Service which 01
Examination officer had
2019 resigned)

Delhi Judicial 2023 36 74 (Out of 110
Service which 02
Examination officers have
2021 resigned)

110. Consequently, the Respondents have failed to establish how a merit-
based ‘gender-neutral’ selection process would negatively impact
functionality, manpower planning, or operational efficiency of the
JAG branch. On the contrary, a merit-based selection process will
improve efficiency of the JAG branch.

CONCLUSION
111. Keeping in view the aforesaid as well as the fact that the Respondents
vide Notification issued under Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950
have permitted women to join the JAG branch, this Court is of the
view that the executive cannot restrict their numbers and/or make a
reservation for male officers under the guise of ‘extent of induction’
by way of a policy or administrative instruction.
112. Further, the impugned notification to the extent that it provides for
only three (03) vacancies for female candidates as against six (06)
vacancies for male candidates is against the concept of equality
as enshrined in the Constitution as it makes a reservation for male
officers under the guise of ‘extent of induction’.
1306 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

113. Though men and women candidates during the JAG selection
procedure appear before separate boards, yet as the selection criteria
and testing parameters of the fifteen (15) Officer Like Qualities are
identical, this Court is of the view that combined merit list ought to
be prepared.
114. Moreover, as held hereinabove, male and female JAG officers do not
have distinct cadres with different conditions of service and the true
meaning of concept of ‘gender-neutrality’ and 2023 recruitment policy
is that Union of India shall recruit the most meritorious candidates
in JAG branch irrespective of their sex/gender as the primary job
of this branch is to give legal advice and conduct cases, but to
‘correct the past’ and to ‘compensate the women for their previous
non-enrolment’, the Union of India shall allocate not less than 50%
of the vacancies to women candidates.
115. However, to restrict the women candidates to 50% of the seats, as
argued by the Respondents despite they being more meritorious than
the male candidates is violative of the Right to Equality. Since in the
present case Petitioner No.1 has obtained 447 marks as against 433
marks of Respondent No.3, this Court directs the Respondents-Union
of India and Army to induct Petitioner No.1 in the next available
training course for being commissioned in the JAG Department of
Indian Army. As Respondent No.3 despite having secured third rank
with 433 marks in the merit list of men candidates has obtained
less marks than the female candidate placed at Serial No.10 in the
Females Merit List, this Court is of the view that his selection by the
Respondents amounts to indirect discrimination and, therefore, he
is not entitled to any relief.
116. This Court clarifies that it is not imposing its own views or predilection
on the Army but is implementing the Constitution and the mandate
of law. But this Court agrees with the view held by many that ‘no
nation can be secure, when half of its population (i.e. its women
force) is held back’.
117. Consequently, this Court directs the Union of India to henceforth
conduct recruitment in the aforesaid manner as well as publish a
common merit list for all JAG candidates (i.e. for all male and female
candidates) and make the merit list public as well as the marks
obtained by all candidates participating in the selection process.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1307

Arshnoor Kaur & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors.

118. With the aforesaid directions, the present writ petition stands disposed
of.

Result of the case: Writ Petition Disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan