ARUN KUMAR AGGARWALversusSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.

                       [2011) 10 S.C.R. 850


A                   ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL
                                  v.
            STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.
              (Criminal Appeal Nos.1706-08 of 2011)
                       SEPTEMBER 2, 2011
8
              [G.S. SINGHVI AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.]

        Judgment/Order:

c        Obiter dictum - Allegation of corruption against
    government servants - Police after conducting investigation
    exonerated accused of all the charges and submitted final
    closure report uls.169, Cr.P.C. to the Special Judge- Special
    Judge rejected the closure report - The order of the Special
D   Judge stated that there were sufficient grounds to take
    cognizance for the offence and matter may be taken up
    seeking necessary sanction to prosecute them - High Court
    quashed the order of the Special Judge by treating the
    operative portion of the order of Special Judge as direction ·
E   issued to the sanctioning authority to sanction the prosecution
    of respondent nos.2 to 4 - On appeal, held: In the facts and
    circumstances of instant case, the refusal of the Special
    Judge to accept the final closure report submitted by
    Lokayukta Police was the only ratio decidendi of the Order -
    The other part of the Order dealing with the initiation of
F   Chai/an proceedings could not be treated as the direction
    issued by the Special Judge - The wordings of the Order
    clearly suggested that it was not in the nature of the command
    or authoritative instruction - The Order was also not specific
    or clear in order to direct or address any authority or body to
G   perform any act or duty - Therefore, it cannot be treated as
    the direction issued by the Special Judge but only Obiter
    Dictum' or mere passing remark made by the Special Judge,
    which only amounted to expression of his personal view -
    Therefore, this portion of the Order dealing with Chai/an
H                                  850
 ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                     851
           PRADESH AND ORS.
proceeding, was neither relevant, pertinent nor essential, while   A
deciding the actual issues which were before the Special
Judge and1 therefore, cannot be treated as the part of the
Judgment of the Special Judge - Therefore, there was no
occasion for the High Court to interfere with the Order of the
Special Judge.                                                     B

     Direction issued by the Court - Scope and nature of -
Held: Direction issued by the Court is in the nature of a
command or authoritative instruction which contemplates the
performance of certain duty or act by a person upon whom it
has been issued - Direction should be specific, simple, clear C
and just and proper depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case but it should not be vague or
sweeping.

     Obiter dictum - Scope and nature of - Held: Is a mere         D
observation or remark made by the court while deciding the
actual issue before it - The mere casual statement or
observation which is not relevant, pertinent or essential to
decide the issue in hand does not form the part of the
judgment of the Court and has no authoritative value - The         E
expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is just
 a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering the
 actual issues pending before the Court - These casuai
remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the
 authoritative or operative part of the judgment.
                                                                   F
     Respondent nos.2 to 4 were the government
servants. The appellant made a complaint to the
Lokayukta that respondent nos.2 to 4 had entered into
sale transactions which had resulted in loss of Rs.4
crores to the government. The FIR was registered against           G
respondent nos.2 to 4 under Sections 13(1-d) and 13(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section
120-B, IPC. A criminal case was registered against
respondent nos.2 to 4 in the court of Special Judge.
However, th~ sanction of the Government was necessary              H
   852    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 10 S.C.R.

A as mandated by Section 19 of the Act in order to
  prosecute the said respondents. The police after
  conducting the investigation exonerated respondent
  nos.2 to 4 of all the charges leveled against them and
  submitted final closure report under Section 169, Cr.P.C.
8 to the Special Judge. The Special Judge rejected the
  closure report. It was held in the order of the Special
  Judge that prima facie the respondents-accused entered
  into conspiracy and caused financial loss to government
  and there were sufficient grounds to take cognizance for
C the offence. The ord.er further read that all the accused
  persons working as Government servant while
  discharging their government duties committed offence
  under Section 19 of the Act and, therefore, it was
  necessary to obtain sanction to prosecute them under
  Section 13 of the Act and matter may be taken up seeking
0 necessary sanction to prosecute the accused to
  prosecute them under Section 13(1-d), 13(2) of the Act
  and under Section 120-B, IPC and for necessary further
  action case be registered. The High Court allowed the
  revision petitions and quashed the order of the Special
E Judge by treating the operative portion of the order of
  Special Judge as direction issued to the sanctioning
  authority to sanction the prosecution of respondent
  nos.2 to 4. The instant appeals were filed challenging the
  order of the High Court.
F
       Allowing the appeals, the Court

      HELD: 1. The direction issued by the Court is in the
  nature of a command or authoritative instruction which
  contemplates the performance of certain duty or act by
G a person upon whom it has been issued. The direction
  should be specific, simple, clear and just and proper
  depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case
  but it should not be vague or sweeping. [Para 20] [863-
  B]
H
  ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA 853
            PRADESH AND ORS.

    Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam 1953 SCR            A
126; lncomeTax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar
Bhagwan Das, Lakhimpurkheri (1964) 6 SCR 411; Rajinder
Nath v. CIT (1979) 4 SCC 282:1979 (1) SCR 272; Kanhiya
Lal Omar v. R. K. Trivedi & Ors. (1985) 4 SCC 628: 1985 (3)
Suppl. SCR 1; Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India            B
(1995) 1 sec 391: 1995 (1) SCR 27 - relied on.

   Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117;
Mansukh LalVithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat AIR 1997
SC 3400: 1997 (3)Suppl. SCR 705 - referred to.
                                                                c
     The Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); Corpus Juris
Secundum, Vol. 26A; P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law
Lexicon 3rd ed. 2005;Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 12A; American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 20; P.
Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (3rd ed. 2005; D
The Wharton's Law Lexicon .(14th Ed. 1993); Blacks Law ·
Dictionary, (9th ed, 2009); Word and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 29; Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 21 - referred
to.
                                                                E
    2. It is well settled that obiter dictum is a mere
observation or remark made by the court by way of aside
while deciding the actual issue before it. The mere casual
statement or observation which is not relevant, pertinent
or essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the
part of the judgment of the Court and have no                   F
authoritative value. The expression of the personal .view
or opinion of the Judge is just a casual remark made
whilst deviating from answering the actual issues
pending before the Court. These casual remarks are
considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the                G
authoritative or operative part of the judgment. In the facts
and circumstances of the instant case, the refusal of the
Special Judge to accept the final closure report submitted
by Lokayukta Police is the only ratio decidendi of the
Order. The other part of the Order which deals with the         H
   854     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 10 S.C.R..


A initiation of Challan proceedings cannot be treated as the
  direction issued by the Special Judge. The relevant
  portion of the Order of the Special Judge dealing with
  Challan Proceeding reads as "Therefore matter may be
  taken up seeking necessary sanction to prosecute the
B accused persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram
  and Shahjaad Khan to prosecute them under Section 13
  (1-d), 13 (2) Anti Corruption Act and under Section 120-B
  l.P.C and for· necessary further action, case be registered
  in the criminal case diary." The wordings of this Order
c clearly suggest that it is not in the nature of the command
  or authoritative instructioh. This Order is also not specific
  or clear in order to direct or address any authority or
  body to perform any act or duty. Therefore, by no stretch
  of imagination, this Order can be considered or treated
  as the direction issued by the Special Judge. The holistic
0
  reading of this Order leads to only one conclusion, that
  is, it is in the nature of 'Obiter Dictum' or mere passing
  remark made by the Special Judge, which only amounts
  to expression of his personal view. Therefore, this portion
  of the Order dealing with Challan proceeding, is neither
E relevant, pertinent nor essential, while deciding the actual
  issues which were before the Special Judge and,
  therefore, cannot be treated as the part of the Judgment
  of the Special Judge. The portion of the Order of the
  Special Judge which deals with the Challan proceedings
F is a mere observation or remark made by way of aside.
  In view of this, the High Court had grossly erred in
  considering and treating this mere observation of the
  Special Judge as the direction of the Court. Therefore,
  there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with
G the Order of the Special Judge. (Para 31-33] (868-F-G;
  869-A-F]
      Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur (1989)
  1 SCC 101: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929; Divisional Controller,
H KSRTC v. MahadevaShetty (2003) 7 SCC 1,97: 2003 (2)
 ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                 855
           PRADESH AND ORS.
Suppl. SCR 14; State of Haryana v. Ranbir (2006) 5 SCC         A
167: 2006 (3) SCR 864; Gimar Traders v. State        0 f
Maharashtra (2007) 7 SCC 555: 2007 (9) SCR 383 - relied
on.
                    Case Law Reference:
                                                               B
   . 1967 SCR 668              referred to         Para 4
    1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 705 referred to            Para 4
    1953 SCR 126               relied on           Para 11
                                                               c
    (1964) 6 SCR 411           relied on           Para 12
    1979 (1) SCR 272           relied on           Para 13
    1985 (3) Suppl. SCR 1      relied on           Para 14
    1995 (1) SCR 27            relied on           Para 15     D

    1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929 relied on              Para 28
    2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 14 relied on               Para 28
    2006 (3) SCR 864           relied on           Para 29     E
    2007 (9) SCR 383           relied on           Para 30

    CRfMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1706-1708 of 2011.
                                                               F
    From the Judgment & Order dated 22.4.2009 of the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh judicature at Jabalpur in Criminal
Revision Petition No. 821 and 966 of 2005 and Misc. Criminal
Case No. 3403 of 2005.

    Sumeet Sharma, Rohit Kumar Singh for the Appellant.        G

   Arvind Verma, Vikas Bansal, B.S. Banthia, Vibha Datta
Makhija, C.D. Singh for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                               H
    856      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 10 S.C.R.

A         H.L. DATIU, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. These appeals, by special leave, are directed against
  the Judgment and Order dated 22.4.2009 passed by the High
  Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Revision No. 821 of 2005,
  Criminal Revision Petition No. 966 of 2005 and Criminal Case·
B No. 3403 of 2005, whereby the High Court has allowed the
  revision application and inter a/ia quashed the Order dated
  26.4.2005 in case diary of Crime No. 165 of 2002 passed by
  the First Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, l<atni
  (hereinafter referred to as "learned Special Judge").
c
         3. The brief factual matrix relating to this appeal is as
    follows: The respondent no. 2, Shri. Raghav Chandra, who is
    a Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal along with
    respondent no. 3, Shri. Shahjad Khan, posted as the then
o   Collector, Katni, Jabalpur and respondent no. 4, Shri. Ram
    Meshram, posted as the Land Acquisition Officer, M.P. Housing
    Board, Bhopal, whilst, discharging their functions, had allegedly
    entered into conspiracy and made a secret plot with Shri. B.D.
    Gautam, the Director of Olphert Company and, subsequently,
E   purchased the land belonging to Olphert Company at higher
    rates for the M.P. Housing Board, thereby, caused a financial
    loss of over '4 Crores to the Government. The appellant
    reported this alleged transaction of purchase of land by the M.P.
    Housing Board, alleging financial loss to the Government, to the
    Lokayukta, Bhopal. Subsequently, the Special Police
F   Establishment (Lokayukta), Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as
    "the Lokayukta Police") registered an FIR No. 165 of 2002
    against accused respondent nos. 2 to 4, as the alleged act or
    conduct of the accused respondents, all working as
    Government Servants, amounts to an offence under Section 13
G   (1-d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
    (hereinafter referred to as "the PCA") and Section 120-B of the
    Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "the IPC").
    Accordingly a Criminal Case No. 165 of 2002 was registered
    against respondent nos. 2 to 4 in the Court of learned Special
H   Judge. However, the sanction of the Government was
 ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA 857
     PRADESH AND ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]

necessary as mandated by Section 19 of the PCA in order to A
prosecute the said accused respondents. Acting upon the
complaint of the appellant, the Lokayukta Police, after
conducting the investigation, had exonerated respondent nos.
2 to 4 of all the charges leveled against them and submitted
final closure report, under Section 169 of the Criminal B
Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr. P.C."), to
the learned Special Judge, Katni as no case had been made
out to prosecute respondents. Thereafter, the learned Special
Judge, Katni after hearing the respondents, appreciating the
evidence on record and perusing the case diary, had rejected c
the closure report vide his Order dated 26.4.2005. The ·
operative portion of the order dated 26.4.2005 passed by the
learned Special Judge is extracted below:
    "31. In this way from above record produced, even prima
    facie, it is evident that the accused had made secrete plot   D
    (durabhi sandhi) with Shri B.D. Gautam the Director of
    Olphert Company with conspiracy and purchased land of
    Olphert Company on higher rate and caused financial loss
    over four crores to the Government which there are
    sufficient grounds for taking cognizance against the          E
    accused persons.
    32. Accused person Shri Raghav Chandra is posted as
    Commissioner of M.P. Housing Board and Shri Ram
    Meshram is posted as Land Acquiring Officer in M.P.
                                                                  F
    Housing Board and Shri Shahjaad Khan while remaining
    posted as Collector, all above accused persons working
    as Government servant, while discharging their
    government duties, committed above crime-under section
    19 of Anti Corruption Act 1988, it is necessary to obtain
    sanction to prosecute Government Servant U/S 13 of Anti-      G
    Corruption Act. Therefore matter may be taken up seeking
    necessary sanction to prosecute the accused persons
    Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram and Shahjaad Khan
    to prosecute them under Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti
    Corruption Act and under Section 120-B l.P.C. and for         H
    858       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A         necessary further action, case be registered in the criminal
          case diary."
       4. Aggrieved by the above observation, respondent nos.
  2 to 4 preferred Criminal Revision Petitions under Section 482
  of the Cr.P.C. before the High Court. The High Court allowed
8 the revision petitions and quashed the Order dated 26.4.2005
  of the learned Special Judge on the ground that the Order of
  the learned Special Judge is illegal and without jurisdiction, in
  view of the decision of this Court in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh
  Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117, as the Magistrate cannot impinge
C upon the jurisdiction of the police by directing them to change
  their opinion when the closure report had been submitted by
  the police under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C. The reliance is also
  placed on the observation made by this Court in the case of
  Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat AIR 1997
D SC 3400 wherein it is observed that:
          "19. Since the validity of "Sanction" depends on the
          applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority of the facts
          of the case as also the material and evidence collected
          during investigation it necessarily follows that the
E
          sarictioning authority has to apply its own independent
          mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether
          prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the
          sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from
          any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon
F         it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the
          discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely
          in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown
          to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration.
          It is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to
G         apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or
          was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to
          grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that
          the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken
          away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction
H         the prosecution."
  ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                    859
       PRADESH AND ORS. [H.L. DATIU, J.]

     5. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us in this       A
 appeal.

      6. The issue involved in the present appeal for our
 consideration is: Whether the High Court is justified in treating
 the operative portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge
                                                                   8
 as a direction issued to the sanctioning authority to sanction
 the prosecution of the accused respondent Nos. 2 to 4.

       7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to
 the lis and perused the record.
                                                                  c
        8. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
  Special Judge, vide his Order dated 26.4.2005, refused to
J accept the closure report submitted before him by the
  Lokayukta Police as he found it to be not reasonable and
  finally rejected it. The other portion of the Order, wherein the D
  learned Special Judge observed particularly about the initiation
  of Challan proceedings, is a mere observation or passing
  remark. In other words, the learned counsel submits that this
  portion of the Order, dealing with Challan proceedings, can,
  at the most, be treated as expression of his personal opinion. E
   He further submits that wholistic reading of this Order clearly
   suggests that the learned Special Judge's remark pertaining
  to Challan proceedings is in the nature of mere obiter dicta
   and could not qualify to be treated as a direction of the Court
   even by any stretch of imagination. The learned counsel
   contends that the Order of the learned Special Judge cannot F
   be treated as direction issued to the sanctioning authority to
   prosecute the respondents as this Order nowhere addresses
   sanctioning authority and moreover, nowhere directs
   sanctioning authority to do any affirmative action or abstain
  from doing anything. Therefore, the High Court is not justified G
  in quashing the Order of the learned Special Judge and
  treating it to be a direction issued to the sanctioning authority
   to prosecute the accused respondent nos.2 to 4.

      9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents       H
    860       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 10 S.C.R.

A   submits that the Order of the learned Special Judge is in the
    nature of command and amounts to a direction to the
    sanctioning authority to prosecute respondent nos. 2 to 4.
    Therefore, this Order of the lea.med Special Judge is illegal and
    without jurisdiction. The learned counsel further supported the
B   impugned Order and Judgment of the High Court.

         10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
    before us. The short point in issue before us is based on the
    nature of the Order passed by the learned Special Judge
    whether it amounts to a direction issued by the Court to the
C   concerned authority or mere observation of the Court.

         11. We will first discuss the nature and scope of the
    expression 'direction' issued by the Court. This Court in
    Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam, 1953 SCR 126
D   whilst distinguishing the expression 'Sanction' from the
    'Direction', for the purpose of initiating the prosecution has held:

          "15. But where a prosecution is directed, it means that the
          authority who gives the direction is satisfied in his own mind
          that the case must be initiated. Sanction is in the nature
E         of a permission, while a direction is in the nature of a
          command." (Emphasis supplied).

         12. In Income Tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Murtidhar
    Bhagwan Das, Lakhimpur kheri, (1964) 6 SCR 411, this Court
F   has observed that the expression "direction" cannot be
    construed in vacuum, but must be collated to the directions
    which the Assistant Appellate Commissioner can give under
    Section 31 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922.

G         13. This Court in Rajinder Nath v. CIT, (1979) 4 SCC 282,
    while considering the meaning of expression 'finding' and
    'direction', occurring in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Income Tax Act,
    1961, has held:

          "11 .... As regards the expression "direction" in Section
H         153(3)(ii) of the Act. it is now well settled that it must be
 ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                      861
     PRADESH AND ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]

    an express direction necessary for the disposal of the          A
    case before the authority or court. It must also be a
    direction which the authority or court is empowered to give
    while deciding the case before it. The expressions "finding"
    and "direction" in Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act must be
    accordingly confined." (Emphasis supplied).                     B

    14. In Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi & Ors., (1985) 4
    SCC 628, this Court has observed that "A direction may
    mean an order issued to a particular individual or a
    precept which· many may have to follow. It may be a             C
    specific or a general order."

     15. In Giani Devender Singh v. Union of India, (1995) 1
SCC 391, this Court, whilst considering the direction issued by
the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation, has observed that
the directions should not be vague, sweeping or affected by         D
sarcasm which are not capable of being implemented. It should
be specific, just and proper in the facts a,nd circumstances of
the case. This Court further held:

     "10. It appears to us that when the High Court was not in      E
     a position to precisely discern what was the complaint
     alleged by the petitioner and when the High Court was of
    ·the view that the prayer made by the petitioner was absurd
     and it also held that the officers who were alleged to have
     been carrying on nefarious activities were more imaginary F
     than real, the direction in general and sweeping terms to
     sack erring officers (whomsoever they may be) and
     overhaul the administration by recruiting only conscientious
     and devoted people like the petitioner in order to satisfy
     the vanity of the petitioner, should not have been made. If G
     the High Court intends to pass an order on an application
     presented before it by treating it as a public interest
     litigation, the High Court must precisely indicate the
     allegations or the statements contained in such petition
     relating to public interest litigation and should indicate how
     public interest was involved and only after ascertaining the H
    862       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 10 S.C.R.


A         correctness of the allegation, should give specific direction
          as may deem just and proper in the facts of the case.

          11. It appears to us that the application was disposed of
          by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High" Court in
          a lighter vein and the order dated 27-2-1992 is couched
B
          in veiled sarcasm. Such course of action, to say the least,
          is not desirable and the High Court should not have
          issued mandate in general and sweeping terms which
          were not intended to be implemented and were not
          capable of being implemented because of utter
c         vagueness of the mandate and of its inherent absurdity. "
          (Emphasis supplied)

        16. The Blacks Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) defines the
    term 'Direction' as an order; an instruction on how to proceed.
D
          17. The meaning of expression "Direction" has been
    ·discussed in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 26A, at pg. 955-956
     as thus:

          "The word "direction" is of common usage, and is defined
E         as meaning the act of governing, ordering, or ruling; the
          act of directing, authority to direct as circumstances may
          require; guidance; management; superintendence;
          "prescription;" also a command, an instruction, an order,
          an order prescribed, either verbally or written, or indicated
F         by acts; that which.is imposed by directing, a guiding or
          authoritative instruction; information as to method."

         18. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law
    Lexicon (3rd ed. 2005) the word 'Direction' means: address
G   of letter, order or instruction as to what one has to do. A
    direction may serve to direct to places as well as to persons.
    Direction contains most of instruction in it and should be
    followed. It is necessary to direct those who are unable to act
    for themselves. Directions given to servants must be clear,
H   simple and precise.
 ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                      863
      PRADESH AND ORS. [H.L. DATIU, J.]

     19. According to the Words and Phrases, Permanent               A
Edition, Vol. 12A~ the term 'Direction' means a guiding or
authoritative instruction, prescription, order,' command.

     20. To sum up, the direction issued by the Court is in the
nature of a command or authoritative instruction which               B
contemplates the performance of certain duty or act by a
person upon whom it has been issued. The direction should be
specific, simple, clear and just and proper depending upon the
facts and circumstances of the case but it should not be vague
or sweeping.
                                                                     c
     21. At this stage, it is pertinent to consider the nature and
scope of a mere observation or obiter dictum in the Order of
the Court. The expression obiter dicta or dicta has been
discussed in American Jurisprudence 2d, Vol. 20, at pg. 437
as thus:                                                             D

     "74. -Dicta

     Ordinarily, a court will decide only the questions necessary
     for determining the particular case presented. But once a
     court acquires jurisdiction, all material questions are open    E
     for its decision; it may properly decided all questions so
     involved, even though it is not absolutely essential to the
     result that all should be decided. It may, for instance,
     determine the question of the constitutionality of a statute,
     although it is not absolutely necessary to the disposition      F
     of the case, if the issue of constitutionality is involved in
     the suit and its settlement is of public importance. An
     expression in an opinion which is not necessary to
     support the decision reached by the court is dictum or
     obiter dictum.                                                  G

     "Dictum" or "obiter dictum: is distinguished from the
     "holding of the court in that the so-called "law of the case"
     does not extend to mere dicta, and mere dicta are not
     binding under the doctrine of stare decisis,                    H
    864       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A         As applied to a particular opinion, the question of whether
          or not a certain part thereof is or is not a mere dictum is
          sometimes a matter of argument. And while the terms
          "dictum" and "obiter dictum" are generally used
          synonymously with regard to expressions in an opinion
s         which are not necessary to support the decision, in
          connection. with the doctrine of stare decisis, a distinction
          has been drawn between mere obiter and )udicial dicta,"
          the latter being an expression of opinion on a point
          deliberately passed upon by the court." (Emphasis
c         supplied).

          Further at pg. 5?5 and 526, the effect of dictum has been
          discussed:

          "190. Decision on legal point; effect of dictum
D
          ... In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, a distinction
          is made between a holding and a dictum. Generally stare
          decisis does not attach to such parts of an opinion of a
          court which are mere dicta. The reason for distinguishing
          a dictum from a holding has been said to be that a question
E
          actually before the court and decided by it is· investigated
          with care and considered in its full extent, whereas other
          principles, although considered in their relation to the case
          decided, are seldom completely investigated as to their
          possible bearing on other cases. Nevertheless courts have
F         sometimes given dicta the same effect as holdings,
          particularly where "judicial dicta" as distinguished from
          "obiter dicta" are involved."

      22. According to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law
G Lexicon (3rd ed. 2005), the expression "observation" means a
  view, reflection; remark; statement; observed truth or facts;
  remarks in speech or writing in reference to something
  observed.

          23. The Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Ed. 1993) defines
H
  ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA 865
      PRADESH
        ' .   AND . ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]

term 'obiter dictum' as an opinion not necessary to a judgment;         A
an observation as to the law made by a judge in the course of
a case, but not necessary to its decision, and therefore of no
binding effect; often called as obiter dictum, ; a remark by the
way.
                                                                        8
      24. The Blacks Law Dictionary, (9th ed, 2009) defines term
'obiter dictum' as a judicial comment made while delivering a
judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be
considered persuasive). - Often shortened to dictum or, less
commonly, obiter. "Strictly speaking an 'obiter dictum' is a            C
remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision
upon a cause, 'by the way' - that is, incidentally or collaterally,
and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any
statement of law enunciated by the judge or court merely by way
of illustration, argument, analogy, or suggestion .... In the           D
common speech of lawyers, all such extrajudicial expressions
of legal opinion are referred to as 'dicta,' or 'obiter dicta,' these
two terms being used interchangeably."

     25 The Word and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 29                E
defines the expression 'obiter dicta' or 'dicta' thus:

     "Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not embody the
     resolution or determination of the court, and made without
     argument or full consideration of the point, are not the
     professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself;          F
     obiter dicta are opinions uttered by the way, not upon the
     point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time
     from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects; It is
     mere observation by a judge on a legal question
     suggested by the case before him, but not arising in such          G
     a manner as to require decision by him; "Obiter dictum"
     is made as argument or _illustration, as pertinent to other
     cases as to the one on hand, and which may enlighten or
     convince, but which in no sense are a part of the judgment
                                                                        H
    866       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 10 S.C.R.


A         in the particular issue, not binding as a precedent, but
          entitled to receive the respect due to the opinion of the
          judge who utters them; Discussion in an opinion of
          principles of law which are not pertinent, relevant, or
          essential to determination of issues before court is "obiter
a         dictum"

        26. The concept of "Dicta" has also been considered in
    Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 21, at pg. 309-12 as thus:

          "190. Dicta
c
          a. In General

          A Dictum is an opinion expressed by a court, but which,
          not being necessarily involved in the case, lacks the force
          of an adjudication; an opinion expressed by a judge on a
D         point not necessarily arising in the case; a statement or
          holding in an opinion not responsive to any issue and noty
          necessary to the decision of the case; an opinion
          expressed on a point in which the judicial mind is not
          directed to the precise question necessary to be
E         determined to fix the rights of the parties; or an opinion of
          a judge which does not embody the resolution or
          determination of the court, and made without argument, or
          full consideration of the point, not the professed deliberate
          determination of the judge himself. The term "dictum" is
F         generally used as an abbreviation of "obiter dictum" which
          means a remark or opinion uttered by the way.

          Such an expression or opinion, as a general rule, is not
          binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis
          rule, even on courts inferior: to the court from which such
G
          expression emanated, no matter how often it may be
          repeated. This general rule is particularly applicable where
          there are prior decisions to the contrary of the statement
          regarded as dictum; where the statement is declared, on
          rehearing, to be dictum; where the dictum is on a question
H
ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                       867
    PRADESH AND ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]

    which the court expressly states that it does not decide;        A
    or where it is contrary to statute and would produce an
    inequitable result. It has also been held that a dictum is not
    the "law of the case," nor res judicata."

    27. The concept of "Dicta" has been discussed in
                                                                     8
Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition (Reissue), Vol. 26,
para. 574 as thus:

    "574. Dicta. Statements which are not necessary to the
    decision, which go beyond the occasion and lay down a
    rule that it is unnecessary for the purpose in hand are          C
    generally termed "dicta". They have no binding authority on
    another court, although they may have some persuasive
    efficacy. Mere passing remarks of a judge are known as
    "obiter dicta", whilst considered enunciations of the judge's
    opinion on a point not arising for decision, and so not part     D
    of the ratio decidendi, have been termed "judicial dicta".
    A third type of dictum may consist in a stateme_nt by a
    judge as to what has been done in other cases which have
    not been reported .

    . . . Practice notes, being directions given without argument,   E
    do not have binding judicial effect: Interlocutory
    observations by members of a court during' argument, while
    of persuasive weight, are not judicial pronouncements and
    do not decide anything."
                                                                     F
     28. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur,
(1989) 1 SCC 101 and Divisional Controller, KSRTC v.
Mahadeva Shetty, (2003) 7 SCC 197, this Court has observed
that "Mere casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every
passing expression of a judge, however eminent, can be G
treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of
authority."                                           ·

    29. In State of Haryana v. Ranbir, (2006) 5 SCC 167, this
Court has discussed the concept of the obiter dictum thus:    ·
                                                                     1-1
    868      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011) 10 S.C.R.


A         "A decision, it is well settled, is an authority for what it
          decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.
          The distinction between a dicta and obiter is well known.
          Obiter dicta is more or less presumably unnecessary to
          the decision. It may be an expression of a viewpoint or
B         sentiments which has no binding effect. See ADM,
          Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla. It is also well settled that the
          statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi
          constitute obiter dicta and are not authoritative. (See
          Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty)"
c      30. In Gimar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7
    SCC 555, this Court has held:

          "Thus, observations of the Court did not relate to any of
          the legal questions arising in the case and, accordingly,
D         cannot be considered as the part of ratio decidendi.
          Hence, in light of the aforementioned judicial
          pronouncements, which have well settled the proposition
          that only the ratio decidendi can act as the binding or
          authoritative precedent, it is clear that the reliance placed
E         on mere general observations or casual expressions of the
          Court, is not of much avail to the respondents."

        31. In view of above, it is well settled that obiter dictum is
  a mere observation or remark made by the court by way of
  aside while deciding the actual issue before it. The mere casual
F statement or observation which is not relevant, pertinent or
  essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the part of
  the judgment of the Court and have no authoritative value. The
  expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is just
  a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering the
G actual issues pending before the Court. These casual remarks
  are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the
  authoritative or operative part of the judgment.

       32. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we
H are of the opinion that the refusal of the learned Special Judge,
 ARUN KUMAR AGGARWAL v. STATE OF MADHYA                      869
     PRADESH AND ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]

vide its Order dated 26.4.2005, to accept the fihal closure report   A
submitted by Lokayukta Police is the only ratio decidendi of
the Order. The other part of the Order which deals with the
initiation of Challan proceedings cannot be treated as the
direction issued by the learned Special Judge. The relevant
portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge dealing with       B
Challan Proceeding reads as "Therefore matter may be taken
up seeking necessary sanction to prosecute the accused
persons Raghav Chandra, Shri Ram Meshram and Shahjaad
Khan to prosecute them under Section 13 (1-d), 13 (2) Anti
Corruption Act and under Section 120-B I. P. C and for               c
necessary further action, case be registered in the criminal
case diary." The wordings of this Order clearly suggest that it
is not in the nature of the command or authoritative instruction.
This Order is also not specific or clear in order to direct or
address any authority or body to perform any act or duty.            D
Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, this Order can be
considered or treated as the direction issued by the learned
Special Judge. The wholistic reading of this Order leads to only
one conclusion, that is, it is in the nature of 'Obiter Dictum' or
mere passing remark made by the learned Special Judge,
which only amounts to expression of his personal view.               E
Therefore, this portion of the Order dealing with Challan
proceeding, is neither relevant, pertinent nor essential, while
deciding the actual issues which were before the learned
Special Judge and hence, cannot be treated as the part of the
Judgment of the learned Special Judge.                               F

     33. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the
opinion that, the portion of the Order of the learn~d Special
Judge which deals with the Challan proceedings is a mere
observation or remark made by way of aside. In view of this,         G
the High Court had grossly erred in considering and treating
this mere observation of the learned Special Judge as the
direction of the Court. Therefore, there was no occasion for the
High Court to interfere with the Order of the learned Special
Judge.                                                               H
    870     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2011) 10 S.C.R.


A       34. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned·
    Order and Judgment of the High Court in Criminal Revision No.
    821 of 2005, Criminal Revision Petition No. 966 of 2005 and
    Criminal Case No. 3403 of 2005 dated 22.4.2009 is set aside.
    We restore the Order of the learned Special Judge dated
B   26.4.2005.

        35. We direct the respondents to comply with the order
    passed by the Trial Court within two months from this date.

    D.G.                                       Appeals allowed.