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Supreme Court of India

BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHORITYversusBIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL (NOW A UNIT OF ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD.) AND ORS.

Citation
2018 INSC 1104
Decided
27 November 2018
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The KTCP Act, including its power to levy betterment fees under Section 18, applies to industrial lands allotted under the KIAD Act, and the special‑versus‑general law maxim does not preclude its operation.

Summary

The Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority (the appellant) sought betterment, road and other charges under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961 from Birla Super Bulk Terminal (the respondent) for a cement terminal built on land allotted by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act. The respondent argued that the KIAD Act, being a special law, barred the KTCP Act from applying and that no betterment fee could be levied. The High Court had set aside the lower court’s order and held that the KTCP Act did not apply to the industrial area, but the Supreme Court reversed this, holding that the KTCP Act’s provisions, including Section 18’s power to levy betterment fees, are applicable even to lands allotted under the KIAD Act. The Court emphasized the distinct objects of the two Acts, the non‑obstante clause in the KTCP Act, and the fact that other allottees had paid similar charges. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the respondent was ordered to pay the levied amount with interest.

Issues considered

  • Whether Sections 14, 15 and 18 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 apply to land allotted under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act and permit the planning authority to levy betterment fees.
  • Whether the maxim ‘Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant’ (special law prevails over general law) bars the application of the KTCP Act in view of the KIAD Act being a special enactment.

Legislation cited

Subjects

betterment feeKarnataka Town and Country Planning ActKarnataka Industrial Areas Development Actspecial vs general legislationplanning authorityindustrial arealand use changenon-obstante clause

Judgment

                       [2018] 13 S.C.R. 635                             635


BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AREA PLANNING                           A
                 AUTHORITY
                                 v.
 BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL (NOW A UNIT OF ULTRA
           TECH CEMENT LTD.) AND ORS.
                                                                        B
                  (Civil Appeal No. 9684 of 2011)
                       NOVEMBER 27, 2018
      [R. BANUMATHI AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
       Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961: ss. 14, 15
                                                                        C
and 18 – Levy of betterment fee u/s. 18 – Sustainability of – On
facts, appellant constituted as the planning authority for a local
planning area – Respondent No.1 sought permission from the
appellant for construction of Bulk Cement Terminal – Land allotted
by Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board-KIADB to
respondent no. 1 – Appellant sought respondent No.1 to pay              D
betterment charges, building construction charges etc. under the
KTPC Act – Writ petition by respondent no. 1 and 2 that appellant
had no authority to demand any development charges since lands
were allotted in favour of respondent no. 1 by the KIADB – Writ
petition dismissed – In appeal, the Division Bench held that for the
                                                                        E
industrial plots allotted by KIADB, the change of land use and the
development thereof comes under the purview of the special
enactment KIAD Act and not under the general law of KTPC Act
and levy of betterment fee u/s. 18 of the KTCP Act is not sustainable
– On appeal, held: The object of KIAD Act is to make special
provisions for securing the establishments of industrial areas in the   F
State and to generally promote the establishment and orderly
development of the industries whereas the KTCP Act is for regulation
of planned growth of land use and development and for the making
and execution of town planning schemes in the State – Both the
Acts-KIAD Act and KTCP Act operate in different fields and the
                                                                        G
maxim Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant is not applicable – There
is nothing in the provisions of the KTCP Act to exclude or exempt
the lands covered by the KIAD Act – Development activities including
the industrial areas fall within the scope of the appellant-Authority
and that the first respondent while obtaining the approval from the
                                                                        H
                                635
636           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     appellant-Authority for its plan is bound to pay the betterment
      charges, road cess and other charges as per the laws – Thus, the
      order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside –
      First respondent to pay the charges to appellant with 6% interest –
      Karnataka Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act – Maxims.
B           Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 By careful reading of the provisions of both the
      Acts, Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961
      and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act it is
      seen that the object of KIAD Act is to make special provisions
C     for securing the establishments of industrial areas in the State
      and to generally promote the establishment and orderly
      development of the industries. On the other hand, KTCP Act is
      for regulation of planned growth of land use and development
      and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in
      the State. Both the Acts i.e. KIAD Act and KTCP Act operate in
D     different fields. Considering the objects of both the enactments,
      there is no merit in the plea of the fifth respondent that once a
      land is acquired for the purpose of industries under the KIAD
      Act and made over to the Board, the use of the land becomes
      ‘use for industrial purpose’ and no further permission for change
E     of use of land by KTCP or any other authority is required.
      [Para 22][649-B-D]
            1.2 From a combined reading of Section 18 with Section
      2(1-c) of KTCP Act, it is clear that the levy of prescribed fee
      under Section 18 of the Act is not merely for change of land use
F     but also for development of land or building. The language of
      expression used in Section 18 that “permission for change of land
      used…” and “development of land or building..” is to be
      interpreted in the light of the object of KTCP Act as enunciated
      in the Preamble. [Para 23][649-F-G]

G           1.3 When the government of Karnataka, Finance
      Department and other departments and also the Commissioner
      for Industrial Development and other departments have
      participated in the said meeting and were all parties to the
      decisions as regards the question of levy of fees by KTCP, it is
      not open to KIADB to resile from the minutes and put forth claim
H
BANGALORE INTERN. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO.                          637
        v. BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL

contrarily. Having been a party to the discussion in the meeting        A
held on 04.12.1999, the State of Karnataka is also not justified in
contending that the lands in question are included in the industrial
area declared by the State Government and hence, not bound to
pay the development fee under Section 18 of the Act.
[Para 25][651-E-G]
                                                                        B
      1.4 Section 14 read with Section 18 of the KTCP Act clearly
connotes that the Planning Authority is entrusted with the function
of granting licence to put up construction on the land including
the land acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act.
This is also clear from the provisions contained in the non–
obstante clause in Section 74-M of the KTCP Act which declares          C
that the provisions of the said Act and the Rules, Regulations
and Bye–Laws made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent contained in any other law. There is nothing
in the provisions of this Act to exclude or exempt the lands which
are covered by the KIAD Act. [Para 27][652-F-G]                         D
      1.5 The High Court, on the one hand, took the view that
Sections 14, 15 and 18 of KTCP Act are not applicable to the
industrial area which is governed by KIAD Act and on the other
hand, held that for compliance of the provisions of Sections 14
and 15 for all the establishment of the industrial unit, the allottee   E
has to seek approval of the Planning Authority constituted under
KTCP Act and KTCP is to scrutinise the plan and other documents
so as to ensure that the establishment of the industrial unit by
the allottee in the industrial area is in conformity with the Zonal
Regulations etc; but KTCP is not to levy betterment fee. The
findings of the High Court are self-contradictory to each other.        F
[Para 29]653-H; 654-A-B]
       1.6 The Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act is
entrusted with the functions of granting approval for any
development on the land within its jurisdiction including the land
acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. Per contra,          G
the enactment of KIAD Act is to make special provision for
securing the establishment of the industrial area in the State and
for that purpose to establish Industrial Areas Development Board.
The provisions of both the Acts make the intention of the
legislature very clear. If there are two possible interpretations of    H
638           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     an enactment, one should avoid the construction which would
      reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the
      broader interpretation. A statute is designed to be workable and
      the interpretation thereof by the court should be to secure that
      object. In so far as the “industrial area” allotted by KIADB, the
      interpretation given by the High Court to the provisions of KTCP
B
      Act would render the existence of the Planning Authority like
      the appellant to futility. While on the one hand, the High Court
      has directed the first respondent to obtain permission from the
      Planning Authority under KTCP Act and that the appellant-
      Authority to scrutinise those plans only to ensure that they are
C     in conformity with the Regulations etc. At the same time, the
      High Court is saying that the appellant-Authority cannot collect
      the betterment fees. Such findings are contradictory to each other
      and cannot be sustained. [Para 30][654-C-H]
            1.7 The High Court held that KIAD Act being a Special
D     Act, the same will prevail over KTCP Act which is a General Act.
      KTCP Act is applicable to all the developmental activities in
      respect of any land coming within the area of Outline Development
      Plan (ODP) and the lands in question even though situated in
      industrial area comes within the area of ODP of the Planning
      Authority. The developmental activities over the said land have
E     to be carried on only with the permission of the Authority and
      both the enactments have to be harmoniously construed so as to
      give effect to each of the Acts enacted by the State Government.
      [Para 31][654-G-H; 655-A]
             1.8 Rule of interpretation says that a statute is best
F     interpreted when it is known why it was enacted, which can be
      seen from the preamble of an Act. As per the preamble of the
      KIAD Act, it is an Act to make special provision for securing the
      establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and
      generally to promote the establishment and orderly development
G     of industries therein. KTCP Act on the other hand, was enacted
      to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and
      development and for the making and execution of town planning
      schemes in the State of Karnataka. Thus, considering the
      legislative intent of the two enactments, it is seen that there is
      nothing in the KIAD Act to destroy the authority of the appellant
H
BANGALORE INTERN. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO.                           639
        v. BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL

which has its own assigned role to perform under the provisions          A
of the KTCP Act. Considering the object and purpose for which
both the Acts were enacted, there is no inconsistency or
overlapping between the two enactments and the power of
authorities constituted under the Acts. As the areas of operation
of KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different, there is no
                                                                         B
question of applicability of the maxim Generalia Specialibus Non
Derogant. [Para 32][655-B-E]
      1.9 The first respondent has not challenged the jurisdiction
of appellant-Authority to levy betterment charges and that the
objections that the first respondent has raised were regarding
the rate of betterment fee treating the first respondent as              C
commercial establishment and the fact that they are situated in
Bengaluru Rural (North) District and not in Bengaluru Urban
District. When the first respondent has not raised the objection
regarding the jurisdiction/competence of the appellant-Authority
to levy betterment fee, the first respondent was not justified in        D
turning around and challenging the powers of the appellant-
Planning Authority to levy betterment charges. The High Court,
did not properly consider the response of the first respondent
and the High Court erred in saying that the role of KTCP is only
to scrutinise the application to ensure that the plan is in conformity
with the provisions of the KTCP Act and that it cannot levy the          E
fee. [Para 34]656-B-D]
      1.10 For obtaining sanction of their plan, the other allottees
of industrial plots by KIADB have paid the betterment charges
and also the road cess as demanded by the appellant-Authority.
When other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB have paid              F
betterment charges and road cess for obtaining sanction of the
plan, the first respondent cannot challenge the levy and contend
that they are not liable to pay the betterment charges. [Para 35]
[656-E-F]
      1.11 The High Court ignored the important provisions of            G
KTCP–Sections 14 and 15 regarding the development act and
the development activities including the industrial areas fall within
the scope of the appellant-Authority and that the first respondent
while obtaining the approval from the appellant-Authority for its
plan is bound to pay the betterment charges, road cess and other         H
640             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     charges as per the laws. The Single Judge rightly dismissed the
      writ petition filed by the first respondent and the Division Bench
      erred in reversing the same. The impugned judgment of the High
      Court is set aside. The first respondent is directed to pay
      Rs.1,48,29,173/- to appellant-Authority with interest at the rate
      of 6% from the date of the demand, within the stipulated period.
B
      [Paras 36, 37][656-F-H; 657-A-B]
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9684
      of 2011
            From the Judgment and Order dated 21.10.2005 of the High Court
C     of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No. 3688/2002 (LB-RES)
            Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., S. J. Amith, Ms. Aishwarya Kumar, Dr.
      (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta Advs. with her for the Appellant.
            Bharat Sangal, Ms. Anindita Deka, Ms. Babita Kushwaha, Ms.
      Isha Gupta, Devadatt Kamat, Nishanth Patil, Ms. Sneha K. Iyer, Rohit
D     Prasad, Joseph Aristotle, Mrs. Priya Aristotle, Shiva P., Ms. Aruna
      Hannah Dutta, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            R. BANUMATHI, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment
      dated 21.10.2005 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore
E
      in Writ Appeal No.3688 of 2002 in and by which the High Court has set
      aside the order passed by the Single Judge thereby setting aside the
      betterment fee levied by the KTCP by holding that the very acquisition
      under the Industrial Area Development Act involve change of land use
      and development by KIADB and while so, further levy of betterment
F     fee under Section 18 of the KTCP is not sustainable.
            2. Brief facts of the case which led to filing of this appeal are that
      the provisions of Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act,
      1961 to provide for regulation of planned growth of land use and
      development and for making and execution of town planning schemes in
G     the State of Karnataka. The State Government, by virtue of powers
      conferred under Section 4-A of the KTCP Act, issued Notification
      No.HUD142 MNX 95 dated 12.01.1996 declaring the area shown in
      the Schedule to the said notification as ‘Bangalore International Airport
      Planning Area’ w.e.f. 12.01.1996. On the same day, the State
      Government issued another Notification No.HUD 142 MSX 95
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                               641
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

constituting the appellant as the Planning Authority for the said local        A
planning area. The State Government by Notification dated 14.05.1997
added some other villages including the villages in question in
Doddaballapur Taluk in the planning area of the appellant.
      3. Respondent No.1 approached the State Government to approve
a project to establish the Cement Terminal near Bangalore which was            B
approved by the Single Window Agency by its clearance order dated
29.11.1996. By exercising powers under Sections 3(1) and 1(3) of KIAD
Act, the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB),
issued a Notification on 03.07.1997 declaring some areas as industrial
areas. Respondent No.1 was allotted lands by KIADB in Thippapura,
Veerapura, Bashettinalli of Doddaballapur Taluk vide allotment letter          C
dated 12/13.01.1998. Subsequently, respondent No.1 was asked to take
possession of the said lands vide letter dated 29.05.1998 by KIADB and
accordingly, possession certificate was issued on 16.07.1998 and
respondent No.1 took possession on 16.7.1998.
        4. On 8.6.1998, Respondent No.1 applied to Appellant authority         D
seeking permission for construction of Bulk Cement Terminal. The
Appellant inspected the spot along with KIADB Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Urban Planning Director and Deputy Metropolitan Commissioner.
By letter dated 17.9.1998, R-1 was informed by the Appellant that on
inspecting the land once again and being satisfied that there is an approach   E
road measuring 15 feet to the proposed land, it was decided to approve
the development plan as per Rules. The Appellant also informed
Respondent No.1 to pay betterment charges @ Rs. 75 per sq. mtr.,
inspection charges @ Rs. 150 per hectare, building construction charges,
penalty @ Rs. 150 per hectare and road charges @ Rs. 1 lakh per acre
totalling Rs.1,48,29,173/- pertaining to the sanctioning of the Development    F
Plan consisting of the plans of storage, packing and administrative-office
buildings.
       5. Respondent No.1 objected to the demand by a letter dated
16.10.1998 stating that it had already made payment to KIADB towards
allotment of lands, and therefore, development fee for constructing the        G
commercial establishment is not necessary. Appellant issued notice dated
08.12.1998 under section 15 (4) of KTCP Act stating that as per Section
15 (1) of the KTCP Act, every development has to be proceeded only
after getting necessary Commencement Certificate from the Appellant.
                                                                               H
642             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     It was stated in the notice that records reveal that no permission has
      been obtained as required under the provisions of KTCP Act. KTCP
      asked respondent No. 1 to stop work and discontinue use of the property
      and to show cause as to why action should not be taken to remove or
      pull down the work and to restore the land to its original condition.
B            6. Respondents No. 1 and 2 filed Writ Petitions No. 37717-719/
      1998 dated 14.12.1998 before the High Court challenging the said notice
      dated 17.9.1998 and notice dated 8.12.1998. Respondent No.1 contended
      that the appellant has no authority to demand any development charges
      since the lands in the question were allotted in favour of Respondent
      No.1 by the KIADB, under the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas
C     Development (KIAD) Act. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed
      the Writ Petitions holding that in view of the declarations issued under
      section 4-A of the KTCP Act, the lands in question continue to be within
      the planning area. The Single Judge further held that when respondent
      No. 1 itself has submitted to the jurisdiction of the appellant by making
D     an application for sanction of plan and for permission and while so, it is
      not open for them to say that the appellant has no jurisdiction or authority
      to demand development charges. The learned Single Judge held that by
      virtue of the power conferred on the appellant under Section 18, the
      appellant has rightly demanded the development charges having permitted
      Respondent No. 1 to use the land for establishment of an industry.
E
             7. In the appeal filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, the Division
      Bench held that KIAD Act is a special Act enacted for securing the
      establishment of industries in the State of Karnataka and the industrial
      area is governed by the provisions of the Act. The High Court further
      held that for the industrial plots allotted by KIADB, the change of land
F     use and the development thereof comes under the purview of the special
      enactment KIAD Act and not under the general law of KTPC Act and
      the provisions of special Law will prevail over the provisions of the
      general Law. The High Court held that the only requirement for
      respondent No.1 is to obtain clearance from the appellant to show that
G     the construction of the industrial unit is in conformity with the zonal
      regulations, etc. and this requirement does not in any way attract the
      provisions of Section 18 of the KTCP Act so as to empower the appellant
      to levy conversion fee/betterment fees.
             8. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted
H     that the High Court erroneously held that Sections 14, 15 and 18 of the
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                              643
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

KTCP Act are not applicable to the lands acquired under the KIAD              A
Act. The learned senior counsel submitted that the provisions of KIAD
Act mainly deals with the declaration of an area as an industrial area
and the acquisition of the lands for the purpose of industrial development
and allotment of the said land and there are no provisions in the KIAD
Act with regard to the construction thereon or the developmental activities
                                                                              B
to be carried out in the industrial sites and one has to fall back upon the
provisions of the KTCP Act for carrying on any development activities
over the said land which brings into action Sections 14 and 15 of the
KTCP Act for seeking permission and the power of the Planning Authority
to levy the betterment fee under Section 18 of the KTCP Act. The
learned senior counsel further submitted that the provisions of KTCP          C
Act govern the entire planning and development of the buildings within
the State of Karnataka including the industrial area falling within the
planning area of the appellant authority and Section 18 of the KTCP Act
automatically comes into play empowering the appellant to charge the
betterment fees. It was submitted that the areas of operation of KTCP
                                                                              D
Act and KIAD Act are entirely different with different aims and
objectives and therefore, the principle of interpretation of “special Act
prevails over general Act” (Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant)
would have no application and the same has been wrongly applied by
the High Court and the Division Bench erred in reversing the judgment
of the Single Judge.                                                          E
       9. Per contra, Mr. Bharat Sangal, learned counsel for the first
respondent submitted that once the area is allotted to KIAD Board, the
acquisition and the allotment being for industrial purpose which involves
the change of land use and its development is controlled by the KIAD
Board and the provisions of KIAD Act and it falls outside the purview         F
of KTCP Act. The learned counsel for the first respondent further
submitted that KIAD being a Special law, it will override the provisions
of Sections 14, 15 and 18 of KTCP Act and a general law like KTCP
Act cannot defeat the provisions of the special Law to the extent to
which they are in conflict. The learned counsel further submitted that
the moment the land was acquired for industrial purpose, it assumes the       G
character of industrial area and no further conversion and development
is required and hence, there is no question of conversion fee/betterment
fee be paid to KTCP and the entire field is covered by KIAD Act and
KIADB Regulations which exclude the application and operation of
KTCP Act, 1966.                                                               H
644            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A            10. The learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent-KIADB
      submitted that once an area or land is acquired and declared as an
      industrial area under Section 3(1) of KIAD Act, the said area gets
      demarcated for industrial use and the KIADB is duty bound to develop
      the area for industrial activities and the ancillary area by virtue of the
      powers and functions under Section 14(C) of KIAD Act. There is no
B
      further requirement to apply for change of land use under the KTCP
      Act. It was further submitted that when any industrial area is set up by
      KIADB, all infrastructure facilities are also installed and the cost and
      the expenditure incurred by the KIADB is passed on to the entrepreneurs
      or allottees who intend to set up facilities for industrial activity in the
C     State of Karnataka and there is no question of payment of conversion
      charges/betterment fee under Section 18 of the KTCP Act.
             11. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused
      the impugned judgment and materials placed on record. Upon
      consideration of the materials placed on record, the following points arise
D     for determination in this appeal:-
               (i)    Whether the High Court was right in holding that Sections
                      14, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act are not applicable when
                      the lands are declared as industrial areas under Section 3
                      of KIAD Act and the payment of betterment fees for the
E                     purported development works under the provisions of the
                      KTCP Act does not arise?
               (ii)    When the areas of operation of KIAD Act and KTCP
                      Act are wholly different with different aims and objectives,
                      whether the High Court was right in saying that the
F                     principle of interpretation of Special Act prevails over the
                      General Law is applicable?
             12. Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (KTCP Act)
      has been enacted for regulation of planning, coordination and supervision
      of the orderly development of the areas within the State of Karnataka.
G     KTCP Act is for the regulation of the planned growth of land use and
      development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes
      in the State.
            13. A combined reading of Section 14 with Section 18 of the KTCP
      Act leads to the conclusion that the Planning Authority under KTCP Act
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                             645
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

is entrusted with the function of granting licence to put up construction    A
on the land including the land allotted by the KIAD Board to the allottees
under the KIAD Act. This is clear from the non-obstante clause in
KTCP Act i.e. Section 76-M which declares that the provisions of Section
76-M of KTCP Act along with rules and regulations and bye-laws made
thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent
                                                                             B
contained in any other law.
      14. For proper appreciation of the contentions urged, we may
usefully refer to the relevant provisions of both KTCP Act and KIAD
Act. The Preamble of the KTCP Act reads as under:-
      “An Act to provide for the regulation of planned growth of             C
      land use and development and for the making and execution
      of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka.
      Whereas it is necessary and expedient,—
      (i) to create conditions favourable for planning and replanning
      of the urban and rural areas in the State of Karnataka, with           D
      a view to providing full civic and social amenities for the
      people in the State,
      (ii) to stop uncontrolled development of land due to land
      speculation and profiteering in land,
                                                                             E
      (iii) to preserve and improve existing recreational facilities
      and other amenities contributing towards balanced use of
      land; and
      (iv) to direct the future growth of populated areas in the State,
      with a view to ensuring desirable standards of environmental
                                                                             F
      health and hygiene, and creating facilities for the orderly
      growth of industry and commerce, thereby promoting general
      standards of living in the State;
      And whereas, in order to ensure that town planning schemes
      are made in a proper manner and their execution is made
      effective, it is necessary to provide that a local authority shall     G
      prepare a development plan for the entire area within its
      jurisdiction;”
       15. “Development” and “Local Authority” are defined in Section
2 of the KTCP Act as under:-
                                                                             H
646            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A           “Section 2. Definitions – In this Act, unless the context otherwise
            requires. –
            ……
            (1-c) “Development” with its grammatical variations, means
            the carrying out of building, engineering, mining, or other operations
B           in, on, over or under land or the making of any material change in
            any building or land, or in the use of any building or land and
            includes sub-division of any land;
            ……

C           [(3-a) “Local authority” means a municipal corporation,
            municipal council, Town Panchayat or Grama Panchayat and a
            Local Authority is a ‘local authority concerned if any land within
            its local limits falls in the area of a plan prepared or to be prepared
            under this Act;

D     Admittedly, appellant herein is the planning authority within the meaning
      of Section 2(7) of the Act.
             16. Section 14 of the KTCP Act deals with enforcement of Outline
      Development Plan (ODP) and Regulations and it prescribes that on or
      from the date on which a declaration of intention to prepare ODP is
      published under Section 10(1), every land use, every change in the land
E
      use and every development in the area covered by the plan shall conform
      to the KTCP Act, the ODP and the Regulations as approved by State
      Government under Section 13(3). Section 14(1) stipulates that every
      land use, every change in land use and every development in the areas
      covered by the plan shall conform to the provisions of the Act, the Outline
F     Development Plan and the regulations, as finally approved by the State
      Government under sub-section (3) of Section 13. Section 14(2)(a) of
      the Act defines the expression ‘development’ which means the carrying
      out of building or other operation in or over or under any land or the
      making of any material change in the use of any building or other land.
G            17. Section 15 authorizes the Planning Authority to grant permission
      for development of building or land. Section 18 confers the power to
      collect betterment fee and it says where the permission for the change
      in the use or development of any land or building is granted under Section
      15 or Section 16, and such change or development is capable of yielding
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                               647
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

betterment income to the owner, the Planning Authority may levy a              A
prescribed fees not exceeding one third of the increase in the value of
the land or building in the prescribed manner for permitting such use or
development. In exercise of its powers under Section 10, the Planning
Authority declared its intention of making ODP by a notification dated
29.03.1996 which was made public. The authority resolved to adopt the
                                                                               B
relevant government orders with regard to charge of betterment fees
dated 05.08.1996.
       18. Section 18 of the KTCP Act confers the power upon the
Planning Authority to collect betterment fee where permission for a
change in the use or development of the land or building is granted under
Section 15 or Section 16 and such change or development is capable of          C
yielding a better income to the owner, the Planning Authority may levy a
prescribed fee not exceeding one-third of the estimated increase in the
value of the land or building in the prescribed manner for permitting such
change in use or development. Section 18 of the KTCP Act reads as
under:-                                                                        D
      Section 18.Recovery of a fee in certain cases of permission
      for change in the use of land or building.-
      [(1) Where permission for change of land use or development of
      land or building is granted under section 14-A or section 14-B or
      Section 15 or Section 17 and such change or development is capable       E
      of yielding a better income to the owner, the Planning Authority
      may levy a prescribed fee not exceeding one-third of the estimated
      increase in the value of the land or building in the prescribed manner
      for permitting such change of land use or development of land or
      building.]                                                               F
      ……
      [(3) The State Government may exempt any Board, Authority or
      body constituted by or under any law owned or controlled by the
      State Government or Central Government or an infrastructure
      Project promoted or implemented by any Company or person and             G
      approved by the State Government or Central Government from
      the payment of fee specified under sub-section (1).
      19. The non-obstante clause in Section 76-M of the KTCP Act
reads as under:-
                                                                               H
648            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A           “Section 76-M. Effect of other Laws.—(1) Save as provided
            in this Act, the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations and
            bye-laws made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding
            anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.
            (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any such other law,-
B           (a) when permission for development in respect of any land has
            been obtained under this Act, such development shall not be
            deemed to be unlawfully undertaken or carried out by reason only
            of the fact that permission, approval or sanction required under
            such other law for such development has not been obtained;
C           (b) when permission for such development has not been obtained
            under this Act, such development shall not be deemed to be lawfully
            undertaken or carried out by reason only of the fact that permission,
            approval or sanction required under such other law for such
            development has been obtained.”
D            20. The purpose of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,
      as seen from the Preamble of the Act, is to make special provisions for
      securing the establishment or industrial areas in the State and generally
      to promote the establishment and orderly development of the industries
      therein and for that purpose to establish Industrial Areas Development
E     Board. The Preamble of the KIAD Act reads as under:-
            “An Act to make special provision for securing the
            establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka
            and generally to promote the establishment and orderly
            development of industries therein, and for that purpose to
F           establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for
            purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.
                  Whereas it is expedient to make special provision for
            securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of
            Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and
            the orderly development of industries in such industrial areas,
G
            and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas
            Development Board and for purposes connected with the
            matters aforesaid.”
             21. As per Section 27 of the KIAD Act, the provisions of the Act
      shall apply to such areas from such date as have been notified by the
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                               649
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 1. Section 47 is             A
the non-obstante clause of KIAD Act which reads as under:-
      “Section 47 – Effect of provisions inconsistent with other
      laws – The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding
      anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law.”
       22. By careful reading of the provisions of both the Acts, it is seen   B
that the object of KIAD Act is to make special provisions for securing
the establishments of industrial areas in the State and to generally promote
the establishment and orderly development of the industries. On the
other hand, KTCP Act is for regulation of planned growth of land use
and development and for the making and execution of town planning              C
schemes in the State. Both the Acts i.e. KIAD Act and KTCP Act
operate in different fields. Considering the objects of both the enactments,
we find that there is no merit in the plea of the fifth respondent that once
a land is acquired for the purpose of industries under the KIAD Act and
made over to the Board, the use of the land becomes ‘use for industrial
purpose’ and no further permission for change of use of land by KTCP           D
or any other authority is required.
       23. Though heading of Section 18 of the KTCP Act is “Recovery
of a fee in certain cases of permission for change in the use of
land or building”, the levy of prescribed fee is not only for permission
for change of land use but also for development of land or building as         E
contemplated under Section 14A or Section 14B or Section 15 or Section
17 of the Act. As pointed out earlier, “development” is defined in Section
2(1-c) of KTCP Act which inter alia provides for “in the use of any
building or land and includes sub-division of any land”. From a
combined reading of Section 18 with Section 2(1-c) of KTCP Act, it is          F
clear that the levy of prescribed fee under Section 18 of the Act is not
merely for change of land use but also for development of land or building.
The language of expression used in Section 18 that “permission for
change of land used…..” and “development of land or building….”
is to be interpreted in the light of the object of KTCP Act as enunciated
in the Preamble of the Act.                                                    G
      24. Power to Exempt:- Prior to Amendment Act 11 of 1997
(with effect from 19.02.1997), Section 16 of KIAD Act provided for
exclusion of operation of other laws in respect of industrial areas. Section
16(C) provided that the State Government may by notification provide
                                                                               H
650             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     that the provisions of any other law relating to local authority which is in
      force in that area shall cease to apply and thereupon such provision was
      ceased to apply thereto. In exercise of such powers, the State
      Government issued the Circular dated 31.12.1990 directing Urban
      Development Authorities, City Improvement Trust Boards, Planning
      Authorities not to collect the betterment charges from the statutory bodies
B
      like Karnataka Housing Board and KIADB. Section 16 of the KIAD
      Act was omitted by Act 11 of 1997 (with effect from 19.02.1997).
      Subsequently by the government order dated 17.07.1997, the above
      Circular dated 31.12.1990 was revoked and the authorities above named
      have been directed to collect the betterment charges as per law.
C            25. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has drawn our
      attention to the Minutes of the Meeting held on 04.12.1999 where the
      question of levy of fees by KTCP in the Bangalore Metropolitan Region
      came up for discussion. The said meeting was attended by various
      authorities including the Finance Department, Commissioner of KIADB,
D     Director of Town Planning etc. After detailed discussion, the following
      decisions were taken:-
            “After detailed discussions, the following decisions were taken:
              1.   The Principal Secretaries to Government UDD & RDPR,
                   in consultation with the Principal Secretary to Government
E                  Commerce & Industries Department and Secretary, Law
                   Department would examine all aspects pertaining to
                   constitution of Industrial Townships in identified industrial
                   areas and come up with firm proposals by end of
                   December, 1999.
F             2. KIADB will obtain approval from the concerned Planning
                 Authority before developing any new industrial area;
              3.   The matter regarding rationalization of various charges,
                   fees and other levies under the KTCP Act and RDPR Act
                   will be re-examined by the concerned departments, having
G                  regard to what is prevailing in neighboring States and firm
                   proposals will be formulated within a period of one month;
              4.   The matter regarding delegation of powers to KIADB for
                   granting approvals for building plans for industrial units to
                   be established in approved industrial areas will be examined
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                              651
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

             by the Urban Development Department and if necessary             A
             suitable amendments would be effected to the concerned
             Town Planning Act; and
        5. Principal Secretary to Government Commerce & Industries
           Department will organize a meeting of major industries who
           had not yet paid certain charges and fee and try to sort out       B
           the matter in consultation with the Urban Development
           Department;
            Concluding the discussions, the Minister for Large &
             Medium Industries and Infrastructure Development
             informed that the main objective of constituting industrial      C
             townships was to simplify and streamline the procedures
             and ensure that approvals and also ensure that these
             industrial areas are maintained properly which at present
             are in a sorry state of affairs. He suggested that a proper
             revenue sharing mechanism between township authority and
             concerned local bodies should be worked out to ensure that       D
             the local bodies are also strengthened and take development
             works outside the industrial area. In view of the inordinate
             delay in fulfilling the commitments which had been made in
             the 1993 policy he requested that all concerned departments
             should take immediate action to formulate a proposal which       E
             is acceptable to all the departments.” [Underlining added]
When the government of Karnataka, Finance Department and other
departments and also the Commissioner for Industrial Development and
other departments have participated in the abovesaid meeting and were
all parties to the above decisions, it is not open to KIADB to resile from    F
the minutes and put forth claim contrarily. Having been a party to the
discussion in the meeting held on 04.12.1999, the State of Karnataka is
also not justified in contending that the lands in question are included in
the industrial area declared by the State Government and hence, not
bound to pay the development fee under Section 18 of the Act.
                                                                              G
       26. It was stated by the learned senior counsel for the appellant
that the State of Karnataka has not filed its counter in the High Court. It
is also to be pointed out that after dismissal of the writ petition by the
Single Judge, a writ appeal was preferred only by the first respondent.
The State of Karnataka has neither filed any appeal nor made its stand
                                                                              H
652            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     clear before the High Court. In the Supreme Court also, the State of
      Karnataka has not filed its counter affidavit. Only at the time of
      arguments, the State of Karnataka has filed written submissions stating
      that the provisions of the KTCP Act are not attracted to the industrial
      area covered under KIAD Act and that Section 18 of the Act will have
      no application and hence, no fee could be levied thereunder. In its written
B
      submissions, the stand taken by the State of Karnataka reads as under:-
            “……It is stated that in the present case, the lands in question are
            included in the industrial area declared by the State Government
            and the change in the land use and development thereof are
            governed by the provisions contained under Karnataka Industrial
C           Areas Development Act, 1966 Sections 14 and 15 of the Karnataka
            Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 are not at all attracted and
            consequently Section 18 thereof will have no application to such
            lands and hence no fee could be levied there under by respondent
            No.4 and the petitioner…..”
D     Since the State of Karnataka has not made its stand clear before the
      High Court nor any counter affidavit sworn in by any responsible officer
      of the State of Karnataka has been filed, we are not inclined to go into
      the merits of the stand taken by State of Karnataka in its written
      submissions. More so, when the State is a party to the meeting held on
E     04.12.1999 and concern expressed in the meeting as to the non-payment
      of development charges and the decisions taken thereon. The State
      appears to have been sitting over the fence and watching its two key
      authorities under KTCP Act and KIAD Act litigating.
             27. Section 14 read with Section 18 of the KTCP Act clearly
F     connotes that the Planning Authority is entrusted with the function of
      granting licence to put up construction on the land including the land
      acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. This is also clear
      from the provisions contained in the non-obstante clause in Section 74-
      M of the KTCP Act which declares that the provisions of the said Act
      and the Rules, Regulations and Bye-Laws made thereunder shall have
G     effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law.
      There is nothing in the provisions of this Act to exclude or exempt the
      lands which are covered by the KIAD Act.
             28. In its lengthy judgment, the High Court inter alia observed
      that the very acquisition for the industrial areas and the development by
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                              653
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

KIADB by itself involve the change of land use and the development by         A
the KIADB and while so, seeking permission for change of land use and
its development under the KTCP Act will be superfluous. The relevant
findings of the High Court in the impugned judgment are as under:-
    • So far as the land acquired under KIAD Act and utilised for
       industrial purpose and development thereof will have to be made        B
       by the Board in the area declared under the Act as an industrial
       area. The industrial activities in the industrial area are developed
       and controlled by the KIADB in accordance with the provisions
       of KIAD Act and it is a part of functions of KIADB;
    • The non-obstante clause-Section 47 of KIAD Act excludes the             C
       application of the provisions of any other Act;
    • The industrial activities in the industrial area, however, shall not
       contravene other laws and it shall be in conformity with Zoning
       Regulations and the Planning Authority constituted under the
       KTCP Act. The submission of plan to the appellant-Authority is         D
       only to ensure that the establishment of the industrial unit by the
       allottee in the industrial area is in conformity with the Zonal
       Regulations. Only for this limited purpose, the allottee of the
       industrial plot must submit its plan to the Planning Authority
       constituted under the KTCP Act for the purpose of obtaining
                                                                              E
       NOC;
    • For granting approval and for issuance of NOC, the Planning
       Authority under KTCP Act cannot levy betterment fee under
       Section 18 of the KTCP Act because the allottee of an industrial
       plot does not seek for a change in the land use or development
                                                                              F
       of the said land. There was already a change of land use and its
       development as an industrial unit which is the function of the
       Board constituted under the Special Act i.e. KIAD Act; and
    • When the entrepreneurs do not seek for change in land use and
       its development within the meaning of Sections 14 and 15 of the
                                                                              G
       KTCP Act, the question for levying any fee for change of land
       use under Section 18 of the Act will not arise.
      29. The High Court, on the one hand, took the view that Sections
14, 15 and 18 of KTCP Act are not applicable to the industrial area
which is governed by KIAD Act. On the other hand, the High Court
                                                                              H
654             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     held that for compliance of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the
      KTCP Act for all the establishment of the industrial unit, the allottee has
      to seek approval of the Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act
      and KTCP is to scrutinise the plan and other documents so as to ensure
      that the establishment of the industrial unit by the allottee in the industrial
      area is in conformity with the Zonal Regulations etc; but KTCP is not to
B
      levy betterment fee. The findings of the High Court are self-contradictory
      to each other.
              30. As discussed earlier, the Planning Authority constituted under
      KTCP Act is entrusted with the functions of granting approval for any
      development on the land within its jurisdiction including the land acquired
C
      and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. Per contra, the enactment
      of KIAD Act is to make special provision for securing the establishment
      of the industrial area in the State and for that purpose to establish Industrial
      Areas Development Board. The provisions of both the Acts make the
      intention of the legislature very clear. As rightly submitted by the learned
D     senior counsel for the appellant that if there are two possible
      interpretations of an enactment, one should avoid the construction which
      would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the broader
      interpretation. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation
      thereof by the court should be to secure that object. In so far as the
      “industrial area” allotted by KIADB, the interpretation given by the High
E
      Court to the provisions of KTCP Act would render the existence of the
      Planning Authority like the appellant to futility. While on the one hand,
      the High Court has directed the first respondent to obtain permission
      from the Planning Authority under KTCP Act and that the appellant-
      Authority to scrutinise those plans only to ensure that they are in
F     conformity with the Regulations etc. At the same time, the High Court
      is saying that the appellant-Authority cannot collect the betterment fees.
      In our considered view, such findings are contradictory to each other
      and cannot be sustained.
            31. The High Court held that KIAD Act being a Special Act, the
G     same will prevail over KTCP Act which is a General Act. KTCP Act is
      applicable to all the developmental activities in respect of any land coming
      within the area of Outline Development Plan (ODP) and the lands in
      question even though situated in industrial area comes within the area of
      ODP of the Planning Authority. The developmental activities over the
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                                 655
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

said land have to be carried on only with the permission of the Authority        A
and both the enactments have to be harmoniously construed so as to
give effect to each of the Acts enacted by the State Government.
       32. The question to be considered in this regard is whether KIAD
Act is a special enactment and KTCP Act a general Act and whether
the maxim ‘Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant’ is applicable as                  B
held by the High Court. Rule of interpretation says that a statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was enacted, which can be seen from
the preamble of an Act. As discussed earlier, as per the preamble of the
KIAD Act, it is an Act to make special provision for securing the
establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally
                                                                                 C
to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries
therein. KTCP Act on the other hand, as we have pointed out earlier,
was enacted to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use
and development and for the making and execution of town planning
schemes in the State of Karnataka. Thus, considering the legislative
intent of the two enactments, it is seen that there is nothing in the KIAD       D
Act to destroy the authority of the Appellant which has its own assigned
role to perform under the provisions of the KTCP Act. Considering the
object and purpose for which both the Acts were enacted, there is no
inconsistency or overlapping between the two enactments and the power
of authorities constituted under the Acts. As the areas of operation of
                                                                                 E
KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different, there is no question of
applicability of the maxim Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant.
       33. Seeking grant of permission for construction of industrial
buildings – Bulk Cement Terminal near Dodaballapur Railway Station,
the first respondent submitted its application to the appellant-Authority
                                                                                 F
on 08.06.1998. On that application for sanctioning the development plan
consisting of the plan of storage, packing and administrative office
buildings in the plot in question, the appellant-Authority vide order dated
17.09.1988 levied betterment charges, road charges etc. of
Rs.1,48,29,173/- under various heads. In response to the same, the first
respondent has sent its reply on 16.10.1998 inter alia stating that:- (i)        G
since the first respondent has made payment to KIADB towards allotment
of lands considering the first respondent as commercial establishment
and levy of development at the rate of Rs.75/- per sq. mtr. may not be
necessary; (ii) the construction put up by the first respondent are industrial
                                                                                 H
656             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 13 S.C.R.


A     buildings and not commercial establishments; and (iii) the first respondent
      is situated in Bengaluru Rural (North) District and it is not situated in
      Bengaluru Urban District attracting levy of such higher fee.
              34. By careful perusal of the first respondent’s response dated
      16.10.1998, it is seen that the first respondent has not challenged the
B     jurisdiction of appellant-Authority to levy betterment charges and that
      the objections that the first respondent has raised were regarding the
      rate of betterment fee treating the first respondent as commercial
      establishment and the fact that they are situated in Bengaluru Rural
      (North) District and not in Bengaluru Urban District. When the first
      respondent has not raised the objection regarding the jurisdiction/
C
      competence of the appellant-Authority to levy betterment fee, the first
      respondent was not justified in turning around and challenging the powers
      of the appellant-Planning Authority to levy betterment charges. The
      High Court, in our view, did not properly consider the response of the
      first respondent and the High Court erred in saying that the role of KTCP
D     is only to scrutinise the application to ensure that the plan is in conformity
      with the provisions of the KTCP Act and that it cannot levy the fee.
             35. It is also pertinent to note that for obtaining sanction of their
      plan, the other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB have paid the
      betterment charges and also the road cess as demanded by the appellant-
E     Authority. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the appellant
      has drawn our attention to the communication from ITC Limited including
      the Pay Order dated 01.08.1997 for payment of betterment charges of
      Rs.3,01,71,600/-. When other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB
      have paid betterment charges and road cess for obtaining sanction of
      the plan, the first respondent cannot challenge the levy and contend that
F
      they are not liable to pay the betterment charges.
              36. The High Court, in our view, ignored the important provisions
      of KTCP i.e. Sections 14 and 15 regarding the development act and the
      development activities including the industrial areas fall within the scope
      of the appellant-Authority and that the first respondent while obtaining
G     the approval from the appellant-Authority for its plan is bound to pay the
      betterment charges, road cess and other charges as per the laws. The
      learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the
      first respondent and the Division Bench erred in reversing the same and
      the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
H
BANGALORE INTER. AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHO. v.                                 657
   BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL [R. BANUMATHI, J.]

       37. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set         A
aside and this appeal is allowed. The first respondent is directed to pay
Rs.1,48,29,173/- to appellant-Authority with interest at the rate of 6%
from the date of the demand (17.09.1998) within a period of two months
from this date, failing which the respondent is liable to pay the interest at
the rate of 12% thereafter on the accrued amount.
                                                                                 B

Nidhi Jain                                                     Appeal allowed.




                                                                                 C




                                                                                 D




                                                                                 E




                                                                                 F




                                                                                 G




                                                                                 H


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BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHORITY versus BIRLA SUPER BULK TERMINAL (NOW A UNIT OF ULTRA TECH CEMENT LTD.) AND ORS. — 2018 INSC 1104 - Legal Desk AI