BANWARI LAL KOTIYAversusP.C. AGGARWAL

                                                                                  567

                           BANWARI LAL KOTIY A
                                                                                         A
                                           v.

                               P.C. AGGARWAL

                                   May 8, 1985
                                                                                         B
            [V,D. TULZAPURKAR AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.)

        Arbitration Act, 1940, sections 2(a) and (e) and 20, scope of-Need for
 fresh assent of both the parties for the actual reference when arises-Actual
 reference when becomes consensual and not unilateral, explained-Interpretation
 of Bye.laws 247 of the Delhi Stock Exchange.                                            c
         The appellant is a share broker and a member of the D~lhi Stock
  Exchange-an exchange recognised by the Central Government under the
  Securities Contracst Regulations) Act, 1956. The respondent, a non
  member. had dealings in shares and securities with the appellant as
  principal to principal between 14th July to 27th September, 1960, in respect           D
  whereof Contract Notes (ex. P.1 to P. 31) in the prescribed form wher~ issued
  by the appellant and were signed by the respondent. Each one of the
  Contracts contained an arbitration clause couched in very wide terms requiring
· the parties thereto to refer all their disputes or claims to arbitration as provided
  in the Rules, Regulations and Bye~laws of the Exchange.
                                                                                         E
         Under these transactions a sum of Rs. 5923 became due and payable
  by the respondent to the appellant but since the respondent raised a dispute
 denying the claim, the said dispute was referred to the arbitration of two
  arbitrators Mr. Prem-Chand and Mr. P.S. Khambete (both members of the
  Exchange) the former being the non1ince of the appellant and the latter being
  the appointee of the Exchange on the respondent's failure to nominate his              F
 arbitrator when called upon to do so. The arbitrators held their proceedings
  in which the respondent participated though he inter alia raised a contention
  that he was not a party to the reference and would not be bound by the Award
  that might be made on the basis of such unilateral reference. The Arbitrators
 made their Award on 18th April. 1961, allowing the claim of the appellant with
  costs against the respondent. In response to the notice of filing the Award in
 the Court, the respondent filed objections to the Award on several grounds              G
 such as denial of the existence of the agreement of reference, that he was not a
 member of the Exchange, that the Contract Notes had not been signed by him,
 that the arbitrators had mis-conducted themselves and the proceedings, that
 the Award had been improperly 'procured etc. Negativing all the objections,
 the Sub-Judge Delhi recorded the findings that the Contract Notes bore the
 signatures of the respondent and as such under the arbitration clause contained         B
 in each one of them read with the relevant Bye-laws there was a valid
 Agreement for Reference to arbitration made the Award_ a rule of the Court and
 passed a decree in favour of the appellant on 7.9.1962.
     568                      suPIUIME COURT REPORTS             (1985) SUPPL, s.c.R..
             In the first appeal preferred to the High Court, a learned Single Judge
A     of tho Delhi High Court entertained a doubt as to whether the respondent could
      be said to be a party to the actual Reference to arbitration even though each
      of the Contract Notes containing the arbitration clause was signed by the
      respondent, since the respondent had not joined in nominating bis arbitrator
      despite service of notice asking him to do so, and whether on that account the
      Reference could be said to be unilateral, referred the same to a larger Bench
     on 5.1.1971. The Full Bench answered the que,tion in favour of the respon-
8    dent, relying on certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Seth
     ThawardtJ1 Pheruma/ v. Union of India reported in (1955) 2 SCR P.48 and took
     the view that notwithstanding the fact that respondent had signed the Contract
     Notes and had thereby become consenting party to the arbitration agreement
     the actual reference to arbitration of the two arbitrators required the assent
     of both the parties and since to such reference the respondent had not given
c    his consent it was a unilateral reference to arbitration and as such the .resut.
     tant Award would not be binding on tl1e respondent. Hence the appeal by
     special leave.

           Allowing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: 1.1 The question whether fresh assent of both the parties for
D    the actual reference is necessary or not must depend upon whelher arbitration
    agreement is a bare agreement or it is an arbitration agreement as defined in
    section 2(a) of the Act. If it is the latter, then, clearly the actual reference to
    arbitration would be consensual and not unilateral and no fre<Jh assent of the
    parties would be necessary nor will resort to section 20 be nesessary. Instead
    the party desirous of going to arbitration can resort to rem~dies available to
E   him under Chapter II of the Arbitration A.ct, 1940; and in a case like the
    instant one he can, as the appellant, did, proceed under the relevant Bye-laws.
                                                                             [582 C-E]

            t .2 It is true that the Arbitration Act, 1940 defines the two expressions
     "arbitration agreement" and 0 reference .. separately, Section 2(a) defines an
    ''arbitration agreement" to mean "a written agreement to submit present or
F   future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not''
    while section 2(e) defines a '•reference" to mean ''a reference to arbitration",
    The latter expression obviously refers to an actual reference made jointly by the
    parties after disputes have arisen between them referring the said disputes for
    adjudication to a named arbitrator or arbitrators, while the former expression
    is wider as it combines within itself two concepts, (a) a bare agreement between
G   the parties that disputes arising between them should be decided or resolved
    through arbitration and (b) an actual reference of a particular dispute or
    disputes for adjudication to a named arbitrator or arbitrators. If that be so,
    it stands to reason that only when the arbi_tration agreement is of the former
    type, namely. a bare agreement a separate reference to arbitration with fresh
    assent of both the parties will be necessary and in the absence of such
H   concensual reference resort to section 20 of the Arbitration Act will be essential
    but where the arbitration agreement conforms to the definition given in section
    2(a), the party desiring arbitration can straightaway approach the arbitrator or
    arbitrators and resort to section 20 of Arbitration Act is unnecessary because
                        il.L. Ki>TIYA V. P.C. AGGARWAL                       569
consent to such actual reference to arbitration shall be deen1ed to be there as
the second concept is included in the agreement signed by the parties, and the      A
aspect that differences or disputes actually arose subsequently would be
inconsequential because the arbitration agreement as defined in section 2(a)
covers not n1erely present but future differences also. In other words, in such
 a case there will be no question of there being any unilateral reference. In
 every case the question will have to be considered as to whether the
 arbitration agreement is a bare agreement of the type indicated earlier or an
 arbitration agreement as defined in section 2(aJ of the Act. [574 D·A; 575 A-CJ    8
       2.1 On a plain reading of the arbitration clause contained in the
Contract Notes read with relevant Bye·laws it is abundantly clear that the
arbitration agreement herein is not a bare arbitration agreement but is clearly
an arbitration agreement as defined in section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act of
1940. In other words, the assent of the parties to actual reference is already      C
there in the agreement: in addition there is a Statutory reference. Therefore,
the reference being consensual (and also statutory) the resultant award would
be valid and binding on the parties to the transactions. This case was not a
case of unilateral reference. Resort to section 20 of the Arbitration Act on the
part of the appellant before approaching the arbitrators for adjudication was
unnecessary and the Award was and is binding on the respondent.
                                                                [577 H; 578 A-CJ    D

       2.2 The arbitration clause contained in the Contract Notes read with
relevant Bye· laws n1ake two 0r three things very clear. fn the first place the
arbitration clause is couched in a very wide language inasn1uch as it makes
arbitrablc not merely the claims or disputes arising out of the transactions
specified in the Contract Note but also "all claims differences and disputes in     E
respect of any dealings, transactions and contracts of a date prior or subse-
quellt to the date of this Contract (including any question whether such
dealings, transactions or contracts have been entered into or not)". Secondly,
the arbitration clause incorporates a provision that all such claims, differences
and disputes "shall be submitted to and decided by arbitration" in Delhi as
provided in the Rules, Regulations and Bye~laws of the Exchange; this is a
pointer to consensual submission in the clause. Thirdly, Bye-laws 247(a}            F
which governs these transactions in terms constitutes the actual reference to
arbitration and under Bye-laws 248(a) and 249(1) the reference is to two
arbitralors who would be the nominees of each one of the parties to the dis·
putes and provision is made empowering the Board of Directors or President
to appoint arbitrator in case a party fails to nominate his own; in other words
once a contract is made subject to Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws (framed
under the rule making power) there comes into existence a statutory submission
                                                                                    G
or reference to arbitradon. [577 D·H]


       3. 1 The true scope and effect of the observations of the Court in Seth
Thawardas Pherun:al's case must be read in the proper perspective and not in a
truncated manner or divorced from the context of specific issue which arose for     H
determination before the Court in that case. It will be clear that these were
neither intended to apply generally to all references nor to lay down the wide
proposition that there can be no reference to arbitration except through the
      570                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (1985] SUPPL. s.c.lt.

       Court under section 20 unless both parties join in it. The observations were
A      made in the context of the specific issue that arose before this Court and were
       not and are not intended to apply generally to all references. The statement
       that in the absence of either, ageement by both sides about the terms of
       reference, or an order of the Court under section 20 (4) compelling a reference
       the arbitrator is not vested with the necessary excl,Jsive jurisdiction' makes it
      clear that the observations were confined to the references of specific questions
      of law. Ordinarily the Court has jurisdiction to set aside an award if an
B     illigelity or an error of law appears on the face of it and it is only 'when a
      specific question of law has been referred to the arbitrator for adjudication that
      his decision thereon falls within his exclusive jurisdiction and cannot be inter~
      fered with by the Court howsoever erroneous it might be. The true effect of
      these observations is that even in the case of an arbitration agreement which
      squarely falls within the definition of that expression as given in section 2(a)
c     and which is not a bare arbitration agreen1ent there would be included in it a
     consensual actual reference by the parties of all their disputes including ques~
     tions of Jaw that may arise later but the arbitrator's award on such questions
     of Jaw would not be within his exclusive juri,di.:tion since specific question or
     questions of law cannot be said to have been referred to him as required by the
     law of arbitration but though the reference would be valid the award and his
     decisions on questions of law is erroneous on the face of it would be liable to
D    be set aside by the Court. This is far from laying down the wide proposition
     that there can be no reference to arbitration except through the Court under
     section 20 unless both the parties join afresh in the actual reference.
                                                           [579 A·C; 581 F-H; 582 A-CJ

            Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India [1955] 2 SCR P. 4S discussed
E    and explained.


            CIVIL APPELAT6 JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 272 of 1972.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 18.7.1972 of the Delhi
F   High Court in F.A.O. No. 139-D of 1962.

            S.S. Ray and Rameshwar Nath for the Appellant.

            Anoop Singh, C.L. ltorara and H.M. Singh for the Respondent.

G           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          TuLZAPURKAR, J. This appeal by special leave is directed
    against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge
H   of the Delhi High Court on 18th July, 1972 in F.A.O. No 139-D of
    1962 whereby a decree in terms of the Award passed by the Trial
    Court was set aside. Principally the view of the Full Bench rendered
    on the specific question referee! to it and which was followed by the
              ll.t. KOTIYA v. P.c. AGGARWAL (Tulzapurkar, J.)          571

     learned Single Judge while allowing the first appeal has been challen-
     ged by the appellant before us in this appeal.                           A
           Facts, admitted and/or found by the lower courts are these:
     The appellant is a share-broker and a member of the Delhi Stock
     Exchange -an Exchange recognised by the Central Government
     under the Securities Contracts (Regulations) Act, 1956. The respon-
     dent, a non-member, had dealings in shares and securities with the
                                                                              B
     appellant as principal to principal between 14th July and 27th
     September, 1960 in respect whereof printed Contract Notes (Ex. P.1
     to P.31) in the prescribed form were issued by the appellant and
     were signed by the respondent. These transacticns were subiect to
     the Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws of the Exchange which covered        c
     transactions between a member and a non-member. Each one of the
     Contracts contained an arbitration clause couched in very wi·Je
     terms requiring the parties thereto to refer all their disputes of
     claims to arbitration as provided in the Rules, Regulations and Bye-
     laws of the Exchange and Bye· law 247(a) incorporated a "Reference
     to Arbitration" in respect of such disputes or claims (whether admit-    D
     ted or not) between a member and a non~member arising out of or
     in relation to such transactions to two arbitrators to be appointed
     under the Rules, Regulations and Bye-laws of the Exchange.


           It appears that under these transactions a sum of Rs. 5923         E
     became due and payable by the respondent to the appellant but since
     the respondent raised a dispute and did not pay the claim the said
     dispute was referred to the arbitration of two arbitrators Mr. Prem
     Chand and Mr. P.S. Khambete (both members of the Exchange)
     after following the procedure prescribed under the Rules, Regulations    F
     and Bye-laws of the Exchange, the former being the nominee of the
     appellant and the latter being the appointee of the Exchange on the


..   respondent's failure to nominate his arbitrator when called upon to
     do so. The arbitrators held their proceedings in which the respon-
     dent participated though he inter a/ia raised a contention that he was
      not a party to the reference and would not be bound by the Award        G
      that might be made on the basis of such unilateral reference. After
     considering the entire evidence oral and documentary produced
      before them and after hearing the parties the arbitrators made their
      Award on 18th April, 1961 whereby they allowed the claim of the
                                                                              H
      appellant with costs against the respondent. The Award was filed in
      Court and after notices of filing the Award were served, the respon-
      dent filed objections to the Award on several grounds such as
      572                  SuPRBl.IE COURT RllPoRTS     (1985] SUPPL. s.c.ii..

      denial of the existence of the agreement of reference, that he was
A     not a member of the Exchange, that the Contract Notes had
      not been signed by him, that the arbitrators had mis-conducted
     themselves and the proceedings, that the Award had been improperly
     procured etc. The learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Delhi who heard the
     matter negatived all the objections raised for setting aside the Award;
B    in particular he recorded the findings that the Contract Notes bore
     the signatures of the respondent and as such under the arbitration
     clause contained in each one of them read with the relevant Bye-laws
     there was a valid Agreement for Reference to arbitration. Conse-
     quently, he made the Award a rule of the Court and passed a decree
     in favour of the appellant on 7.9.1962.
c
            The respondent preferred an appeal being F.A.O. No. 139-D
     of 1962 to the High Court of Delhi. The learned Single Judge who
     heard the appeal confirmed the trial court's findings on all the issues
     arising in the case except on the question of validity of the reference.
D
     Undoubtedly, he in agreement with the trial court held that
     the Contract Notes Exbs. P I to P. 31 which contained the
    arbitration clause, were signed by the respondent but even so,
    since the respondent had not joined in nominating his arbitrator
    despite service of notice asking him to do so, he entertained
E   a doubt as to whether the respondent could be said to be a
    party to the actual Reference to arbitration and whether on that
    account the Reference to the two arbitrators could be said to be
    unilateral and therefore, in view of the importance of the question
    involved, he referred the same to a larger Bench keeping the appeal
    on his file pending receipt of the decision of the larger Bench on the
F   point. This reference order was made on 5th January, 1971 in
    consequence whereof the question came to be referred to a Full
    Bench.


G         The Full Bench answered the question in favour of the respon·
    dent. It took the view that notwithstanding the fact that respondent
    had signed the Contract Notes and had thereby become consenting
    party to the arbitration agreement the actual reference to arbitration
    of the two arbitrators Prem Chand and P.C. Khambete required the
H   assent of both the parties and since to such reference the respondent
    had not given his consent it was a unilateral reference to arbitration
    and as such the resultant Award would not be binding on the respon·
    dent. In taking the view that the actual reference also required fresh
              B.L. KOTIYA '· P.C. AGGARWAL (Tulzapurkar, J.)            573

    assent of both the parties the Full Bench relied upon some obvser·

-   vations made by this Court in its decision in Seth Thawardas
    Pherumal v. Union of India.( 1) The Full Bench rejected the submission
    made before it on behalf of the appellant that the relevant obser·
                                                                              A


    vations of this Court on which it sought to rely for taking such view
    should be confined to and must be regarded as having been made in
    the context of the specific question which actually arose for decision-   8
    before this Court in that case. The Full Bench expressed its final
    conclusion in these words :

               "In cases where a contract between the parties con-
          tains what may be called an arbitration clause to refer
          future disputes to arbitration, the agreement is merely an          c
          agreement to submit future differences to arbitration
          within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act.
          If disputes arise in the future, a reference bas to be made
          to arbitration within the meaning of section 2(e) of the
          Arbitration Act and at this stage there should be a                 D
          consent of both the parties. If the consent exists it would
          not be necessary to proceed under Chapter III by making
          an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act
           and the parties or one of the parties can proceed under
           Chapter II of the said Act."
                                                                              E
     Presumably the Full Bench held that since there was no such consent
     at such later stage for the actual reference on the part of the
     respondent herein an application under s. 20 was necessary to be
     taken out by the appellant and in the absence of such step having
     been taken the actual Reference was unilateral and consequently the      F
     Award made on such reference was not binding on the respondent.
     When the matter went back to the learned Single Judge he naturally
     following the view of the Full Bench allowed the appeal of the


-    respondent and set aside the decree passed in terms of the Award.
     It is this view of the Full Bench that is under challenge in this
     appeal.

          It is obvious that two questions really arise for our determi·
                                                                              G


     nation in this appeal. First, whether in the facts and circumstances
     of the case there was a unilateral reference to arbitration of th~       H

          (I) [1955] 2 S,C.R. 48,
     574                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [1985) SUPPL. S.C.R.

    two arbitrators Mr. Prem Chand and Mr. P.S. Khambete or having
A   regard to the terms and conditions of the Contract Notes which
    included an arbitration clause in very wide terms to which
    the respondent had become a party by signing the Contract
    Notes and the relevant Rules Regulations and Bye-laws of the
    Exchange the respondent could be said to have accorded his
    consent to the actual Reference to arbitration of the two arbitrators?
B
    In other words whether a fresh assent on his part was necessary at
    the stage when the reference came to be made to the two arbitrators
    in accordance with the relevant Bye-laws of the Exchange? And the
    second, whether the Full Bench has prop~rly appreciated the true
                                                                                  -
    scope and effect of the relevant observations made by this Court in
c   Seth Thawardas Pheruma/'s case (supra)?

           It is true that the Arbitration Act, 1940 defines the two expres-
     sions "arbitration agreement" and "reference" separately. Seeton
    2(a) defines an "arbitration agreement" to mean "a written agreement
    to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an
D   arbitrator is named therein or not" while s.2(e) defines a "reference"
    to mean "a reference to arbitration". The latter expression obvious-
    ly refer.; to au actual reference made jointly by the parties after
    disputes have arisen between them referring the said disputes for
    adjudication to a named arbitrator or arbitrators, while the former
E   expression is wider as it combines within itself two concepts, (a) a
    bare agreement between the parties that disputes arising between
    them should be decided or resolved through arbitration and (b) an
    actual reference of a particular dispute or disputes for adjudication
    to a named arbitrator or arbitrators. This will be clear form the
    manner in which the expression "submission" was defined in the
F   earlier Indian Arbitration Act, 1899 because, following the English
    Arbitration Act, 1889, the Indian Arbitration Act 1899 defined the
    expression "submission" in the same words now used to define
    "arbitration agreement" in the 1940 Act and in Russell on Arbitra-
    tion (20th Edn.) at page 44 it has been steated that this term
    (arbitration agreement as defined) covers both the concepts (a) and
G   (b) mentioned above within it. If that be so, it stands to reason
    that only when the arbitration agreement is of the former type,
    namely, a bare agreement a separate reference to arbitration with
    fresh assent of both the parties will be necessary and in the absence
    of such concensual reference resort to s. 20 of the Arbitration Act
H
    will be essential but where the arbitration agreement conforms to the
    definition given in s. 2 (a), the party desiring arbitration:can straighta-
    way approach the arbitrator or arbitrators and resort to s. 20 of
              B.L. llOTIYA v. P.C. AGGARWAL (Tu/zapurkar, J.)             575

    Arbitration Act is unnecessary because consent to such actual
    reference to arbitration shall be deemed to be there as the second          A
    concept is included in the agreement signed by the parties, and the
    aspect that differences or disputes actually arose subsequently would
    be inconsequential because the arbitration agreement as defined in
    s.2(a) covers not merely present but future differences also. In other
    words, in such a case there will be no question of there being any          B
    unilateral reference. Such being the true position in law it is difficult
    to agree with the view of the Full Bench that "where a contract
    between the parties contains what may be called an arbitration
    clause to refer future disputes to arbitration the agreement is
    merely an agreement to submit future differences to arbitration
     within the meaning ofs.2(a) of the Arbitration Act and that if             c
     disputes arise in future a reference has to be made to arbitration
     within the meaning of s.2(e) of the agreement and at this stage there
     should be a consent of both the parties." In every case the question
     will have to be considered as to whether the arbitration agreement
     is a bare agreement of the type indicated earlier or an arbitration        D
     agreement as defined in s.2(a) of the Act and we proceed to examine
    this question in regard to the arbitration agreement in the instant
     case.

          It has not been disputed before us that the Contract Notes
    Exbts. P. l to P.31 issued by the appellant and signed by the respon-       E
    dent contain printed terms and conditions on the basis of which the
    transactions were put through by the parties and that such terms
    and conditions include an arbitration clause. There is also no

-   dispute that these dealings were subject to or governed by the Rules,
    Regulations and Bye-laws and the usages of the Exchange. The
    arbitration clause printed in each one of the Contract Notes runs
                                                                                F
    thus :

               "In the event of any claim (whether admitted or not),
          difference or dispute arising between you and me/us out
          of these transactions the matters shall be referred to                G
          arbitration in Delhi as provided in the Rules, Bye-laws and
          Regulations of Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd·
           D~.                                                        ,

               This contract constitutes and shall be deemed to                 H
           constitute as provided overleaf an agreement between you
           and me/us that all claims (wheth~r acjmi.tte4 9r not}
     576                  SUPREME .COURT REPORTS          (1985) SUPPL. S.C.R.
                                                                                 -•
           differences and disputes in respect of any dealings trans-
A          actions and contracts of a date prior or subsequent to the
           date of this contract (including any question whether
           such dealings, transactions or contracts have been
           entered into or not) shall be submitted to and decided by
           arbitration in Delhi as provided in Rules, Bye-laws and
           Regulations of the Delhi Stock Exchange Association
B
           Ltd; Delhi.

               The provisions printed overleaf form a part of the
           contract."

c   On the reverse of the Contract Notes arc printed verbatim, Bye-laws
    Nos. 247 to 249 and 273 and 274 of the Exchange contained in the
    Chapter of the Bye-laws dealing with "arbitration other than between
    the members." Bye-law 247 appears under the heading "Reference
    to Arbitration" and clause (a) thereof is relevant which runs thus:
D                "247 (a) All claims (whether admitted or not) diffe-
           rences and disputes between a member and a non-member
           or non-members (the terms ''non-member'' and "non..
           members" shall include a remisier, authorised clerk or
           employee or any other person with whom the member
E          shares brokerage) arising out of or in relation to dealings,
           transactions and contracts made subject to Rules, Byc-
           laws and Regulations of the Exchange or with reference
           to anything mcidental thereto or in pursuance thereof or
           relating to their construction, fuifilment or validity or
           relating to the rights, obligations and liabilities of re-
F          misiers, authorised clerks, employees or any other person
           with whom the member shares brokerage in relation to
           such dealings, transactions and contracts shall be referred
           ro and decided by arbitration as provided in the Rules,
           Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange".

G   Bye-law 248 deals with "Appointment of Arbitrators" and clause (a)
    thereof is material which runs thus :

               "248(a) All claims, differences, and disputes required
           to be referred to arbitration under these Bye-laws and
H          Regulations shall be referred to the arbitration of two
           members of the Exchange one to be appointed by each
           party."
          B.L. KOTIYA '· P.C. AGGARWAL (Tulzapurkar, J.)          577

Bye·law 249 deals with "Appointment of Arbitrators by the Board
of Directors or President" and cl.(l} thereof which is material runs       A
thus:

          "249. On payment in advance of the minimum fees
      of arbitrators prescribed under these Bye·laws and
      Regulations by any party to a claim, difference or                   B
      dispute the Board of Directors or the President shall
      appoint an arbitrator.

      (i) if after one party bas appointed an arbitrator ready
          and willing to act and there is failure, neglect or
          refusal on the part of the other party or parties to             c
           appoint an arbitrator (ready and willing to act)
           within seven days after service of written notice of
           that appointment or within such extended time as the
           Board of Directors or the President may on the
           application of the other party or parties allow".               D
The aforesaid arbitration clause contained in the Contract Notes
read with relevant Bye-laws make two or three things very clear. In
the first place the arbitration clause is couched in a very wide
language inasmuch as it makes arbitrable not merely the claims or
disputes arising out of the transactions specified in the Contract Note
                                                                           E
but also "all claims dilferences and disputes in respect of any
dealings, transactions and contracts of a date prior or subsequent to
the date of this Contract (including any question whether such
dealings, transactions or contracts have been entered into or not)".
 Secondly, the arbitration clause incorporates a provi<ion that all such   F
claims, differences and disputes "shall be submitted to and decided
 by arbitration" in Delhi as provided in the Rules, Regulations and
Bye-laws of the Exchange; this is a pointer to consensual submission
in the clause. Thirdly, Bye-law 247(a) which governs these transac·
 tions in terms constitutes the actual reference to arbiiration and
 under Bye-laws 248(a) and 249 (1) the reference is to two arbitrators     G
 who would be the nominees of each one of the parties to the disputes
 and provision is made empowering the Board of Directors or
 President to appoint arbitrator in case a party fails to nominate his
 own; in other words once a contract is made subject to Rules,
 Regulations and Bye·laws (framed under the rule making powers)            H
 there comes into existence a statutory submission or reference to
 arbitration. On a plain reading of the arbitration clause contained
    578                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS          [1985) SUPPL. s.c.ll.

    in the Contract Notes read with relevant Bye-laws it is abundantly
A   clear that the arbitration agreement herein is not a bare arbitration
    agreement but is clearly an arbitration agreement as defined in s.2(a)
    of the Arbitration Act of 1940. In other words, the assent of the
    parties to actual reference is already there in the agreement; in addi-
    tion there is a statutory reference. Therefore the reference being
B   consensual (and also statutory) the resultant award would be valid
    and binding on the parties to the transactions. That being so it is
    difficult to accept the Full Bench view that this was a case of
    unilateral reference requiring fresh assent of the respondent at the
    stage when the reference came to be made to two arbitrators. In our
    view resort to s.20 of the Arbitration Act on the part of the appel-
c   lant before approaching the arbitrators for adjudication was
    unnecessary and the Award was and is binding on the respondent.

          For taking the view that it was a case of unilateral reference
    requiring fresh assent of the respondent at the stage when the
D   reference came to be made to Messers Prem Chand and Khambete
    and that in the absence of such fresh assent from the respondent it
    was necessary for the appellant to approach the Court with an
    applicatian under s.20 of the Arbitration Act the Full Bench relied
    upon the following observations made by this Court in Thawardas
    Pheruma/ case (supra) :
E
               "A reference requires the assent of 'both' sides. IC
          one side is not prepared to submit a given matter to
          arbitration when there is an agreement between them that
          it should be referred, then recourse must be had to the
F         Court under section 20 of the Act and the recalcitrant
          party can then be compelled to submit the matter under
          sub-section (4). In the absence of either, agreement by
          'both' sides about the terms of reference, or an order of
          the Court under section 20( 4) compelling a reference, the
          arbitrator is not vested with the necessary exclusive
G         jurisdiction."

    The Full Bench has taken the view that the above observations are
    applicable generally to all references and are not restricted to refer-
    ences of specific questions of law arising in given set of facts and
B   circumstances and lay down the wide proposition that there can be
    no reference to arbitration except through the Court under s.20
    unless both the parties join in the actual reference. That is why
               B.L. KOT!YA '· P.C. AGGARWAL (Tu/zapurkor, J.)          579

     the Full Bench has expressed its final conclusion in the manner and
     language quoted earlier.                                                 A

           With great respect, we would like to observe that the Full
     Bench has failed to appreciate the true scope and effect of the
     aforementioned observations of this Court. These observations
     must be read in the proper perspective and not in a truncated manner
     or divorced from the context of specific issue which arose for deter·    B
     mination before the Court in that case. So considered it will be
     clear that these were neither intended to apply generally to all
     references nor to lay down the wide proposition that there can be no
     reference to arbitration except through the Court under s.20 unless
     both parties join in it.                                                 C

           Briefly stated the facts in Thawardas Pherumal's case (supra)
     were these: Seth Thawardas, a contractor, entered into a contract
     with the Government for supply of two and half crores of pucca
     bricks to be delivered in instalments according to a fixed time
     schedule. A clause in the contract required "all disputes arising out    D
     of or relating to the contract to be referred to arbitration" of the
     Superintending Engineer of the Circle for the time being· Disputes
     arose about a number of matters between the parties at the same
     were duly referred to the arbitrator. One of the claims (the 5th
     head of the claim) preferred by the contractor was a loss of
      Rs. 75,900 being the value of 88 lacs of katcha bricks that were
                                                                              E
     destroyed by rain. The contractor's case in regard to this claim was
     that there was default on the part of the CP.W.D. in not removing
     the fully baked bricks which were ready for delivery, that due to
     delay in removal of baked bricks unburnt katcha bricks got accumla-
     ted which could be not be fed into his kilns and in the meanwhile        F
     rains set in with the result that 88 lacs of katcha bricks were
     destroyed by the rains and hence he was entitled to claim the value
     thereof as loss. Government's reply was two fold. First, it urged
     that the katcha bricks formed no part of the contract and even if it

--    was at fault in not taking delivery of the pucca bricks in time all
     that it will be liable for would be for the breach of that contract
     but the loss that was occasioned by damage caused to the katcha
                                                                              G

     bricks which formod no pirt of th;; contract was too remote,
     Secondly, compensation for this loss could in no event be claimed
     because this kind of stiuation was envisaged by the parties
     when the contract was made and it was expressly stipulated that
                                                                              H
     Government would not be responsible and in that behalf reliance
      was placed on clause (6) of the agreement which in terms stated: "the
      580                 SUPllBME COURT REPORTS        11985) SUPPL. s.c.11..

        department will not entertain any claim for damage to unburnt
A       bricks due to any cause wh~tsoever." The arbitrator held that
        the said clause was not meant "to absolve the department
       from carrying out their part of contract and so he awarded
       the coniractor Rs. 64075 under this head. This part of the
       award was challenged on the ground that it disclosed an illegality
B      and an error of law on the fact of it. This Court took the view
       that the arbitrator had clearly gone wrong in law, his construction
       of the terms of the contract being faulty and the award was liable
       to be set aside. Even so a contention was raised on behalf of the
      contractor that the Court could not interfere with or set aside the
      award inasmuch as the question of law had been specifically referred
c     to the Arbitrator for his adjudication and therefore, he had exclusive
      jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the court could not
      inrerfere with that decision, however, erroneous in law it might be.
      Therefore, the real issue that arose for determination before the
      Court in that case was whether the question of law arising between
      the parties had been specifically referred to the arbitrator or not and
D
      on the facts of the case the court expressed the view that such a
      specific question of law could not be expected to be referred to
     arbitration by reason of the arbitration clause contained in the
     original contract inasmuch as the question could not be known to
     the parties unless and until the dispute actually arose and that such
E    a question could be specifically formulated and referred only after
     the dispute aro<e. Since the question could not be and was not
     contained in the original arbitration clause it was required to be
     referred to arbitration by both the parties after disputes arose and
     since this was not done the Court held that the question of law bad
    not been specifically referred to the arbitrator and therefore, the
F   arbitrator bad no exclusive jurisdiction to decide the same and there
    being an error of law apparent on the face of the award the Court
    could interfere with the decision and set aside the award. It was in
    this context that the Court considered the necessity of either making



                                                                                 -
    such a reference by both the parties afresh or a Court's order under
G   s.20(4) so as to give exclusive jurisdiction to the arbitrator to decide
    the question of law rightly or wrongly and the aforementioned
    observations on which the Full Bench bas relied were not meant for
    applying generally to all references.

H         This would also be clear if the relevant observations are read
    in their entirety and in proper perspective. The relevant observations
    appearing at page 58 of the Report ru11 th1w
         il.t. KOTiYA v. P.c. AGGARWAL (Tuizapurkar ,/.)             581

          "We are of the opinion that this is not the kind of
    s,iecific reference on a point of law that the law of arbitra-         A
    tion requires. In the first place, what was shown to us is
    no reference at all. It is only an incidental matter intro·
    duced by the Dominion Government to repel the claim
    made by the contractor in general terms under claim No.5.
    In the next place, this was the submission of the                      8
    contractor alone. A reference requires the assent of
    'both sides'. If one side is not prepared to submit a given
    matter to arbitration when there is an agreement between
    them that it should be referred, then recourse must be had
    to the Court under section 20 of the Act and the recalci-
    trant party can then be compelled to submit the matter                 c
     under sub-section (4). In the absence of either, agreement
     by 'both sides' about the terms of reference, or an order
     of the Court under section 20(4) compelling a reference,
     the arbitrator is not vested with the necessary exclusive
     jurisdiction. Therefore, when a question of law is the                D
     point at issue, unless 'both sides' specifically agree to
     refer it and agree to be bound by the arbitrator's decision,
     the jurisdiction of the Court to set an arbitration right
     when the error is apparent on the face of the award is
     not ousted. The mere fact that both parties submit
     incidental arguments about a point of law in the course               E
     of the proceedings is not enough".


       On reading the aforesaid observations in proper perspective it
is clear that these were made in the context of the specific issue that
arose before this Court and were no! and are not intended to apply         F
generally to all references. The statement that in the absence of
either, agreement by both sides about the terms of reference, or an
order of the Court under s.20(4) compelling a reference, the
arbitrator is not vested with 'the necessary exclusive jurisdiction'
makes it clear that the observations were confined to the references
of specific questions of law. Ordinarily the Court has jmisdiction
                                                                           G
to set aside an award if an illegality or an error of law appears on
the face of it and it is only when a specific question of law has been
referred to the arbitrator for adjudication that his decision thereon
falls within his exclusive jurisdiction and cannot be interfered with
by tbe Court howsoever erroneous it might be. The true effect of
                                                                           H
these observations is that even in the case of an arbitration agree·
ment which squarely falls within the definition of that expression as
    582                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS         (198Sj SUPPL. s.c.1\.

    given in s.2(a) (and which is not a bare arbitration agreement) there
A   would be included in it a consensual actual reference by the parties of
    all their disputes including questions of law that may arise later but
    the arbitrator's award on such questions of law would not be within
    his exclusive jurisdiction since specific question or questions of law
    cannot be said to have been referred to him as required by the law
    of arbitration but though the reference would be valid the award
B
    and his decisions on questions of law if erroneous on the face of it
    would be liable to be set aside by the Court. This is far from laying
    down the wide proposition that there can be no reference to arbitra-
    tion except through the Court under s.20 unless both the parties
    join afresh in the actual reference.
c
          As we have said above the question whether fresh assent of both
    the parties for the actual reference is necessary or not must depend
    upon whether arbitration agreement is a bare agreement of the type
    indicated earlier or it is an arbitration agreement as defined in s.2(a)
    of the Ac!. If it is the latter then clearly the actual reference to
D   arbitration would be consensual and not unilateral and no fresh
    assent of the parties would be necessary nor will resort to s.20 be
    necessary. Instead the party desirous of going to arbitration can
    resort to remedies available to him under Chapter II of the Arbitra·
    tion Act, 1940; and in a case like the instant one he can, as the
E   appellant did, proceed under the relevant Bye-laws.

          Having regard to the above discussion the appeal is allowed,
    the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge passed in
    F.A.O. 139-D of 1962 following the view of the Full Bench is set
    aside and the decree in terms of the Award which was passed by the
F   learned trial Judge is restored. The respondent will pay the costs of
    the appeal to the appellant.

    S.R.                                                   Appeal Allowed.