BAR COUNCIL OF INDIAversusBOARD OF MANG. DAYANAND COLLEGE OF LAW AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2006 INSC 920
- Decided
- 28 November 2006
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- H K SEMA
Holding
The appointment of respondent No. 5 as Principal of Dayanand Law College was invalid because it did not meet the qualification requirements prescribed by the Advocates Act and Bar Council of India Rules, and the recommending authority must observe those requirements.
Summary
The Bar Council of India (BCI) challenged two Allahabad High Court writ orders that upheld the appointment of a philosopher, respondent No. 5, as Principal of Dayanand College of Law despite his lack of legal qualifications. The High Court had held that the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, being a later state law, prevailed over the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council's rules, and that the BCI had no role in legal education. The Supreme Court examined whether the two statutes could be harmoniously construed, applying the pith‑and‑substance doctrine, and held that the appointment must satisfy the qualifications prescribed by the Advocates Act and Bar Council rules. It ruled that the recommending authority and the State Government must adhere to those requirements when appointing a law‑college principal. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgments, allowed the BCI's appeals, upheld the writ filed by the college management, and dismissed the writ filed by respondent No. 5.
Issues considered
- Whether a person lacking a law degree can be appointed as Principal of a law college under the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act and Statute 11.14.
- Whether the Advocates Act, 1961 and Bar Council of India Rules are applicable to the appointment of a law‑college principal.
- Whether there is a conflict between the University Act (state law) and the Advocates Act (central law) and which law prevails under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Bar Council of India has authority over standards of legal education and qualifications of teachers and principals.
- Whether the requirement of a doctorate in law for a law‑college principal must be enforced.
Legislation cited
- Advocates Act, 1961s. 24, s. 4, s. 49(1)(a), s. 49(1)(d), s. 7(1)(h), s. 7(1)(i)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 254(2), s. Seventh Schedule List I entries 77,78, s. Seventh Schedule List III
- Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980s. 12
- Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for Selection of Teachers) Regulations, 1983
- Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973
Subjects
Judgment
A BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA
v.
BOARD OF MANG. DAYANAND COLLEGE OF LAW AND ORS.
NOVEMBER 28, 2006
B [H.K. SEMA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.]
Service Law:
Principal of Law College-Selection and appointment of-Requirement
C of qualification in /aw-Held, the recommending authority under .the
Universities Act and the State Government should, while selecting and
appointing Principal of Law College, also adhere to the requirements of the
Advocates Act and the Rules framed thereunder by the Bar Council of India-
Bar Council of India should also consider justification of watering down
D qualification of Doctorate or Post-Graduation in law-Bar Council of India-
Role of in legal education-Discussed-UP. Universities Act, 1973-Kanpur
University Statutes-Statute 11.14-Advocates Act, 1961-Bar Council of
India Rules, 1955-r. 12.
Interpretation of Statutes-Rule of harmonious construction-
E Appointment of Principal of Law College-Qualification-Held, first task of
a Court confronted with a set of parallel provisions relating to appointment
of Principal ofa Law College is to see whether provisions could be reconciled
or harmoniously construed so as to achieve object of both the enactments-
There is nothing in Universities Act or the Statutes whi~h stands in the way
of recommending authority to adhere to requirements of Advocates Act or
F Rules of Bar Council of India-Doctrine of Pith and Substance~onstitution
of India, 1950-Seventh Schedule-List I, Entries 77 and 78-U.P. State
Universities Act, 1973-Kanpur University Statute-I 1.14-Advocates Act,
1961-Bar Council of India Rules, 1955-r.12.
G Respondent no. 1, who had a degree of Doctorate in Philosophy, was
appointed as Principal of respondent no. I-Law College under the provisions
of the U.P. Universities Act, 1973. He was said to have been teaching ethics
and ancient law in the College. On an inspection, the Bar Council of India
found that he did not possess a qualification in law and, therefore, withdrew
its recognition to the College. Thereupon the Management of the College filed
II 756
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA'" BOARD OF MANG. DAYANANDCOLLEGEOF LAW 757
a writ petition before the High Court questioning the validity of appointment A
of respondent no. 5. Meanwhile on his transfer as Principal to another Degree
College, he also filed a writ petition challenging his order of transfer. The
High Court held that in view of the provisions of the U.P. Universities Act,
appointment of respondent no. 5 was entitled to be upheld notwithstanding
anything contained in the Advocates Act, 1961 or the Rules framed thereunder
by the Bar Council of India. Since the Bar Council of India was not a party in B
the said two writ petitions, it filed the present appeals seeking leave of the
Court.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The State Government and the recommending authority were C
not justified in recommending and appointing respondent No. 5 as the
Principal of respondent no. I-Law College. Consistent with the Advocates Act
and the rules of the Bar Council of India, respondent No. 5 could not have
been appointed as the Principal of a Law College. 1768-C; 769-AI
D
1.2. Notwithstanding the procedure to be followed under the U.P.
Universities Act, 1973 and Statute 11.14 of the Kanpur University Statutes,
as amended, it is necessary for the recommending authority and the State
Government when concerned with the appointment of a Principal of a Law
College, also to adhere to the requirements of the Advocates Act and the rules
of the Bar Council oflndia. This would ensure a harmonious working of the E
Universities and the Bar Council of India in respect of legal education and
the avoidance of any problems for the students coming out of the Institution
wanting to pursue the legal profession. (768-B-C]
O.N. Mohindroo v. The Bar Council of Delhi & Ors., (1968) 2 S.C.R.
709; The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v. The State ofU.P. & Anr., (1973) 2 F
S.C.R. 1073 and Ujagar Prints & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1989] 3
S.C.C. 488, referred to.
2.1. The first task of a court confronted with a set of parallel provisions
relating to appointment of a principal of a law college like the one in the G
amended provision of the Statute under the University Act and the Rules made
:::
by the Bar Council of India which could ultimately refuse to admit a graduate
of law coming out of the University to enrolment as an advocate, which alone
would entitle him to practice, is to see whether the provisions could not be
reconciled or harmoniously construed so as to achieve the object of both the
enactments. Prior to 13.1.1995, there was no conflict between Statute 11.14 H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A and Rule 12 of the Rules of the Bar Council. In 1995, in the University
Statutes, the requirement of the Principal having to be the holder of a
doctorate in one of the subjects taught in the College, was done away with.
Obviously, such a provision could not be understood as controlling fully
professional education like that in Medicine, Engineering or Law.
(765-F-G-H)
B
2.2. In pith and substance, the Advocates Act falls under Entries 77 and
78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. That apart, it is not
necessary to postulate a conflict of legislation in this case. A harmonious
understanding could lead to the position that the Principal of a Law College
has to be appointed after a process of selection by the Higher Education
C Services Commission, a body constituted in that behalf under the University
Act, but while nominating from the list prepared, and while appointing him, it
must be borne in mind that he should fulfill the requirements of the Advocates
Act, 1961 and Rules of the Bar Council of India framed thereunder. There
is nothing in the University Act or the Statutes framed thereunder, which
D stands in the way of adopting of such a course. (767-B, DJ
3.1. Though the Bar Council of India may not have been entrusted with
direct control of legal education in the sense in which the same is entrusted
to a University, still, it retains adequate power to control the course of studies
in law, the power of inspection, the power of recognition of degrees and the
E power to deny enrolment to law degree holders, unless the University from
which they pass out is recognized by it. 17<?5-E)
3.2. It may not be correct to say that the Bar Council of India is totally
unconcerned with the legal education, though .primarily legal education may
also be within the province of Universities. But, as the apex professional body,
F the Bar Council of India is concerned with the standards of the legal
profession and the equipment of those who seek entry into that profession.
The Bar Council of India is also thus concerned with the legal education in
the country. Therefore, instead of taking a pedantic view of the situation, the
State Government and the recommending authority are expected to ensure
G that the requirement set down by the Bar Council oflndia is also complied
with. [767-F, G)
3.3. Further, it is a matter for the Bar Council of India to ponder over
and to consider whether there is any justification in watering down the
qualification for .a Principal as either a doctorate in law or a postgraduate
H degree in law. Similarly, the Bar Council of India should take note of the
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA,,_ BOARD OF MANG. DAY ANAND COLLEGE OF LAW [BALASUBRAMANYAN. J.] 759
argument that it takes no interest in legal education or in keeping up the A
standards of the profession, so that it could take steps to rectify the situation.
(768-F-HJ
4. The authorities concerned and the High Court will deal with the
grievances of respondent No. 5 regarding his status and posting in an
expeditious manner, if moved in that behalf, and take an appropriate decision B
consistent with what has been stated in this judgment. (769-CI
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5301-5302 of
2001.
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 7-12-2000 of the High Court C
of Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 47967/2000 and 48183/2000.
Sanjeev Sachdeva, Preet Pal Singh, Sumesu Dhawan, Saurabh Sharma
and Chetan Chopra for the Appellant.
Dinesh Dwivedi, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Abhishek Chaudhury, S.K. Venna,
D
D.K. Singh, Pradeep Shukla, Raj Kishor Choudhary and Abhijit Sengupta for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
P.K. BALASUBRAMANY AN, J. 1. The Bar Council of India challenges
the judgments of the High Court of Allahabad in two Writ Petitions holding
that the appointment of respondent No. 5 in these appeals as the Principal
of the Dayanand College of Law was valid and within the competence of the
State of Uttar Pradesh and the Chhatrapati Shri Sahu Ji Maharaj Kanpur
University, Kanpur. Respondent No. 5 was appointed Principal of the said F
Law College on 11.12.1995. On an inspection, the Bar Council of India found
that respondent No. 5 did not possess a qualification in law and hence
withdrew its recognition to the College. At that stage, the Management of the
College filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 48183 of2000 questioning
the validity of the appointment of respondent No. 5 as the Principal of the G
College. Meanwhile, respondent No. 5 was transferred as the Principal of
Nagrik Degree College and he challenged the said order of transfer on the
ground that he was competent to hold the post of Principal of the Law College
and the reason for his transfer was unsustainable and that a Principal could
not be transferred to another College as sought to be done. The bone of
contention· in the Writ Petitions was whether a person who did not possess H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A a degree or a postgraduate degree in law and was. not qualified to practise
law, could be appointed as the Principal of a Law College and whether it was
not essential to have a degree in law before one could be appointed as
Principal of a Law College. The Bar Council of India was not a party to the
Writ Petitions. The High Court took the view that going by the Uttar Pradesh
State Universities Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as, "the University Act"),
B such an appointment could be made notwithstanding anything contained in
the Advocates Act, 1961 or in the Rules framed by the Bar Council of India.
The High Court proceeded on the basis that there was a conflict between the
two enactments, namely, the University Act and the Advocates Act and in
terms of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, the University Act, the
C later State Act with the assent of the President, would prevail over the
Advocates Act and since appointment to the post of a Principal of a College
affiliated to a University was governed by the University Act, the appointment
of respondent No. 5 as Principal of the Law College was liable to be upheld.
It was also held that the Bar Council of India did not have any control
regarding legal education. The order transferring respondent No. 5 away from
D the post of Principal of the Law College was consequently set aside. No
notice was also issued to the Bar Council of India, the apex professional body
of Advocates, before taking such a decision. However, taking note of the
consequences of the decision rendered by the High Court, the Bar Council
of India has filed these appeals challenging ·the decision of the High Court
E with the leave of this Court.
2. The appointments to Higher Educational institutions in the State of
Uttar Pradesh including Degree Colleges is done by the Higher Education
Services Commission constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education
Services Commission Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act") and in
F terms ofUttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission (Procedure for
selection of teachers) Regulations, 1983. Section 12 of the Act insists that
every appointment of a teacher shall be in terms of the Act and a teacher is
defined to include a Principal. Section 12(1) provides that any appointment
made in contravention of the Act would be void. On the basis of the relevant
Regulations framed under Section 31 of the said Act, advertisements are to
G be issued inviting applications for appointment of Principals to various degree
colleges that had made requisitions in that behalf or had reported vacancy
and on the basis of the procedure for selection, a list is to be prepared of the
candidates eligible for appointment as Principa~s. The appointments to various
Colleges are made from the said panel depending on circumstances including
H the preference of the candidates. Statute 11.14 provides the qualification to
,·..:.
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA r. BOARD OF MANG. DAYANAND COLLEGE OF LAW [BALASUBRAMANYAN,J.) 761
be possessed for the post of Principal in the colleges affiliated to the Kanpur A
University. Prior to 13. l.l 995, Statute l l.14 (i)(b) provided that the Principal
must possess "a doctorate degree in one of the subjects taught in the college,
with 7 years' experience of teaching degree class". With effect from 13.l.1995,
the said Statute was amended and clause (b) thereafter read, "a doctorate
degree, with 7 years' experience of teaching degree class". In other words,
the requirement that the appointee must have a doctorate degree in one of B
the subjects taught in the College was done away with. Until 13.1.1995, a
person could be appointed Principal of a Law College only if he possessed
a doctorate degree in law or in one of the branches of law taught in that
College. But after 13. l.l 995, on an ordinary literal interpretation of the amended
clause, a person possessing a doctorate degree in a subject wholly unrelated C
to law could also be appointed the Principal of a Law College. Respondent
No. 5 herein, who was one among the candidates selected and included in
the panel and who was appointed as Principal of the Dayanand Law College
had a doctorate in Philosophy and had no degree or qualification in law .
. 3. The management initially accepted the appointment of respondent D
No. 5 as Principal. It is said that he was teaching Ethics and Ancient Law in
the College. As noticed earlier, on an inspection made by the Bar Council of
India, it came out that the Principal did not have any qualification in law. The
Bar Council of India, therefore, withdrew the recognition granted to the
College. This placed the students coming out of the College in jeopardy since E
the Bar Council of India could deny them enrolment and entry into the
profession on the ground that the Institution in which they studied did not
have recognition. It was then, that the management, acting through its Secretary,
filed the Writ Petition praying for the issue of a writ of quo warranto, calling
upon respondent No. 5 to show on what authority he was· holding office. In
that situation, respondent No. 5 was transferred as Principal of another F
College. It is the case of respondent No. 5 that he could not join that post
since an interim order was passed by the High Court restraining him from
taking charge as Principal of that College and this compelled him to file a writ
petition questioning his very transfer. It is in that context that the High Court
held that the appointment of respondent No. 5 was consistent with the
University Act and since that Act prevailed over the Advocates Act and the G
relevant rules of the Bar Council of India, the status of respondent No. 5
could not be questioned. Based on that decision, the High Court also set
aside the order transferring respondent No. 5. No doubt, it also took the view
.that such a transfer of Principal was not contemplated by the University Act
· or the Regulations thereunder. H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A · 4. There is no doubt that the University Act, 1973 had the assent of the
President of India and it was an enactment later in point of time to the
Advocates Act, 1961. According to the High Court, since the appointment of
. the Principal of the Law College was made on the basis of the relevant
provisions of the University Act, and the Regulations framed thereunder and
based on the qualification prescribed by the Statute 11. 14 as it stood on the
B date of appointment, the provisions of the Advocates Act or the rules of the
Bar Council of India could not be invoked to nullify his appointment or to
question his authority as Principal. Thus, the High Court postulated a conflict
between a State Law thafhad the assent of the President and a prior Central
enactment and based on Article 254(2) of the Constitution granted relief to
C respondent No. 5.
5. The High Court also observed that the Bar Council of India had no
role in legal educati?n as such and that its role was confined to controlling
the profession of Advocates and the commencement of the profession, that
I
is, enrolment as an Advocate and hence the Bar Council of India could not
D make any prescription regarding legal education or about those who are to
teach law, or who are to be the Principal of a College of Law. It also proceeded
on the basis that the Advocates Act is a legislation under Entry 25 or 26 of
List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and since the
State law is under Entry 25 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the
E Constitution, the State law would prevail in the context of Article 254 (2) of
the Constitution. The Bar Council of India feels aggrieved by these findings
of the High Court and is before this Court with these appeals.
6. Learned counsel for the Bar Council of India submitted that the High
Court was first of all in error in holding that the legislative power for enacting
F the Advocates Act is traceable to Entry 26 of List III of the Se;enth Schedule
to the Constitution. Learned counsel relied on the decision of the Constitution
Bench in O.N. Mohindroo v. The Bar Council of Delhi & Ors. (1968] 2 S.C.R.
709 to contend that the said legislation falls under Entries 77 and 78 of List
I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Learned counsel also sought
to derive support from the decision in The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v.
G The State ofU.P. & Anr., (1973] 2 S.C.R. 1073 in that regard. With reference
to the decision in Mis Ujagar Prints & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1989]
3 S.C.C. 488, learned counsel reemphasized that pith and substance rule had
to be applied and even if the law is traceable to more than one entry, it would
still continue to be a legislation under Entries 77 and 78 in List I. He further
H submitted that the High Court was in error in proceeding on the basis that
.. BAR COUNCIL OF lNDIA "· BOARD OF MANG. DAYANAND COLLEGE OF LAW [BALASUBRAMANYAN, l.] 763
both the legislations fell under List III of the Seventh Schedule and A
consequently the University Act would prevail. This was sought to be met
by learned counsel for respondent No. 5 and for the State by contending that
the Advocates Act could only be traced to Entry 26 of List III of the Seventh
Schedule and the High Court was right in finding that the University Act
would prevail.
B
7. The Bar Council of India is constituted under Section 4 of the
Advocates Act. It consists of the Attorney General of India, the Solicitor
General of India, both in their ex officio capacities and one member elected
by each State Bar Council from amongst its members. It is a body corporate.
The functions assigned to it are enumerated in Section 7 of the Act. The C
functions relevant for our purpose are contained in Section 7(1) (h) and
Section 7(l)(i). They read:
"7(l)(h) to promote legal education and to lay down standards of such
education in consultation with the Universities in India imparting
such education and the State Bar Councils;"
D
7(1Xi) to recognize Universities whose degree in law shall be a
qualification for enrolment as an advocate and for that purpose
to visit and inspect Universities or cause the State Bar Councils
to visit and inspect Universities in accordance with such directions
as it may give in this behalf;"
E
The duty of admission and enrolment of Advocates is entrusted to the
State Bar Council except in the case of Supreme Court advocates which is
with the Bar Council of India. After 12.3 .1967, a person may be admitted as
an advocate on a State roll only. if he has obtained a degree in law from a
University recognized by the Bar Council of India. Section 24, to the extent F
it is relevant here, reads:
"24. Persons wh_o may be admitted as advocates on a State roll.
(I) Subject to the provisions of this Act, and the rules made thereunder,
a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State
roll, if he fulfills the following conditions, namely:- G
(a)
(b) ..................... ..
(c) he has obtained a degree in law-
H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A (i) before the 12th day of March, 1967 from any University in the
territory of India; or
(ii) before the 15th of August, 1947, from any University in any
area which was comprised before that date within India as defined
by the Government of India Act, 1935; or
B (iii) after the 12th day of March, 1967, save as provided in sub-
clatise (iiia) after undergoing a three years course of study in law
from any University in India which is recognized for the purposes
of this Act by the Bar Council of India; or
(iiia) after undergoing a course of study in law, the duration of
c which is not less than two academic years commencing from the
academic year 1967-68 or any earlier academic year from any
University in India which is recognized for the purposes of this
Act by the Bar Council of India; or
(iv) in any other case, from any University outside the territory
D of India, if the degree is recognized for the purposes of this Act
by the Bar Council of India] or;
he is a barrister and is called to the Bar on or before the 31st day
of December, 1976 or has passed the articled clerks examination
or any other examination specified by the High Court at Bombay
E or Calcutta for enrolment as an attorney of that High Court; or
has obtained such other fofeign qualification in law as is
recognized by the Bar Coun~il of India for the purpose of admission
as an advocate under this Act;"
Section 49 confers the power to make rules for discharging the functions of
F the Bar Council of India. Relevant topics for our purposes are set down
hereunder:
"49(l)(at) the minimum qualificatfons required for admission to a
course of degree in law in any recognised University;"
G and
"49(1)(d). the standards of legal education to be observed by
Universities in India and the inspection of Universities for that
purpose;"
8. The Bar Council oflndia Rules are framed by the Bar Council oflndia
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA 1·. BOARD OF MANG. DAY ANAND COLLEGE OF LAW [BALASUBRAMANYAN. J.] 765
in exercise of its rule making power. Part IV thereof deals with legal education, A
the duration of it, the syllabi etc. Section A deals with five-year law course
and Section B deals with three-year law course. Under Section A Rule 2, a
degree in law obtained from a University shall not be recognized for the
purpose of enrolment as an advocate under the Advocates Act unless the
conditions laid down therein are fulfilled. Only then a student coming out of B
that University could get enrolled as an advocate. Provision he5 also been
made regarding teachers of law. Rule 12 reads:
"12. Full-time teachers of law including the Principal of the College
shall ordinarily be holders of a Master's degree in law and where the
holders of Master's degree in law are not available, persons with C
teaching experience for a minimum period of I 0 years in law may be
considered. Part-time teachers other then one with LL.M. degree shall
have a minimum practice of five years at the Bar."
9. Rule 17(1) stipulates that no college after the coming into force of the
Rules shall impart instruction in a course of study in law for enrolment as an D
advocate unless its affiliation has been approved by the Bar Council of India.
Thus, though the Bar Council of India may not have been entrusted with
direct control of legal education in the sense in which the same is entrusted
to a University, still, the Bar Council of India retains adequate power to
control the course of studies in law, the power of inspection, the power of
recognition of degrees and the power to deny enrolment to law degree E
holders, unless the University from which they pass out is recognized by the
Bar Council of India.
10. The first task of a court confronted with a set of parallel provisions
relating to the appointment of a princjpal of a law college like the one in the F
amended provision of the Statute under the University Act and the Rules
made by the Bar Council of India which could ultimately refuse to admit a
graduate of law coming out of the University to enrolment as an advocate,
which alone would entitle him to practice, is to see whether the provisions
could not be reconciled or harmoniously construed so as to achieve the
object of both the enactments. Prior to 13.1.1995, there was no conflict G
between Statute 11.14 and Rule 12 of the Rules of the Bar Council. In 1995,
in the University Statutes, the requirement of the Principal having to be the
holder of a doctorate in one of the subjects taught in the College, was done
away with. Obviously, such a provision could not be understood as controlling
fully professional education like that in Medicine, Engineering or Law. No
H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A doubt, the University has not made a distinction in that regard in this context.
But obviously, it does not appeal to common sense to say that an engineer
could be appointed the Principal of a Medical College or a Great Physician
could be appointed as the Principal of an Engineering College. Same is the
position regarding the appointment of a doctorate in Science or a doctorate
in Philosophy as the Principal of a law college.
B
11. The aim of most of the students who enter the law college, is to get
enrolled as Advocates and practice law in the country. To do that, they have
necessarily to have a degree from a University that is recognized by the Bar
Council of India. Therefore, the court, in a situation like the present one, has
C to· ask itself whether it could not harmoniously construe the relevant provisions
and reach a conclusion consistent with the main aim of seeking or imparting
legal education. So approached, nothing stands in the way of the court
coming to the conclusion that though under the relevant Statute of the
University as amended, theoretically, it may be possible to appoint a Doctor
of Philosophy or a Doctor of Science as the Principal of a Law College, taking
D into account the requirements of the Advocates Act, the Rules of the Bar
Council of India and the main purpose of legal education, the Court would
be justified in holding that as regards the post of the Principal of a Law
College, it would be necessary for the proposed incumbent also to satisfy the
requirements of the Rules of the Bar Council of India. Such a harmonious
E understanding of the position recognizing the realities of the situation, would
justify the conclusion that a Doctorate holder in any of the law subjects could
alone be appointed as the Principal of a Law College. The High Court, in our
view, made an error in not trying to reconcile the relevant provisions and in .
not making an attempt to harmoniously construe the relevant provisions so
as to give efficacy to all of them. A harmonious understanding could lead to
F the position that the Principal of a Law College has to be appointed after a
process of selection by the body constituted in that behalf, under the University
Act, but while nominating from the list prepared, and while appointing him,
it must be borne in mind that he should fulfill the requirements of the Rules
of the Bar Council of India framed under the Advocates Act and it be ensured
that he holds a Doctorate in any one of the branches of law taught in the
G law college. We do not see anything in the University Act or the Statutes
framed thereunder, which stands in the way of the adopting of such a course.
Therefore, when a request is made for selection of a Principal of a law college,
the University and the Selection Committee has to ensure that applications
are invited from those who are qualified to be principals of a law college in
H terms of the Rules of the Bar Council and from the list prepared, a person
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA"· BOARD OF MANG. DAY ANAND COLLEGE OF LAW [BALASUBRAMANYAN. I.] 767
possessing the requisite qualification, is nominated and appointed as the A
Principal of a law college.
12. It is clear from the decision of the Constitution Bench in O.N.
Mohindroo v. The Bar Council of Delhi & Ors. (supra) that in pith and
substance, the Advocates Act falls under Entries 77 and 78 of List I of the
Seventh Schedule. That apart, it is not necessary to postulate a conflict of B
legislation in this case as we have indicated earlier. It is true that under the
University Act, the selection of a Principal of a College affiliated to the
concerned University has been left to a Higher Education Services Commission
and respondent No. 5 was included in the panel of selected candidates
pursuant to a due selection by that Commission. It is also true that theoretically C
the State Government on the recommendation of the Director of Higher
Education could appoint any one from that list as Principal of any College
:~
including a Law College. But when concerned with the appointment of a
Principal of the Law College, there cannot be any difficulty either in the
Recommending Authority or in the State Government recognizing the fact that
a person duly qualified in law is required to be the Principal of that Law D
College in the interests of the students coming out of that College in the light
of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the rules framed by the Bar Council of India
governing enrolment of Advocates and their practice. It must be the endeavour
of the State and the Recommending Authority to ensure that the students
coming out of the College are not put to any difficulty and to ensure that their E
career as professionals is in no way jeopardized by the action of the
Government in appointing a Principal to a Law College. Therefore, even while
adhering to its process of selection of a Principal, it behoves the State to
ensure that the appointment it makes is also consistent with the Advocates
Act and the rules framed by the Bar Council of India. It may not be correct
to say that the Bar Council of India is totally unconcerned with the legal F
education, though primarily legal education may als6 be within the province
of Universities. But, as the apex professional body, the Bar Council of India
is concerned with the standards of the legal profession and the equipment
of those who seek entry into that profession. The Bar Council of India is also
thus concerned with the legal education in the country. Therefore, instead of G
taking a pedantic view of the situation, the State Government and the
Recommending Authority are expected to ensure that the requirement set
down by the Bar Council of India is also complied with. We are of the view
that the High Court was not correct in its approach in postulating a conflict
between the two laws and in resolving it based on Article 254(2) of the
'constitution. Of course, the question whether the assent to the Act would H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A also extend to the statute framed under it and that too to an amendment made
subsequent to the assent are questions that do not call for an answer in this
case in the light of the view we have adopted.
13. According to us therefore, notwithstanding the procedure to be
followed under the University Act and Statute 11.14 as amended, it is necessary
B for the Recommending Authority and the State Government when concerned
with the appointment of a Principal of a Law College, also to adhere to the
requirements of the Advocates Act and the rules of the Bar Council of India.
This would ensure a harmonious working of the Universities and the Bar
Council of India in respect of legal education and the avoidance of any
C problems for the students coming out of the Institution wanting to pursue the
legal profession. We therefore hold that the State Government and the
Recommending Authority were not justified in recommending and appointing
respondent No. 5 as the Principal of the Dayanand Law College.
14. It is somewhat difficult to appreciate why clause (b) of Statute 11.14
D (ii) was amended by dropping the requirement that the Principal should hold
a doctorate degree in one of the subjects taught in the college. Does the State
and the University want a square peg in a round hole? Is it consistent with
good educational policy to appoint a Scientist as the Principal of an exclusive
Art or Commerce College or a Doctor of Literature or History, as the Principal
of an exclusive Science College? It is, therefore, necessary for the concerned
E authorities to look into this aspect and consider whether clause (b ), as it
stood prior to 13.1.1995, should be not restored in the interests of education
in general.
15. It was stated during the course of arguments that the Bar Council
F of India itself has watered down the requirement that the Principal of a Law
College must have a Postgraduate degree in law and has now provided that .
it is enough ifhe has a mere degree in law. This again is a matter for the Bar
Council of India to ponder over and to consider whether there is any
justification in watering down the qualification for a Principal as either a
doctorate in law or a postgraduate degree in law. We are sure that what was
G envisaged as the body of Peers would seriously consider this question.
Similarly, the argument by learned counsel for the respondents that the Bar
Council of India takes no interest in legal education or in keeping up the
standards of the profession, is something that the Bar Council oflndia should
take note of so that it could take steps to rectify the situation, if there is any
substance in that submission.
H
BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA v. BOARD OF MANG. DAYANAND COLLEGE OF LAW [BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.] 769
16. We find that consistent with the Advocates Act and the rules of the A
Bar Council of India, respondent No. 5 could not have been appointed as the
Principal of a Law College, however, eminent he might be as a philosopher,
friend and guide to the students and his competence to teach Ethics could
be recognized. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent No. 5 that he was
not responsible for his appointment as the Principal of the Law College and
he has suffered because of this controversy which is not of his making and B
since he was relieved from the post of the Principal of the Law College
subsequent to the interim order passed by this Court in these appeals. It is
submitted that though he was transferred as the Principal of another Institution,
he could not take charge because of some interim orders passed by the High
Court in a Writ Petition filed by some interested persons. Now, that we have C
clarified the position, we have, no doubt, that the authorities that be and the
High Court will deal with the grievances of respondent No. 5 regarding his
status and posting in an expeditious manner, if moved in that behalf and take
an appropriate decision consistent with what we have stated in this judgment.
17. The appeals are thus allowed, the judgments of the High Court are D
set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the management is allowed and the Writ
Petition filed by respondent No. 5 is dismissed. The parties are directed to
suffer their respective costs.
RP. Appeals allowed.
f E
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.