Supreme Court of India
BCCIversusCRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 64
- Decided
- 22 January 2015
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
The Court held that BCCI, though not a State, is subject to writ jurisdiction; the Probe Committee’s findings that Meiyappan and Kundra were team officials who bet are upheld; the cover‑up charge against Srinivasan is not proved; the amendment to Rule 6.2.4 is void as it contravenes public policy and natural justice; and appropriate sanctions must be determined by an independent committee with further investigation into Sundar Raman.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) is a "State" under Article 12 and concluded that, although it is not, it performs public functions and is therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court upheld the Probe Committee’s findings that Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra were team officials of Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals respectively and that they had engaged in betting, making the allegations established on a pre‑ponderance of probability. It held that the allegations of cover‑up against N. Srinivasan were not proved. The amendment to IPL Regulation 6.2.4 permitting administrators to hold commercial interests in BCCI events was declared void as it violated public policy and the principles of natural justice. The Court directed that appropriate sanctions under the IPL Operational Rules, the Anti‑Corruption Code and the Code of Conduct be imposed by an independent three‑member committee, and ordered further investigation into Sundar Raman’s conduct. Finally, the appeals were disposed of with detailed directions for reform of BCCI’s governance.
Issues considered
- Whether BCCI is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and, if not, whether it is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
- Whether Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra were 'team officials' of their respective IPL franchises and whether the betting allegations against them are proved.
- What punitive measures are permissible under the IPL Operational Rules, Anti‑Corruption Code and Code of Conduct for the misconduct of Meiyappan, Kundra and their franchisees.
- Whether the allegations of cover‑up leveled against N. Srinivasan are proved.
- Whether the amendment to Regulation 6.2.4 allowing administrators to acquire commercial interests in IPL, Champions League and T‑20 events is legally valid.
- Whether the allegations against Sundar Raman, Chief Operating Officer of IPL, are proved and what consequences follow.
- What orders and directions should be issued in light of the above findings.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. Section 34
- BCCI Anti‑Corruption Codes. Article 2, s. Article 6
- Code of Conduct for Players and Team Officialss. Article 2.4.4, s. Article 7
- Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 14, s. Article 226
- Indian Contract Act, 1872s. Section 23
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 120B, s. Section 420
- IPL Operational Ruless. Rule 6.2.4, s. Rule 6.3.19, s. Rule 6.4
Subjects
public interest litigationstate definitionwrit jurisdictionmatch fixingbettingconflict of interestpublic policynatural justiceadministrative lawsports lawBCCI governance
Judgment
[2015] 1 S.C.R. 165
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA A
v.
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4235 of 2014
JANUARY 22, 2015
s.
[T.S. THAKUR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM
KALIFULLA, JJ.]
Constitution of India, 1950: Article 12 - BCCI - Whether
'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and if not whether C
amenable to writ jurisdiction u!Article 226 - Held: BCCI
discharge several important public functions and is thus is
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court u/Article 226
even when it is not 'State' within the meaning of Article 12.
D
Sporting frauds:
Match fixing and betting - Whether Meiyappan and Raj
Kundra were 'team officials' of their respective IPL teams -
Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals and whether
a/legations of betting levelled against them stood proved - E
Held: The Probe Committee, recorded a specific finding that
Meiyappan was working/associated with the IPL as team
official of the CSK - That Meiyappan was a team official of
CSK owned by India Cements Ltd. was not disputed by either
India Cements Ltd. or any other party - The Probe Committee F
on the basis of the further investigation and enquiry further
held that Raj Kundra. was a 'team official', a 'player s_µpport
personnel' and 'participant' within the meaning of the _re1evant
rules and that he had indulged in betting - Given the nature
of the proceedings entrusted to the Probe Committee and the G
standard of proof applicable to the same, then~ is no reason
to disagree with the conclusion of the Probe Committee - The
material assembled in the course of the investigation by the
Probe Committee provided a reasonably safe basis for
165 H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A holding that the accusations made against Gurunath
Meiyappan and Raj Kundra stood established on a
preponderance of probabilities - The finding was by no means
without basis or perverse to call for interference with the same
- The misconduct against these two individuals as also their
B respective franchisees/teams/owners is actionable under the
Rules - Three-member Committee constituted to determine
the quantum of punishment - IPL Operational Rules - Code
of Conduct for Players and the Team Official - Anti Corruption
Code - Betting.
c Match fixing and betting - Whether allegation of cover
up against Srinivasan stood proved - Held: The Probe
Committee recorded a specific finding that the a/legations of
Match fixing, spot-fixing or betting were not proved against
Srinivasan in the course of the enquiry - Srinivasan had even
D stepped aside while the probe was on to avoid any accusation
being made against him - Similarly, the allegation that an
effort was made to suppress facts before the Probe Committee
or that Gurunath was shown only as a cricket e11thusiast
whereas he was a team official, .may, at best, raise a suspicion
E against Srinivasan but suspicion cannot be taken as proof to
hold him guilty of the alleged cover up - Therefore, it cannot
be said that the charge of attempted cover up leveled against
Srinivasan stood proved.
F Match fixing and betting - Whether a/legations levelled
against Sundar Raman, Chief Operating Officer IPL, stood
proved - Held: The report submitted by the investigating team
and the Probe Committee did not indict Sundar Raman in
clear words - The observ<Itions made regarding his role and
G conduct simply gave rise to a serious suspicion about his
involvement in the betting affairs of the team owners/officials
apart from suggesting that having received information about
betting activities in connection with IPL matches, he remained
totally inert in the matter instead of taking suitable action
warranted under the circumstances - Therefore, the.
H
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CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
allegations made against him cannot go un-probed, even if A
it means a further investigation by the investigating team
provided to the Probe Committee or by any other means -
Three-member Committee constituted to also examine the
role played by Sundar Raman.
B
IPL Regulations: r.6.2.4 - Amendment to r.6.2.4
. permitting Administrators of BCCI to acquire or hold
commercial interests in BCCJ like IPL, champions league and
T-20 - Propriety of - Held: r. 6. 2. 4 to the extent, it permits,
protects and even perpetuates situations where the
Administrators can have commercial interests in breach or C
conflict with the duty they owe to the BCCI or to the people at
large must be held to be against public policy - Amendment
to r. 6. 2. 4 clearly negates the declarations and resolves of the
BCCI by permitting situations in which conflict of interest would
grossly erode the confidence of the people in the authenticity, D
purity and integrity of the game - An amendment which
strikes at the very essence of the game as stated in the Anti
Corruption Code cannot obviously co-exist with the
fundamental imperatives - Conflict of interest situation is a
complete anti-thesis to everything recognized by BCCI as E
constituting fundamental imperatives of the game, hence
unsustainable and impermissible in Jaw.
Administrative law:
Findings of Domestic Tribunal - Scope of interference F
..:.. Held: Supreme Court is not sitting in appeal against the
findings of a Domestic Tribunal set up to enquire into the
allegations of misconduct levelled against a team official of
a participating team and is, therefore, not to re-appraise the
material that was assembled by the Probe Committee and G
relied upon to support its finding.
Public policy - Concept of - Held: Any rule, contract or
arrangement that actually defeats or tends to defeat the high
ideals of fairness and objectivity in the discharge of public H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 1 S.C.R.
A functions no matter by a private non-gov.emmental body will
be opposed to public policy - r.6.2.4 of the IPL Regulations
to the extent it permits, protects and even perpetuate situations
where the Administrators can have commercial interests in
breach or conflict with the duty they owe to the BCCI or to the
B people at large must be held to be against public policy -
Sporting frauds - Contract Act, 1872 - s.23.
Doctrines/Principles:
Principle of natural justice - Held: Violation of a-rule of
C natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as
discrimination - Where discrimination is the result of State
action, it is a violation of Article 14 - Therefore, a violation of
a principle of natural justice by a State action is a violation of
Article 14.
D
Administrative authority - Principle of natural justice -
Applicability of - Held: Even if the duties and functions which
BCCI discharges are administrative and not quasi-judicial, the
principles of natural justice will find their application with the
E same rigor as may be applicable to quasi-judicial functions
- Sporting frauds.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: Re: Question No.1: Whether the respondent-
F BCCI is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and if it is
not, whether it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
1.1. Article 12 of the Constitution of India gives an
G inclusive definition to the expression 'State', and says
that for purposes of Part Ill of the Constitution the
expression 'State' includes the Parliament of India, the
Government and the Legislat!Jre of each of the States and
Local or other authorities within the territory of India or
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BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 169
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
under the control of the Government of India. The A
question whether or not BCCI is 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12 may not make any material
difference to the case at hand in view of the admi~ted
position that respondent-BCCI does discharge several
important public functions which make it amenable to the B
writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. [Para 20] [194-H; 195-A, C-D]
1.2. BCCI regulates and controls the game of cricket
to the exclusion of all others. It enjoys the power of C
choosing the members of the national team and the
umpires. It spends crores of rupees on building and
maintaining infrastructure like stadia, running of cricket
academies and Supporting State Associations. It sells
broadcast and telecast rights and collects admission fee
to venues where the matches are played. All these D
activities are undertaken with the tacit concurrence of the
State Government and the Government of India. The State
has not chosen to bring any law or taken any other step
that would either deprive or dilute the Board's monopoly
in the field of cricket. Any organization or entity that has E
such pervasive control over the game and its affairs and
such powers as can make dreams end up in smoke or
come true cannot be said to be undertEking any private
activity. The functions of the Board are clearly public
functions, which, till such time the State intervenes to F
takeover the same, remain in the nature of public
functions, no matter discharged by a society registered
under the Registration of Societies Act. [Para 30) [204-F,
G; 205-D-E]
G
Sukhdev and Ors. etc. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh
Raghuvanshi and Anr. etc. (1975) 1 SCC 421: 1975 (3)
SCR 619; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
Authority of India and Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 489: 1979 (3)
SCR 1014; Ajay Hasia and ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A and ors. (1981) 1 SCC 722: 1981 (2) SCR 79; Pradeep
Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002)
5 SCC 111: 2002 @} --5CR 100; Sabhajit Tewary v. Union
of India and Ors. (1975)1 SCC 485; Board of Control for
Cricket in tfidia v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCC 741:
B 2005 (1) SCR 173; Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of
~ · India (2005) 4 sec 649: 2005 (1) SCR 913 - relied on.
Marsh v. Alabama (3) 326 U.S. 501: 19 L. ed. 265; Evans
v. Newton 382 US 296 15 L.Ed.·2nd 373, Ch 614 = 1963 1
C All. E.R. 590; New York v. United States 326 US 572 -
referred to.
Re: Question No.2: Whether Gurunath Meiyappan
and Raj Kundra were 'team officials' of their
respective IPL teams • Chennai Super Kings (CSK)
D and Rajasthan Royals? If so, whether allegations of
betting levelled against them stood proved?
2.1. The Probe Committee recorded a specific finding
that Gurunath Meiyappan was working/associated with
E the IPL as team official of the CSK. The Committee further
held that so long as Meiyappan was a team official, the
consequences of his acts of betting would flow even
when he was not the owner, or the perceived owner of
the CSK. That Meiyappan was a team official of CSK
F owned by India Cements Ltd. was not disputed by either
India Cements Ltd. or any other party. The Probe
Committee further held that Meiyappan was indulging in
betting. Given the nature of the proceedings entrusted to
the Probe Committee and the standard of proof
applicable to the same, there is no reason to disagree
G with its conclusion that Meiyappan was indeed indulging
in betting. The material assembled in the course of the
investigation by the Probe Committee provided a
reasonably safe basis for holding that the accusations
made against Meiyappan stood established on a
H preponderance of probabilities. This Court is not sitting
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 171
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
in appeal against the findings of a Domestic Tribunal set A
up to enquire into the allegations of misconduct levelled
against a team official of· a participating team and is,
therefore, not re-appraising the material relied upon by the
Probe Committee to support its finding. The finding is by
no means without basis or perverse to call for B
interference with the same. [Paras 31 to 33) [207-C, E-H;
208-A]
2.2. The Probe Committee on the basis of the further
investigation and enquiry came to the conclusion that Raj C
Kundra was a 'team official', a 'player support personnel'
and 'participant' within the meaning of the relevant rules
and that he had indulged in betting. The IPL Operational
Rules provide for 'disciplinary and complaint procedure'
to be followed in regard to the complaints and/or
breaches of the regulations and/or charges of 0
misconduct levelled against anyone connected with the
IPL. This procedure includes establishment of a
'Disciplinary Procedure Commission' to hear and decide
such matters. Instead of constituting a 'Disciplinary
Procedure Commission' ·comprising three members of E
IPL Code of Behaviour Committee, the BCCI had
appointed a three-member Committee comprising two
former Judges of the High Court with Mr. Jagdale as the
third member. The departure came ostensibly because of
a public hue and cry over betting by those owning the F
participating teams. The situation was in that view
extraordinary which called for an extraordinary approach.
The Probe Committee was reduced to two members after
Mr. Jagdale decided to resign, but the Committee was
asked by the Board to continue and complete the probe G
even with its reduced strength. This was a conscious
departure by the BCCI from the procedure laid down by
the IPL Operational Rules which was faulted by the High
Court. When the matter travelled to this Court, the
seriousness of the allegations and the ramifications H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A involved led to the setting up of a High Powered Probe
Committee in place of the Disciplinary Procedure
Commission as contemplated by the IPL Operational
Rules and Regulations. The whole purpose behind
setting up of the Probe Committee was to make the entire
B process of investigation and enquiry into the allegations
credible. The Probe Committee headed by a former Chief
Justice of the High Court was never intended to conduct
a preliminary investigation. It was on the contrary
understood by all concerned to be a substitute for the
c Disciplinary Procedure Commission under the Rules
empowered to examine the allegations and record
findings. The second aspect is that the Probe Committee
set up by the BCCI had expressed its inability to do
anything in the matter on account of absence of any
0 material to support the allegations appearing in the press.
The BCCI had, for all intents and purposes, treated that
finding to be conclusive giving a quietus to the
controversy. The direction for appointment of a Probe
Committee ~as issued in exercise of appellate powers
E vested in this Court. The directions came in a public
interest petition with a view to finding out whether there
was any truth in the allegations that owners of IPL teams
and franchisees were in a big way indulging in sporting
frauds th~reby discrediting the game and cheating the
public of their confidence in its purity. That being the
F object, it was futile to set up the "disciplinary procedure"
under the Rules against the ~xercise of such plenary
powers as are vested in this Court. [Paras 36, 40, 41) (209-
H; 210-A; 212-G; 213-D-E, F-H; 214-A-B; 215-8-D]
G 2.3. Like the Disciplinary Procedure Commission
even the Probe Committee set up by this Court was
bound to observe the principles of natural justice in the
matter of conducting the probe entrusted to it. That is
because of the consequences that would flow from any
H finding which the Probe Committee would record against
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 173
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
those accused of wrong doings. Admittedly, Raj Kundra A
was heard by the Committee before concluding that he
had indulged in betting. Absence of any notice to anyone
else was of little consequence so long as the person
concerned was duly notified and afforded a fair
opportunity. To that extent, therefore, the grievance B
sought to be projected by the Jaipur IPL Private Ltd.
regarding absence of any notice is rejected. [Para 42]
[215-E-F; 216-C-D]
T.P. Daver v. Lodge Victoria No.363 S.C. Belgaum and C
Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1144: 1964 SCR 1 - held inapplicable
Ambalal Sarabhai and Ors. v. Phiroz H. Anita AIR 1939
Born 35 - referred to.
/Lennox Arthur Patrick O'Reilly and Ors. v. Cyril Cuthbert o
Gittens AIR 1949 PC 313; Maclean v. Workers Union LR
1929 1 CHO 602, 623 LAPO Reilly v. C. C. Gittens AIR 1949
PC 313 - referred to.
Re: Question No.3: If question No.2 is answered in
the affirmative, what consequential action in the E
nature of punishment is permissible under the
relevant Rules and Regulations, and against whom?
3. It is common ground that there are different sets of
rules and regulations applicable to the fact situation at F
hand. Even the franchise agreement between the BCCI
and the franchisees contain provisions that provide for
action in situations like the one at hand. [Para 47] [219-D-
E]
G
The different sets of rules and regulations are:
(i) Permissible action in terms of the IPL
Operational Rules:
A careful reading of the IPL Operational Rules H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 1 S.C.R. .
A showed that every franchisee, player, team official, and/
or match official is subject to the said rules. In terms of
Rule 2.1.4, each person subject to these rules is
restrained from acting or omitting to act in any way that
would or might reasonably be anticipated to have an
s adverse affect on the match and/or reputation of such
person, any team, any player, any team official, the BCCI,
the league and/or the game. Each franchisee is in terms
of Rule 4.1.1 under an obligation to ensure that each of
its team official complies with the regulations, and in
c particular Article 2 of the BCCI and Anti-Corruption Code.
The rule, however, provides that all those persons who
are accredited for the league by BCCI either centrally or
.locally, shall be deemed to be team officials for the
purposes of those regulations. In terms of Regulation 6.4,
BCCI can impose any one of the sanctions enumerated
0
thereunder which includes suspension of the player or
other person subject to the Operational Rules from
playing or involving in matches for a specified period and
suspension of the team or franchisee from the league.
Payment of money from a person subject to these
E Operational Rules either to BCCI or to any other person
subject to those rules is also provided as one of the
permissible sanctions. Once Meiyappan and Raj Kundra
are accepted as team officials, their misconduct ·which
has adversely affected the image of the BCCI and the
F league as also the game and brought each one of them
to disrepute can result in imposition of one or more of the
sanctions stipulated under Rule 6.4. Those sanctions are
not limited to Meiyappan and Raj Kundra alone but may
extend to suspension of the team or the franchisee from
G the league also. [Paras 48 to 50] [224-D-E, F-G, H; 225-A-
C, D-E]
(ii) Permissible action under the Anti Corruption
Code for participants:
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 175
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
The BCCI claims to have adopted the Anti Corruption A
Code for achieving, what it describes as certain
"fundamental sporting imperatives". BCCI is, by the
standards set by it, duty bound to ensure that the game
of cricket is played in accordance with those sporting
imp~ratives not only because the game itself is described B
as a gentleman's game but also because adherence to
sporting imperatives alone can maintain the public
confidence in its purity. Article 2.2.1 treats betting as one
of the actionable wrongs under the Code. In terms of
Article 2.5.2 the participant who authorises, causes, c
knowingly assists, encourages, aids, abets, covers up or
is otherwise complicit in any act or omission of the types
described in Articles 2.1. to 2.4 committed by his/her
coach, trainer, manager, agent, family member, guest or
other associate shall be treated as having committed D
such an act or omission himself and shall be liable
accordingly under the Anti-Corruption Code. Meiyappan
having been found to be a team official of CSK is a
"player support personnel" hence a participant within the
meaning of the Anti-Corruption Code. Therefore, even E
under the Anti-Corruption Code for participants any act
like betting can attract sanctions not only for the person
who indulges in such conduct but also for all those who
authorise, cause, knowingly assist, encourage, aid, abet,
cover up or are otherwise complicit in any act of omission
or commission relating to such activity. [paras 51, 55, 56) F
(225-F, G-H; 236-A-C, D, G-H]
(iii) Permissible action under the "Code of
Conduct for Players and the Team Official":
G
Code of Conduct for Players and Team Officials also
prescribes punishment/sanctions for players or team
officials found guilty of different levels of offences
stipulated in the said Code. The team official who is found
guilty of betting is certainly acting against the spirit of the
H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A game and bringing disrepute to it. Article 7 of the Code
empowers the match Referee or the Commissioner to
impose suitable sanction upon the person concerned
depending upon the level of the offence which is
committed. The punishment can range between warning
B to suspension for a lifetime depending upon the nature
and the gravity of the offence committed. In terms of
Clause 11.3 (c) of the Franchise Agreement, if the
franchisee/any franchisee group company and/or any
owner acts in a manner that has a material adverse effect
c upon the reputation or standing of the league, BCCl-IPL,
BCCI, the franchisee, the t;;am or any other team and/or
the game of cricket, the BCCl-IPL is empowered to
terminate the agreement. The expression 'owner' shall
mean any person who is the ultimate Controller of the
Franchisee. [Paras 57, 58, 60] [237-B, F-G, 238-E-F]
0
Re: Question no.4. Whether allegations of cover up,
levelled against N. Srinivasan stand proved. If so. to
what effect?
E 4. The Probe Committee recorded a specific finding
that the allegations of Match fixing, spot-fixing or betting
were not proved against Srinivasan in the course of the
enquiry. It was argued that the facts clearly established
that Srinivasan had attempted to cover up the betting
F activities of his son-in-law who was a team official of CSK.
The appointment of a Probe Committee comprising
former Judges of the High Court cannot be seen as an
attempt to cover up nor can Srinivasan be accused of
withholding any incriminating material from the Probe
G Committee especially when there was nothing to show
that Srinivasan was indeed in possession of any
incriminating material that was withheld by him.
Srinivasan had in fact stepped aside while the probe was
on to avoid any accusation being made against him.
H Similarly, the allegation that an effort was made to
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 177
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
suppress facts before the Mudgal Committee or that A
Gurunath was shown only as a cricket enthusiast
whereas he was a team official, may, at best, raise a
suspicion against Srinivasan but suspicion can hardly be
taken as proof to hold him guilty of the alleged cover up.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the charge of attempted B·
cover up leveled against Mr. Srinivasan stood proved.
[Paras 63, 65] (239-B-C, D; 241-C, E]
Question 5. Whether Regulation 6.2.4 to the extent it
permits administrators to have commercial interest in C
the IPL, Champions League and Twenty-20 events is
legally bad?
5.1. Rule 6.2.4 before amendment was in the
following words: "No Administrators shall have, directly
or indirectly, any commercial interest in the matches or D
events conducted by the Board." The impugned
amendment added the following words at the end of the
above Rule: "excluding events like IPL or Champions
League Twenty 20." Rule 6.2.4 after amendment, permits
creation of commercial interests in the events organized E
by BCCI by its Administrators. This enabling provision
disregards the potential conflict of interest which will
arise between an administrator's duty as a functionary of
the BCCI on the one hand and his interest as the holder
of any such commercial interest on the other. Three real
F
life situations that have arisen in the past, qua India
Cements owned by Srinivasan's family and captained by
him, ·simply demonstrate how such conflicts have arisen
between the duty which Srinivasan owes to BCCI and
through the BCCI to the cricketing world at large and his
commercial if not personal interest in the events which G
BCCI organizes. The first instance arose when .BCCI
awarded compensation of a sum of Rs.10.40 crores to
CSK on account of the cancellation of the Champions
League Tournament 2008. It is not in dispute that
H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A Srinivasan was one of those who contributed to the
taking of the decision to award that amount towards
compensation to his own team. A similar award of a sum
of rupees 13.10 crores came in the year 2009 which too
fell foul of his duty on the one hand and interest on the
B other. Return of the amount because of a public outcry
may no doubt mean that Srinivasan tried to come clean
on the subject even when his company may have
suffered a loss, but it may as well mean that the return of
the amount came only under public pressure and in
c recognition of the fact that the amount was not actually
due and payable and yet was paid to the detriment of
BCCI who is a trustee of general public interest in the
sport of cricket and everything that goes with it. The third
instance where Srinivasan's commercial interest came in
. D direct conflict with his duty as President of BCCI is when
allegations of betting were leveled against his son-in-law
Meiyappan. Amendment to Rule 6.2.4 is the true villain in
the situation at hand. It is the amendment which attempts
to validate what was on the date of the award of the
franchise invalid as Rule 6.2.4 did not as on that date
E permit an administrator to have any commercial interest
in any event organized by BCCI. While it may not be
feasible at this stage to interfere with the award of the
franchise to ICL especially when hundreds of crores
have been invested by the franchisee, the amendment
F which .perpetuates such a conflict cannot be
countenanced and shall have to be struck down. The
validity of the Rule 6.2.4 as amended can be examined
also from the stand point of its being opposed to "Public
Policy". The expression has been used in Section 23 of
G the Contract Act, 1872 and in Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 and other statutes but has not
been given any precise definition primarily because the
expression represents a dynamic concept and is,
therefore, incapable of any strait-jacket definition,
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 179
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
meaning or explanation. [Paras 70, 71, 81 to 85] [243-D- A
F; 250-G-H; 251-B-D; 252-C, D-E, F; 253-0-E; F-H]
A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 2
SCC 262: 1970 (1) SCR 457; Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel etc. (1985) 3 SCC 398: 1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131;
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited ii. Brojo B
Nath Ganguly and Anr. etc. (1986) 3 SCC 156: 1986
(2) SCR 278; Murlidhar Aggarwal and Anr. v. State of UP. &
Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 472: 1975 (1) SCR 575; Oil & Natural
Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705:
2003 (3) SCR 691 ; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. C
Western GECO International Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 263 - relied
on.
5.2. Any d~viation, abrogation, frustration or negation
of the salutary principles of justice, fairness, good
conscience, equity and objectivity will be opposed to 0
public policy. It follows that any rule, contract or
arrangemerit that actually defeats or tends to defeat the
high ideals of fairness and objectivity in the discharge of
public functions no matter by a private non-governmental
body will be opposed to public polic~·. Applied to the case E
at hand Rule 6.2.4 to the extent, it permits, protect!i and
even perpetuates situations Vlhere the Administrators
can have commercial interests in breach or conflict with
the duty they owe to the BCCT or to the people at large
must be held to be ~gainst public policy, hence, illegal. F
That is particularly so when BCCI has m the Anti
Corruption Code adopted by it recognized public
confidence in the authenticity and integrity of the'
sporting contest as a fundamental imp4l!rative. It has
accepted and rtghtly so, that all cricket matches must be G
contested on a level playing field with the outcome to be
determined solely by the respective merits of the
competing teams. [para 90] [260-A-E]
.5.3. There is no manner of doubt whatsoever ~at the
H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A game enjoys its popularity and raises passions only
because of what it stands for and because the people
who watch the sport believe that it is being played in the
true spirit of the game without letting any corrupting
influence come anywhere near the principles and
B fundamental imperatives considered sacrosanct and
inviolable. The expression 'Administrator' appearing in
Rule 6.2.4 has been defined to mean and !nclude present
and past Presidents, Honorary Secretaries, Honorary
Treasures, Honorary Joint Secretaries of the BCCI.
c Presidents and Secretaries present or past of members
affiliated to BCCI are also treated as administrator along
with representative of a member or an associate member
or affiliate member of the Board. That apart, any person
connected with any of the committees appointed by the
Board are also treated as administrator; none of whom
D could have any' commercial interest in any BCCI event
but for the impugned amendment to Rule 6.2.4. It is
common ground that the owner of a team buys the
franchise in an open auction. India Cements Ltd. owner
of CSK has also bought the Chennai franchise in an
E open auction held by BCCI. This sale and purchase of
the franchises is a purely commercial/business venture
for India Cements Ltd. involving investment of hundred~
of crores. Accordingly Amendment to Rule 6.2.4
permitting Administrators of BCCI to acquire or hold
F commercial interests in BCCI like IPL, champions league
and T-20 is held to be bad. [paras 92, 98] [263-H; 264-A-
B; 267-D-F, G-H; 269-A-B]
K. Murugon v. Fencing Association of India, Jabalpur and
G ors. (1991) 2 SCC 412: 1991 (1) SCR 658; N. Kannadasan
v. Ajoy Khose and Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 1: 2009 (7) SCR 668
; Centre for PIL and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (2011) 4
sec 1: 2011 (4) SCR 445 - relied on.
Question 6 Whether allegations levelled against Mr.
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 181
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
Sundar Raman, Chief Operating Officer IPL, stand A
proved? If so, to what effect?
6. Sundar Raman in his capacity as the Chief
Operating Officer was charged with the duty of
overseeing the tournament and all other live events ·
including the opening ceremony and also the general 8
operations, sponsorships activities, television
production, estimations of costs, negotiation of contracts,
administration duties, travel and transport and other
related functions. The allegation levelled against him was
that he was in constant touch with Vindoo Dara Singh C
evidenced by nearly 350 calls made thereto between
them during the IPL. In its final report the Probe
Committee, however, recorded a finding that Sundar
Raman had known a bookie and had contacted him at 8
different times in the IP.L. The report submitted by the D
investigating team and the Probe Committee did not
indict Sundar Raman in clear words. The observations
made regarding his role and conduct simply gave rise to
a serious suspicion about his involvement in the betting
affairs of the team owners/officials apart from suggesting E
that having received information about betting activities
in connection with IPL matches, he remained totally inert
in the matter instead of taking suitable action warranted
under the circumstances. Sundar Raman was the spirit
behind the entire exercise and cannot be said to be F
unconcerned with what goes on in the course of the
tournament especially if it has the potential of bringing
disrepute to the game/BCCI. Therefore, the allegations
made against him cannot go un-probed, even if it means
a further investigation by the investigating team. Truth G
about the allegations, made against Sunda:- Raman, must
be brought to light, for it is only then that all suspicions
about the fraudulent activities and practices floating in
the media against the BCCI and its administrators in
several proceedings before different courts can be given
H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ,{,2015] 1 S.C.R.
A a quietus. [paras 99, 101, 104, 105] [269-C-D, H, 270-A;
271-C-D, G-H; 272-A-B]
Question 7 What orders and directions need be
passed in the light of the discussions and answers
to questions 1 to 5 above?
B
7.1. The question is whether this court should impose
a suitable punishment or leave it to the BCCI to do the
needful. The trajectory of the present litigation, and the
important issues it has raised as also the profile of the
C individuals who have been indicted, would demand tliat
the award of punishment for misconduct is left to an
independent committee to exercise that power for and on
the behalf of BCCI. The other aspect, is the need for a
probe into activities of Sundar Raman. The proposed
Committee would examine the role played by Sundar
0 Raman with the help of the investigating team
constituted. [paras 107, 108] [272-F, G-H; 273-B-H]
7.2. The three-member Committee is also requested
to examine and make suitable recommendations to the
E BCCI for such reforms in its practices and procedures
and such amendments in the Memorandum of
Association, Rules and Regulations. [Para 110] [275-E-F]
Case Law Reference :
1975 (3) SCR 619 relied on Para 21
F
1979 (3) SCR 1014 reli~d on Para 24
1981 (2) SCR 79 relied on Para 25
2002 (3) SCR 100 relied on Para 26
G (1975) 1 sec 485 relied on Para 26
2005 (1) SCR 173 relied on Para 27
2005 (1) SCR 913 relied on Para 28
1964 SCR 1 held inapplicable Para 38
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 183
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR
AIR 1939 Bombay 35 referred to Paras 38, 45 A
AIR 1949 PC 313 referred to Paras 38, 44
1970 (1) SCR 457 relied on Para 74
1985 (2) Suppl. SCR 131 relied on Para 76
B
1986 (2) SCR 278 relied on Para 77
1975 (1) SCR 575 relied on Para 85
2003 (3) SCR 691 relied on Para 88
(2014) 9 sec 263 relied on Para 89 ·C
1991 (1) SCR 658 relied on Para 93
2009 (7) SCR 668 relied on Para 94
2011 (4 ) SCR 445 relied on Para 95
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. D
4235 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07 .2013 of the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Public Interest Litigation
No. 55 of 2013. E
WITH
C. A. Nos. 4236 of 2014 & 1155 of 2015
C. A. Sundaram, Nalini Chidambaram, Siddhartha Luthra, F
Raju Ramachandran, Kapil Sibal, Mahesh Jethmalani, Ashok
Desai, Shekhar Naphade, V. Giri, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Radha
Rangaswamy, P. R. Raman, Rohini Musa, Akhila Kaushik, S.
P. Arthi, Rahul Mascarenhans, Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Raman
Kumar, Rupendra Singh, Rajat Sehgal, Chandrashekhar G
Verma, S. Swadeep Hora, Gagan Gupta, Vikas Mehta,
Puneeth K. G., Rajat Sehgal, lshwar Nankani, Jagdish
Choudhary, Rashmi Singh, Pooja Dhar, Amal Chitale, Salim
lnamdar, Pragya Baghel, K. Hari Shankar, Aditya Verma, Vikas
Singh Jangra, S. Lakshmi, Aarti Goyal, Tamali Wad, Deep Roy, H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A Monish Panda, Anish Dayal, Anthony Handique, Siddarath
Vaid, lshwar Mohanty, Vaibhav Sharma, Shubhangi Tuli,
Deeptakriti Verma, Neha Sharma, Viraj Gandhi, Rashmi Singh,
Mishra Saurabh, Vanshaja Shukla, Ankit Kr. Lal, M. Yogesh
Kanna, Santha Kumaran, S. Janani, Hari Shankar K., Rahul
B Pratap, Tejveer Singh Bhatia, Gaurav Sharma, Aprajita Singh,
Rahul Gupta, Rahul Mehta, Priyanka Rai, Chirag M. Shroff, P.
B. Suresh, Vipin Nair, Udayaditya Banerjee (for Temple Law
Firm) for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Allegations of sporting frauds like match fixing and
betting have for the past few years cast a cloud over the
0 working of the Board of Cricket Control in India (BCCI). Cricket
being more than just a sport for millions in this part of the world,
accusations of malpractices and conflict of interests against
those who not only hold positions of influence in the BCCI but
also own franchises and teams competing in the IPL format
E have left many a cricketing enthusiasts and followers of the
game worried and deeply suspicious about what goes on in
the name of the game. There is no denying the fact that lower
the threshold of tolerance for any wrong doing higher is the
expectation of the people, from the system. And cricket being
not only a passion but a great unifying force in this country, a
F zero tolerance approach towards any wrong doing alone can
satisfy the cry for cleansing.
3. These appeals arise out of two successive writ petitions
filed in public interest by the appellant-Cricket Association of
G Bihar before the High Court of Bombay for several reliefs
including a writ in the nature of mandamus directing BCCI to
recall its order constituting a probe panel comprising two retired
Judges of Madras High Court to enquire into the allegations of
betting and spot fixing in the Indian Premier League (IPL) made
H among others against one Gurunath Meiyappan. The High Court
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 185
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
·has by its order dated 30th July, 2013 passed in PIL No.55 of A
2013 granted that relief but declined a possible reconstitution
of the panel. Aggrieved, BCCI h'as assailed the order passed
by the High Court in Civil Appeal No.4235 of 2014. In the
connected Civil Appeal No.4236 of 2014, Cricket Association
of Bihar has prayed for further and consequential orders which B
according to the appellant could and indeed ought to have
been passed by the High Court, inter alia, for removal of
respondent No.2 from the post of President of BCCI and
cancellation of the franchise favouring Chennai Super Kings
and Rajasthan Royals for the IPL matches to be conducted in c
future. In Civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.34228 of 2014
the association challenges the validity of Regulation 6.2.4 of the
BCCI Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers,
Umpires & Administrators (for short 'BCCI Regulations') and
the order passed by the High Court dismissing PIL No.107 of D
2013.
4. Cricket Association of Bihar is a society registered
under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 just as respondent
- BCCI is a Society registered under the provisions of Tamil
Nadu Registration of Societies Act 1975. Mr. N.Srinivisan - E
respondent No. 2 in Civil Appeal No.4236 of 2014 is the
President of the Board besides being the Vice-Chairman and
Managing Director of respondent No.3-lndia Cements Limited,
a public Limited Company.
F
5. In a meeting held on 13th September, 2007, the working
committee of the respondent-Board appears to have taken a
decision to launch what came to be known as Indian Premier
League (IPL) to be run by a Committee constituted by general
body of the BCCI to be called IPL Governing Council. In G
December 2007 the IPL Governing Council invited tenders for
grant of IPL franchises on open competitive bidding basis, in
which only corporate bodies were allowed to participate. India
Cements Ltd. was one of those who participated in the auction
for the Chennai franchise and emerged successful in the same.
H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 1 S.C.R.
A The team it assembled was christened Chennai Super Kings.
Jaipur IPL Cricket Private Limited partly owned and promoted
by respondent No.5 similarly emerged successful for the Jaipur
Franchise and assembled a team called Rajasthan Royals.
Franchise Agreements were, pursuant to the auction, signed
B by BCCI with the franchisees concerned.
6. On 27th September, 2008 Mr. N.Srinivasan was elected
as the Secretary of the BCCI in a General Body Meeting. In the
same meeting Regulation 6.2.4 of the IPL Regulations was
C amended to exclude from its operation events like IPL and
Champions' League twenty-20. We shall presently turn to
Regulation 6.2.4 but before we do that we need to complete
the factual narrative.
7. In April 2013, Special Cell, Delhi Police, Lodhi Colony,
D New Delhi, is said to have received secret information that
certain members of the underworld were involved in fixing of
matches in the recently concluded edition of the IPL. FIR No.20
of 2013 was, on that information, registered by the Special Cell,
Delhi Police, under Sections 420 and 120 B of the IPC and
E Mr. S. Sreesanth, Mr. Ajit Chandila and Mr. Ankit Chavan of
the Rajasthan Royals alongwith 7 bookies detained for
allegations of spot-fixing. Shortly thereafter Mr. Gurunathan
Meiyappan, son-in-law of Mr. N.Srinivasan was also arrested
by the Mumbai Police on 25th May, 2013 in a spot fixing/betting
F case. Soon after the arrest on 26th May, 2013 came an
announcement that a Commission comprising two members of
the BCCI and one independent member would be constituted
to enquire into allegations of betting and spot fixing. This was
followed by nomination of two former Judges of the High Court
G of Madras and Shri Sanjay Jagdale as members of a Probe
Commission to enquire into the allegations of betting and spot
fixing. Shri Sanjay Jagdale, however, resigned as member of
the Probe Commission leaving the two former Judges to
complete the probe. Mr. N.Srinivasan announced that he was
stepping aside from the post of President of the BCCI until the
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 187
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
probe was completed ostensibly because of the alleged· A
involvement of his son-in-law in the betting and spot fixing
racket.
8. It was in the above backdrop that the appellant-
Association filed W.P. No.55 of 2013 before the High Court of B
Judicature at Bombay, inter alia, for a declaration that
appointment of the two-member Probe Commission was ultra
vires of the Rules and Regulations of the BCCI and for a
mandamus directing constitution of a panel comprising retired
Judges to hold an enquiry against among others Mr. Gurunath
.Meiyappan for his involvement in betting and spot fixing. The C
petitioner further prayed for termination of the franchise
agreement entered into between the BCCI, on the one hand,
and Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals on the other.
A mandamus directing institution of disciplinary proceedings
against Mr. N.Srinivasan was also prayed for, besides a prayer D
for his suspension pending the probe and other proceedings.
The appellant-Association in addition prayed for a prohibition
against Mr. N.Srinivisan restraining him from contesting the
election for the post of President of BCCI in future. and
representing the BCCI in the International Cricket Council (ICC). E
9. By its order dated 30th July, 2013, a Division Bench of
the High Court of Bombay declared that the Probe Commission
set up by the BCCI was not validly constituted being in violation
of the provisions of Rules 2.2 and 3 of Section 6 of the IPL F
Operational Rules. The High Court, however, declined to grant
any further relief by way of constituting a panel to conduct an
enquiry under the supervision of the High Court. The High Court
was of the view that constitution of a Probe Committee under
Section 6 of the IPL Operational Rules was the prerogative of G
the BCCI. Civil Appeal No.4235 of 2014 preferred by the BCCI
aSsails the said order of the High Court to the extent it declares
the constitution of the Probe Commission to be illegal and ultra
vires of the relevant rules and regulations. The Cricket
Association of Bihar has also, as noticed earlier, assailed the
H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A very same order in Civil Appeal No.4236 of 2014 to the extent
it has declined to grant further and consequential relief to the
appellant.
10. When this matter came up for hearing on 27th
B September, 2013 before a Bench comprising AK. Patnaik and
J.S. Khehar JJ., this Court permitted the Annual General
Meeting of the respondent-BCCI to be held on 29th September,
2013 as schedu!ed and so also election to the post of
President, subject to the condition that in case respondent No.2-
C Mr. N.Srinivisan got elected, he will not take charge until further
orders. When the matter came up again on 8th October, 2013,
this Court noted that although Mr. N.Srinivasan had been
elected as the President of the Board yet a probe into the
allegations of betting and spot fixing was necessary. A reading
of order dated 8th October, 2013 passed by this Court would
D show that the constitution of the Probe Committee comprising
Mr. Justice Mukul Mudgal, retired Chief Justice of Punjab and .
Haryana High Court, Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, Additional
Solicitor General and Mr. Nilay Dutt, Senior Advocate, Gauhati
High Court was passed with the consent of the parties. Justice
E Mukul Mudgal was appointed Chairman of the Probe
Committee.
11. The Probe Committee started its proceedings in the
right earnest and invited all such persons as had any
F information in their possession regarding the Terms of
Reference to furnish such information to the Committee. It also
interacted with Gurunath Meiyappan, Raj Kundara and the
players against whom the BCCI had taken action for match
fixing and spot fixing. Besides the Committee interacted with
G the law enforcement agencies, former players associated with
IPL, personnel from the team management, eminent sports
journalists and sport commentators, personnel from anti-
corruption unit of the BCCI and ICC, personnel from the BCCI
and the IP!,. Governing Body and persons whose name featured
H in the documents pertaining to the Terms of Refere11ce. Based
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 189
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.)
on the enquiries made by it from all concerned, the Committee A
submitted a report dated 9th February, 2014, in which the
Committee arrived at the following conclusions:
(i) That Gurunath Meiyappan formed an integral
part of Chennai Super Kings and most persons
B
viewed him as the face of the team, though de-jure
ownership vested in India Cements Ltd.
(ii) That Gurunath Meiyappan was a team official
within the meaning of IPL Operational Rules if not
de facto owner of CSK. c
(iii) That Gurunath Meiyappan had knowledge of or
was in a position to easily access sensitive team
information, team strategies knowledge about
match conditions etc. which knowledge was D
outside the purview of an ordinary person following
the game of cricket.
(iv) That Gurunath Meiyappan was also a
participant under IPL Anti-corruption Code hence
IPL Rules and Regulations were squarely E
applicable to him.
(v) That Gurunath Meiyappan was in regular touch
with bookies and punters.
F
(vi) That several calls were traced between
Gurunath Meiyappan ana Vindoo Dara Singh who
was himself a punter in close proximity with several
other bookies, evident from the telephonic
transcripts produced by the Bombay Police.
G
(vii) That Mr. Ramesh Vyas and Jupiter were acting
for Vindoo Dara Singh who was also placing bets
for certain IPL stakeholders and actors including
Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan. Mr. Meiyappan was in
close contact with Mr. Vikram Agarwal who is a H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A hotelier and alleged punter operating from Chennai
as revealed by call record details produced by the
Chennai Police in Crime No.1 of 2013 registered
by the CBCID Branch.
B • (viii) That Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan would regularly
place bets in IPL matches both in favour of his team
(i.e. CSK) and against his team - a fact established
from call records produced by the Mumbai Police.
(ix) That Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan would place bets
c through Vindoo Dara Singh and such bets were
even placed during the course of IPL match as
revealed by transcripts produced by Mumbai
Police.
D (x) That in one instance Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan
made certain predictions to Mr. Vindoo Dara SiAgh
regarding the runs that would be scored in a match
between CSK and Rajasthan Royals held on 12th
May, 2013 at Jaipur. According to Mr. Meiyappan's
prediction that CSK would score 130-140 runs
E
came true as CSK actually scored 141 runs only.
12. The Probe Committee on the above findings held Mr.
Gurunath Meiyappan guilty of betting which in its opinion was
accentuated by his position in the CSK. What is important is
F that the Probe Committee held that Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan
had in his acts of bettingJhe implicit approval of the franchisee
owner India Cements thereby bringing the team to disrepute
and violating Sections 2.2.1 and 2.14 of the IPL Operational
Rules besides Articles 2.2.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.3 of the IPL Anti-
G Corruption Code and Articles 2.4.4 of the IPL Code of Conduct
for Players and Team Officials.
13. The Committee also held that franchisee owner CSK
was responsible for its failure to ensure that Mr. Gurunath
H Meiyappan complied with BCCI Anti-Corruption Code, IPL
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 191
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Operational Rules and IPL Regulations. The franchisee's A
actions were on that basis held to be in violation of Section
4.4.1 of the IPL Operational Rules and Clause 11.3 of the
franchise's agreement. The Committee summed up its
conclusion regarding the investigation against Mr. Gurunath
Meiyappan and India Cements Ltd. the owner of ICL in the B
following passage:
"Thus, the Committee is of the view that for the acts of
betting by Mr. Meiyappan, which is further accentuated
by the position he held in CSK, which was held by Mr.
Meiyappan with the implicit approval of the franchisee C
owner India Cements, Mr. Meiyappan is in violation of
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.14 the IPL Operatio(lal Rules for
bringing the game in disrepute, Arlie/es 2.2.1, 2.2.2. and
2.2.3 of the IPL Anti Corruption Code for his acts of
betting and Articles 2.4.4 of the IPL Code of Conduct for D
Players artd Team Officials, for bring disrepute to the
game of cricket. The said illegal acts further stand
accentuated in light of his position/role in CSK. The
Committee is a/so of the opinion that the franchisee
owner of CSK is responsible for failing to ensure Mr. E
Meiyappan (Team Officials) had.complied with the BCCI
Anti-Corruption Code. IPL Operational rules. IPL
Regulations and hence the franchisee's actions are in
violation of Section 4.4. 1 of the IPL Operational Rules
and Clause 11. 3 of the franchises agreement. v F
(emphasis supplied)
14. As regards the allegations of betting and spot-fixing
in IPL made against Mr. Raj Kundra, the Committee opined that
further and serious investigation was required to be conducted G
into the said allegations for the allegations of betting if proved
against Mr. Kundra and his wife Ms. Shilpa Shetty, would
constitute a serious infraction of the provisions of IPL
· Operational Rules, the Anti-Corruption Code and the Code of
Conduct for Players and Team Officials. The Committee also H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 1 S.C.R.
A examined the allegations of match/spot fixing made against
several players and noticed that the BCCI had conducted an
inquiry into the allegations and found the same to be proved.
The Committee was, however, of the view that the disciplinary
. action taken by BCCI against the delinquent players was
B adequate and satisfactory.
15. Having said that the Committee referred to allegations
of sporting frauds made before it during its interaction with
several persons connected with the game. The Committee
placed before this Court the names of persons against whom
C such allegations were made in a sealed envelope. The
Committee also mentioned other issues including the issue of
"conflict of interest" between Mr. N.Srinivasan as the BCCI
President on the one hand and CEO of India Cements Ltd. on
the other. The Committee concluded its report by making certaJn
D recommendations that would, in its opinion, help remove the
malaise of spot/match fixing and detect sporting frauds by
BCCl's Investigation Wing.
16. The report submitted by the Probe Committee was
E then considered by this Court in its order dated 16th May, 2014
by which this Court permitted the Probe Committee to enquire
into the allegations made against those named in the sealed
cover filed before the Court by the Committee including Mr. N.
Srinivasan. This Court also provided the necessary manpower
F for a quick and effective investigation by constituting an ·
investigation team with the direction that the team shall have
the power to investigate, require attendance of witnesses and
record their depositions and the power to search and seize
apart from other powers necessary for conducting the
G investigation except the power to arrest. The Committee filed
an interim report dated 1st September, 2014, and wound up
its proceedings by its third and final report dated 1st November,
2014 in which it took note of the scientific evaluation of Gurunath
Meiyappan's recorded voice which revealed that the recorded
voice was indeed that of Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan. In a separate
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 193
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
report submitted by Mr. Nilay Dutta, the third member of the A
Probe Committee, Shri Dutta had observed that for the
Committee to arrive at a conclusive finding as regards the voice
alleged to be that of Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan, a scientific
evaluation was necessary. The Committee's final report took
note of the scientific evaluation and recorded a unanimous B
conclusion that Mr. Gurunath Meiyaopan had actually indulged
in betting in IPL matches. It, however, found no material to show
that Gurunath Meiyappan was involved in match fixing.
17. As regards Mr. Raj"Kundra, the Committee came to C
the conclusion that Mr. Kundra had indulged in betting in
violation of BCCI Regulations and IPL Anti-Corruption Code.
The Committee further came to the conclusion that N. Srinivasan
was not involved in match fixing activity nor was he involved in
preventing investigation into match fixing. The Committee held
that although Mr. N. Srinivasan was aware of the violation of D
the players' code, by individual No.3 yet no action was taken
against him by Mr. Srinivasan or any other official who was
aware of the infraction.
18. Copies of the report except the portion that related to E
findings qua the players were made available to counsel for the
parties to give them an opportunity to respond to the same.
Since Mr. Raj Kundra and Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan were not
parties to these proceedings, this Court issued notice to them
enclosing and made copies of the reports available to them to F
enable them to respond to the finaings recorded by the
Committee. That opportunity was usefully utilized by all the
parties concerned by filing their respective responses.
19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at
considerable length. The following questions fall for our G
determination:
(1) Whether the respondent-Board of Cricket
Control of India is 'State' within the meaning of
Article 12 and if it is not, whether it is amenable H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India? (See
Paras 20 to 30)
(2) Whether Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra
were 'team officials' of their respective IPL teams
B
- Chennai Super Kings and Rajasthan Royals? If
so, whether allegations of betting levelled against
them stand proved?(See Paras 31 to 46)
(3) If question No. 2 is answered in the affirmative,
c what consequential a9tion in the nature of
punishment is permissible under the relevant
Rules and Regulations, and against whom? (See
Paras 47 to 62)
D (4) Whether allegations of cover up, levelled
against Mr. N. Srinivasan stand proved. ·If so, to
what effect? (See Paras 63 to 65)
(5) Whether Regulation 6. 2. 4 to the extent it
permits administrators to have commercial
E interest in the IPL, Champions League and
Twenty-20 events is legally bad? (See Paras 66
to 98)
(6) Whether a/legations levelled against Mr.
F Sundar Raman, Chief Operating Officer IPL, stand
proved? If so, to what effect?( See Paras 99 to
105)
(7) What orders and directions need be passed in
the light of the discussions and answers to
G questions 1 to 5 above?(See Paras 106 to 109)
We propose to deal with the questions ad seriatim:
Re: Question No.1:
H 20. Article 12 of the Constitution of India gives an inclusive
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 195
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
definition to the expression 'State', and says that for purposes A
of Part Ill of the Constitution the expression 'State' includes the
Parliament of India, the Government and the Legislature of each
of the States and Local or other authorities within the territory
of India or under the control of the Government of India. A long
line of decisions of this Court have examined and interpreted B
the expression appearing in Article 12 with a view to
determining whether or not a given entity is 'State' within the
meaning of Article 12. It is unnecessary to refer to all such
decisions pronounced over the past few decades not only
because the law is by now fairly well settled by Constitution c
Bench decisions of this Court but also because the question
whether or not BCCI is 'State' within tre meaning of Article 12
may not make any material difference to the case at hand in
view of the admitted position that respondent-BCCI does
discharge several important public functions which make it
0
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. We may all the same refer to
a few landmarks on the judicial landscape only as a reminder
to what is settled and binding upon us.
21. In Sukhdev and Ors. etc. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh E
Raghuvanshi and Anr. etc. (1975) 1 sec 421, one of the
questions that fell for considerations was whether an employee
of statutory corporation like Oil and Natural Gas Commission
established under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act
1959, Indian Finance Corporation, established under the Indian F
Finance Corporation Act, 1948 and the Life Insurance
Corporation under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956,
was entitled to claim protection of Articles 14 and 16 against
the Corporation. A Constitution bench of this Court answered
the question in the affirmative by a majority of 4:1. Mathew J., G
in his concurring judgement referred to Marsh v. Alabama (3)
326 U.S. 501: 19 L. ed. 265 to hold that even where a
corporation is privately performing a public function it is bound
by the constitutional standard applicable to all State actions.
Marsh v. Alabama (supra), it is noteworthy, arose out of a H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
· Aprosecution launched against a Jehovah's witness for her
refusal to leave the side walk where she was distributing
religious pamphlets. She was fined five dollars but aggrieved
by her prosecution she approached the Supreme Court to
argue that the corporation that owned the town had denied the
B right of religious liberty available to Marsh. The U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the contention and declared that administration
of public bodies like a town through private entities were
tantamount to carrying out functions of a public body. Private
right of the corporation could, therefore, be exercised only within
c constitutional limitations. Black J. speaking for the Court
observed:
"The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
D constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the owners
of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads
may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his
farm. Since these facilities are built and operated
primarily to benefit the public and since their operation
E is essentially a public function, it is subject to state
regulation".
22. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion simply
added that the function discharged by the corporation as a
F municipal corporation was a public function hence subject to
State Regulation.
23. Borrowing support from the above decision and several
others this Court in Sukhdev's case (supra) held:
G "97. Another factor which might be considered is whether
the operation is an important public function. The
combination of State aid and the furnishing of an
important public service may result in a conclusion that
the operation should be classified as a State agency. If
H a given function is of such public importance and so
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 197
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
closely related to governmental functions as to be A
classified as a governmental agency, then even the
presence or absence of State financial aid might be
irrelevant in making a finding of State action. If the
function does not fall within such a description, then mere
addition of State money would not influence the B
conclusion.
101. In America, corporations or associations, private in
character, but dealing with public rights, have already
been held subject to constitutional standards. Political C
parties, for example, even though they are not statutory
organisations, and are in form private clubs, are within
this category. So also are labour unions on which statutes
confer the right of collective bargaining ....
102. Institutions engaged in matters of high public D
interest or performing public functions are by virtue of the
nature of the function performed government agencies~.
Activities which are too fundamental to the society are by
definition too important not to be considered government
function. This demands the delineation of a theory which E
requires Government to provide all persons with all
fundamentals of life and the determinations of aspects·
which are fundamental. The State today has an
affirmative duty of seeing that all essentials of life are
made available to all persons. The task of the State F
today is to make possible the achievement of a good life
both by removing obstacles in the path of such
achievements and in assisting individual in realising his
ideal of self-perfection. . ...
24. In Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport G
Authority of India and Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 489
this Court held that while a corporation may be created by a
statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act,
1956, or the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the question that
often arises is as to when does the corporation become an H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A instrumentality or agency of the Government and what are the
tests to determine whether a corporation is or is not such an
instrumentality or agency. While holding that there is no cut and
dried formula that can provide an answer, this Court referred
to American decisions in Evans v. Newton 382 US 296 15
s L.Ed.-2nd 373, Ch 614 = 1963 1 All. E.R. 590 and New York
v. United States 326 US 572 to declare that if the functions of
the corporation are of public importance and closely related to
governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in
classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of
c the State. This Court said:
"16. There is also another factor which may be regarded
as having a bearing on this issue and it is whether the
operation of the corporation is an important public
function. It has been held in the United States in a
D number of cases that the concept of private action must
yield to a concept of State action where public functions
are being performed. Vide Arthur S. Miller: "The
Constitutional Law of the 'Security State"'. It was pointed
out by Douglas, J., in Evans v. Newton that "when private
E individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become
agencies or instrumentalities of the State". Of course. with
the growth of the welfare State. it is very difficult to define
what functions are governmental and what are not.
F because. as pointed out by Vil/mer. L.J.. in Pfizer v.
Ministry of Health there has been since mid-Victorian
times, "a revolution in political thought and a totally
different conception prevails today as to what is and what
is not within the functions of Government". Douglas, J.,
G also observed to the same effect in New York v. United
States: "A State's project is as much a legitimate
governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to
private enterprise, or conducted for profit." Cf. Helvering
v. GerhardtH. A State may deem it as essential to its
H economy that it own and operate a railroad, a mill, or an
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 199
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR (T.S. THAKUR, J.]
irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges, A
street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have
been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident or even
dangerous extension of State activities may today be
deemed indispensable. It mav be noted that besides the
so-called traditional functions. the modem State operates B
a multitude of public enterprises and discharges a host
of other public functions. If the functions of the corporation
are of public importance and closelv related to
governmental functions. it would be a relevant factor in
classifving the corporation as an instrumentalitv or c.
agency of Government. This is precisely what was pointed
out by Mathew, J., in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram where the
learned Judge said that "institutions engaged in matters
of high public interest or performing public functions are
by virtue of the nature of the functions performed
0
government agencies. Activities which are too
fundamental to the society are by definition too important
not to be considered government func.fions".
(emphasis supplied)
E
25. In Ajay Hasia and ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and
ors. (1981) 1 sec 722, this Court noted the constitutional
philosophy of a democratic socialistic republic requiring the
government to undertake a multitude of socio-economic
operations, and the practical advantages of functioning through F
the legal device of a corporation for a myriad of commercial
and economic activities. But any such contrivance of carrying
on such activities cannot, declared this Court, exonerate the
government of its basic obligation to respect the fundamental
rights of the citizens for otherwise it would be the easiest thing G
for any government to assign to a plurality of corporations almost
every State business and thereby cheat the people of this
country of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them under the
Constitution. The Court went on to enunciate certain tests
applicable for determining whether an entity is an
H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A "instrumentality or the agency of the State'', an expression that
does not figure in Article 12 of the Constitution but which would
constitute an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution.
26. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of
B Chemical Biology and Ors. (2002) 5 sec 111 a seven-Judge
Bench of this Court was examining whether Council of Scientific
and Industrial Research was a State within the meaning of
Articles 12 and 13(2) of the.Constitution. The Court decided
by a majority of 5:2 that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia's
C case (supra) were not a rigid set of principles so that if a body
falls within any of them it must be considered to be a 'State'.
The question in each individual case, declared this Court, would
be whether on facts the body is financially, functionally and
administratively dominated by or under the control of the
Government. Such control must be particular to the body in
D question and must be pervasive to make any such body State
within the meaning of Article 12. Mere regulatory control whether
under statute or otherwise would not be sufficient. Overruling
an earlier decision of this Court in Sabhajit Tewary v. Union
of India and Ors. (1975) 1 SCC 485, this Court held that
E Council of Scientific and Industrial Research even when
registered as Society was 'State' within the meaning of Article
12.
27. In Board of Control for Cricket in India & Anr. v. Netaji
F Cricket Club and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 741, this Court had an
occasion to consider the role and the nature of functions being
discharged by the BCCI. This Court held that the Boards control
over the sport of cricket was deep and pervasive and that it
exercised enormous public functions, which made it obligatory
G for the Board to follow the doctrine of 'fairness and good faith'.
This Court said:
"80. The Board is a society registered under the Tamil
Nadu Societies Registration Act. It enjoys a monopoly
status as regards regulation of the sport of cricket in
H terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 201
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Assbciation. It controls the sport of cricket and lays down A
the law therefor. /tinter alia enjoys benefits by way of tax
exemption and right to use stadia at nominal annual rent.
It earns a huge revenue not only by selling tickets to
viewers but also selling right to exhibit films live on TV
and broadcasting the same. Ordinarily. its full members B
are the State associations except Association of Indian
Universities. Railwav Sports Control Board and Services
Sports Control Board. As a member of ICC. it represents
the countrv in the international fora. It exercises enormous
public functions. It has the authority to select players. c
umpires and officials to represent the country in the
international fora. It exercises total control over the
players. umpires and other officers. The Rules of the
Board clearly demonstrate that without its recognition no
competitive cricket can be hosted either within or outside 0
the country. Its control over the sport of competitive
cricket is deeply pervasive and complete.
81. In Jaw, there cannot be any dispute that having regard
to the enormity of power exercised by it, the Board is
bound to follow the doctrine of "fairness" and "good faith" E
in all its activities. Having regard to the fact that it has to
fulfil the hopes and aspirations of millions, it has a duty
to act reasonably. It cannot act arbitrarily, whimsically or
capriciously. As the Board controls the profession of
cricketers, its actions are required to be judged and F
viewed by higher standards."
(emphasis is ours)
28. The question whether the respondent-BCCI is 'State'
within the meaning of Article 12 fell directly for consideration G
of this Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India
and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 649. By a majority of 3:2 this Court
ruled that respondent-BCCI was not 'State' within the meaning
of Article 12. This Court held that the Board was not created
by any statute, nor was a part of the share capital held by the H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A Government. There was practically no financial assistance
given to the Board by the Government, and even when the
Board did enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket such
status was not State conferred or State protected. So also there
is no deep and pervasive State control. The control, if any, is
B only regulatory in nature as applicable to other similar bodies.
The control is not specifically exercised under any special
statute applicable to the Board. All functions of the Board are
not public functions nor are they closely related to governmental
functions. The Board is not created by transfer of a government-
C owned corporation and was an autonomous body. Relying upon
the tests laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas's case (supra),
this Court held that the Board was not financially, functionally
or administratively dominated by or under the control of the
Government so as to bring it within the expression 'State'
appearing in Article 12 of the Constitution. Having said that this
0
Court examined whether the Board was discharging public
duties in the nature of State functions. Repelling the contention
that the functions being discharged by the Board were public
duties in the nature of State functions which would ryiake the
E Board a State within the meaning of Article 12 this Court
observed:
"29. It was then argued that the Board discharges public
duties which are in the nature of State functions.
Elaborating on this argument it was pointed out that the
F Board selects a team to represent India in international
matches. The Board makes rules that govern the
activities of the cricket players, umpires and other
persons involved in the activities of cricket. These,
according to the petitioner, are all in the nature of State
G functions and an entity which discharges such functions
can only be an instrumentality of State, therefore, the
Board falls within the definition of State for the purpose
of Article 12. Assuming that the abovementioned
functions of the Board do amount to public duties or
H State functions, the question for our consideration is:
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 203
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
would this be sufficient to hold the Board to be a State A
for the purpose of Article 12? While considering this
aspect of the argument of the petitioner, it should be
borne in mind that the State/Union has not chosen the
Board to perform these duties nor has it legally
authorised the Board to carry out these functions under B
any law or agreement. It has chosen to leave the activities
of cricket to be controlled by private bodies out of such
bodies' own volition (self-arrogated). In such
circumstances when the actions of the Board are not
actions as an authorised representative of the State, can c
it be said that the Board is discharging State functions?
The answer should be no. In the absence of any
authorisation, if a private body chooses to discharge any
such function which is not prohibited by law then it would
be incorrect to hold that such action of the body would
0
make it an instrumentality of the State. The Union of India
has tried to make out a case that the Board discharges
these functions because of the de facto recognition
granted by it to the Board under the guidelines framed
by it, but the Board has denied the same. In this regard
we must hold that the Union of India has failed to prove E
that there is any recognition by the Union of India under
the guidelines framed by it, and that the Board is
discharging these functions on its own as an autonomous
body."
F
29. Having said that this Court recognized the fact that the
Board was discharging some duties like the Selection of Indian
Cricket Team, controlling the activities of the players which
activities were akin to public duties or State functions so that if
there is any breach of a constitutional or statutory obligation or G
the rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party shall be entitled
to seek redress under the ordinary law or by way of a writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is much
wider than Article 32. This Court observed:
H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A "31. Be that as it mav. it cannot be denied that the Board
does discharge some duties like the selection of an
Indian cricket team. controlling the activities of the
players and others involved in the game of cricket. These
activities can be said to be akin to public duties or State
B functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional
or statutorv obligation or rights of other citizens. the
aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition
under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator
of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he
c is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is
always a just remedy for the violation of a right of a citizen.
Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an
aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the
ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than
D
Article 32."
(emphasis supplied)
30. The majority view thus favours the view that BCCI is
E amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226 even when it is not 'State' within the meaning of Article 12.
The rationale underlying that view if we may say with utmost
respect lies in the "nature of duties and functions" which the
BCCI performs. It is common ground that the respondent-Board
F has a complete sway over the game of cricket in this country.
It regulates and controls the game to the exclusion of all others.
It formulates rules, regulations norms and standards covering
all aspect of the game. It enjoys the power of choosing the
members of the national team and the umpires. It exercises the
G power of disqualifying players which may at times put an end
to the sporting career of a person. It spends crores of rupees
on building and maintaining infrastructure like stadia, running
of cricket academies and Supporting State Associations. It
frames pension schemes and incurs expenditure on coaches,
trainers etc. It sells broadcast and telecast rights and collects
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 205
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
admission fee to venues where the matches are played. All A
these activities are undertaken with the tacit concurrence of the
State Government and the Government of India who are not only
fully aware but supportive of the activities of the Board. The
State has not chosen to bring any law or taken any other step
that would either deprive or dilute the Board's monopoly in the B
field of cricket. On the contrary, the Government of India have
allowed the Board to select the national team which is then
recognized by all concerned and applauded by the entire nation
including at times by the highest of the dignitaries when they
win tournaments and bring laurels home. Those distinguishing c
themselves in the international arena are conferred highest
civilian. awards like the Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan,
Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri apart from sporting awards
instituted by the Government. Such is the passion for this game
in this country that cricketers are seen as icons by youngsters,
0
middle aged and the old alike. Any organization or entity that
has such pervasive control over the game and its affairs and
such powers as can make dreams end up in smoke or come
true cannot be said to be undertaking any private activity. The
functions of the Board are clearly public functions, which, till
E
such time the State intervenes to takeover the same, remain
in the nature of public functions, no matter discharged by a
society registered under the Registration of Societies Act.
Suffice it to say that if the Government not only allows an
autonomous/private body to discharge functions which it could
in law takeover or regulate but even lends its assistance to such F
a non-government body to undertake such functions which by
their very nature are public functions, it cannot be said that the
functions are not public functions or that the entity discharging
the same is not answerable on the standards generally
applicable to judicial review of State action. Our answer to G
question No.1, therefore, is in the negative, qua, the first part
and affirmative qua the second. BCCI may not be State under
Article 12 of the Constitution but is certainly amenable to writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A Re: Question No.2:
31. The Probe Committee, on an interpretation of the
provisions of the relevant rules and the material placed before
it, recorded a specific finding that Gurunath Meiyappan was
8 working/associated with the IPL as team official of the Chennai
Super Kings. The Committee further held that for the operation
of the relevant Rules and Regulations it made no difference
whether Gurunath Meiyappan was the owner or simply a team
official of CSK. That is because so long as Gurunath
C Meiyappan was a team official, which the Committee found he
was, the consequences of his acts of betting would flow even
when he was not the owner, or the perceived owner of the CSK.
That Gurunath Meiyappan was a team official of CSK owned
by India Cements Ltd. was not disputed by either India Cements
Ltd. or any other party appearing before us. Mr. Siddharth
D Luthra, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. Gurunath
Meiyappan, however, declined to commit himself to any stand
on that aspect. When asked if his client was a team official of
CSK, Mr. Luthra claimed the right to remain silent as his client
was being prosecuted in a Court at Mumbai for betting. We will
E concede to Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan the right to silence in view
of the pend ency of the prosecution launched against him. That
does not, however, prevent the Court from examining whether
Gurunath Meiyappan was a team official for purposes of
disciplinary action permissible under the relevant rules and
F regulations. We may hasten to add that our examination of that-
issue will be without prejudice to Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan's right
to claim that he was not a team official if at all the said question
arises for consideration in the criminal trial pending against
him, nor shall our opinion on the subject be taken as binding
G upon the criminal court where the question can be examined
independently.
32. Having said that we find that the Probe Committee has
correctly appreciated the facts as emerging from the documents
H and the depositions of witnesses recorded by it and rightly
come to the conclusion that Gurunath Meiyappan was a team
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 207
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
official of CSK. That is so especially when India Cements Ltd. A
who owns the team made a candid admission before us that
Gurunath Meiyappan was indeed a team official within the
meaning of that expression under the rules. We, therefore, see
no real, much less compelling reason, for us to disagree or
reverse the finding recorded by the Probe Committee on that B
aspect.
33. The Probe Committee has on the basis of the material
available to it further held that Gurunath Meiyappan was
indulging in betting. That finding was not seriously assailed C
before us by Mr. Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
his behalf. Mr. Luthra's concern was that since Mr. Guru.nath
Meiyappan was being prosecuted, any specific stance that he
may take is likely to prejudice him at the trial in the criminal case.
We have, however, made it clear and we do so again that any
finding as to the involvement of Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan in D
betting activities recorded by the Probe Committee or by this
Court shall remain confined to the present proceedings which
are addressing the limited question whether any administrative/
disciplinary action needs to be taken against those accused
of such activities. Having said so, we must make it clear that E
given the nature of the proceedings entrusted to the Probe
Committee and the standard of proof applicable to the same,
we see no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the Probe
Committee that Gurunath Meiyappan was indeed indulging in
betting. The material assembled in the course of the F
investigation by the Probe Committee provides a reasonably
safe basis for holding that the accusations made against
Gurunath Meiyappan stood established on a preponderance of
probabilities. We are at any rate not sitting in appeal against
the findings of a Domestic Tribunal set up to enquire into the G
allegations of misconduct levelled against a team official of a
participating team. We are not, therefore, re-appraising the
material thfut has been assembled by the Probe Committee and
relied upon to support its finding. The finding is by no means
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A without basis or perverse to call for our interference with the
same.
34. That brings us to the findings recorded against Mr. Raj
Kundra, whose part ownership and accreditation as a team
official of Rajasthan Royal was not disputed before us. In its
8
report dated 9th February, 2014, the Probe Committee had
referred to the statement of Mr. Umesh Goenka, recorded under
Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. by a Delhi Court in which the said
Mr. Goenka had stated that Mr. Raj Kundra used to indulge in
betting in IPL matches through him. The Probe Committee
C opined that the allegations levelled against Mr. Raj Kundra and
his wife Ms. Shilpa Shetty required to be investigated
further. The Committee held that if the allegations of betting
were found proved against Mr. Raj Kundra and his wife Shilpa
Shetty the same would constitute serious infraction of the IPL
D Operational Rules, the IPL Anti-Corruption Code and the IPL
Code of Conduct for Players and Team Official. The Committee
observed:
''The Committee is thus of the view that if the a/legations
E of betting against Mr. Raj Kundra and Ms. Shetty who are
part of Rajasthan Royals, stand proved the same would
constitute a serious infraction of Sections 2. 2. 1 and 2. 14
of the IPL Operational Rules for bringing the game in
disrepute, Articles 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 of the IPL Anti
F Corruption Code for acts of betting and Articles 2.4.4 of
the IPL Code of Conduct for Players and Team Officials,
for bring disrepute to the game of cricket."
35. A concurring report submitted by Mr. Nilay Dutta the
third member of the Probe Committee also expressed a similar
G view when it said:
"There seems to have been an effort to cover up the
involvement of Mr. Raj Kundra in betting. In terms of the
regulations in force of the BCCI, even legal betting is not
H permitted on the part of an owner of a franchisee. No
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 209
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
benefit would accrue to Mr. Raj Kundra by an attempt to A
show that bets were placed through legal betting methods
in other countries. There are materials on record which
justify an appropriate investigation to ascertain the
culpability of Mr. Raj Kundra and his wife Ms. Shi/pa
Shetty in placing bets as owner of a franchise.e in IPL. B
Any such culpability on the part of the Kundras would
fasten liability on the franchisee, Jaipur IPL Cricket
Private Limited and it would be incumbent to
ascertain such liability of the franchisee for purposes
of appropriate sanctions under the Operational Rules c
and/or the Franchise Agreement. The Committee
understands that the susp.ension imposed on Mr. Raj
Kundra by the BCC/ is still in force. The BCCI must take
a zero tolerance position as regards corruption in cricket
and any possible violation of the BCCI Anti-Corruption 0
Code and the Operational Rules by any person. It goes
without saying that Mr. Raj Kundra and his wife Ms.
Shi/pa Shetty Kundra were owners as per the Franchise
Agreement and accredited as such under the IPL
Operational Rules. They are Team officials within the
E
meaning of the said Rules. Being Team officials they are
subject to the Code of conduct for Players and Team
Officials prohibiting betting in course of IPL matches and
would face appropriate sanctions ·under the Operational
Rules. It would be in fitness of things that pending final
determination of the culpability of the Kundras, they be F
kept suspended from participating in any activity of the
BCC/ including the IPL matches in view of the materials
on record."
36. This Court taking note of the observations made by the G
Probe Committee not only directed further investigation into the
allegations against Mr. Raj Kundra but also provided necessary
support to the Probe Committee to do so effectively. The
Committee has on the basis of the said further investigation and
enquiry come to the conclusion that Mr. Raj Kundra was a 'team H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A official', a 'player support personnel' and 'participant' within the
meaning of the relevant rules and that he had indulged in betting.
37. The Committee has, while dealing with the case of Mr.
Raj Kundra, referred to as Individual No.11 in the said report
observed:
8
"Individual 11: This individual was in touch with the
bookies about betting and thus by not reporting contact
with the bookie has violated BCClllPL Anti-Corruption
Code. The Committee also found that the investigation
C against this individual was abruptly and without reason
stopped by the Rajasthan Police upon receiving the case
papers from Delhi Police. The Committee found that a
friend of individual 11 was a known punter. The said
punter has given a section 164 statement to the effect that
D he was placing bets on behalf of individual 11. Individual
11 had introduced him (punter) to another bookie who
dealt with larger stakes. Section 161 statement made by
another player confirmed that individual 11 introduced
him to a bookie. Materials on record indicate that
E individual 11 was placing bets or was at the minimum
standing guarantee for his punter friend. These infractions
also violate BCClllPL Anti-Corruption Code."
38. Appearing for Mr. Raj Kundra, Mr. Shakher Naphade,
F learned senior counsel, argued that the report submitted by the
Probe Committee could at best be taken as a preliminary
report. A proper enquiry into the allegations made against Mr.
Raj Kundra shall have to be separately conducted in terms of
the relevant rules and regulations. In support of that contention
he placed reliance upon the disciplinary procedure prescribed
G under Rule 6.2.2 of the IPL Operational Rules which postulates
establishment of a "Disciplinary Procedure Commission" to
hear and adjudicate upon any complaint alleging any breach
or misconduct under the regulations. In terms of Rule 6.2.2 the
Commission has to comprise three members of IPL Code of
H Behaviour Committee selected by BCCI. The Commission is
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 211
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
in terms of Rule 6.2.4 empowered to investigate any breach of A
the regulations or any Player Contract by any person subject
to the Operational Rules. Rule 6.3.1 prescribes the complaint
procedure which is according to the learned counsel mandatory
especially when Rule 6.3.8 requires the hearing to be
conducted in a fair manner and in consonance with the B
principles of natural justice including the right to call and to
question and examine witnesses in person or by telephone or
video conference where necessary. Reliance was placed upon
Rule 6.3.19 to argue that standard of proof in support of the
complaint shall be whether "the Commission is comfortably C
satisfied" bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations
made regarding the 'commission of the offence' and that the
standard of proof in all cases shall be considered on a sliding
scale from, at a minimum, a mere balance of probability upto
proof beyond a reasonable doubt from the least serious to the
most serious offences. It was contended that the person found
D
guilty is then entitled to file an appeal before the Appeal
Commission established under Section 6.5.4 consisting upto
three members to hear and decide the appeal. This procedure,
it was argued by Mr. Naphade, could not be deviated from as
the rules were binding upon the parties concerned. Reliance E
in support was placed on the decisions of this Court in T.P.
Daver v. Lodge Victoria No.363 S.C. Belgaum and Ors. (AIR
1963 SC 1144), Ambalal Sarabhai and Ors. v. Phiroz H. Anita _
(AIR 1939 Bombay 35) and Lennox Arthur Patrick O'Reilly
and Ors. v. Cyril Cuthbert Gittens (AIR 1949 PC 313). F
39. On behalf of Jaipur IPL Cricket Private Ltd. it was
argued by Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel that there
was no direct allegation against the said company and that the
findings recorded by the Probe Committee that Mr. Raj Kundra G
was the owner of Rajasthan Royals was not wholly correct
inasmuch as Raj Kundra and his family own just about 11 %
equity in the holding company of respondent No.4-Jaipur IPL
Cricket Private Ltd. Having said that Mr. Desai fairly conceded
that Raj Kundra was duly accredited and doubtless a 'team
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A official' in terms of IPL Operational Rules and also 'Player
Support Personnel' and Participant in terms of the IPL Anti~
Corruption Code. Mr. Desai, however, assailed the findings
recorded by Justice Mudgal Committee that Mr. Raj Kundra had
indulged in betting in IPL matches and argued that the report
was vag~e and unsustainable against Mr. Raj Kundra more so
8
against Rajasthan Royals. It was argued by him that Mr. Raj
Kundra was never a part of the management directly or indirectly
and had never participated in the management decisions
including decisions regarding the purchase of players or the
C strategy adopted by the franchisee or its team. No notice was,
according to Mr. Desai, served upon respondent No.4-
company although Mr. Raj Kundra was summoned and
examined by the Probe Committee. According to the learned
counsel, Justice Mudgal Committee had only completed the first
stage process of investigation leaving the second stage 'fact
D finding' and the third stage 'adjudication' issues open. It was
contended that even if Mr. Raj Kundra was held to be guilty of
betting, the question whether any punishment/sanctions could
be imposed upon a franchisee will have to be considered in
the totality of the circumstances having regard to the fact that
E other promoters of the company that owns Rajasthan Royals
need not be punished for the misconduct of one of the
promoters holding only 11 % equity. The question of
proportionality of the sanction/punishment shall also have to be
kept in mind argued Mr. Desai.
F
40. There is no gainsaying that the IPL Operational Rules
provide for what is described as 'disciplinary and complaint
procedure' to be followed in regard to the complaints and/or
breaches of the regulations and/or charges of misconduct
G levelled against anyone connected with the IPL. This procedure
includes establishment of a 'Disciplinary Procedure
Commission' to hear and decide such matters. The
Commission is in terms of Rule 6.2.2 to comprise three
members of the IPL Code of Behaviour Committee to be
H selected by the BCCI. It is also clear from Rules 6.3.1 to 6.3.21
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 213
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
that the Commission is required to follow a fair and reasonable A
procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. In
terms of Rule 6.3.19 standard of proof can vary between
balance of probability and proof beyond a reasonable doubt
depending upon the seriousness of the allegat,on~ being
examined. by the Commission. What is important1 is that the B
Commission is not in term_s of Regulation 6.320 bdunt:y strict
rules of evidence and that facts relating to any offenc can be
established by any reliable means including admissi ns. This
procec:lure can and indeed ought to be followed in cases where
there is no real or compelling justification for a departure.· Two c
:distit:iet aspects all the same need be kept in mind in the case
at hand. The first is that even the BCCI had not adhered to the
prescribed procedure in the present case. Instead of
constifuting a 'Disciplinary Procedure Commission' comprising
three members of IPL Code of Behaviour Committee, the BCCI D
had appointed a three-member Committee comprising two
forme~ Judges of the High Court of Madras with Mr. Jagdale
as the"third member. The departure came ostensibly because
of a public hue and cry over betting by those owning the
participating teams. The situation was in that view extraordinary E
which called for an extraordinary approach. A Committee
comprising two former Judges of the High Court of Madras was
BCCl's response to the extraordinary situation with Mr. Jagdale
as the third member. The Probe Committee-was reduced to
two members after Mr. Jagdale decided to resign, but the
Committee was asked by the Board to continue and complete F
the probe even with its reduced strength. This was a conscious
departure b_y the BCCI from the procedure laid down by the IPL
Operational Rules which was faulted by the High Court of
Bombay in the writ petition filed by the appellant-association.
When the matter travelled to this Court the seriousness of the G
allegations and the ramifications involved led to the setting up
of a High Powered Probe Committee in place of the
Disciplinary Procedure Commission contemplated by the IPL
Operational Rules and Regulations. The whole purpose behind
H
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A setting up of the Probe Committee was to make the entire
process of investigation and enquiry into the allegations
credible. The Probe Committee headed by a former Chief
Justice of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was never
intended to conduct a preliminary investigation as was
B suggested by Mis Naphade and Desai. It was on the contrary
understood by all concerned to be a substitute for the
Disciplinary Procedure Commission under the Rules
empowered to examine the allegations and record findings. It
is wholly wrong to suggest that the report of such a High
c Powered Probe Committee could be trivialised by treating it
as a preliminary investigation that could lead to no more than
initiation of proceedings before the Disciplinary Procedure
Commission envisaged by Rule 6.2.2 of the Rules mentioned
above.
D 41. The second aspect is that the Probe Committee set
up by the BCCI had expressed its inability to do anything in the
matter on account of absence of any material to support the
allegations appearing in the press. The BCCI had, for all intents
and purposes, treated that finding to be conclusive giving a
E quietus to the controversy. It was not as though the finding of
the Committee comprising two former Judges of the Madras
High Court was meant to be some kind of a preliminary report
which would require scrutiny or examination by the Disciplinary
Procedure Commission before a clean chit was given to the
F individuals concerned. If that be so, it is difficult to countenance
the argument that IPL Operational Rules had any further role to
play in the matter of an enquiry into the allegations levelled
against the persons concerned. It 'is equally difficult to
appreciate how the significance of the reports submitted by the
G Probe Committee set up by this Court could be undermined
simply because the IPL Operational Rules provide for a
Disciplinary Procedure Commission with a particular
composition. We have in that view no hesitation in rejecting the
contention urged by Mis. Naphade and Desai tnat the
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 215
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
procedure prescribed by the IPL Operational Rules must be A
followed despite all that has transpired till now or that the report
submitted by Justice Mudgal Committee was of no value
except that it could provided a basis for setting the Disciplinary
Procedure into motion. We need to remember that the direction
for appointment of a Probe Committee was issued in exercise B
of appellate powers vested in this Court in proceedings arising
out of Article 226 of the Constitution as also those vested in
this Court under Article 142 thereof. We also need to remember
that the directions came in a public interest petition with a view
to finding out whether there was any truth in the allegations that c
owners of IPL teams and franchisees were in a big way
indulging in sporting frauds thereby discrediting the game and
cheating the public of their confidence in its purity. That being
the object, it is futile to set up the "disciplinary procedure" under
the Rules against the exercise of such plenary powers as are
D
vested in this Court under the constitutional provisions
mentioned above.
42. Having said that we must say and say it without any
hesitation that like the Disciplinary Procedure Commission
even the Probe Committee set up by this Court was bound to E
observe the principles of natural justice in the matter of
conducting the probe entrusted to it. That is because of the
consequences that would flow from any finding which the Probe
Committee would record against those accused of wrong
doings. As seen earlier, Raj Kundra has been found to be a F
team official of Rajasthan Royals by the Probe Committee.
Even according to the concessions made before us by the
learned counsel appearing for Mr. Raj Kundra Jaipur IPL
Cricket Private Ltd. he was a duly accredited team official.
Such being the position a notice was required to go only to Mr. G
Raj Kundra for it was he alone who was alleged to have
indulged in betting. Mr. Desai's contention that since the
Committee did not issue any notice to Jaipur IPL Cricket
Private Ltd. the owner of Rajasthan Royals the finding recorded
by the Probe Committee holding Mr. Raj Kundra guilty of H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· (2015] 1 S.C.R.
A betting was vitiated does not appear to be sound to us.
Whether. or not Mr. Raj Kundra's misconduct can and should
result in loss of franchise granted to Rajasthan Royals is a
matter which may concern Jaipur IPL cricket Private Ltd. but
that is a different matter altogether. The question immediately
8 falling for our consideration is not whether the franchise held
by Mr. Desai's client should be cancelled. The question _is
whether Mr. Raj Kundra was heard by the Justice Mudgal
Committee, before holding him guilty of betting. Our answer to
that question is in the affirmative. Admittedly, Mr. Raj Kundra
c was heard by the Committee before concluding that he had
indulged in betting. Absence of any notice to anyone else was
of little consequence so long as the person concerned was duly
notified and afforded a fair opportunity. To that extent, therefore,
the grievance sought to be projected by the Jaipur IPL Private
D Ltd. regarding absence of any notice need be noticed only to
be rejected.
43. There was no serious challenge to the findings
recorded by the Probe Committee on the merits of the findings
against Mr. Raj Kundra. Mr. Desai appearing for Jaipur IPL
E Cricket Private Ltd., no doubt, contended that the finding was
based on certain assumptions, but we do not see any merit in
those contentions. Even otherwise strict rules of evidence do
not have any application to an enquiry like the one entrusted to
the Probe Committee or contemplated by IPL Operational
F Rules. The essence of the rules applicable even to the
Disciplinary Commission is that it ought to adopt a fair and
reasonable procedure while enquiring into the allegations of
misconduct. Rule 6.3.19 of the Operational Rules specifically
states that the standard of proof in respect of all complaints
G shall be "whether the Commission is comfortably satisfied" with
the allegations that the offence has been committed. Such
satisfaction could on a sliding scale vary from a mere balance
of prob~bility upto proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Rules of
evidend,e are made specifically inapplicable to the disciplinary
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. . 217
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
proceedings in terms of Rule 6.3.20 of the IPL Operational A
Rules. The Probe Committee's findings in our opinion comply
with all the basic requirements of fairness and reasonableness
and, therefore, call for no interference from us particularly when
we are not sitting in appeal over the said findings nor are we
required to substitute our own conclusion based on a B
reappraisal of the material that was available before the Probe
Committee for those of the Committee.
44. In the light of what we have stated, the decision of this
Court in T.P. Davers case (supra) does not lend any assistance C
to the respondents Raj Kundra or Jaipur IPL Cricket Private ltd.
That was a case arising out of expulsion of the appellant Mr.
Daver as a member of Lodge Victoria No.363 S.C. at Belgaum
on allegations suggesting commission of 12 masonic offences
by him. The charges levelled against the appellant were put to
vote and the members of the Masonic Lodge held each one of D
those charges to have been proved. This culminated in the
passing of a resolution expelling the appellant from the Lodge.
An appeal against the said decision was dismissed and so
was a further appeal to the Grand Lodge of Scotland who
considered the sentence imposed on the appellant as one of E
"suspension sine die". It was in that background that a suit was
instituted by Mr. T.P. Daver in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior
Division for a declaration that the resolution passed by the
Victoria Lodge was illegal and void and thaf he continued to
be a member of the Lodge despite the said resolution. The suit F
was contested by the defendants and was eventually dismissed
and so was an appeal before the High Court of Mysore. In a
further appeal this Court held that while expelling a member,
the conditions laid down in the rules must be strictly complied
with. Relying upon Maclean v. Workers Union LR 1929 1 CHO G
602, 623 and LAPO Reilly v. C.C. Gittens (AIR 1949 PC 313)
this Court held that in matters of this kind the decision of the
domestic tribunal cannot be questioned so long as the Tribunal
. has not exceeded its jurisdiction or acted dishonestly or in bad
faith. This Court summed up the principles applicable in the H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R
A following words:
"9. The following principles may be gathered from the
above discussion. (1) A member of a masonic lodge is
bound to abide by the rules of the lodge; and if the rules
provide for expulsion, he shall be expelled only in the
B
manner provided by the rules. (2) The lodge is bound to
act strictly according to the rules whether a particular rule
is mandatory or directory falls to be decided in each
case, having regard to the well settled rules of
construction in that regard. (3) The jurisdiction of a civil
c court is rather limited; it cannot obviously sit as a court
of appeal from decisions of such a body; it can set aside
the order of such a body, if the said body acts without
jurisdiction or does not act in good faith or acts in
violation of the principles of natural justice as explained
D in the decisions cited supra."
45. The present appeals do not arise from a suit as was
the position in T.P. Daver's case (supra). More importantly, the
present appeals arise out of writ proceedings instituted in public
E interest, a concept unknown when T.P. Daver's case (supra)
was decided. At any rate, the domestic Tribunal under the rules
in the instant case was substituted by a Tribunal constituted
under the orders of the Court and with the consent of the parties,
to serve a larger public good viz. to find out the veracity of the
F serious allegations of sporting frauds like spot fixing, match
fixing and betting by those who were not only participants in the
tournaments played but also managing the affairs of the BCCI
giving rise to serious issues of conflict of interest adversely
affecting the game so popular in this country that any fraud as
G suggested was bound to shake the confidence of the public in
general and those who love it in particular. Same is the position
with the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ambalal
Sarabhai and Ors. v. Phiris H. Antia (AIR 1939 Born. 35). That
was also a case where a member of a social club was expelled
from the club and the expulsion challenged in the Court. A
H Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay in second appeal
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 219
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
held that the club had not followed the elementary principles of A
natural justice which gave enough room to the Civil Court to
interfere. The position in the case at hand is in no way
analogous to the fact situation of that case. So long as-~lidgal
Committee has conducted the proceedings in conson-ance with
the principles of natural justice, the Committee's finding that Raj B
Kundra was a team official of Rajasthan Royals and that he had
indulged in betting cannot be faulted.
46. Our answer to question No.2 is, therefore, in the
affirmative.
c
Re: Question No.3:
47. What possible action is permissible against Mr.
Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra and their teams and
Franchisees is what logically falls for our consideration in the 0
face of our answer to question No.2 above. There is no
gainsaying that the question shall have to be answered by
reference to the set of rules applicable. It is common ground
that there are different sets of rules and regulations applicable
to the fact situation at hand. It is also not in dispute that even
E
the franchise agreement between the BCCI and the franchisees
contain provisions that provide for action iA situations like the
one at hand. We shall, for the sake of clarity, answer the
question by reference to each set of rules separately.
(i) Permissible action in terms of the IPL Operational F
Rules:
48. In Section I of the IPL Operational Rules are defined
different expressions used in the said Rules. Sections 2 and 4
stipulate obligations of the franchisees and team/players while G
Section 6 thereof prescribes regulations and disciplinary
procedure which, _inter a/ia, includes under Section 6.1
sanctions that can be imposed for acts of misconduct if any
committed. The relevant provisions of IPL Operational Rules
effective from 15th March, 2013 are as under:
H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 1 S.C.R.
A "SECTION 1 - DEFINITIONS
1. 1. In these Operational Rules (unless the context
requires otherwise) the following expressions shall have
the following meanings:
8 xxxx xxxx--xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
Franchisee means an entity which has entered into a
Franchise Agreement with BCCI;
c Franchise Agreement means an agreement between
BCCI and a third party (a Franchisee) under which such
Franchisee as agreed to filed a Team in the league and
pursuant to which such Franchisee enjoys certain rights
and has as~umed certain obligations as set out therein
0 and as contemplated by these Operational Rules;
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
Person means any individual, company, partnership or
any other entity of any kind.
E
Person subject to these Operational Rules means any
Franchisee, any Player, any Team Official and/or any
Match Official;
Player means a person who has been registered as a
F
player with BCCI;
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
Regulations means, together, these Operational Rules
G and the IPL Regulations;
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
SECTION 2 - FRANCHISEE AND TEAMIPLA YER
H OBLIGATIONS-GENERAL
BOARD OF CONTR.OL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 221
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
2.1. EFFECT OF OPERATIONAL RULES A
Participation in or other involvement with the League is
deemed to constitute and to be an acceptance by ~ch
person subject to these Operational Rules bf an
agreement with and obligation owed to BCCI to be bound 8
by and subject to the Regulations, the Laws of Cricket,
the terms of each relevant Player Contract (insofar as
such Player Contract relates to any Persons subject to
these Operational Rules) and the jurisdiction of the BCCI
in connection therewith.
c
2.2. OBLIGAION TO COMPETE/OTHER MATCHES
2.2.1 Each Franchisee shall procure that its Team shall
in good faith compete to the best of its ability in the
League in general and in each Match in which its Team o
participates
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
2.14 CONDUCT
E
Each person subject to these Operational Rules shall
not, whether during a Match or otherwise, act or omit to
act in any way which would or might reasonably be
anticipated to have an adverse affect on the image and!
or reputation of such Person, any Team, any Player, any F
Team Official, the BCCI, the League and/or the Game or
which would otherwise bring any of the foregoing into
disrepute.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx G
SECTION 4 - OTHER FRANCHISEE OBL/GAIONS
4.1 TEAM OFFICIALS
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A 4.1.1 Each Franchisee shall ensure that each of its Team
Officials complies with the Regulations, including without
limitation, the BCCI Anti-Corruption Code for Participants
(and the attention of Franchises is drawn in particular to
Article 2 of the BC/ Anti-Corruption Code for Participants
B for a list of the offences under that code). For the
avoidance of doubt, all of those persons who are
accredited as representing the Franchisee, whether
accredited for the League by BCC/ either centrally or
locally, shall be deemed to be a Team Official for the
c purpose of the Regulations.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
SECTION 6 - REGULA T/ONS AND DISCIPLINARY
PROCEDURE
D
6. 1 APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
6.1.1 The provisions of the regulations listed in paragraph
1.2 of this Section (being the IPL Regulations) together
with these Operational Rules shall apply to the League
E
and bind any person subject to these Operational Rules
such that they shall be bound to comply with such of
them as apply to each such Person.
6.1.2 The IPL Regulations referred to in paragraph 1. 1
F above are as follows;
(i) ······· ....
G (viii) the IPL Code of Conduct for Players and Team
Officials;
(xiv) the BCCI Anti-Corruption Code for Participants;
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 223
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
(xv) the IPL Auction Briefing; A
(xvi) BCCl's Minimum Standards for Players and
Match Officials Areas at Matches.
(xvii) any other code as may be issued by BCCI from
time to time which shall be made available either B
on the Official IPL website, the Tournament
Handbook or otherwise by BCCI (and each Person
subject to these Operational Rules shall be
obliged to ensure that it abides by the latest
version of the Regulations) C
6.4 SANCTIONS
6.4.2 The Commission may, through BCCI, impose one
or more of the following sanctions or actions in relation
to any Offence; 0
(a) order compensation and/or an order that the
reasonable costs of the proceedings in relation to
any Complaint be borne by whichever Person has
been found to have committed the Offence or E
apportioned in cases where two or more Persons
have committed an Offence;
(b) suspend a Player or other Person Subject to
these Operational Rules form playing or F
otherwise being involved in Matches for a
specified period;
(c) suspend a Team or Franchisee from the
League;
G
(d) order the payment of money from a Person
subject to these Operational Rules either to BCCI
or to another Person including another Person
subject to these Operational Rules;
H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A (e) order a declaration as to any finding of fact or
interpretation of the Regulations and/or any Player
Contract.
(f) order a deduction of points from a Team;
B (g) order r,ectification of a contract or refuse the
registration of a Player by BCCI;
(h) order the specific performance of an act or matter,
or to do or stop doing or not to do something;
c (i) Impose a financial penalty payable to BCCI or any
other Person
(j) order any other sanction action that the
Commission views as reasonable in the interest
D of justice."
49. A careful reading of the Operational Rules extracted
above would show that every franchisee, player, team official,
and/or match official is subject to the said rules. In terms of Rule
E 2.1 (supra) participation or other involvement with the league
is deemed to constitute an acceptance by each person subject
to these operational rules of an agreement with an obligation
owed to BCCI to be bound by the regulations, the laws of
cricket, the terms of the player contract and the jurisdiction of
F the BCCI in connection therewith. In terms of Rule 2.1.4 (supra)
each person subject to these rules is restrained from acting or
omitting to act in any way that would or might reasonably be
anticipated to have an adver;se affect on the match and/or
reputation of such person, any team, any player, any team
official, the BCCI, the league and/or the game or which would
G otherwise bring any of the ''foregoing into disrepute. More
importantly, each franchisee is in terms of Rule 4.1.1 under an
obligation to ensure that each of its team official complies with
the regulations, and in particular Article 2 of the BCCI and Anti-
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 225
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Corruption Code. The rule, however, provides that all those A
persons who are accredited for the league by BCCI either
centrally or locally, shall be deemed to be team officials for the
purposes of those regulations. In terms of Regulation 6.4
(supra) BCCI can impose any one of the sanctions enumerated
thereunder which includes suspension of the player or other B
person subject to the Operational Rules from playing or
involving in matches for a specified period and suspension of
the team or franchisee from the league. Payment of money from
a person subject to these Operational Rules either to BCCI or
to any other person subject to those rules is also provided as c
one of the permissible sanctions.
50. The upshot of the above discussion is that once Mr.
Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr. Raj Kundra are accepted as team
officials, their misconduct which has adversely affected the
image of the BCCI and the league as also the game and D
brought each one of them to disrepute can result in imposition
of one or more of the sanctions stipulated under Rule 6.4
(supra). It is noteworthy that those sanctions are not limited to
Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra alone but may extend to
suspension of the team or the franchisee from the league also. E
(ii) Permissible action under the Anti Corruption
Code for participants:
51. The B~CI claims to have adopted the Anti Corruption
F
Code for achieving, what it describes as certain "fundamental
sporting imperatives". We may fruitfully reproduce those
fundamental sporting imperatives only to highlight that the BCCI
is, by the' standards set by it, duty bound to ensure that the
game of cricket is played in accordance with those sporting
imperatives not only because the game itself is described as G
a gentleman's game but also because adherence to sporting
imperatives alone can maintain the public confidence in its
purity. The BCCI has, as will appear from a plain reading of
the imperatives set out in the Rules, committed itself in no
H
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 1 S.C.R.
A uncertain terms to maintaining public confidence in the game.
The BCCI stand firmly committed to the following fundamental
sporting imperatives:
"1.1.1 All cricket matches are to be contested on a level
playing-field, with the outcome to be determined solely by the
8
respective merits of the competing teams and to remain
uncertain until the cricket match is completed. This is the
essential characteristic that gives sport its unique appeal.
1. 1. 2 Public confidence in the authenticity and integrity
C of the sporting contest is therefore vital. If that confidence
is undermined. then the very essence of cricket will be
shaken to the core. It is the determination to protect that
essence of cricket that has led the Board of Control for
Cricket in India to adopt this Anti-Corruption Code.
D
1. 1. 3 Advancing technology and increasing popularity
have led to a substantial increase in the amount, and the
sophistication, of betting on cricket matches. The
development of new betting products, including spread-
betting and betting exchanges, as well as internet and
E
phone accounts that allow people to place a bet at any
time and from any place, even after a cricket match has
started, have all increased the potential for the
development of corrupt betting practices. That, in turn,
increases the risk that attempts will be made to involve
F participants in such practices. Even where that risk is
more theoretical than practical, its consequence is to
create a perception that the integrity of the sport is under
threat.
G 1. 1. 4 Furthermore, the nature of this type of misconduct
is such that it is carried out under cover and in secret,
thereby creating significant challenges for the BCCI in
the enforcement of rules of conduct. As a consequence,
the BCCI needs to be empowered to seek information
H from and share information with competent authorities
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. · 227
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
and other relevant third parties, and to require Participants A
to cooperate fully with all investigations and requests for
information.
1.1.5 The BCCI is committed to taking every step in its
power to prevent corrupt betting practices undermining 8
the integrity of the sport of cricket. including any efforts
to influence improperly the outcome or any other aspect
of any Match or Event."
(emphasis supplied)
c
52. In Appendix 1 to the Anti-Corruption Code for
Participants are given definitions for different terms appearing
in the said Code including a definition for expressions like, bet,
Corrupt Conduct, domestic match, event, ineligibility, inside
information, match, participant, player, player support personnel 0
etc. The relevant part of the Appendix dealt with the definition
may also be extracted for the sake of clarity:
"DEFINITIONS:
Anti-Corruption Code. This Anti-Corruption Code E
promulgated by the BCCI on the Effective date.
Bet. Any wager, bet or other form of financial speculation,
and Betting is the carrying out of such activity.
Corrupt Conduct. Any act or omission that would amount F
to an offence under Article 2 of this Anti-Corruption Code
or the equivalent provisions of anti-corruption rules of any
other National Cricket Federation or the ICC Anti-
Corruption Code.
G
Domestic Match. Any 'First-Class Match', 'List A Limited
Overs Match' or 'List A Twenty20 Match', as those terms
are defined in the ICC Classification of Official Cricket
(as amended from time to time) including all matches
organized by the BCCI. H
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A Event. Any competition, tournament, tour, event or
equivalent that involves one or more Matches.
lneligibilitv. Means the Participant is barred for a
specified period of time from participation in the sport of
cricket, as set out more specifically in Article 6. 5.
B
Inside Information. Any information relating to any Match
or Event that a Participant possesses by virtue of his/her
position within the sport. Such information includes, but
is not limited to, factual information regarding the
c competitors in the Match or Event, the conditions, tactical
considerations or any other aspect of the Match or Event,
but does not include such information that is already
published or a matter of public record, readily acquired
by an interested member of the public, or disclosed
D according to the rules and regulations governing the
relevant Match or Event.
Match. A cricket match of any format and duration in
length in which two cricket teams compete against each ·
other.
E
Participant. Any Player, Player Support Personnel,
Umpire, Match Referee or Umpire Support Personnel.
Plaver. Any cricketer who is selected (or who has been
F selected in the preceding twelve (12) months) in any
playing or touring team or squad that is chosen to
represent the BCCI or any of its affiliate and associate
bodies in any International Match or Domestic Match.
Player Support Personnel. Any coach, trainer, manager,
G selector, team official, doctor, physiotherapist or any other
person employed by, representing or otherwise affiliated
to a playing/touring team or squad that is chosen to
represent a National Cricket Federation in any Domestic
Match or International Match or series of such Matches.
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 229
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Suspension. Means the Participant is temporarily barred A
from participating in the sport of cricket pending a decision on
the allegation that he/she has committed an offence under this
Anti-Corruption Code, as set out more specifically in Article
4.6."
B
53. In terms of Article 2 appearing in the Code of Anti-
Corruption, betting, misuse of inside information are some of
the actionable wrongs under the Code. Article 2 reads:
"ARTICLE 2 - OFFENCES UNDER THIS ANT/-
CORRUPT/ON CODE c
2.2.1 CORRUPTION
2. 2. 1 Fixing or contriving in any way or otherwise
influencing improperly, or being a part to any effort to fix
D
or contrive in any way or otherwise influence improperly,
the result, progress, conduct or any other aspect of any
Match or Event.
2. 1. 2 Seeking, accepting, offering or agreeing to accept
any bribe or other Reward to fix or to contrive in any bribe E
or other Reward to fix or to contrive in any way or
otherwise to influence improperly to result, progress,
conduct or any other aspect of any Match or Event.
2. 1. 4 Soliciting, including, enticing, instructing, F
persuading, encouraging or facilitating (a) any Participant
tO commit an offence under any of the foregoing
provisions of this Article 2. 1 and/or (b) any other person
to do any act that would be an offence if that person were
a Participant
G
2.2.2 BETTING
2.2. 1 Placing, accepting, laying or otherwise entering into
any Bet with any other party (whether individual, company
H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A or otherwise) in relation to the result, progress, conduct
or any other aspect of any Match or Event.
2.2.2. Soliciting, including, enticing, instructing,
persuading, encouraging, facilitating or authorising any
other party to enter into a Bet for the direct or indirect
8
benefit of the Participant in relation to the result, progress,
conduct or any other aspect of any Match or Event.
2.2.3 MISUSE OF INSIDE INFORMATION:
c 2.3.1 Using, for Betting purposes, any inside information
2.3.2 Disclosing inside information to any person (with or
without Reward) before or during any Match or Event
where the participant might reasonably be expected to
know that disclosure of such information in such
D circumstances could be used in relation to Betting.
NOTE: Any potential offence under this Article will be
considered on its own set of facts and the particular
circumstances surrounding any relevant disclosure. For
E example, it may be an offence under this clause to
disclose inside information: (a) to journalists or other
members of the media; and/or (b) on social networking
websites where the Participant might reasonably be
expected to know that disclosure of such information in
F such circumstances could be used in relation to Betting.
However, nothing in this Article is intended to prohibit any
such disclosure made within a personal relationship
(such as to a member of the Participant's family) where
it is reasonable for the Participant to expect that such
G information can be disclosed in cortfidence and without
being subsequently used for Betting.
2.3.3. Soliciting, inducing, enticing persuading,
encouraging or facilitation (a) any Participant to commit
an offence under any of the foregoing provisions of this
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 231
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Article 2.3 and/or (b) any other person to do any act that A
would be an offence if that person were a Participant.
2.4 GENERAL
2.4.1 Providing or receiving any gift, payment or other
8
benefit (whether of a monetary value or otherwise) in
circumstances that the Participant might reasonably have
expected could bring him/her or the sport of cricket into
disrepute.
NOTE: This Article is only intended to catch 'disrepute' C
that, when considered in all of the relevant circumstances,
relates (directly or indirectly) to any of the underlying
imperatives of and conduct prohibited by this Anti-
Corruption Code (including as described in Article 1. 1.)
D
Where any substantial gift, payment or other benefit is
received by any Participant from an unknown person or .
organisation and/or for no apparent reason, such
Participant is advised to report such receipt to the
Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her designee).
Where such Participant does hot make such a report, E
then that is likely to constitute strong evidence of the
commission of this offence.
2.4.2 Failing or refusing to disclose to the ACU BCCI
(without undue delay) full details of any approaches or F
invitations received by the Participant to engage in
conduct that would amount to a breach of this Anti-
Corruption Code.
2.4.3 Failing or refusing to disclose to the ACU BCCI G
(without undue delay) full details of any incident, fact or
matter that comes to the attention of a Participant that
may evidence an offence under this Anti-Corruption
Code by a third party, including (without limitation)
H
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A approaches or invitations that have been received by any
other party to engage in conduct that would amount to a
breach of this Anti-Corruption Code.
Note: All Participants shall have continuing obligation to
report any new incident, fact, or matter that may evidence
B
an offence under this Anti-Corruption Code to the ACU-
BCCI, even if the Participants' prior knowledge has
already been reported.
2.4.4 Failing or refusing, without compelling justification,
c to cooperate with any reasonable investigation carried
out by the Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her
designee) in relation to possible offences under this Anti-
Corruption Code, including failure to provide any
information and/or documentation requested by the
D Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her designee)
(whether as part of a formal Demand pursuant to Article
4.3 or otherwise) that may be relevant to such
investigation.
2.5.1 Any attempt by a Participant, or any agreement
E
between (a) a Participant and (bO any other person, to act
in a manner that would culminate in the commission of
an offence under this Anti-Corruption Code, shal(be
treated as if an offence had been committed, whether or
not such attempt or agreement in fact resulted in the
F commission of such offence. However, there shall be no
offence under this Anti-Corruption C0ide where the
Participant renounces the attempt or ag~ment prior to
it being discovered by a third party not Involved in the
1
attempt or agreement. ·
G
2.5.2 A participant who authorises, causes, knowingly
assists, encourages, aids, abets, covers up or is otherwise
complicit in any acts or omissions of the type described
in Article 2. 1 - 2.4 committed by his/her coach, trainer,
H manager, agent, family member, guest or other affiliate
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 233
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
or associate shall be treated as having committed such A
acts or omissions himself and shall be liable accordingly
under this Anti-Corruption Code."
54. Sanctions prescribed under Article 6 of the Code
include suspension ranging from six months to a lifetime 8
depending upon the nature and gravity of the offence/
misconduct proved against the person concerned. Article 6
runs as under: ·
"6. 1 Where it is determined that an offence under this
Anti-Corruption Code has been committed, the BCCI C
Disciplinary Committee will be required to impose an
appropriate sanction upon the Participant from the range
of permissible sanctions described in Article 6.2. In order
to determine the appropriate sanction that is to be
imposed in each case, the BCCI Disciplinary Committee D
must first determine the relative seriousness of the
offence,. including identifying all relevant factors that it
deems to:
6. 1. 1 aggravate the nature of the offence under this Anti- E
Corruption Code, namely:
6.1.1.4 where the offence substantially damaged (or had
the potential to damage substantially) the commercial F
·value and/or the Rublic interest in the relevant Match(es)
or Event(s);
6. 1. 1. 5 where the offence affected (or had the potential to
affect) the result of the relevant Match(es) or Event(s);
G
'6.1.1.6 where the welfare of a Participant or any other
person has been endangered as a result of the offence;
6. 1. 1. 7 where the offence involved more than one
Participant or other persons; and/or H/
234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A 6.1.1.8 any other aggravating factor(s) that the BCCI
Disciplinary Committee considers relevant and
appropriate.
6. 1. 2 mitigate the nature of the offence under the Anti-
Corruption Code, namely;
B
6. 1. 2. 2 the Participant's good previous disciplinary
record;
6. 1. 2. 3 the young age and/or lack of experience of the
c Participant;
6.1.2.4 where the Participant has cooperated with the
Designated Anti-Corruption Official (or his/her designee)
and any investigation or Demand carried out by him/her;
D 6.1.2.5 where the offence did not substantially damage
(or have the potential to substantially damage) the
commercial value and/or the public interest in the
relevant Match(es) or Event(s);
E 6.1.2.6 where the offence did not affect (or have the
potential to affect) the result of the relevant Match(es) or
Event(s);
6. 1. 2. 8 where the Participant has already suffered
penalties under other laws and/or regulations for the same
F offence; and/or
6. 1. 2. 9 any other mitigating factor(s) that the BCCI
Disciplinary Committee considers relevant and
appropriate.
G
6.2 Having considered all of the factors described in
Articles 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, the BCCI Disciplinary Committee
shall then determine, in accordance with the following
table, what the appropriate sanction(s) should be:"
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 235
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
ANll RANGE OF ADDlllONAL A
CORRUPTION PERMISSIBLE DISCRETION TO
CODE OFFENCE PERIOD OF IMPOSE A
INELIGIBILITY FINE
Articles 2.1.1, A minimum of
B
2.1.2, 2.1.3 and five (5) years
2.1.4 (Corruption) and a maximum
of a lifetime.
Articles 2.2.1, 2.2.2 A minimum of
and 2.2.3 (Betting) two (2) years c
and a maximum
of five (5) years.
Articles 2.3.1 and
AND (in all cases)
2.3.3 (as it relates A minimum of
the Anti-Corruption
to an offence two (2) years D
Tribunal shall have
under Article 2.3.1) and a maximum
the discretion to
(Misuse of inside of five (5) years.
impose a fine on the
information)
Player or Player
Articles 2.3.2 and Support Personnel
2.3.3 (as it relates A minimum of up to a maximum of E
to an offence six (6) months the value of any
under Article 2.3.2) and a Reward received by
(Misuse of inside maximum of five the Player or Player
information) (5) years. Support Personnel
directly, out of, or in F
Articles 2.4.1 and (General) A
2.4.2 relation to, the
minimum of
offence committed
one (1) year and
under the Anti-
a maximum of
Corruption Code.
five (5) years).
G
Articles 2.4.3 and (General) A
2.4.4 minimum of
six (6) months
and a maximum
of two (2) years.
I H
236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A 55. It is manifest that Article 2.2.1 treats betting as one of
the actionable wrongs under the Code. In terms of Article 2.5.2
the participant who authorises, causes, knowingly assists,
encourages, aids, abets, covers up or is otherwise complicit
in any act or omission of the types described in Articles 2.1. to
B 2.4 committed by his/her coach, trainer, manager, agent, family
member, guest or other associate shall be treated as having
committed such an act or omission himself and shall be liable
accordingly under the Anti-Corruption Code. The expression
'participant' has been defined to include any player, player
c support personnel, Umpire, match Referee or Umpire Support
Personnel. The expression 'player support personnel' means
any coach trainer, manager, selector, team official, doctor etc.
Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan having been found to be a team official
of Chennai Super Kings is a "player support personnel" hence
a participant within the meaning of the Anti-Corruption Code.
0
What is important is that apart from Gurunath Meiyappan in his
capacity as the team official if any participant connected with
CSK, authorises, causes, knowingly assists, encourages, aids,
abets, covers up or is otherwise complicit in any act or
omission he/she will also be liable to action under the Anti-
E Corruption Code as if he/she had himself/herself committed the
act of misconduct.
56. In terms of Article 6 of the Code, upon consideration
of relevant factors the disciplinary committee of the BCCI is
F empowered to impose an appropriate sanction upon the
delinquent having regard to the provisions of Article 6.2 and the
Table appearing thereunder. There is, therefore, no manner of
doubt that even under the Anti-Corruption Code for participants
any act like betting can attract sanctions not only for the person
G who indulges in such conduct but also for all those who
authorise, cause, knowingly assist, encourage, aid, abet, cover
up or are otherwise complicit in any act of omission or
commission relating to such activity.
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 237
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
(iii) Permissible action under the "Code of Conduct A
for Players and the Team Official":
57. Code of conduct for Players and Team Officials also
prescribes punishment/sanctions for players or team officials
found guilty of different levels of offences stipulated in the said B.
Code. Articles 2.1 - 2.5 stipulate different levels of offences
which, if committed by the players or team officials, can lead
to imposition of sanctions against them. Article 2.4.4 is,
however, a catch all provision to cover all types of conduct which
are not covered by specific offences set out in the Code. It C
reads:
"2.4.4. Where the facts of the alleged incident are not
adequately or clearly covered by any of the above offences,
conduct that either; (a) is contrary to the spirit of the game;
or (b) brings the game into disrepute. D
Note: Article 2.4.4 is intended to be a 'catch-all' provision
of cover all types of conduct of an overwhelmingly serious
nature that are not (and, because of their nature, cannot
be) adequately covered by the specific offences set out E
elsewhere in the Code of Conduct.
See guidance notes to Article 2.1.8 for examples of
conduct that may (depending upon the seriousness and
context of the breach) be prohibited under Article 2.4.4."
F
58. The team official who is found guilty of betting is
certainly acting against the spirit of the game and bringing
disrepute to it. Article 7 of the Code empowers the match
Referee or the Commissioner to impose suitable sanction
upon the person concerned depending upon the level of the G
offence which is committed. The punishment can range
between warning to suspension for a lifetime depending upon
the nature and the gravity ofthe offence committed.
59. We may, before parting with the discussion on this
H
238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A question, refer to the Franchise Agreement executed between
BCCI on the one hand and the franchisees on the other. Clause
11.3 of the said agreement reads:
"11.3 BCCl-IPL may terminate this Agreement with
immediate effect by written notice if"
B
(a) there is a Change of Control of the Franchise (whether
direct or indirect) and/or a Listing which in each case
does not occur strictly in accordance with Clause 1O;
c (b) the Franchisee transfers any material part of its
business or assets to any other person other than in
accordance with Clause 1O;
(c) the Franchisee, any Franchisee Group Company and!
or any Owner acts in any way which has a material
D adverse effect upon the reputation or standing of the
League, BCCl-IPL, BCCI, the Franchisee, the Team (or
any other team in the League) and/or the game of cricket."
60. In terms of Clause 11.3 (c) (supra) if the franchisee,
E any franchisee group company and/or any owner acts in a
manner that has a material adverse effect upon the reputation
or standing of the league, BCCl-IPL, BCCI, the franchisee, the
team or any other team and/or the game of cricket, the BCCl-
IPL is empowered to terminate the agreement.The expression
F 'owner' has been defined in Clause 1.1 as under:
"Owner shall mean any person who is the ultimate
Controller of the Franchisee;"
61. It is evident from the above provisions that the BCCl-
G IPL is in situations stipulated under Clause 11.3 competent to
direct the termination of the agreement. What would constitute
"material adverse effect" upon reputation or standing of the
league or BCCl-IPL, BCCI, the franchisee, the team or game
of cricket shall, however, depend upon the facts and
H circumstances of each case. What cannot be disputed is that
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 239
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
the right to terminate the agreement is available to the BCCI- A
IPL even in accordance with the provisions of the franchise
agreements themselves.
62. Question No.3 is answered accordingly.
Re: Question No.4: B
63. The Probe Committee has recorded a specific finding
that the allegations of Match fixing, spot-fixing or betting were
not proved against Mr. Srinivasan in the course of the enquiry.
That finding was not seriously assailed before us, by Mrs. c
Chidambaram, counsel for the appellant Association. What was
all the same strenuously argued by the learned counsel was that
the facts brought on record clearly established that Mr.
_?rinivasan had attempted to cover up the betting activities of
his son-in-law who was a team official of CSK. The attempted 0
cover up, it was contended, was a serious offence, which would
call for action against him and ICL who owned CSK. The
argument was primarily based on the following circumstances
and inferences drawn from facts proved or admitted:
(i) A three-Member Commjttee comprising two E
former Judges of the High Court of Madras and Mr.
Jagdale was hastily set up to enquire into the
allegations of betting on 28th May, 2013 i.e. within
four days of the arrest of Gurunath Meiyappan. The
setting up of the Committee by Mr. Srinivasan was F
aimed at giving Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan a clean
chit and along with him a clean chit to ICL owned
by Mr. Srinivasan and his family.
(ii) The Committee got reduced to two members G
only, after resignation of Mr. Jagdale, but was asked
to continue the probe which was over within a day
resulting in an all clear report in favour of Gurunath
Meiyappan. The Committee opined that there was
no material laid before it to substantiate the
H
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A allegation that Gurunath Meiyappan was betting.
The appellant association alleges that the BCCI
then headed by Mr. Srinivasan did not do anything
to make good the charge of betting leveled against
Gurunath Meiyappan, not because it could not do
B so but because it was not interested in doing so.
Any attempt to prove the allegation would have led
to Gurunath Meiyappan being found guilty, which
would in turn lead to cancellation of the franchise
held by ICL owned by Srinivasan.
c (iii) Before the Mudgal Probe Committee,
representatives of India Cements appeared to
assert that Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan had no share
holding in ICL thereby withholding information that
Gurunath Meiyappan's wife and Mr. Srinivasan's
D daughter held equity in ICL which gave Gurunath
Meiyappan a substantial clout over the affairs of ICL
cricketing or otherwise.
(iv) Mr. N. Srinivasan and M.S. Dhoni, in their
E depositions before the Committee took the stand
that Gurunath Meiyappan had nothing to do with the
cricketing affairs of CSK and that he was only a
cricketing enthusiast. That stand was proved to be
factually wrong by the Probe Committee who found
F that Gurunath Meiyappan was a team official who
had access to sensitive match information not
available to any ordinary cricketing enthusiast.
64. The above circumstances, it was contended by Ms.
Chidambaram, highly probablised the cover up theory, having
G regard to the fact that Mr. Srinivasan had a deep rooted interest
in such a cover up no matter as the President of BCCI he was
duty bound to do everything humanly possible to discover the
truth and allow the law to take its own course. Inasmuch as the
conflict between his own interest as owner of the team that could
H be disenfranchised and his duty to remain above board, and
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 241
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
objective in his capacity as President of the BCCI prevented A
the truth from coming to light by what was according to Ms.
Chidambaram a device contrived to get a clean chit, Mr.
Srinivasan had also committed an act of misconduct that could
call for suitable punishment for him.
B
65. It is, in our opinion, difficult to hold that the
circumstances enumerated by Mrs. Chidambaram proved by
preponderance of probability the charge of cover up leveled
against Mr. Srinivasan. The appointment of a Probe Committee
comprising former Judges of the High Court cannot be seen C
as an attempt to cover up nor can Mr. Srinivasan be accused
of withholding any incriminating material from the Probe
Committee especially when there is nothing to show that Mr.
Srinivasan was indeed in possession· of any incriminating
material that was withheld by him. Mr. Srinivasan had in fact
stepped aside while the probe was on to avoid any accusation D
being made against him. Similarly, the allegation that an effort
was made to suppress facts before the Mudgal Committee or
that Mr. Gurunath was shown only as a cricket enthusiast
whereas he was a team official, may, at best, raise a suspicion
against Mr. Srinivasan but suspicion can hardly be taken as E
proof to hold him guilty of the alleged cover up. We cannot,
therefore, with any amount of certainty, say that the charge of
attempted cover up leveled against Mr. Srinivasan stands
proved. Our answer to question No.4 is, therefore, in the
negative. F
Re: Question No.5:
66. Amendment to Rule .e.2.4 was assailed before the
High Court of Bombay on three principal grounds. The first was
that the amendment was ma/a fide inasmuch as the whole G
object underlying the same was to protect the grant of Chennai
Franchise to Mr. Srinivasan's India Cements Ltd. which was as
on the date of the grant in clear breach of Rule 6.2.4 as it
existed before its amendment. As treasurer of BCCI Mr.
Srinivasan was an administrator who could neither acquire nor H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A hold any commercial interest in any BCCI event including IPL,
Champions League & Twenty-20 tournaments as all these
tournaments are fundamentally BCCI events. Suit filed by Mr.
Muthiah had no doubt brought up the question of conflict of
interest, in breach of Rule 6.2.4 but the challenge was sought
B to be neutralized by amending the rule itself and taking the three
events mentioned above out of the mischief of Rule 6.2.4
67. The second limb of the challenge to the amendment
was that the same was brought hurriedly without any supporting
recommendation from any Committee without an agenda item
C for deliberations of the BCCI and without a proper notice to the
members who were supposed to discuss the same. The
amendment was pushed through under the residuary and
omnibus "any other item" appearing in the agenda even when
it was an extremely important matter of far reaching implications
D which changed a fundamental imperative applicable to all the
events organized by BCCI. In substance, the second limb of the
challenge was also suggestive of the amendment having been
brought about to serve the personal interest of those
administering the affairs of BCCI rather than any ethically or
E morally correct proposition to ensure purity of the game or to
nurture the confidence of those who are fond of it.
68. The third ground on which the amendment came under
challenge was that the same is opposed to public policy and
F good conscience. The argument, it appears, was that inasmuch
as the amendment permitted in perpetuity a conflict between
administrator's duty and his commercial interest, it fell foul of
the concept of fairness, transparency and probity in the
discharge of public functions by the BCCI and its
G administrators.
69. The High Court of Bombay has, as seen earlier,
repelled the challenge and upheld the amendment in question
by its judgment and order impugned in Civil Appeal arising out
of SLP (Civil) No.34228 of 2014. We have, while dealing with
H question No.1 above, held that BCCI is amenable to writ
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 243
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution as it discharges A
"Public Functions". The natural corollary flowing from that finding
is that all actions which BCCI takes while discharging such
public functions are open to scrutiny by the Courts in exercise
of their powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It also
implies that such actions shall when under scrutiny be judged B
by the standards and on principles that govern similar actions
when taken by the State or its instrumentalities. The approach
which a Court exercising powers of judicial review of
administrative action adopts will remain the same irrespective
of whether the action under review is taken by the State or its c
instrumentality or by any non statutory non government
organisation like the BCCI in the case at hand. It follows that
Rule 6.2.4 will be subject to the same tests and standards as
would apply to any similar provision emanating from a statute
or the general executive power of the State.
D
70. Rule 6.2.4 before amendment was in the following
words:
"No Administrators shall have, directly or indirectly, any
commercial interest in the matches or events conducted E
by the Board."
71. The impugned amendment added the following words
at the end of the above Rule:
"excluding events like IPL or Champions League F
Twenty 20."
72. It is common ground that the validity of the impugned
amendment to Rule 6.2.4 shall have to be tested on a threefold
basis viz. (i) whether the amendment is made by the authority G
competent tc do so; (ii) whether the authority competent to bring
about an amendment has followed the procedure prescribed
for the same; and (iii) whether the amendment falls foul of any
statute or principle of law, violation whereof cannot be
countenanced.
H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 1 S.C.R.
A 73. Seen in the light of the Articles of Association, we find
no infirmity in the amendment to Rule 6.2.4 in so far as the
legislative competence (if we may use that expression) of the
authority that brought about the amendment is concerned. It is
nobody's case that the amendment was beyond the
s competence of the authority that made it. So also, there is in
our opinion no merit in the argument that the amendment should
fall because the same did not figure as an item in the agenda
for the meeting in which the same was passed. The Contention
that the amendment came as a side wind on the basis of a
c report of a Committee that was supposed to examine issues
touching anti racism also does not carry any conviction. It is true
that the circumstances, in which the amendment came about,
may create a suspicion as to the bona fides of the exercise
but a mere suspicion may not be enough to strike the same
down. So long as the forum where the matter was taken-up,
0
discussed and a resolution passed was competent to deal with
the subject, procedural deficiencies which do not affect the
competence of the authority do not matter much. We have,
therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the contention that the
amendment is bad because the same came up all too suddenly
E for discussion, without any real research or other work to
support it and without adequate notice to the members to think
about and usefully contribute to the deliberations.
74. That leaves us with the third facet of the question which
F is not free from difficulty and must therefore be dealt with more
comprehensively. The amendment has not been questioned on
the ground that the same violates the Tamil Nadu Registration
of Societies Act under which BCCI stands registered as a
Society. It is also not challenged on the ground that any other
G Statute regulating such societies is breached. What is
contended is that inasmuch as the amendment permits
commercial interest to be held by administrators in the events
organised by BCCI it violates a fundamental tenet of law that
no one can be a judge in his own cause, recognized universally
H as an essential facet of the principles of natural justice which
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 245
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
must permeate every action that BCCI takes in the discharge A
of its public functions. That contention is not without merit and
needs to be carefully explored from different angles. But before
we do so we may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in
A.K. Kraipak & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1969) 2 SCC
262 where a Constitution bench of this Court was examining B
whether Principles of Natural Justice have any application to
purely administrative actions as distinguished from those
described as quasi judicial in nature. The question there arose
in the context of a selection process in which Naqishbund who
was a member of the Selection Committee was himself a c
candidate alongwith others for induction into the Indian Forest
Service. The challenge was founded on the plea that there was
a conflict between the duty which Naqishbund was required to
perform as a member of the selection Committee and his
interest as a candidate for selection. In defence of his role and 0
the selection made by the Committee it was argued that the
Selection Committee discharged Administrative functions to
which the principles of natural justice had no application.
Repelling the contention this Court held that horizons of natural
justice were constantly expanding, and that the principles apply E
only in areas not covered by any law validly made. The Court
observed:
"20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure
. justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of
justice. These rules can operate only in areas not F
covered by any law validly mad~. In other words they do
not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The
concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of
change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it
included just two rules namely: (1) no one shall be a judge G
in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa)
and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without
affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram
partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was env{saged
and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A good faith, I-''\without bias and not arbitrarily or
unreasonably. But in the course of years many more
subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural
justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts
that unless the authority concerned was required by the
B law under which it functioned to act judicially there was
no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. ·
The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the
purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent
miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules
c should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. .
Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates
administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries.
Enquiries which were considered administrative at one
time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in
character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both
D
quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative
enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry
may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a
quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in
Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala1Q the rules
E
of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular
rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must
depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances
of that case, the framework of the law under which the
enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or
F body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever
a complaint is made before a court that some principle
of natural justice had been contravened the court has to
decide whether the observance of that rule was
necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case."
G
75. Dealing with the conflict of duty and interest and the
test applicable when examining whether a given process is
vitiated by bias, this Court made the following telling
observations:
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 247
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [TS. THAKUR, J.]
"15. It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as A
one of the members of the selection board. It is true that
ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State
should be considered as the most appropriate person to
be in the selection board. He must be expected to know
his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their B
strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for
selection to the All-India Service is entitled to great
weight. But then under the circumstances it was improper
to have included Naqishbund :JS a member of the
selection board. He was one of the persons to be c
considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice
to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he
did not participate in the deliberations of the committee
when his name was considered. But then the very fact that
he was a member of the selection board must have had
0
its own impact on the decision of the selection board.
Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of
the selection board when the claims of his rivals
particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also
party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates
in order of preference. At every stage of his participation E
in the deliberations of the selection board there was a
conflict between his interest and duty. Under those
circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have
been impartial. The real question is not whether he was
biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. F
Therefore what we have to see is whether there is
reasonable ground for believing that he was likelv to have
been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney General
that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must
be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the G
question of bias we have to take into consideration
human probabilities and ordinary course of human
conduct. It was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out
his rivals in order to secure his position from further
challenge. Naturally he was also interested in H
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A safeguarding his position while preparing the list of
selected candidates."
(emphasis supplied)
76. The significance of the principles of natural justice vis-
8 a-vis Article 14 of the Constitution is no longer res integra. The
principles have been held to be a part and parcel of the
guarantee contained in Article 14. We may in this connection
briefly refer to the decision of this Court in Union of India and
ors. etc. v. Tulsiram Patel etc. (1985) 3 sec 398 where this.
C Court declared that Principles of natural justice have now come
to be recognized as being a part of the constitutional guarantee
contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed:
"Violation of a rule of natural justice results in
D arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination and
where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a
violation of Article 14. Therefore, a violation of a principle
of natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article
14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repository of the
principles of natural justice, nor those principles are the
E
creation of Article 14. Article 14 is not their begetter but
their constitutional guardian."
77. The above position was reiterated in Central Inland
Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. v. Brojo Nath
F Ganguly and Anr. etc. (1986) 3 SCC 156. This Court observed
as under:
"95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to
be recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained
G in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic
interpretation given by this Court to the concept of
equality which is the subject-matter of that article. Shortly
put, the syllogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural
justice results in arbitrariness which is· the same as
discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 249
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
action, it is a violation of Article 14: therefore, a violation A
of a principle of natural justice by a State action is a
violation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole
repository of the principles of natural justice. What it does
is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them
will be struck down. The principles of natural justice. B
however. apply not only to legislation and State action but
also where any tribunal. authority or body of men. not
coming_ within the definition of State in Article 12. is
charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case,
the principles of natural justice require that it must decide c
such matter fairly and impartially."
(emphasis supplied)
78. There is no gainsaying that in the ever expanding
· horizons of the principles of natural justice, it makes little or D
practically no difference whether the action or the nature of the
proceedings being tested are administrative or quasi-judicial.
The principles apply to either more or less uniformly. It follows
that even if the duties and functions which BCCI discharges are
administrative and not quasi-judicial, the principles will find their E
application with the same rigor as may be applicable to quasi-
judicial functions. Does the amendment to Rule 6.2.4, in any
way violate the principles of natural justice or the essence
thereof is the real question.
79. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the
F
amendment authorizes, contrary to what is demanded by the
principles of natural justice, the creation and continuance of a
conflict of interest situation. That is what is not permissible on
a true and proper application of the principles of natural justice.
The contention is that but for the amendment, Rule 6.2.4 would G
debar any conflict of interest, by forbidding administrators of
BCCI from having any commercial interest in the events
organized by the BCCI. That is according to the appellant an
ideal situation which gets distorted and corrupted by the
amendment permitting such commercial interests disregarding H
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A the fact that creation or continuance of such interests will, bring
about a serious conflict between the duties of administrators
on the one hand and their personal/commercial interest on the
other.
8 80. The respondents, on the contrary, argue that conflict
of interest is a reality of life and exists in any number of
situations some of them at times unavoidable. But, what is
important is that the Rules should provide for resolving the
conflict. Relying upon, rules applicable to conflict of interests
C in different sporting bodies, it was contended by Mr. Sibal that
unless, the conflict of interests is so palpable, that there is no
room for any resolution; the rule cannot and should not be struck
down simply because it may give rise to a conflict of interest
at any time in future.
D 81. There is no gainsaid that a conflict of interest situation
may arise even when the rules or the norms do not specifically
authorize acts or transactions that may lead to such a conflict.
The scheme of the rules, may itself suggest that a conflict of
interest is not welcome. And yet, such a conflict may at times
E arise, in which event, the rules can provide for a mechanism,
to resolve the conflict as is the position in some of the rules to
which our attention was drawn in regard to some other sports.
The question, however, is whether a rule can by a positive and
enabling provision permit acts and transactions which would by
F their very nature bring about a conflict of interest. Our answer
,is in the negative. It is one thing to say that conflict may arise
even when rules do not specifically permit such a conflict
situation and a totally different thing to permit acts which will
per se bring about such a conflict. The case at hand falls in the
G latter category. Rule 6.2.4 after amendment, permits creation
of commercial interests in the events organized by BCCI by its
Administrators. This enabling provision disregards the potential
conflict of interest which will arise between an administrator's
duty as a functionary of the BCCI on the one hand and his
H interest as the holder of any such commercial interest on the
1
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 251
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
other. The respondents may argue as indeed they have done, A
that commercial interest held by India Cements Ltd. in the IPL
and other events do not constitute a conflict per se so as to fall
foul of the principle that such conflicts are impermissible on the
touchstone of fairness, reasonableness and probity in the
discharge of public functions by the BCCI. But that contention B
is specious and deserves notice only to be rejected. Three real
life situations that have arisen in the past, qua India Cements
owned by Mr. Srinivasan's family and captained by him, simply
demonstrate how such conflicts have arisen between the duty
which Mr. Srinivasan owes to BCCI and through the BCCI to c
the cricketing world at large and his commercial if not personal
interest in the events which BCCI organizes. The first instance
arose when BCCI awarded compensation of a sum of Rs.10.40
crores to Chennai Super Kings - on account of the cancellation
of the Champions League Tournament 2008. It is not in dispute
D
that Mr. Srinivasan was one of those who contributed to the
taking of the decision to award that amount towards
compensation to his own team. True it is that a similar amount
was awarded to Rajasthan Royals the other finalist also, but that
does not, mean that to the extent Mr. Srinivasan, participated
E
and deliberated in the proceedings i leading to the award of a
hefty amount of compensation, he was not privy to a self-
serving deeision that benefited India Cements Ltd. a company
promoted by Mr. Srinivasan. The fact that some others also
participated in the decision-making process as members of
IPL Governing Council does not cure the legal flaw arising out F
of the penefactor also being the beneficiary of the decision.
The situation is analogous to Naqishbund participating in the
selection proceedings even when he was himself a candidate
for selection as in Kraipak's case (supra). As a matter of fact,
Naqishbund had recused himself from the proceedings when G
his own case was taken up for consideration. But this Court
remained unimpressed and took the view that any such recusal
did not make any material difference, as bias in such like
situations operates in a subtle manner. In the case at hand Mr.
Srinivasan had not even done that much no matter it would have H
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A made little or no difference even if he had done so. At any rate,
the test is not whether bias was actually at work when the
decision was taken. It is the reasonable likelihood of bias that
determines whether the action can be faulted. A reasonable
likelihood of bias is what can be seen even in the case at hand
B when the decision to award compensation was taken by the
governing council of IPL with Mr. Srinivasan, present and
participating as a member.
82. A similar award of a sum of rupees 13.10 crores came
in the year 2009 which too fell foul of his duty on the one hand
C and interest on the other. Mr. Sibal, no doubt, argued that this
amount was returned by ICL subsequently, but such return,
does not improve the matters. The decision1oaward an amount
higher than the one awarded earlier appears to have led to
public criticism raising the pitch further for Mr. Srinivasan's
D removal from the BCCI on the principles of conflict of interest.
Return of the amount because of a public outcry may no doubt
mean that Mr. Srinivasan tried to come clean on the subject
even when his company may have suffered a loss, but it may
as well mean that the return of the amount came only under
E public pressure and in recognition of the fact that the amount
was not actually due and payable and yet was paid to the
detriment of BCCI who is a trustee of general public interest in
the sport of cricket and everything that goes with it.
F 83. The third instance where Mr. Srinivasan's commercial
interest came in direct conflict with his duty as President of
BCCI is when allegations of betting were leveled against his
son-in-law Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan. Even ignoring for a
moment the argument that Mr. Srinivasan had made a
G deliberate attempt to cover up the betting racket that came to
light, facts now prove that Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan was
involved in betting in IPL matches even when he was a team
official of CSK. We have, while dealing with question No.3, held
that the misconduct of Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan and Raj Kundra
can result in award of punishment not only to the said two
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 253
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
persons but even to the franchisees themselves. That being so, A
a clear conflict of interest has arisen between what is Mr.
Srinivasan's duty as President of BCCI on the one hand and
~is interest as father-in-law of Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan and
owner of team CSK on the- other. The argument that Mr.
Srinivasan owns only 0.14% equity in ICL is of no avail if not B
totally misleading when we find from the record that his family
directly and/or indirectly holds 29.23% of the equity in the ICL
with Mr. Srinivasan his wife and daughter as directors on the
Board of that company.
84. It is in the light of the above unnecessary to delve
c
further to discover conflict of interest although, the appellant has
relied upon several other matters in which there is a potential
conflict between his duty as President of the BCCI and his
commercial interest. Suffice it to say that amendment to Rule
6.2.4 is the true villain in the situation at hand. It is the D
amendment which attempts to validate what was on the date
of the award of the franchise invalid as Rule 6.2.4 did not as
on that date permit an administrator to have any commercial
interest in any event organized by BCCI. While it may not be
feasible at this stage to interfere with the award of the franchise E
to ICL especially when hundreds of crores have been invested
by the franchisee, the amendment which perpetuates such a
conflict cannot be countenanced and shall have to be struck
down.
F
85. The validity of the Rule 6.2.4 as amended can be
examined also from the stand point of its being opposed to
"Public Policy" But for doing so we need to first examine what
is meant by "Public Policy" as it is understood in legal parlance.
The expression has been used in Section 23 of the Indian G
Contract Act, 1872 and in Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 and a host of other statutes but has not
been given any precise definition primarily because the
expression represents a dynamic concept and is, therefore,
incapable of any strait-jacket definition, meaning or explanation.
H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A That has not, however, deterred jurists and Courts from ·
explaining the expression from very early times. Mathew J.
speaking for the Court in Mur/idhar Aggarwal and Anr. v. Stat~
of U.P. & Ors. (1974) 2 SCC 472 referred to Winfield's
definition in Public Policy in English Common Law 42 Harvard
B Law Review 76 to declare that:
"31. Public policy does not remain static in any given
community. It may vary from generation to generation
and even in the same generation. Public policy would be
almost useless if it were to remain in fixed moulds for all
c time."
86. The Court then grappled with the problem of
ascertaining public policy if the same is variable and depends
on the welfare of the community and observed:
D
"32. If it is variabl(!, if it depends on the welfare of the
community at any given time, how are the courts to
ascertain it? The Judges are more to be trusted as
interpreters of the law than as expounders of public
policy. However, there is no alternative under our system
E
but to vest this power with Judges. The difficulty of
discovering what public policy is at any given moment
certainly does not absolve the Judges from the duty of
doing so. In conducting an enquiry, as already stated
Judges are not hidebound by precedent. The Judges
F
must look beyond the f/arrow field of past precedents.
though this still leaves open the question. in which
direction they must cast their gaze. The Judges are to
base their decisions on the opinions of men of the world.
as distinguished from opinions based on legal learning.
G In other words, the Judges will have to look beyond the
jurisprudence and that in so doing, they must consult not
their own personal standards or predilections but those
of the dominant opinion at a given moment, or what .has
been termed customary morality. The Judges must
H consider the social consequences of the rule
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 255
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
propounded. especiallv in the light of the factual A
evidence available as to its probable results. Of course,
it is not to be expected that men of the world are to be
subpoenaed as expert witnesses in the trial of every
action raising a question of public policy. It is not open
to the Judges to make a sort of referendum or hear B
evidence or conduct an inquirv as to the prevailing moral
concept. Such an extended extra-judicial enquiry is wholly
outside the tradition of courts where the tendency is to
"trust the Judge to be a typical representative of his day
and generation". Our law relies, on the implied insight of c
the Judge on such matters. It is the Judges themselves,
assisted by the bar, who here represent the highest
common factor of public sentiment and intelligence. No
doubt, there is no assurance that Judges will interpret the
mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men.
0
But this is beside the point. The point is rather that this
power must be lodged somewhere and under our
Constitution and laws, it has been lodged in the Judges
and if they have to fulfil their function as Judges, it could
hardly be lodged elsewhere."
E
(emphasis supplied)
87. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation (supra)
this Court was also considering the import of the expression
'Public Policy' in the context of the service conditions of an F
employee empowering the employer to terminate his service
at his sweet will upon service of three months notice or payment
of salary in lieu thereof. Explaining the dynamic nature of the
concept of public policy this Court observed:
"Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular G
government. It connotes some matter which concerns the
public good and the public interest. The concept of what
is for the public good or in the public interest or what
would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the
public interest has varied from time to time. As new H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A concepts take the place of old, transactions which were
once considered against public policy are now being
upheld by the courts and similarly where there has been
a well-recognized head of public policy, the courts have
not shirked from extending it to new transactions and
B changed circumstances and have at times not even
flinched from inventing a new head of public policy.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
It is thus clear that the principles governing public policy
C must be and are capable, on proper occasion, ·of
expansion or modification. Practices which were
considered perfectly normal at one time have today
become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience.
If there is no head of public policy which covers a case,
o then the court must in consonance with public conscience
and in keeping with public good and public interest
declare such practice to be opposed to public policy.
Above all, in deciding any case which may not be
covered by authority our courts have before them the
E beacon light of the Preamble to the Constitution. Lacking
precedent, the court can always be guided by that light
and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights
and the Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution.
88. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Oil
F & Nat~ral Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5
sec 705, where this Court was considering the meaning and
import of the expression "Public Policy of India" as a ground
for setting aside an arbitral award. Speaking for the Court M.B.
Shah, J. held that the expression 'Public Policy of India'
G appearing in the Act aforementioned must be given a liberal
meaning for otherwise resolution of disputes by resort to
Arbitration proceedings will get frustrated because patently
illegal awards would remain immune to Courts interference.
This Court declared that what was against public good and
H public interest cannot be held to be consistent with Public
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 257
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Policy. The following passage aptly summed up the approach A
to be adopted in the matter:
"31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase "public policy of
India" used in Section 34 in context is required to be
given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept 8
of public policy connotes some matter which concerns
public good and the public interest. What is for public
good or in public interest or what would be injurious or
harmful to the public good or public interest has varied
from time to time. However, the award which is, on the C
face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions
cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award!
judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the
administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition
to narrower meaning given to the term "public policy" in
Renusagar case it is required to be held that the award D
could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would
be - award could be set aside if it is contrary to:
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or.
E
(b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.
F
Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the
illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award
is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside
if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the
conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public G
policy and is required to be adjudged void."
89. In Oil ahd Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western
GECO International Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 263, this Court was
examining the meaning of 'Fundamental Policy of Indian Law'
an expression used by this Court in Saw Pipes' case (supra). H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015) 1 S.C.R.
A Extending the frontiers of what will constitute 'Public Policy of
India' this Court observed:
"35. What then would constitute the "fundamental policy
of Indian law" is the question. The decision in ONGC
B does not elaborate that aspect. Even so, the expression
must, in our opinion, include all such fundamental
principles as provide a basis for administration of justice
and enforcement of law in this country. Without meaning
to exhaustively enumerate the purport of the expression
"fundamental policy of Indian law'; we may refer to three
c distinct and fundamental juristic principles that must
necessarily be understood as a part and parcel of the
fundamental policy of Indian law. The first and foremost .
is the principle that in every determination whether by a
court or other authority that affects the rights of a citizen
D or leads to any civil consequences, the court or authority
concerned is bound to adopt what is in legal parlance
called a 'judicial approach" in the matter. The duty to
adopt a judicial approach arises from the very nature of
the power exercised by the court or the authority does not
E have to be separately or additionally enjoined upon the
fora concerned. What must be remembered is that the
importance of a judicial approach in judicial and quasi-
judicial determination lies in the fact that so long as the
court, tribunal or the authority exercising powers that
F affect the rights or obligations of the parties before them
shows fidelity to judicial approach, they cannot act in an
arbitrary, capricious or whimsical manner. Judicial
approach ensures that the authority acts bona fide and
deals with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective
G manner and that its decision is not actuated by any
extraneous consideration. Judicial approach in that
sense acts as a check against flaws and faults that can
render the decision of a court, tribunal or authority
vulnerable to challenge.
H
BOARD OF CONTROL rOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 259
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
38. Equally important and indeed fundamental to the A
policy of Indian law is the principle that a court and so
also a quasi-judicial authority must, while determining the
rights and obligations of parties before it, do so in
accordance with the principles of natural justice. Besides
the celebrated audi alteram partem rule one of the facets B
of the principles of natural justice is that the court!
authority deciding the matter must apply its mind to the
attendant facts and circumstances while taking a view one
way or the other. Non-application of mind is a e/efect that
is fatal to any adjudication. Application of mind is best c
demonstrated by disclosure of the mind and disclosure
of mind is best done by recording reasons in support of
the decision which the court or authority is taking. The
requirement that an adjudicatory authority must apply its
mind is, in that view, so deeply embedded in our
0
jurisprudence that it can be described as a fundamental
policy of Indian law.
39. No less important is the principle now recognised as
a salutary juristic fundamental in administrative law that
a decision which is perverse or so irrational that no E
reasonable person would have arrived at the same will
not be sustained in a court of law. Perversity or
irrationality of decisions is tested on the touchstone of
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. Decisions that
fall short of the standards of reasonableness are open F
to challenge in a court of law often in writ jurisdiction of
the superior courts but no less in statutory processes
wherever the same are available."
90. To sum up: Public Policy is not a static concept. It varies
G
with times and from generation to generation. But what is in
public good and public interest cannot be opposed to public
policy and vice-versa. Fundamental Policy of Law would also
constitute a facet of public policy. This would imply that all those
principles of law that ensure justice, fair play and bring
H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A transparency and objectivity and promote probity in the
discharge of public functions would also constitute public policy.
Conversely any deviation, abrogation, frustration or negation of
the salutary principles of justice, fairness, good conscience,
equity and objectivity will be opposed to public policy. It follows
B that any rule, contract or arrangement that actually defeats or
tends to defeat the high ideals of fairness and objectivity in the
discharge of public functions no matter by a private non-
governmental body will be opposed to public policy. Applied
to the case at hand Rule 6.2.4 to the extent, it permits, protects
c and even perpetuates situations where the Administrators can
have commercial interests in breach or conflict with the duty they
owe to the BCCI or to the people at large must be held to be
against public policy, hence, illegal. That is particularly so when
BCCI has in the Anti Corruption Code adopted by it recognized
public confidence in the authenticity and integrity of the sporting
0
contest as a fundamental imperative. It has accepted and, in
our opinion rightly so, that all cricket matches must be contested
on a level playing field with the outcome to be determined solely
by the respective merits of the competing teams. The Anti
Corruption Code of the BCCI does not mince words in
E accepting the stark reality that if the confidence of the public in
the purity of the game is undermined then the very essence of
the game of cricket shall be shaken. The BCCI has in no
uncertain terms declared its resolve to protect the fundamental
imperatives constituting the essence of the game of cricket and
F its determination to take every step in its power to prevent
corrupt betting practices undermining the integrity of the sport
including any effort to influence the outcome of any match.
Unfortunately, however, the amendment to Rule 6.2.4 clearly
negates the declarations and resolves of the BCCI by
G permitting situations in which conflict of interest would grossly
erode the confidence of the people in the authenticity, purity and
integrity of the game. An amendment which strikes a~the very
essence of the game as stated in the Anti Corruption Code
cannot obviously co-exist with the fundamental. imperatives.
H Conflict of interest situation is a complete 9·riti-thesis to
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 261
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
everything recognized by BCCI as constituting fundamental A
in:iperatives of the game hence unsustainable and
impermissible in law.
91. Before we wind up the discussion on the validity of Rule
6.2.4 and the vice of conflict of interest it permits after the
B
1 impugned amendment, we may in brief deal with the
submissions which Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for
the respondent Mr. Srinivasan urged before us. It was
contended by Mr. Sibal that IPL was conceived as a
commercial enterprise, structured in a manner that it eliminated
all possibility of conflict of interest. That is because all decisions, c
financial or otherwise relating to the IPL, are already known to
all the participants leaving no discretion with any official of the
BCCI. The commercial interest of an administrator in the IPL
can never be in conflict with the administrator's duty in the BCC!
argued Mr. Sibal. That apart, every franchise is treated equally D
since the contractual obligation with the BCCI is identical for
each franchise leaving no possibility of differential treatment by
BCCI. It was also argued that IPL is Distinct from other
matches/events conducted by the BCCI so that there is no
question of any conflict of interest between the role of a person E
as an administrator of BCCI and an owner of an IPL franchise.
The following distinguishing features were in this regard relied
upon:
(i) IPL is not a tournament to test the players' ability F
to play representative cricket since the record of
each player in the IPL is not considered for
National Selections. IPL is only a platform
provided to cricketers - both Indian and
International, to make a living from the sport G
outside of playing representative cricket, which is
not as remunerative.
(ii) The IPL teams revolve around a business
structure and each team is formed pursuant to
winning a franchise for a particular stadium in a H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A commercial tender floated by BCCI, whereas in
representative cricket it is the acer, a non-for.
profit society which manages the teams selected
by it.
8 (iii) The franchise in the IPL has a contractual
arrangement by which the franchise fee is paid to
the BCCI and in return the franchisee gets a share
of the broadcast and sponsorship revenue. In
representative cricket, the income from sponsors
and broadcast fee goes exclusively to the BCCI.
c
(iv) IPL was started as a commercial venture by BCCI
to bring more money into the game from the
private sector for being ploughed back into the
sport in the form of infrastructure, development of
0 the game, players' benefit and ground facilities in
all parts of the country. Income from broadcast
rights of the National Team is incidental to the
membership of the BCCI to ICC that permits the
BCCI to field the India Team against other teams
E of other Member Nations.
(v) In IPL, the Selection Committees of BCCI for
various age groups have no role to play. Players
from all over the world through their respective
National Boards enroll for the auction. Players
F cannot pick or choose a franchisee to play once
enlisted for the auction. The player intake by a
franchisee is dependent on Open Market
principles. In the IPL, the players are allowed to
be traded between franchisees within the rules of
G permitted salary caps as detailed in the Players
Regulations.
(vi) Entertainment of the public hitherto not interested
in the sport, i.e. bringing in newer fans to the game
H has been a goal of the IPL whereas representative
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 263
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
cricket is the more serious version and a pathway A
to the National Selectlpn. "' ' '
92. There is no gainsaying th-atMr: Sibal was right in
contending that in certain areas the BCCI or anyone of its
administrators/office bearers does not have any discretion
B
except to go by what is prescribed as a uniform pattern for all
the franchisees. But, to say that there is no possibility of any
conflict of interest arising in IPL format between an
administrator's duty and ttie commercial interest if any held by
him is not in our opinion correct. The three live situations to
which we have adverted in the earlier part of this order in which C
a conflict has arisen in the case at hand only prove that conflict
of interest is not only possible but ominously looming large if
an administrator also owns a competing team. So also the
contention that, IPL being a commercial venture of BCCI and
a platform for Indian and International cricketers to make a living D
from the sport, is neither here nor there. No one has found fault
with IPL as a format, nor is there any challenge to the wisdom
of BCCI in introducing this format for the benefit of cricketers
or for its own benefit. The question is whether the BCCI can
afford to see the game lose its credibility in the eyes of those E
who watch it, by allowing an impression to gather ground that
what goes on in the name of the game is no more than a farce
because of sporting frauds like betting, match fixing and the
like. Can the BCCI live with the idea of the game being seen
only as a means to cheat the unsuspecting and gullible F
spectators watching the proceedings whether in the stadium or
on the television with the passion one rarely sees in any other
sporting enterprise. BCCl's commercial plans for its own benefit
and the benefit of the players are bound to blow up in smoke,
if the people who watch and support the game were to lose G
interest or be indifferent because, they get to know that some
business interests have hijacked the game for their own ends
or that the game is no longer the game they know or love
because of frauds on and off the field. There is no manner of
doubt whatsoever that the game enjoys its popularity and raises
H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A passions only because of what it stands for and because the
people who watch the ~port believe that it is being played in
the true spirit of the game without letting any corrupting influence
come anywhere near the principles and fundamental
imperatives considered sacrosanct and inviolable. All told
8 whatever be the format of the game and whatever be the
commercial angles to it, the game is what it is, only if it is played
in its pristine form free from any sporting fraud. And it is
because of that fundamental imperative that these proceedings
assume such importance. The fundamental imperatives, to
C which BCCI is avowedly committed in the Anti Corruption
Code, cannot be diluted leave alone neglected or negated.
93. In K. Murugon v. Fencing Association of India,
Jabalpur and ors. (1991) 2 sec 412 this Court held that sports
in India have assumed a great importance for the community
D while international sports has assumed greater importance over
the past few decades. Despite this, however, several sports
bodies in this country have got involved in group fights leading
to litigation in the process losing sight of the objectives which
such societies and bodies are meant to serve and achieve. This
E Court therefore emphasized the need for setting right the
working of the societies rather than adjudicating upon the
individual's right to office by reference to the provisions of law
relating to meetings, injunctions, etc. The following passage
from the Murugon's decision (supra) is a timely reminder of the
F need of the hour:
"12. This does not appear to us to be a matter where
individual rights in terms of the rules and regulations of
the Society should engage our attention. Sports in
modern times has been co'lsidered to be a matter of
G great importance to the communitv. International sports
has assumed greater importance and has been in the
focus for over a few decades. In some of the recent
Olvmpic games the performance of small States has
indeed been excellent and laudable while the
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 265
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
performance of a great country like India with world's A
second highest population has been miserable. It is
unfortunate that the highest body in charge of monitoring
all aspects of such sports has got involved in group fight
leading to litigation and the objectives of the Society have
been lost sight of. The representation of India in the JOA B
has been in jeopardy. The grooming of amateurs has
been thrown to the winds and the responsibility placed on
the Society has not been responded. This, therefore,
does not appear to us to be a situation where rights to
office will have to be worked out by referring to the c
provisions of the Jaw relating to meetings. injunction and
rights appurtenant to elective offices. What seems to be
of paramount importance is that healthy conditions must
be restored as early as possible into the working of the
Society and a fresh election has to be held as that seems D
to be the only way to get out of the malady."
(emphasis supplied)
94. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in N.
Kannadasan v. Ajoy Khose and Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 1, where E
this Court was examining the question relatin'g to qualities
required for appointment of a candidate as President of the
State Consumer Commission. The petitioner was in that case
found unfit to be appointed as a permanent Judge of the High
Court. The question was whether his being unsuitable for F
appointment as a permanent Judge could be a reason for
denying to him an appointment as President of the State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. Dealing with the
question of a possible conflict between public interest on the
one hand and private interest on the other this Court in para G
93 of the decision observed:
"93. The superior courts must take into consideration as
to what is good for the judiciary as an institution and not
for the Judge himself. An act of balancing between public
interest and private interest must be made. Thus, H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A institution as also public interest must be uppermost in
the mind of the court. When such factors are to be taken
into consideration, the court may not insist upon a proof
It would not delve deep into the allegations. The court
must bear in mind the limitations in arriving at a finding
B in regard to lack of integrity against the person
concerned."
95. The decision in Kannadasan case (supra) was relied
upon by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Centre for PIL
and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (2011) 4 SCC 1 where
C this Court dealt with the importance of institutional integrity and
declared that an institution is more important than an individual.
The following passage from the decision is apposite:
"45. . . ... Thus, we are concerned with the institution and
D its integrity including institutional competence and
functioning and not the desirability of the candidate alone
who is going to be the Central Vigilance Commissioner,
though personal integrity is an important quality. It is the
independence and impartiality of the institution like the
E CVC which has to be maintained and preserved in the
larger interest of the rule of law (see Vineet Narai (1988)
1 sec 226)."
96. BCCI is a very important institution that discharges
F important public functions. Demands of institutional integrity
are, therefore, heavy and need to be met suitably in larger
public interest. Individuals are birds of passage while institutions
are forever. The expectations of the millions of cricket lovers
in particular and public at large in general, have lowered
considerably the threshold of tolerance for any mischief, wrong
G doing or corrupt practices which ought to be weeded out of the
system. Conflict of interest is one area which appears to have
led to the current confusion and serious misgivings in the public
mind as to the manner in which BCCI is managing its affairs.
'
H 97. It was lastly argued by Mr. Sundaram, learned senior
•
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 267
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
counsel for BCCI that if administrators were held to be A
disentitled to have any commercial interest in BCCI events
including IPL, the same may adversely affect not only the IPL
format but certain outstanding sports persons who by reason
of their proficiency in cricket and its affairs are often engaged
as coaches, mentors, commentators or on similar other B
positions may also be rendered disqualified to get such
engagements. This would mean that the teams will lose the
advantage of having these outstanding sports persons on their
side while the sport persons will lose the opportunity to earn a
livelihood only because they hold or have at an earJier point of C
time held an administrative office in BCCI. Such an
interpretation or disqualification would not be in the interest of
the game or those who have distinguished themselves in the
same, argued Mr. Sundaram.
98. The expression 'Administrator' appearing in D
Rule 6.2.4 has been defined to mean and include present and
past Presidents, Honorary Secretaries, Honorary Treasures,
Honorary Joint Secretaries of the BCCI. Presidents and
Secretaries present or past of members affiliated to BCCI are
also treated as administrator along with representative of a E
member or an associate member or affiliate member of the
Board. That apart, any person connected with any of the
committees appointed by the Board are also treated as
administrator; none of whom could have any commercial
interest in any BCCI event but for the impugned amendment to F
Rule 6.2.4. What is important, however, is that the challenge in
the present proceedings arises in the context of Mr. Srinivasan,
President of BCCI having commercial interest in the IPL by
reason of the company promoted by him owning Chennai Super
Kings. It is common ground that the owner of a team buys the G
franchise in an open auction. India Cements Ltd. owner of CSK
has also bought the Chennai franchise in an open auction held
by BCCI. This sale and purchase of the franchises is a purely
commercial/business venture for India Cements Ltd. involving
investment of hundreds of crores. The franchise can grow as a
H
..
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A 'brand' and in terms of franchise agreement executed between
franchisee and the BCCI be sold for a price subject to the
conditions stipulated in the agreement. There is, therefore, no
manner of doubt that the investment made by India Cements
Ltd. is a business investment no matter in a sporting activity.
B To the extent the business investment has come from India
Cements Ltd. promoted by Mr. Srinivisan and his family, India
Cements and everyone connected with it as shareholders
acquire a business/commercial interest in the IPL events
organised by BCCI. The association of India Cements Ltd. and
C Mr. Srinivasan with IPL is being faulted on account of this
commercial interest which India Cements Ltd. has acquired for
itself. Whether or not players engaged as mentors, coaches,
managers or commentators in connection with the events for
remuneration payable to them will also be ineligible for any such
assignment does not directly fall for our consideration in these
D proceedings. That apart, it may well be argued that there is a
difference betWeen commercial interest referred to in Rule 6.2.4
and 'professional engagement' of a player on account of his
proficiency in the game. It may be logically contended that the
engagement of a player even though made on a remuneration
E remains a professional engagement because of his
professional skill in the game of cricket and not because he
has made any investment like India Cements Ltd. has done in
acquiring a franchise or in any other form. Be that as it may,
we do not consider it necessary or even proper to authoritatlvely
F pronounce upon the question whether such engagement of
players, as are mentioned above, would fall foul of the
prohibition contained in Rule 6.2.4 as it stood before
amendment. The issue may be examined as and when the
same arises directly for consideration. All that we need say at
G this stage is that whetti.er or not a player who is an
'administrator' by reason of an existing or earlier assignment
held by him can acquire or hold a commercial interest in any
BCCI event, will depend upon the nature of the interest that such
person has acquired and whether the same is purely
H professional or has any commercial element to it. Beyond that
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 269
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
we do not propose to say anything at this stage. Question No. A
5 is accordingly answered in the affirmative and Amendment
to Rule 6.2.4 permitting Administrators of BCCI to acquire or
hold commercial interests in BCCI like IPL, champions league
and T-20 held to be bad for the reasons we have set out in the
foregoing paras. B
Re: Question No.6:
99. Mr. ·sundar Raman in his capacity as the Chief
Operating Officer was charged with the·duty of overseeing the
tournament and all other live events including the opening C
ceremony and also the general operations. sponsorships
activities, television production, estimations of costs,
negotiation of contracts, administration duties, travel and
transport and other related functions. According to the allegation
levelled against him, he was ·in constant touch with Mr. Vindoo D
Dara Singh evidenced by nearly 350 calls made thereto
between them during the IPL.
100. The investigating team headed by Mr. B.B. Mishra
summed up its conclusion about Mr. Sundar Raman's
involvement in its report dated 28th August 2014 in which it E
stated:
''The allegation emanated from a statement of Bindra.
The verification so far indicates that Vindoo Dara Singh
and Sundar Raman knew each other, but in the years
F
2012 and 2013, they have hardly made calls to each
other. The CDR of Vindoo Dara Singh for the period
01.01.2013 to 20.5.2013 which is available doesn't
indicate any call made/received by him to/from Sunder
Raman. Virk will have to be requested to join
investigation and part with the information available with G
him."
101. In its final report dated on 1.11.2014 the Probe
Committee recorded a finding that Mr. Sundar Raman,
described as Individual 12 in that report, had known a bookie
H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A and had contacted him at eight different times in the IPL. The
Committee said:
"This individual knew a contact of a bookie and had
conta.cted him eight times in one season. This individual
admitted knowing the contact of the bookies but however
B
claimed to be unaware of his connection with betting
activities. This individual also accepted that he had
received information about individual 1 and individual 11
taking part in betting activities but was infoimed by ICC-
ACSU chief that this was not actionable information. This
c individual also accepted that this information was not
conveyed to any other individual."
102. In the objection filed before this Court, Mr. Sundar
Raman has, inter alia, argued that the Probe Committee has
D not recorded any specific finding that he had knowledge of Mr.
Vindoo Dara Singh being a bookie. It is also asserted by Mr.
Sundar Raman that he knew of Mr. Vindoo Dara Singh only as
a celebrity who used to frequently attend IPL matches and
events with other celebrities. Mr. Sundar Raman has
E specifically denied having any knowledge about the activities
of Vindoo Dara Singh and his contacts. Based on certain call
records produced by Mr. Sundar Raman, it is claimed that there
were only 5 calls between the two of them during a period of
ten months and that making or receiving such calls was a part
F of his job as the Chief Operating Officer of IPL.
103. The other allegation against Mr. Sundar Raman was
that even though he had received information that a number of
owners/team officials were involved in betting yet he had taken
no action in the matter. When asked about the correctness of
G this accusation, Mr. Sundar Raman appears to have argued
that it was Mr. V.P. Singh who had verbally informed him about
reports alleging that a number of owners/team officials were
involved in betting on IPL matches but Mr. V.P. Singh is also
alleged to have told Mr. Sundar Raman that the information was
· H not actionable.
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 271
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
104. From a reading of the report submitted by the A
investigating team, we find that the team intended to request
Mr. Virk to join the investigation and part with the information
with him regarding Mr. Sundar Raman's proximity to Vindoo
Dara Singh, the alleged bookie/contact of the bookie. The
Probe Committee has stopped short of recording a specific B
finding regarding the complicity of Mr. Sundar Raman in the
betting racket, nor is there any explicit justification provided by
the report for the finding that 8 and not 350 calls were made
between Mr. Sundar Raman and Vindoo Dara Singh. Suffice
it to say that the report submitted by the investigating team and c
the Probe Committee do not indict Mr. Sundar Raman in clear
words. The observations made regarding his role and conduct
simply give rise to a serious suspicion about his involvement
in the betting affairs of the team owners/officials apart from
suggesting that having received information about betting D
activities in.connection with IPL matches, he remained totally
inert in the matter instead of taking suitable action warranted
under the circumstances.
105. The question then is whether Mr. Sundar Raman can
be declared to be completely innocent or does his conduct and E
activities call for any other probe or investigation. Mr. Sundar
Raman was, and continues to be the Chief Operating Officer
of IPL. He has held and continues to hold a very important
position in the entire system. On his own showing he was
dealing with practically all aspects of organization of the game, F
including facilitating whenever necessary the appearance and
participation of celebrities and organizing tickets, accreditation
cards and such other matters. He was, therefore, the spirit
behind the entire exercise and cannot be said to be
unconcerned with what goes on in the course of the tournament G
especially if it has the potential of bringing disrepute to the
game/BCCI. We are, therefore, not inclined to let the allegations
made against Mr. Sundar Raman go un-probed, even if it
means a further investigation by the investigating team
provided to the probe committee or by any other means. Truth H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A about t.he allegations, made against Mr. Sundar Raman, must
be brought to light, for it is only then that all suspicions about
the fraudulent activities and practices floating in the media
against the BCCI and its administrators in several proceedings
before different courts can be given a quietus. Having said that
B we propose to issue appropriate directions regarding further
investigation and probe into the activities and conduct of Mr.
Sundar Raman on conditions that we will stipulate separately
in the later part of this judgment.
c Re: Question No.7:
106. We have while answering Questions No.2 and 3 held
Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr. Raj Kundra to be guilty of
betting. We have also while answering those questions held that
· the misconduct against these two individuals is actionable as
D per the relevant rules to which we have referred in detail. Not
only that, we have held that action under the rules can also be
taken against the franchisees concerned. We have noticed that
that the quantum of sanction/punishment can vary depending
upon the gravity of the misconduct of the persons committing
E the same.
107. One of the issues that would fall for determination in
the light of these findings would be whether we should impose
a suitable punishment ourselves or leave it to the BCCI to do
the needful. Having given our anxious consideration to that
F aspect we are of the view that neither of these two courses
would be appropriate. We say so because the power to punish
for misconduct vests in the BCCI. V:Je do not consider it proper
to clutch at the jurisdiction of BCCI to impose a suitable
punishment. At the same time we do not think that in a matter
G like this the award of a suitable punishment to those liable for
such punishment can be left to the BCCI. The trajectory of the
present litigation, and the important issues it has raised as also
the profile of the individuals who have been indicted, would, in
our opinion, demand that the award of punishment for
H misconduct is left to an independent committee to exercise that
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 273
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
power for and on the behalf of BCCI. This would not only A
remove any apprehension of bias and/or influence one way or
the other but also make the entire process objective and
transparent especially when we propose to constitute a
committee comprising outstanding judicial minds of
impeccable honesty. B
108. The other aspect, which needs attention, is the need
for a probe into activities of Mr. Sundar Raman. We are of the
view that, once we appoint a Committee to determine and
award punishment, we can instead of referring the matter back
to Mudgal Committee, request the proposed new Committee C
to examine the role played by Mr. Sundar Raman, if necessary,
with the help of the investigating team constituted by us earlier.
109. The proposed Committee can also, in our opinion,
be requested to examine and make suitable recommendations
0
on the following aspects:
(i) Amendments considered necessary to the
memorandum of association of the BCCI and the
prevalent rules and regulations for streamlining the
conduct of elections to different posts/officers in the E
BCCI including conditions of eligibility and
disqualifications, if any, for candidates wanting to
contest the election for such posts including the
office of the president of the BCCI.
(ii) Amendments to the memorandum of F
association, and rules and regulation considered
necessary to provide a mechanism for resolving
conflict of interest should such a conflict arise
despite Rule 6.2.4 prohibiting creation or holding
of any commercial interest by the administrators, G
with particular reference to persons, who by virtue
of their proficiency in the game of Cricket, were to
necessarily play some role as Coaches, Managers,
Commentators etc.
(iii) Amendment, if any, to the Memorandum of H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 1 S.C.R.
A Association and the Rules and Regulations of BCCI
to carry out the recommendations of the Probe
Committee headed by Justice Mudgal, subject to
such recommendations being found acceptable by
the newly appointed Committee.
B (iv) Any other recommendation with or without
suitable amendment of the relevant Rules and
Regulations, which the Committee may consider
necessary to make with a view to preventing
sporting frauds, conflict of interests, streamlining the
c working of BCCI to make it more responsive to the
expectations of the public ~t large and to bring
transparency in practices and procedures followed
by BCCI.
110. lri the result we pass the following order:
D
(I} Amendment to Rule 6.2.4 whereby the words
'excluding events like IPL or Champions League
Twenty 20', were added to the said rule is hereby
declared void and ineffective. The judgment and
E order of the High Court of Bombay in PIL No.107
of 2013 is resultantly set aside and the said writ
petition allowed to the extent indicated above.
(II) The quantum of punishment to be imposed on
Mr. Gurunath Meiyappan and Mr. Raj Kundra as
F also their respective franchisees/teams/owners of
the teams shall be determined by a Committee
comprising the following:
(i} Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha-, former Chief
Justice of India - Chairman.
G
(ii) Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan, former Judge,
Supreme Court of India - Member.
(iii) Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.V. Raveendran, former
Judge, Supreme Court of India - Member.
H
BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA v. 275
CRICKET ASSOCIATION OF BIHAR [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
The Committee shall, before taking a final view on A
the quantum of punishment to be awarded, issue
notice to all those likely to be affected and provide
to them a hearing in the matter. The order passed
by the Col'Jlmittee shall be final and binding upon
BCCI and the parties concerned subject to the right 8
of the aggrieved party seeking redress in
appropriate judicial proceedings in- accordance
with law.
(Ill) The three-member Committee constituted in
terms of Para (II) above, shall also examine the role C
of Mr. Sundar Raman with or without further
investigation, into his activities, and if found guilty,
impose a suitable punishment upon him on behalf
of BCCI.
Investigating team constituted by this Court under D
Shri 8.8. Mishra shall for that purpose be available
to the newly constituted Committee to carry out all
such investigations as may be considered
necessary, with all such powers as were vested in
it in terms of our order dated 16th May, 2014. E
(IV) The three-member Committee is· also
requested to examine and make suitable
recommendations to the BCCI for such reforms in
its practices and procedures and such
amendments in the Memorandum of Association, F
Rules and Regulations as may be considered
necessary and proper on matters set out by us in
Para number 109 of this· order .
. ,(V) The constitution of the Committee or its G
deliberations shall not affect the ensuing elections
which-the BCCI shall hold within six weeks from the
date of this order in accordance with the prevalent
rules and regulations subject to the condition that
no one who has any commercial interest in the H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 1 S.C.R.
A BCCI events (including Mr. N. Srinivasan) shall be
eligible for contesting the elections for any post
whatsoever. We make it clear that the
disqualification for contesting elections applicable
to those who are holding any commercial interest
B in BCCI events shall hold good and continue till such
time the person concerned holds such commercial
interest or till the Committee considers and awards
suitable punishment to those liable for the same;
whichever is later.
c (VI) The Committee shall be free to fix their fees
which shall be paid by the BCCI who shall, in
addition, bear all incidental expenses such as travel,
hotel, transport and secretarial services, necessary
for the Committee to conclude its proceedings. The
D fees will be paid by the BCCI to the members at
such intervals and in such manner as the Committee
may decide. The venue of the proceedings shall be
at the discretion of the Committee.
111. We hope and trust that the Committee concludes the
E proceedings as early as possible, but as far as possible within
a period of six months.
112. These appeals shall stand disposed of in the above
terms with the direction that the relevant record received from
Justice Mudgal Committee shall be forwarded to the Chairman
F of the newly appointed Committee without any delay.
113. We place on record our deep appreciation for the
work done by the Probe Committee headed by Justice Mukul
Mudgal and all those who assisted the Committee in the Probe
G and its early completion.
114. All miscellaneous applications shall also stand
disposed of in the· above terms.
Devika Gujral Appeals disposed of
H
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