BHUPINDERPAL SINGH GILLversusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

                  [2025] 1 S.C.R. 804 : 2025 INSC 83

                        Bhupinderpal Singh Gill
                                    v.
                       State of Punjab and Others
                        (Civil Appeal No. 183 of 2025)
                               20 January 2025
                [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Whether the impugned order of the High Court, in which the
       Disciplinary Authority’s order imposing penalty and the order of
       the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant have
       merged, warrants any interference on any of the grounds available for
       judicial review; whether the objection by the respondent that limited
       notice having been issued at the time of admission of the intra-court
       appeal and the appellant’s grievance being addressed, this Court
       ought not to enlarge the scope of the appeal has any substance.

                                   Headnotes†
       Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal Rules, 1970) – r.8 –
       Disciplinary action was initiated against the appellant-Senior
       Medical Officer 11 days prior to his retirement alleging that he
       committed misconduct by proceeding on leave without it being
       sanctioned; defying the directions of the Election Commission
       and the higher authorities; not participating in the pulse polio
       programme; threatening legal action against Senior Assistant
       of the Civil Surgeon – Disciplinary Authority ordered a cut in
       pension – High Court modified the punishment – Interference
       with:
       Held: On facts, there is no legal evidence on the basis of which the
       appellant can be held guilty of the charges that he had proceeded
       on leave without sanction thereof and did not comply with the orders
       of his superior officers – The charge as regards the appellant having
       threatened the Senior Assistant is also not proved – Further, it is
       the clear finding of the Inquiry Officer that the appellant was not
       assigned any duty in connection with election duty and pulse polio
       programme during the period he wished to avail leave to attend
       court proceedings before the High Court – Insofar as defiance of

* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                                  805

         Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


     Election Commission’s directions by the appellant are concerned, no
     such written directions were part of the documentary evidence led
     before the Inquiry Officer – Impugned order of the Division Bench,
     the order of dismissal passed by the Single Judge as well as the
     order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority, set aside –
     Appellant entitled to full pension without any cut, the deduction
     made so far to be returned as directed – Costs of Rs.50,000/-
     awarded to the appellant. [Paras 38, 39, 42, 45]

     Practice and Procedure – Limited notice issued at the stage
     of admission – Enlargement of the scope of petition/appeal
     during final hearing not barred – Objection by the respondent
     that limited notice having been issued at the time of admission
     of the intra-court appeal by the High Court and the appellant’s
     grievance being addressed, this Court ought not to enlarge
     the scope of the appeal:
     Held: Objection is without any substance – Issuing limited notice
     at the stage of admission does not bar a Constitutional Court
     having inherent powers to enlarge the scope of a petition/appeal
     at the stage of final hearing particularly when enforcement of any
     Fundamental/Constitutional right is urged by the party approaching
     it – Any observation that the court makes while entertaining the
     petition/appeal by issuing limited notice is tentative which cannot
     limit the court’s jurisdiction to consider the controversy, as raised,
     in its entire perspective – Whether or not the court would enlarge
     the scope is, however, a question largely dependent on the facts
     and circumstances of each case. [Para 19]
     Disciplinary proceedings/Inquiry proceedings – Punishment
     orders – Interference with – Principles governing – Discussed –
     Judicial review – Constitution of India – Article 226. [Para 33]

     Disciplinary proceedings/Inquiry proceedings – Principles
     of Natural Justice, discussed – Plea of the appellant that the
     process of decision-making was vitiated for lack of procedural
     fairness:
     Held: Validity of disciplinary action is to be tested on the touchstone of
     Articles 14, 16 and 21 as well as Article 311(2), wherever applicable –
     To test whether interference is warranted, the scrutiny ought to be
     confined to finding out whether the disciplinary proceedings were
     conducted fairly; if not, then it has caused prejudice to the charged
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       employee – In the present case, the appellant submitted a detailed
       response to the inquiry report however, his claims were dismissed
       by a single sentence that the same were not acceptable – This is
       not part of a fair procedure – Constitution of India – Articles 14,
       16, 21 and 311 – Judicial review. [Paras 35, 40]

                                Case Law Cited
       Union of India v. H.C. Goel [1964] 4 SCR 718 : 1963 SCC OnLine
       SC 16 – followed.
       Maneka Gandhi v. India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248;
       Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India [2023] 10 SCR
       595 : (2023) 13 SCC 401 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Punjab Civil Services (Punishment & Appeal Rules, 1970);
       Constitution of India.

                                List of Keywords
       Disciplinary proceedings; Disciplinary action; Disciplinary authority;
       Inquiry Officer; Election Commission; Election duty; Leave without
       sanction; Pulse polio programme; Senior Medical Officer; Senior
       Doctor; Civil Surgeon; Orders of the superior officers not complied
       with; Inquiry report; Serious misconduct; Cut in pension; Full
       pension; Principles of Natural Justice; Vengeance; Public servant;
       Leave; Limited notice issued at the time of admission; Intra-court
       appeal; Lack of procedural fairness; Judicial review of the decision
       of the Disciplinary Authority; Prejudice.

                               Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 183 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 19.04.2022 of the High Court
       of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 600 of 2021

                           Appearances for Parties
       P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., M/s. Bakshi & Associates, Advs. for the
       Appellant.
       Ms. Nupur Kumar, Adv. for the Respondents.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                          807

            Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


                     Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

      Dipankar Datta, J.

      Facts
1.    The appellant was at the twilight of his long career of 34 (thirty-four)
      years in public service. At the relevant time, he was holding the post
      of Senior Medical Officer, CHC, Dirba, District Sangrur, under the
      Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of Punjab1.
      Eleven days prior to the appellant’s retirement on superannuation
      on 31st March, 2017, he was served with a charge-sheet dated 20th
      March, 2017 in connection with disciplinary action that was proposed
      against him under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment
      & Appeal Rules, 1970).
2.    The charge-sheet alleged that the appellant had committed misconduct
      by (i) not complying with the direction of the Election Commission;
      (ii) proceeding on leave without sanction thereof; (iii) failing to take
      part in the pulse polio programme and giving threats for legal action
      to the Senior Assistant of the Civil Surgeon, Sangrur2; and (iv) not
      complying with the orders of the superior officers.
3.    Consequent to pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, an order
      was issued on 31st March, 2017 refusing the appellant extension of
      service; instead, the appellant was relieved of his duty and made to
      retire on 31st March, 2017 (afternoon). It was recorded in the said
      order that such retirement would not affect the disciplinary proceedings
      pending against the appellant; also, if any amount is recoverable
      from him, the GoP would have the right to recover such amount.
4.    Almost a year lapsed, since the charge-sheet was issued to the
      appellant, without any development. As late as on 23rd February,
      2018, a retired bureaucrat (a member of the Indian Administrative
      Service) was appointed as the Inquiry Officer.
5.    The appellant, despite not having responded to the charge-sheet,
      diligently participated in the inquiry before the Inquiry Officer. While


1    GoP
2    Civil Surgeon
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       refuting the charges levelled against him, the appellant cross-
       examined the two witnesses produced on behalf of the prosecution in
       support of the charges. The appellant also furnished an explanation
       vis-à-vis the incidents before he proceeded on leave. Upon purported
       consideration of the evidence led by the prosecution and the
       explanation furnished by the appellant, the Inquiry Officer submitted
       a report of enquiry concluding as follows:
               “Keeping in view the above, all the charges No. 1 to 4
               levelled in the charge-sheet against Sh. Bhupinder Singh
               Gill. Service No. 3674, Senior Medical Officer (Retd) are
               proved, but so far as the matter of giving threat to take
               legal action against the Assistant of the office of Civil
               Surgeon that is not proved.”
6.     The report of the Inquiry Officer was furnished to the appellant vide
       a memo dated 7th September, 2018 and his comments were sought.
       By his reply dated 9th September, 2018, the appellant sought to
       highlight the infirmities in the inquiry report and prayed that the
       disciplinary proceedings be dropped.
7.     The Principal Secretary of the Health and Family Welfare Department,
       GoP3, passed a final order dated 11th October, 2019 upon purported
       consideration of the charge-sheet, the evidence led in course of the
       inquiry by the prosecution, the defence of the appellant, the inquiry
       report and the response of the appellant thereto. He ordered a cut
       in pension based on the observations/findings made by him. The
       contents of the said order will be noticed at a later part of this judgment.

       Proceedings before the High Court
8.     The order of the Disciplinary Authority dated 11th October, 2019,
       ordering a cut of 2% pension with cumulative/permanent effect, was
       challenged by the appellant in a writ petition4 before the High Court
       of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh5. A single Judge of the High
       Court, vide judgment and order dated 26th February, 2021, dismissed
       the writ petition.


3    Disciplinary Authority
4    CWP-34272-2019 (O&M)
5    High Court
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      809

           Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


9.    Aggrieved thereby, the appellant presented an intra-court appeal6.
      The Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order
      dated 19th April, 2022 allowed the appeal in part by modifying the
      punishment imposed upon the appellant by the Disciplinary Authority.
      Instead of the penalty of 2% pension cut with cumulative/permanent
      effect, the same was altered to 2% pension cut for a period of 5
      years whereafter the appellant was made entitled to full pension
      upon “completion of five years period from the date the inflicted
      punishment has been effected”.

      The Challenge
10. This appeal, by special leave, mounts a challenge to the said judgment
    and order dated 19th April, 2022 of the Division Bench of the High
    Court, although partial relief was granted thereby to the appellant.

      Contentions of the parties
11. Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
    contended that having regard to the materials on record it is clear as
    crystal that the appellant did not commit any misconduct warranting
    punishment. According to him, the disciplinary proceedings were
    initiated by the respondents to teach the appellant a lesson for
    having questioned their actions before the High Court in several
    proceedings. Reference was made by him to proceedings instituted
    by the appellant before the High Court alleging contempt against
    some of the high- ranking officials of the GoP. In pursuance thereof,
    the respondents had to cough up in excess of Rs. 3,00,000/- (three
    lakh) to the appellant, of which he had been illegally deprived. Our
    attention was further invited to the evidence led on behalf of the
    prosecution as well as the specific defence taken by the appellant
    to demonstrate the perversity in the findings of the Inquiry Officer
    as well as the order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority.
12. Mr. Patwalia also submitted that the appellant having been in public
    service in excess of three decades without blemish, the governmental
    action of initiating disciplinary proceedings a few days prior to his
    retirement and imposing on him the unwarranted penalty of ordering
    of a cut in pension, which is the source of his sustenance in the
    winter years of his life, is absolutely arbitrary apart from smacking


6    LPA No. 600 of 2021 (O&M)
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       of mala fide, which the High Court failed to take note of. He, thus,
       prayed that the orders of the Disciplinary Authority, the Single Judge
       and the Division Bench be set aside and all benefits be restored in
       favour of the appellant to which he was legitimately entitled.
13. Per contra, appearing for the respondents, Ms. Nupur, learned
    counsel contended that inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer
    by granting reasonable, sufficient and adequate opportunity to the
    appellant to defend himself. There has been no breach of principle
    of natural justice in proceeding against the appellant and rightly, the
    appellant has not so alleged. The findings returned by the Inquiry
    Officer are based on legal evidence and the order of the Disciplinary
    Authority imposing penalty demonstrates application of mind to the
    materials on record. Thus, no interference is called for.
14. Our attention was drawn by Ms. Nupur to the order dated 28th July,
    2021 issuing notice on the intra-court appeal. According to her, limited
    notice was issued to the effect that 2% cut in pension could have
    been for a limited period and not with cumulative/permanent effect.
    Relief having been provided by the Division Bench by the impugned
    order, she concluded by submitting that the appellant can have no
    cause for any further grievance.

       The Issues
15. The broad issue emerging for decision is, whether the impugned
    order of the High Court, in which the Disciplinary Authority’s order
    imposing penalty and the order of the Single Judge dismissing the
    writ petition of the appellant have merged, warrants any interference
    on any of the grounds available for judicial review. Besides, we
    are also tasked to decide the objection that limited notice having
    been issued at the time of admission of the intra-court appeal and
    the appellant’s grievance being addressed, this Court ought not to
    enlarge the scope of the appeal.

       Analysis
16. We have perused the documents on record including the inquiry
    report and other relevant materials.
17. At the outset, we propose to deal with the objection raised by Ms. Nupur.
18. It is true that limited notice was issued by the Division Bench while
    admitting the intra-court appeal. However, a reading of the impugned
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             811

         Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


     order does not reveal that the Division Bench while disposing of
     such appeal considered the sole point on which limited notice was
     issued; on the contrary, arguments were advanced by the parties
     on similar lines as advanced before us and after noting the rival
     claims, the Division Bench proceeded to dispose of the appeal by
     holding as follows:
           “In the present case also, the petitioner has put in service
           of 34 years and not an iota of material has been brought
           on record to even remotely suggest that the writ petitioner
           had been a trouble maker or undisciplined employee or
           habitual of absenting himself from work without permission.
           On the contrary, the factors that ostensibly appear to have
           influenced the competent authority have also been candidly
           pleaded and brought on record i.e. actively pursuing litigation
           in which the highest authority of the department i.e. Principal
           Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Punjab
           was as such a party respondent by name, as contemnor,
           in COCP No.2304 of 2013 titled ‘Dr. Bhupinder Pal Singh
           Gill vs. Smt. Vini Mahajan and others’. No material has
           been brought to our notice that the aforesaid factual aspect
           was ever denied or refuted or appropriately dealt with, at
           the time of imposing the punishment.
           Keeping in view the above discussion, the material
           available on record, ratio of the judgments referred to
           and the peculiar facts and circumstances, we are of the
           considered opinion that the punishment inflicted on the writ
           petitioner being a 2% cut in pension, in perpetuity, even
           if the finding with regard to the charges is left untouched,
           is disproportionate to the misconduct and is sufficient to
           shock the conscience of the Court. Thus, the writ petitioner
           does not deserve to be treated any differently and as such
           taking a consistent view, the present appeal is liable to be
           allowed partly and the order of punishment deserves to be
           modified accordingly. Therefore, the ends of justice would
           be met if the impugned punishment is modified to be for
           a limited specific period other than being in perpetuity i.e.
           with cumulative effect. None the less, the same would still
           act as a deterrent for other employees to discharge the
           duties in a proper manner and remain careful to follow all
           instructions issued from time to time.
812                                                       [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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            Accordingly, the order dated 26.02.2021 and the order
            dated 28.04.2021 passed by the writ Court are set aside
            and the order dated 11.10.2019 (Annexure P-13) passed
            by Principal Secretary, Punjab Government, Health and
            Family Welfare Department, imposing 2% cut in pension
            with cumulative/permanent effect, is modified to that of
            2% cut in pension for a period of 5 years. Consequently,
            full pension would be restored on the completion of give
            years period from the date the inflicted punishment has
            been effected.”
                                                (emphasis supplied)

       In view of the approach adopted by the Division Bench in examining
       the contentious issues arising before it, we consider the objection
       of Ms. Nupur to be without substance.
19. Even otherwise, issuing limited notice at the stage of admission
    does not bar a Constitutional Court having inherent powers to pass
    such orders as the justice of the case before it demands to enlarge
    the scope of a petition/appeal at the stage of final hearing. Any
    observation that the court may choose to make while entertaining
    the petition/appeal by issuing limited notice ought to be regarded
    as tentative. Such observation cannot limit the court’s jurisdiction to
    consider the controversy, as raised, in its entire perspective. Whether
    or not the court would enlarge the scope is, however, a question
    which is largely dependent on the facts and circumstances of each
    case. If the court seized of the petition/appeal considers that the
    justice of the case before it demands enlargement of the scope,
    notwithstanding that a limited notice had been issued earlier, the
    court’s powers are not fettered particularly when enforcement of any
    Fundamental/Constitutional right is urged by the party approaching it.
    We, therefore, see no reason to accept the objection of Ms. Nupur
    and show the appellant the door at the threshold.
20. Having dealt with the objection, it is now time to consider the merits
    of the appellant’s claim and decide the broad issue.
21. The appellant applied on 27th January, 2017 for availing leave on 28th,
    30th and 31st, January, 2017 to attend proceedings pending before
    the High Court. Since the details of the proceedings have been noted
    by the Division Bench and the same have not been disputed by the
    respondents, we refrain from referring to it here.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                       813

          Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


22. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant had proceeded
    on leave without the same being sanctioned, defying the directions
    of the Election Commission and the higher authorities, and without
    participating in the pulse polio programme.
23. The allegation levelled against the appellant was sought to be
    established by the prosecution by examining two witnesses, (i) a clerk
    (PW-1) in the office of the Civil Surgeon and (ii) a senior assistant
    (PW-2) in the branch office of the Director, Health and Family Welfare.
24. Referring to the records, PW-1 gave a statement that the appellant
    proceeded on leave on 27th January, 2017 without getting his casual
    leave sanctioned and without handing over charge of his post to
    anyone. The appellant was informed of non-sanction of his leave by
    the Senior Assistant in the office of the Civil Surgeon on telephone to
    which the appellant responded by saying that he be not harassed by
    making phone calls and also that since he has no duty for the pulse
    polio programme, he would take legal action. Reference was then
    made by PW-1 to a letter dated 06th January, 2017 of the Secretary,
    Health and Managing Director, Punjab Health System Corporation,
    Punjab7 to the effect that grant of leave was closed due to Election
    Code in Punjab and that directions had been made by the appropriate
    authority of the Election Office, keeping in view the Election Code,
    that leave be not granted to any officer/official; however, despite
    knowledge of the same, the appellant had proceeded on leave.
25. In course of cross-examination, PW-1 stated that no call detail is
    available regarding the telephonic message purportedly given by the
    Senior Assistant to the appellant and it is only the Senior Assistant
    who would be in a position to throw light because PW-1 did not have
    any record of conversation. It was also admitted that on cancellation
    of leave, separate letter was not written to the appellant; also that,
    as per the record, no duty had been assigned to the appellant in
    the pulse polio programme from 29th January, 2017 to 31st January,
    2017 or by the Election Commission. The letter dated 6th January,
    2017 of the M.D., PHSC did not prohibit grant of leave to Senior
    Medical Officer; however, it prohibited grant of leave to specialist
    Doctor/General Medical Officer and para-medical staff, and leave to
    them could only be granted in special situations upon obtaining the


7   M.D., PHSC
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       approval of the Director, Health. PW-1 reiterated, while responding to
       a question as to the time when leave of the appellant was cancelled,
       that the Civil Surgeon cancelled the leave on 27th January due to
       Election Code and pulse polio programme but that there is no record
       regarding time. He also admitted the absence of any Government
       Order requiring communication of non-sanction of leave through
       telephone and not in writing. He was unaware as to whether the
       appellant had been charge-sheeted for keeping him away “from the
       fruits of extension in service”.
26. As PW-2, the Senior Assistant produced a document dated 30th
    January, 2017 (Ex.PW/2/1) of the Civil Surgeon which was addressed
    to the Additional Chief Secretary (Health) conveying that the appellant
    proceeded on leave on 27th January, 2017 without such leave being
    sanctioned, without informing anybody and without handing over
    charge to anybody. Further, PW-2 stated that due to Election Code
    “the leave were closed” and that the Senior Assistant of the Civil
    Surgeon had informed the appellant regarding cancellation of leave
    on telephone owing to Election Code and pulse polio programme
    from 29th January, 2017 to 31st January, 2017.
27. In course of cross-examination by the appellant, PW-2 admitted
    that in the letter of the Civil Surgeon, being Ex.PW/2/1, call record
    of the Senior Assistant, call details and confirmation of calls made
    are not available.
28. According to the appellant, he personally visited the office of the Civil
    Surgeon on 27th January, 2017 at 3.00 pm. As per the procedure
    of the GoP, he gave his leave application to the Receipt Clerk and
    obtained a receipt. On such application, the Medical Officer, Dental,
    CHC, Dirba put her signature. The appellant waited till 5.00 pm but
    since the Civil Surgeon was not available in the office from 3.00 pm
    to 5.00 pm, he was asked to go on leave. It was the further case of
    the appellant that during the long 34 (thirty-four) years of his service,
    he was never given any letter sanctioning his leave. It was also
    his version that he had not received any telephonic message from
    anyone in the office of the Civil Surgeon asking him not to proceed
    on leave and, therefore, he went on leave. He had also not received
    any letter regarding non-sanction of his leave. Further, he was not
    given election duty by the Election Commission of India nor was he
    assigned duty from 29th January, 2017 to 31st January, 2017 for the
    pulse polio programme.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           815

         Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


29. The Inquiry Officer, prior to recording his conclusion as extracted in
    paragraph 5 (supra) found the following facts to have come to light.
    We consider it appropriate to reproduce the same from the report,
    reading as follows:
           “1. The Delinquent officer on 27-1-2017 after getting the
           leave of 28-1-2017, 30-1-2017 and 31-1-2017 along with
           station from 27-1-2017 to 2-2-2017 received in the office
           of Civil Surgeon, Sangrur, went on leave without getting
           the same sanctioned, when in those days election code
           was going on and pulse polio programme was also going
           on. In this regard, as per the directions issued by Election
           commission/Health Department, the leave only could
           only be availed, in special circumstances, after getting
           prior permission from Director, Health Services. As per
           the rules, no leave can be availed as a right. Powers are
           empowered to the competent authority to sanction or not
           to sanction the leave. The argument by the Delinquent
           that there was no duty of him in election and pulse polio,
           is not acceptable. During the election and pulse polio,
           it is the duty of the supervisory officer to maintain the
           health services and to provide duties to the departmental
           employees and to assure the regular supply of medicines
           and to maintain cold chain etc. Being Senior Medical
           Officer and being incharge of an organization, it was the
           duty of the Delinquent officer that he during the elections
           and pulse polio programme, leads the officers/officials of
           his department and supervise their works so that these
           important programmes of the Government can be fulfilled
           successfully. But on the part of Delinquent officer, this was
           not done and did not take part in pulse polio programme.
           So far as the charge to give threat to take legal action
           against Sh. Rakesh Kumar, Senior Assistant office of Civil
           Surgeon, Sangrur, in this regard neither the concerned
           Senior Assistant has been produced as a witness nor
           any record or detail of call regarding conversion on
           telephone with the Delinquent has been produced by the
           Prosecution. Because the conversation of the concerned
           Senior Assistant of the office of Civil Surgeon had taken
           place ‘With the Delinquent, which, as per the record, was
           brought by him in the notice of Civil Surgeon. But hear say
           evidence as per the Indian Evidence Act cannot be admitted
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            as a proof. Therefore, to give threats from the Delinquent
            Doctor to Senior Assistant, office of Civil Surgeon, Sangrur
            to take legal action, due to non-submission of any proof
            by the PO, this charge is not proved.”
30.    As noted, the inquiry report was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority.
       Paragraph 2 of the said order being relevant, reads as follows:
            “2. Doctor Bhupinder Pal Singh Gill while giving his
            explanation dated 19-9-2018 with ref. to Memo. No.
            17/34/17-4H1/3226 dated 07-09-2018 of Govt, refused to
            accept the report and by telling him innocent, before taking
            any decision in this regard, requested for personal hearing
            to submit his defence. While considering the explanation
            submitted by the Doctor, the competent authority vide
            Govt. Memo. No. 17/34/17-4S1—3568 dated 17-10-2018,
            he was given personal hearing. During the personal
            hearing, the arguments put by the Doctor and facts were
            not acceptable. Therefore, the charges mentioned in the
            charge-sheet which have been proved by the Inquiry
            Officer in his report, after consideration of the same, it
            has been decided to make a tentative cut of 2% out of the
            pension of Doctor Bhupinder Pal Singh Gill. In this regard
            vie Govt. letter No. 17/34/17-4H1/1073 dated 12-04-2019,
            approval of P.P.S.C, Patiala had been sought which has
            been received vide this letter No. Dis.321/2019/-7/1950
            dated 19-07-19, keeping in view this, as per the decision
            taken by the Govt., permission is granted of 2% pension
            cut with cumulative/permanent effect out of the pension
            of Dr. Bhupinder Pal Singh Gill.”
31. These are the bare facts triggering the challenge by the appellant
    to the order of penalty imposing a cut in pension for the remainder
    of the period he would receive pension, which partially succeeded
    before the Division Bench of the High Court and was modified to a
    period of 5 (five) years.
32. Before we embark on a judicial review of the decision taken by the
    Disciplinary Authority to penalise the appellant and examine the
    correctness of the impugned order, we need to remind ourselves
    of the well-settled principles relating to interference with decisions
    taken in pursuance of disciplinary proceedings to discipline and
    control errant employees.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                           817

          Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


33. Certain generic principles governing interference with orders of
    punishment that are passed following inquiry proceedings have
    evolved over a period of time. Law is well settled that an administrative
    order punishing a delinquent employee is not ordinarily subject to
    correction in judicial review because the disciplinary authority is
    the sole judge of facts. If there is some legal evidence on which
    the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that
    evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the high court in a
    writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However,
    should on consideration of the materials on record, the court be
    satisfied that there has been a violation of the principles of natural
    justice, or that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted contrary
    to statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry, or
    that the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by
    considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or
    that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is ex facie arbitrary or
    capricious, so much so that no reasonable person could have arrived
    at such conclusion, or there is any other ground very similar to the
    above, the high court may in the exercise of its discretion interfere
    to set things right. After all, public servants to whom Article 311
    of the Constitution apply do enjoy certain procedural safeguards,
    enforcement of which by the high court can legitimately be urged by
    such servants depending upon the extent of breach that is manifestly
    demonstrated.
34. It would further be of immense profit, at this stage, to consider a
    specific principle which is tailored to the particular situation and could
    clinch the issue. The Constitution Bench of this Court, speaking
    through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J., in Union of India v. H.C.
    Goel 8 laid down a specific test which could be applied if a contention
    were raised that the conclusion is based on no evidence. Relevant
    passages from the said decision evincing one of the two questions
    arising for decision and the answer thereto, read as follows:
            “1. Two short questions of law arise for our decision in the
            present appeal. The first question is … ; and the other
            question is whether the High Court in dealing with a writ
            petition filed by a Government Officer who has been
            dismissed from Government service is entitled to hold that


8   (1964) 4 SCR 718
818                                                       [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                      Supreme Court Reports


       the conclusion reached by the Government in regard to
       his misconduct if (sic, is) not supported by any evidence at
       all. As our judgment will show, we are inclined to answer
       both the questions in the affirmative. Thus, the appellant,
       the Union of India, succeeds on the first point, but fails
       on the second. …
       20. … It still remains to be considered whether the
       respondent is not right when he contends that in the
       circumstances of this case, the conclusion of the
       Government is based on no evidence whatever. It is
       a conclusion which is perverse and, therefore, suffers
       from such an obvious and patent error on the face of the
       record that the High Court would be justified in quashing
       it. In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants
       who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as
       to attract Article 311(2), the High Court under Article 226
       has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the
       Government on which the impugned order of dismissal
       rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true
       that the order of dismissal which may be passed against
       a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can
       be described as an administrative order; nevertheless,
       the proceedings held against such a public servant under
       the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of
       the charges framed against him are in the nature of
       quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt
       that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed by a
       public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that
       the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said
       proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based
       on no evidence. …
       23. … In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on
       such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question
       about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of
       a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the
       competence of the authority which deals with the question;
       but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is
       any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion.
       In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             819

           Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


             is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the
             charge in question is proved against the respondent? This
             approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the
             evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that
             evidence illegally (sic, legally) the impugned conclusion
             follows or not. …
             26. … Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the
             appellant to root out corruption from public service, we
             cannot ignore the fact that in carrying out the said purpose,
             mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place
             of proof even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the
             technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may
             not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but
             nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty
             scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are
             not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as
             to disciplinary enquires held under the statutory rules. … ”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)

35. It also needs to be emphasised that although the traditional concept
    of natural justice comprises of the two rules that prohibit anyone
    from being condemned unheard and anyone from being a judge
    of his own cause, jurisprudence on natural justice principles have
    seen a distinct shift ever since the decision in Maneka Gandhi v.
    India9 constitutionalised principles of natural justice, as held in
    Madhayamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India10. Drawing
    inspiration from such authorities, it would be apt to observe that
    in relation to disciplinary proceedings, subject to just exceptions,
    natural justice would envisage observance of procedural fairness
    before holding a public servant guilty of misconduct and imposing a
    punishment on him for such misconduct. While it is true that principles
    of natural justice supplement, and not supplant, the law, such
    principles have been declared by this Court to be a constituent feature
    of Article 14. Validity of any disciplinary action, whenever questioned,
    has to be tested on the touchstone of Articles 14, 16 and 21 as well
    as Article 311(2), wherever applicable. To test whether interference


9    (1978) 1 SCC 248
10   (2023) 13 SCC 401
820                                                         [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       is warranted, this Court has laid down that the scrutiny ought to be
       confined to finding out whether the disciplinary proceedings have
       been conducted fairly; if not, an inference can be drawn that this
       has caused prejudice to the charged employee. Be that as it may,
       there can be no gainsaying that the consequences of violation of a
       fair procedure, which principles of natural justice embody, in a given
       situation has to be considered on a case-by-case basis bearing in
       mind that judicial review is not intended to be an appeal in disguise.
36. Though the rules closely associated with the traditional concept of
    natural justice may not have been breached in this case, the contention
    of the appellant that the process of decision-making stands vitiated
    for lack of procedural fairness has to be examined given the nature
    of challenge raised.
37. Memory refreshed; we now proceed to examine whether the appellant
    has set up any case for interference.
38. The second and the fourth charges levelled against the appellant
    that he had proceeded on leave without sanction thereof and in not
    complying with the orders of his superior officers seem to be the
    most vital charges. Undoubtedly, no public servant can claim leave
    as a matter of right. Leave is a matter regulated by rules and such
    rules need to be duly adhered to by each public servant. While
    there can be no quarrel on this aspect, we have not found any such
    circumstance from the record to afford ground for holding that the
    appellant did commit a serious misconduct. In order to establish that
    the appellant had committed a serious misconduct by proceeding on
    leave without leave being sanctioned (leave cancelled as per PW-1),
    the prosecution endeavoured to prove that the Civil Surgeon had
    refused to sanction leave, prayed by the appellant, and that he was
    telephonically informed by the Senior Assistant of such refusal. That
    the appellant had visited the office of the Civil Surgeon, remained
    there from 3.00 pm to 5.00 pm and submitted his application for
    leave which was duly acknowledged, have not been disputed by
    the prosecution. Interestingly, the Inquiry Officer while exonerating
    the appellant of the second part of the third charge reasoned that
    neither the Senior Assistant had been produced in the inquiry as a
    witness nor were call details produced, and what PW-1 said is mere
    hearsay; hence, in the absence of proof, that part of the charge is
    not proved. This was a valid reason assigned by the Inquiry Officer,
    which the Disciplinary Authority even accepted. On the same analogy
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                         821

         Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


     and for the same reason, the appellant could not have been held
     guilty in respect of the second charge. There is no record of the
     Civil Surgeon’s refusal to sanction leave being communicated to the
     appellant either. In such view of the matter, we have no hesitation to
     hold that there was no legal evidence based whereon the appellant
     could have been held guilty of the second and fourth charges.
39. That the appellant did not comply with the directions of the Election
    Commission and did not participate in the pulse polio programme
    constitute the first charge and the first part of the third charge,
    respectively. The second part of the third charge of the appellant
    having threatened the Senior Assistant has not been found to be
    proved. It is the clear finding of the Inquiry Officer, based on the
    evidence on record, that the appellant was not assigned any duty in
    connection with election duty and pulse polio programme during the
    period he wished to avail leave to attend court proceedings before the
    High Court. Insofar as defiance of Election Commission’s directions
    by the appellant are concerned, no such written directions were part
    of the documentary evidence led before the Inquiry Officer. Though
    the letter of the M.D., PHSC was not made part of the evidence, we
    shall assume that the appellant, PW-1 and the Inquiry Officer knew
    the contents of the said letter and were aware that in view of the
    ensuing elections in February, 2017, instructions had been received
    not to grant leave to any officer unless permitted by the Director,
    Health. However, the appellant’s contention that public servants on
    the verge of retirement are not assigned election duty was not shown
    to be incorrect and untenable. Rather curiously, the Inquiry Officer
    resorted to ingenuity to hold the appellant guilty. As is evident from
    the report, the prosecution having failed to establish that the appellant
    had been assigned election duty as well as duty associated with the
    pulse polio programme, the Inquiry Officer went on record to hold
    the charges under consideration proved by referring to what was,
    in his perception, the duty of a senior medical officer who has been
    in charge of an organisation. It needs no discussion that the Inquiry
    Officer found the appellant guilty for a perceived failure to perform
    a moral duty. Not only was it completely extraneous, but such a
    finding was clearly at variance with the charge levelled against the
    appellant. We hold that holding the appellant guilty of a perceived
    failure to perform a duty not being the charge in respect of which
822                                                          [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       any opportunity of explanation was given, such a finding could not
       have been taken into consideration by the Disciplinary Authority to
       impose penalty on the appellant.
40. The order of penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority dated 11th
    October, 2019, on another count, does not also commend to be
    legal and valid. A detailed response to the inquiry report had been
    submitted by the appellant. Dismissing the claims by a single sentence
    that the same are not acceptable, is not part of a fair procedure.
    This is a substantial ground for which appellant’s grievance seems
    to be justified.
41. We have extracted verbatim (supra) the reasons assigned by the
    Division Bench in support of the ultimate order it passed modifying
    the penalty. It is not in doubt that in a rare and appropriate case,
    to shorten litigation and for exceptional reasons to be recorded in
    writing, a high court may substitute the punishment imposed on the
    delinquent employee. However, what has overwhelmed our ability of
    comprehension is that the Division Bench despite having returned
    clear findings in favour of the appellant adopted a hands-off approach
    by leaving the findings with regard to the charges untouched. In our
    considered opinion, the tenor of the impugned order does suggest
    that the Division Bench found the appellant to have been wronged
    and regard being had thereto, the Division Bench ought to have set
    things right by interfering with the findings and granting full relief that
    we intend to grant to the appellant. The impugned order, insofar
    as it declines to interfere with the findings on the charges, being
    clearly indefensible, we proceed to grant relief to the appellant as
    indicated hereafter.

       Relief
42. The impugned order of the Division Bench is set aside together with
    the order of dismissal passed by the Single Judge. The order of
    penalty passed by the appellant’s Disciplinary Authority also stands
    set aside and the writ petition is allowed. We direct that the appellant
    shall be entitled to full pension without any cut. Whatever quantum
    has been deducted from his pension shall be returned, within three
    months from date, together with interest @ 6% per annum.
43. The appeal stands allowed.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                              823

         Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Others


     Epilogue
44. We could have ended our judgment here. However, before parting,
    we need to dwell on one aspect. The appellant had raised a specific
    plea before the Inquiry Officer that being on the verge of retirement,
    election duty could not have been assigned to him. True it is, he
    did not produce any documentary evidence in this behalf. However,
    in present days where one can access documents without much
    ado, we have been able to lay our hands on an order dated 07th
    September, 2016 issued from the office of the Election Commission
    of India, addressed to the Chief Secretary, Punjab on the subject
    of General Elections in Punjab having regard to expiry of the term
    of the State Legislative Assembly of Punjab on 18th March, 2016
    (sic, 2017). Clauses (iv) and (xii) of the said order being extremely
    relevant, are quoted below:
           “(iv) In any election very large number of employees
           are drafted for different type of election duty and the
           Commission has no intention of massive dislocation of
           state machinery by massive transfers. Hence, the aforesaid
           transfer policy is normally not applicable to officers/officials
           who are not directly connected with elections like doctors,
           engineers, teachers/principals etc. However, if there are
           specific complaints of political bias or prejudice against
           any such govt. officer which on enquiry are found to be
           substantiated, the then CEO/ECI may order not only for
           transfer of such official but also appropriate departmental
           actions against him.

                     x                    x                    x
           (xii) Any officer who is due to retire within the coming six
           months will be exempted from the purview of the above-
           mentioned directions of the Commission. Further officers
           falling in category (home/3+ criteria if they are due to
           retire within 6 months) shall not be engaged for performing
           election duties during the elections without permission of
           the Commission.”
                                                  (emphasis in original)

45. If indeed such is the stand of the Election Commission that, inter
    alia, doctors and officers who are due to retire within 6 (six) months
824                                                        [2025] 1 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       next be exempted from election duty, the letter dated 6th January,
       2017 of the M.D., PHSC could not have laid down a requirement
       contrary to what the Election Commission ordered. In all fairness,
       the Disciplinary Authority ought not to have initiated disciplinary
       proceedings against the appellant on the face of such clear order of
       the Election Commission. The appellant is, therefore, quite right in
       contending that the disciplinary proceedings culminating in the order
       of penalty were nothing but a ruse to wreak vengeance for he having
       dragged high officials of the GoP to the High Court and in tasting
       success to obtain his legitimate monetary dues. The Constitutional
       concept is that not only the country but every State in the country
       would be a welfare state. As the regulator and dispenser of special
       services and provider of a large number of benefits, none can perhaps
       deny that a welfare state ought to strive for achieving the maximum
       welfare and securing the best interests of the people. This happens
       to be a case where certain officials of the GoP have stooped too low
       to punish a senior doctor, on the verge of retirement, for no better
       reason than that he had dared to take on the mighty executive in
       a court of law. While deprecating such vile acts of the concerned
       officials, we see the need to adequately compensate the appellant.
46. Accordingly, we direct that the appellant shall be entitled to costs
    assessed conservatively at Rs.50,000/-, to be released in his favour
    within the aforesaid period. Should there be any default, the appellant
    shall be free to bring it to our notice for appropriate direction. We
    grant liberty to the GoP to realize the amount of costs payable in
    terms hereof from the persons responsible after fixing responsibility
    in accordance with law.
47. We must place on record that the respondents have not been
    alerted by bringing to their notice the aforesaid order of the Election
    Commission and, therefore, if they have their own version to place for
    our consideration, they shall be at liberty to approach us to have the
    order for costs set aside before expiry of the time limit fixed above.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey