Holding

Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act plainly and unambiguously defines "unprotected worker" as every manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective of protection under other labour legislation.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "unprotected worker" under Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969. The petitioners argued that the term should be limited to casual workers not covered by other labour statutes, relying on earlier High Court decisions and legislative history. The respondents contended that the language of the provision is clear, plain and unambiguous, covering every manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled employment, regardless of other protections. The Court held that the definition is exhaustive and inclusive, reading it together with Section 2(12) (definition of "worker") and rejecting the narrower interpretation. It emphasized that the plain meaning rule prevails over external aids, and that doctrines of stare decisis and contemporanea expositio do not override the statutory text. Consequently, the Full Bench judgment was affirmed and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act limits "unprotected worker" to casual workers not protected by other labour laws.
Whether the plain meaning of the statutory language overrides legislative history, the doctrine of stare decisis, and the rule of contemporanea expositio.
Whether the definition of "unprotected worker" must be read in conjunction with Section 2(12) defining "worker".

Legislation cited

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946
Constitution of Indias. Article 254
Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and Other Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969s. 15, s. 21, s. 2(11), s. 2(12), s. 2(13), s. 22
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961
Payment of Wages Act, 1936
Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Subjects

unprotected workerMathadi Actstatutory interpretationplain meaning rulestare decisiscontemporanea expositiolabour legislationMaharashtrascheduled employment

Judgment

[2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 618

j •
A BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD.
v.
BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 8452 of 2009)
DECEMBER 17, 2009
8
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]

t •
Labour laws:

c Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Worl<ers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 - ss.
2(11 }, (12), 21 and 22 - Term 'unprotected worker' -
Interpretation of - Scope of s. 2(11) - Held: Language of s.
2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear, thus, not capable of
any other meaning - It means that every worl<er, who is doing
D
manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any ~ .
scheduled employment, would become an 'unprotected
worl<er' - In the Preamble of the Act, 'unprotected manual
worl<ers' is mentioned in wider sense - It displays the intention
of State Government to make better provision for such worl<ers
E - lnt~rpretation of term 'unprotected worl<er' not hit by doctrine
of stare decisis - Also, such interpretation not violative of
doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et
Fortissima In Lege - Plea that such worl<ers who were covered
by other Central Acts could not be covered uls. 2(11), being "
F a State Act, not maintainable - Interpretation of statutes -
Doctrines - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 254.
In the instant matters, the two concurrent judgments
of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, one by the
G majority that the interpretation by *Century Textile and
Industries Ltd. case of the term "unprotected worker" in
s. 2(11) of the Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other
Manual Workers (Regulation of Employment and Welfare)
Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who come
H 618
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 619
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
• t
within the purview of the Act, is not correct and proper A
and is overruled; and the judgment of Single Judge that
u/s. 2(11) of the Act, 'unprotected worker' means every
manual worker who is engaged or to be engaged in any
scheduled employment, irrespective of whether he is
protected by other labour legislations or not, and the B
definition is not restricted to those manual workers who
are casually engaged, is under challenge.
t -I
Dismissing the matters, the Court
HELD: 1. The Full Bench was absolutely correct in c
coming to the conclusions that it did. [Para 42] [684-H]
2.1. The term "worker" is used in the definition of
'unprotected worker' in s. 2(11) of the Maharashtra
Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of
_,., ;.
Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969. Therefore, while D
considering the s. 2 (11), the scope of the term 'worker'
u/s. 2 (12) of the Act, is to be considered. The definition
of the term 'worker' is an inclusive definition. It includes
a worker, who is engaged by the employer directly or
through any agency and it is not necessary that such E
worker gets the wages or not. The term 'wages' is also
defined in s. 2(13) of the Act. Therefore, even if such
">: person does not earn the wages, as contemplated in s.
2(13), such person who is engaged to do manual work
in any scheduled employment, would be a worker. F
Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict
sense of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is
working with the permission or under the agreement with
the employer or contractor, even then such worker
would be a 'worker' within the meaning of s. 2(12) of the G
t Act. The only exception is that such worker should not
be a member of employer's family. The definitions of
'worker' and 'unprotected worker' given in ss. 2(11) and
2(12) of the Act would have to be read together for
realizing the scope of the s. 2(1 ~) of the Act. Therefore,
H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

I •
A the language of s. 2(11) is plain, unambiguous and clear
and thus, is not capable of any other meaning. It means
that every worker, who is doing manual work and is
engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment, would be covered by that definition and
8 would become an unprotected worker. The use of the
word 'means' which then positively rules aside any other
meaning than the one which is dependent upon the plain
and unambiguous language of the provision. [Paras 14
and 19] [654-D-H; 655-A-B; 658-A-B]
C *Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279; Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt.
Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. 2006
Ill LLJ 824 Born; Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana
vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. 2008 (10) SC 166;
O Cable Corporation of India vs. Addi. Commissioner of Labour
2008 (7) SCC 680; Feroz N. Dotivala vs. P.M. Wadhwani
2003(1) SCC 433; P. Kasilingam & Ors. vs. P.S.G. College
of Technology & Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1395; Bhaiji vs. Sub-
Divisional Officer, Thandla & Ors. 2003(1) SCC 692; Baldev
E Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini 2005(12) sec 778; Printers
(Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.
1994 (2) Sec 434; K. V. Muthu vs. Angamuthu Ammal
1997(2) SCC 53; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. vs. Gujarat
Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. 1980(2) SCC 593,
F referred to.
2.2. Where the language is clear and admits of no
doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision
on the basis of the external aids. It is possible that the
plain meaning runs counter to the objects or creates
G absurdity or doubts by attributing that plain language. It
is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or
contradiction if the plain language of the s. 2(11) is
accepted and acted upon for the purposes of
interpretation. It must be noted that in spite of s. 2(11 ),
H which included the words "but for the provisions of this Act
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 621
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
• +
is not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and A
benefits of the labour force in the State", these precise words
were removed by the legislature and the definition was
made limited as it has been finally legislated upon. The
legislature being conscious of the fact and being armed
with all the Committee Reports and also being armed with B
the factual data, deliberately avoided those words. This
is clear pointer to the legislative intent. What the appellants
' ... are asking was to read in that definition, these precise
words, which were consciously and deliberately omitted
from the definition. But that would amount to supplying c
the casus omissus and it is not possible, in the instant case.
Though this Court may supply the casus omissus, it would
be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus supplying of
this casus omissus would be extremely necessary due to
the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature, but D
. that is not the case here. [Paras 19 and 24] [657-8; 662-
. F-H; 663-A-E]
Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors.
2003(1) SCC 692; State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Govind
Singh 2005 (10) sec 437, relied on E
2.3. The definition is not to be read in isolation and it
must be read in the context of the phrase which would
'I(
define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous and the
definition of the words must be given a meaningful
F
application; where the context makes the definition given
in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the saine
meaning cannot be assigned. The ratio Will not apply
since the definition given in section 2(11) of the Act is
extremely clear and there is no vagueness or ambiguity
about it. The omission of the words as proposed earlier G
from the final definition is a deliberate and conscious act
on the part of the legislature, only with the objective to
provide protection to all the labourers or workers, who
were the manual workers and were engaged or to be
engaged in any scheduled emplcvment. Therefore, there H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge ~ •
the scope of the definition and once it is accepted, all the
submissions regarding the objects and reasons, the
Committee Reports, the legislative history being contrary
to the expressed language, are relegated to the
B background and are liable to be ignored. (Para 24) (663-
F-H; 664-A·D]
U.P. State Electricity Board vs. Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr.
2004(8) SCC 402; Maharashtra State Road Transport
~ .
Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2003(4) SCC
c 200; The State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Mis. Chhotabhai Jethabhai
Patel and Co. & Anr. 1972 (1) SCC 209; R.D. Goyal & Anr.
vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. 2003 (1) SCC 81, Held
inapplicable.

D Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. 2004
(5) sec 409, refe"ed to.
2.4. It was suggested that only where the other
legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the
better conditions, then alone the Mathadi Act would be
E brought Into and, therefore, necessarily the unprotected
workmen would be such workmen, who are deprived of
the better conditions of service. The argument that if the
workers were adequately protected, they cannot be
covered under section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is
F Incorrect for the reason that the mention of "unprotected
manual workers" In the Preamble is clearly mentioned in
the wider sense and even the Preamble of the Mathadi
Act displays the intention of the State Government to
make better provision for the unprotected manual
G workers. Merely because some workmen are manual
workers and not casual workers, would not make any
difference. In the Preamble, terminology of "casual
workers" Is not to be found. Therefore, even on this basis,
the definition cannot be restricted. [Para 26) (666-A·D]
H Mukesh K. Tripathi vs. Senior Divisional Manager, UC
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 623
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
~ t A
2004(8) SCC 387; State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical
Association 2002 (1) SCC 589; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr.
vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. 1994 (2) SCC 434,
Held inapplicabfe.
Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Anr.
B
2007(1) SCC 467; Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi
2004 (5) sec 409, referred to.
. ~ 2.5. Section 22 of the Act provides that the State
Government may exempt from the operation of all or any
of the provisions of the Act or any scheme, all or any of c
the classes of unprotected workers employed in any
scheduled employment or the establishment or part of
any establishment, if in the opinion of the State
Government, all such unprotected workers are in the
enjoyment of benefits, which are, on the whole, not less D
J. favourable to such unprotected workers than the benefits
provided by or under the Mathadi Act, of course, subject
to certain conditions and after the consultation with
Advisory Committee. It cannot be said that by the
acceptance of the plain meaning of the wider definition
E
given out in section 2(11) of the Act, there would be
creations of contradictions. A Statement of Objects and
Reasons for introducing the Bill is an external aid, which
should be of no consequence if the language is clear.
Even if the Statement of Objects and Reasons is read, it
does not further the case of the appellants~ Appellants, F
while relying on the Statement of Objects and Reasons
j
submitted that it was because the workers in various
employments were not receiving adequate protection and
benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation that
this Bill was introduced alongwith Statement of Objects G
• ~ & Reasons. If inspite of this, the legislature went on to
delete those words, the intention of the legislature must
be loud and clear and it cannot persuade to hold that
there is anything contradictory to the definition in the
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Statement of Objects and Reasons. Even if that was so, ••
when the legislature consciously deletes certain words,
then there will be no question of relying and insisting
upon those words. [Paras 29 and 30) [668-A-H; 669-A-B)
2.6. The submission that when all the persons
B
working in a scheduled industry, doing manual work,
become the unprotected workers, then there is no
question of the Inspector examining any such person, ~

because everybody would be an unprotected worker, is
clearly wrong. What is required is that every unprotected
c worker has to be registered with the Board. If the
Inspector suspects that any such worker, though an
unprotected worker, is either not registered or does not
get the protection of the Board and is engaged by the
employer, then he can examine such a person. Section
D 15 would not become unworkable. [Paras 30 and 31) [669- ,,.
F-H]
2. 7. Section 17G provides that the provisions of
Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 would be
applicable in case of trial of offences under this Act.
E
Section 18 provides that provisions of Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 shall mutatis mutandis apply to
registered unprotected workers and they shall be
deemed to be workmen within the meaning of that Act.
Section 19 makes the similar provision regarding the
F Payment of Wages Act, 1936 to the workers, while
Section 20 provides the application of Maternity Benefit
Act, 1961. These sections are not of any relevance to
•
arrive at the correct meaning of section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act. In all these Sections, the words used are
G 'registered unprotected workers'. There is a provision for
creation of the Boards under section 6 of the Mathadi Act
and every unprotected worker has to register himself with
J -
the Board. Therefore, the reliance on these provisions
would be no consequence. The terminology of 'registered
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON &625
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR.
unprotected workers' in sections 18, 19 and 20 of the A
Mathadi Act was brought into force by Maharashtra Act
No. 40 of 1974 .and under that, these words deemed
always to have been substituted for the original
terminology of 'unprotected workers'. Therefore, there is
no reason to take any different view in the light of these B
sections. [Para 32) [670-A-E]
2.8. It is accepted thats. 2(12) is a general provision
r 1
and s. 2(11) is a specific provision. So long as that
language of section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is clear
enough, there will not be any question of cutting the C
scope of the term 'unprotected workman'. As regard the
submission that this interpretation would lead to absurd
results, whereby ss. 2(11) and 2(12) would be identical,
there is no such possibility. The Sections have to be read
together. Section 2(12) specifies the worker, which in turn D
is used in Section 2(11) further. Therefore, they would not
be identical under any circumstances. [Para 33) [670-F-
H; 671-A-B]
2.9. Once a workman is engaged to do the manual E
work, he automatically becomes an unprotected
workman and would have to be registered with the
Board. The interpretation that is proposed to be given,
does not make any of the provision absurd c,nd does not
lead to manifest the injustice or the absurdity. [Para 34)
[671-E-F; 672-A] F

Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure Industrial
Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. 2007(8) SCC 705, referred
to.
2.10. The golden rule of interpretation is that the G
statutes are to be interpreted according to grammatical
. and ordinary sense of the word in grammatical or literal
meaning unmindful of consequence of such
interpretation. It was only when such grammatical and
H
626 SUPREME COURTREPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the
legislature never intended that the said rule has to give
place to the 'rule of legislative intent'. In the instant case,
the golden rule of interpretation would not lead to any
injustice. [Para 35] (672-C-O]
B National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut 2007
(3) SCC 700; Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay
Environmental Action Group & Ors. 2006(3) SCC 434,
referred to.
c 2.11. No absurdity, inconsistency or any contradiction
with the other provisions of the Act is found. It will be
seen that the absurdity which the appellants are referring
again and again has to be such that it should be contrary
to the sense and reason and, therefore, should include a
0 result, which is unworkable or impracticable,
inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless,
artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter-
mischief. There would arise no absurdity of any kind if the
literal interpretation is given. Once the literal construction
E is accepted, there will be no further question of holding
otherwise on the basis of the intent of the legislature.
[Para 35) [674-A-C]
3. The application of doctrine of stare decisis cannot
help the appellants in the instant case. While rejecting the
F arguments, those thousands of workmen who are
otherwise exploited by Toliwalas, Mu.kadams and at tim~s.
the employers are in mind. The enactment is a beneficial
enactment, providing the protection to such workers, who
do not have the honest representation and it is with this
G lofty idea that a progressive State like State of ,
Maharashtra has brought about this legislation. The
definition would have to be all the more broad, engulfing
maximum area to the advantage of a workman. [Para 38)
[680-F-H; 681-A]
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 627
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
' i-
State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat A
& Ors. 2005 (8) sec 534, relied on.
I
Mishri Lal (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Dhirendera Nath (Dead) by
Lrs. & Ors. 1999 (4) SCC 11; Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs.
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors. 2002 (5) SCC 111;
B
Union of India & Anr. vs. Azadi Bachao Ando/an & Anr. 2004
(10) SCC 1; C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra Misc.
Petition No. 150 of 1973 decided on 19.4.1974; S.B. More
.\
' & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Misc. Petition No. 414
of 1973 decided on 24.4.1974; Lal/ubhai Kevaldas & Anr.
vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Writ Petition No. 119 c
of 1979 decided on 16.1.1980; lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs.
Bombay Port Trust 1994 I CLR 187; Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279;
Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar
;
Union vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 1995 Supp. 3 SCC D
28; Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV), Mumbai vs. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. 2008 (1) SCC 494; Maharashtra State
Road Transport Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors
2003(4) SCC 200; Danial Latifi & Anr. vs. Union of India 2001
(7) SCC 740; Mis. Good Year India Ltd. vs. State of Haryana E
AIR 1990 SC 781; Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat
. 1987 (1) SCC 213; Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar
Mill (P) Ltd. 2003 (2) SCC 111; Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
'<
vs. N.R. Vairamani 2004 (8) SCC 579, referred to.
Quinn vs. Leathern 1901 Appeal Cases 495, referred F
to.
Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., referred to.
4. The submission on the basis of the maxim
Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et Forlissima In Lege G
-· ~. that the Full bench should have considered how the
authorities themselves construed and understood the
law, and certain letters were referred for the same; and
that since the State Government itself understood the
H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL) SC R

A provision in a particular manner, such understanding
should be honoured by the Courts, is erroneous. It is not
the task of the State Government, more particularly, the
Executive Branch to interpret the law; that is the task of
the Courts. Even if the State Government understood the
B Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and
correct interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts.
Therefore, how the State Government officials
understood the Act, is really irrelev<mt. This cannot be
viewed to be an absolute doctrine. Even if the person
c who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular
manner, that does not prevent the Court in giving to the
Court, its true construction. [Paras 11, 39 and 40] [647-
G; 681-C; 682-E-F-G; 683-D-E]
lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port Trust (1994) I CLR
D 187; Godawat Pan Masala Products l.P. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union
of India & Ors. 2004 (7) SCC 68; Senior Electric Inspector
vs. Laxminarayan Chopra AIR 1962 SC 159; Raja Ram
Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 828; J.K. Cotton
Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1988
E SC 191; Doypack Systems Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1988
SC 782; Punjab Traders vs. State of Punjab 1991 (1) SCC
86, referred to.
y
Clyde Navigation Trustees vs. Laird 1883 (8) Appeal
F Cases 658; Assheton Smith vs. Owen 1906 (1) Ch 179;
Goldsmiths' Co. vs. Wyatt 1907 (1) KB 95, referred to.
Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.
5. It was submitted that the Article 254 prescribes that
G in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any Central
legislation, whether made before or after a State
legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both
-
cover the same field. An exception to this lies in sub-
Article (2), which preserves and protects a State
enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the
H
BHlJWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 629
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.
Vice President. This challenge is in the nature of a A
challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of
the State Act. Such was not the challenge. Article 254
does not provide a guide for the interpretation of a State
statute. The appellants are also not certain about the
proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was B
received on 5.6.1969, since the said proposal could not
be located by them. Therefore, all the arguments must fall
to the ground once the Presidential assent under Article
254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact
that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be c
used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this
question was never before the Full Bench and the Full
Bench rightly rejected the said argument on the ground
that this was not the case of the appellants. [Para 41] [684-
A-F]
D
Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. vs. National Textile Corporation
Ltd. 2002 (8) SCC 182; Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar
Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and
Charitable Trust vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 1996 (3) SCC
15, Held inapplicable. E

Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra 2000 II CLR 279; Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt.
Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. 2006
Ill LLJ 824 Born; Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana F
vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. 2008(10) SC 166,
referred to.
Case Law Reference:
2000 II CLR 279 Referred to. Paras 3, 4, 10, 11, G
12, 13, 15, 36, 37,
/'
38
(2006) Ill LLJ 824 Born Referred to. Para 10, 13
(1994) I CLR 187 Referred to. Paras 11, 36, 37,
H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
~ .
A 39, 40
1995 Supp. 3 SCC 28 Referred to. Paras 11, 36, 37
2004 (7) sec 68 Referred to. Paras 11, 40
2008 (10) SC 166 Referred to. Para 12
B
2003 (1) sec 692 Relied on. Para 19
2008 (7) sec 680 Referred to. Para 19 ~ ..
2003 (1) sec 433 Referred to. Para 19
c AIR 1995 SC 1395 Referred to. Para 19
2005 (12) sec 778 Referred to. Para 19
1997 (2) sec 53 Referred to. Para 20
1980 (2) sec 593 Referred to. Para 20
D 4
2005 (10) sec 437 Relied on. Para 24
2004 (5) sec 409 Referred to. Para 24
2004 (8) sec 402 Held inapplicable. Para 24
E 2003 (4) sec 200 Held inapplicable. Para 25
1912 (1) sec 209 Held inapplicable. Para 25
2003 (1) sec 81 Held inapplicable. Para 25 r

F 1994 (2) sec 434 Held inapplicable. Para 28
2001 (1) sec 467 Referred to. Para 28
2004 (8) sec 387 Held inapplicable. Para 28
2002 (1) sec 589 Held inapplicable. Para 28
G
2001 (8) sec 105 Referred to. Para 34
2001 (3) sec 100 Referred to. Para 35
2oos (3) sec 434 Referred to. Para 35
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON &631
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR.

1999 (4) sec 11 Referred to. Para 36 A
2002 (5) sec 111 Referred to. Para 36
2004 (10) sec 1 Referred to. Para 36

2008 (1) sec 494 Referred to. Paras 37, 38
B
2003(4) sec 200 Referred to. Para 37

! ~ 2001 (7) sec 140 Referred to. Para 37

AIR 1990 SC 781 Referred to. Para 37

1901 Appeal Cases 495 Referred to. Para 38 c
1987 (1) sec 213 Referred to. Para 38
2003 (2) sec 111 Referred to. Para 38
2004 (8) sec 579 Referred to. Para 38 D
2005 (8) sec 534 Relied on. Para 38
1883 (8) Appeal
Cases 658 Referred to. Para 40
1906 (1) Ch 179 Referred to. Para 40
E
1907 (1) KB 95 Referred to. Para 40
AIR 1962 SC 159 Referred to. Para 40
AIR 1964 SC 828 Referred to. Para 40
AIR 1988 SC 191 Referred to. Para 40 F

AIR 1988 SC 782 Referred to. Para 40
1991 (1) sec 86 Referred to. Para 40

2002 (8) sec 182 Held inapplicable. Para 41 G
1996 (3) sec 1s Held inapplicable. Para 41
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8452 of 2009.
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 30.8.2006 in WP No.
597/2001 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.

WITH

C.A. No. 8453 of 2009
B
SLP (C) ....... CC No. 4065 of 2007

SLP (C) ....... CC No. 4046 of 2007 ~

C.A. No. 8454-8455 of 2009

c C.A. No. 8457 of 2009
C.A. No. 8458 of 2009

Jamshed P. Cama (NP), Chander Uday Singh (NP), K.K.
Singhvi, Indira Jaising, Raghvendra S. Srivatsa, T.R. Venkat
D Subramanium, Abhijat P. Medh, Manish Kumar, Gopal Singh,
Pragya Baghel, Debmalya Banerjee, Animesh Sinha, Manik
Karanjawala, Nandini Gore, P.V. Dinesh, Sindhu T.P. P.S.
Sudheer, Lata Desai, Pallavi Divekar, Vimal Chandra S. Dave,
Nitin S. Tambwekar, B.S. Sai, K. Rajeev, Bharathi, Mehak G.
E Sethi, Naveen R. Nath, Arun R.Pendekar, Sanjay Kharde, Asha
Gopalan Nair, Vishnu Sharma, Shrish Kumar Misra, Rajesh
Kumar for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by "
F V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. This judgment will dispose of SLP
(Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP (Civil) No. 3624 of 2007, SLP
(Civil) .... CC No. 4065 of 2007, SLP (Civil) .... CC No. 4046
of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of 2007, SLP (Civil)
No. 20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600 of 2008.
G 2. Leave granted in SLP (Civil) No. 1982 of 2007, SLP
(Civil) No. 3624 of 2007, SLP (Civil) Nos. 13462-13463 of
2007, SLP (Civil) No. 20206 of 2007, and SLP (Civil) No. 9600
of 2008

H 3. Two concurrent judgments of the Full Bench of the
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 633
;. STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

Bombay High Court, one written by Hon'ble J.N. Patel and A
Hon'ble Roshan Dalvi, JJ. and a separate but concurrent
judgment authored by Hon'ble Deshmukh, J. have fallen for
consideration. The reference to Full Bench was occasioned on
account of the two Learned Judges of the Bombay High Court,
principally not agreeing with another Division Bench Judgment B
reported in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs.
'I State of Maharashtra [2000 II CLR 279] in its interpretation of
the term "unprotected worker" provided by Section 2( 11) of the
Maharashtra Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers
(Regulation of Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 (hereinafter c
referred to as 'Mathadi Act') and term "worker" provided by
Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The referring Bench was of
the opinion that the interpretation given to those two terms in
the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
• Maharashtra (cited supra) was in conflict with the statutory 0
provisions enacted by the Legislature in the said Mathadi Act.
The question referred to the Full Bench was as under:-

"In view of the statutory definition of the expression
"unprotected worker" in Section 2(11) of the Maharashtra
Mathadi, Hamal and other Manual Workers (Regulation of E
Employment and Welfare) Act, 1969 is the interpretation
placed by the Division Bench in Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, 2000 II CLR 279
on the aforesaid expression that it is only casually engaged
workers who come within the purview of the Act, correct F
and proper?"

In the two aforementioned judgments of the Bombay High
Court, the Learned Judges, writing the majority judgment,
recorded as under:-
G
"For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the interpretation
placed by the Division Bench in Century Textile and
Industries Ltd. & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
2000 II CLR 270 on the definition of the words "unprotected
worker" and "worker" for the purpose of applicability to H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Mathadi Act, 1969 that it is only the casual workmen who
come within the purview of the Act, is not correct and
proper and it is erroneous which deserves to be ignored
and is overruled."

The Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) gave
8
his final verdict in the following words:-
~
"To conclude, therefore, to my mind it is clear that within
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act "unprotected
worker" means every manual worker who is engaged or
C to be engaged in any scheduled employment, irrespective
of whether he is protected by other labour legislations or
not and "unprotected workers" within the meaning of the
Act are definitely not only those manual workers who are
casually engaged."
D
4. The above two judgments are challenged basically on
the contention that the judgment in the case of Century Textiles
& Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) is
essentially a correct judgment, while the view taken by the Full
Bench and the interpretation put forth by the same of the
E Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, is erroneous
inasmuch as the impugned judgments have ignored to take into
account the context in which these provisions have been ,
enacted and they also ignored the intention of the Legislature,
which is reflected from the Preamble and the other provisions
F of this Act.

5. Lengthy arguments were advanced before us. While
arguments on the side of appellants were led by Shri J.P.
Cama, Learned Senior Counsel, the arguments on behalf of
G respondents were led by Shri K.K. Singhvi and Ms. Indira
Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel.

6. Before taking up the issue, the short history of the
legislation is a must.
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 635
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
. t.
7. A Bill was introduced in the Maharashtra Legislature, A
being Bill No. XCIX of 1968 for regulating the employment of
unprotected manual workers employed in certain employments
in the State of Maharashtra to make provision for their
adequate supply and proper and full utilization in such
employments and for matters connected therewith. This Bill was B
first introduced in the Winter Sessions of Maharasthra
Legislature at Nagpur. It was then referred to the Joint
:4 Committee for its report. The basic idea behind bringing this
legislation, as it is reflected in Statement of Objects and
Reasons, was that persons engaged in occupations like c
mathadi, hamals, fishermen, salt pan workers, casual labour,
jatha workers and those engaged in similar manual work
elsewhere, were not receiving adequate protection and benefits
within the ambit of existing labour legislation. Therefore, with a
view to studying the conditions of the work of the persons
0
~ engaged in these occupations, the Government had appointed
a Committee on 15.7.1965 to examine whether relief could be
given to these workers within the ambit of the existing labour
legislation and make recommendation as to how such relief
could be given. The Statement of Objects and Reasons E
mentions that report was made by the Committee to the
Government on 17.11.1967. In that report, it was mentioned that
the persons engaged in vocations like mathadi, hamals, casual
workers employed in docks, lokhandi jatha workers, salt pan
workers and other manual workers mostly work outside fixed
premises in the open and are mostly engaged on piece-rate F
system in a number of cases. They are not employed directly,
but are either engaged through Mukadum or Toliwalas or gangs
as and when there is work and they also work for different
employers on one and the same day. The volume of work is
not always constant. In view of the peculiar nature of work, its G
variety, the precarious means of employment and the system
of payment and the particular vulnerability to exploitation of this
class of labour, the Committee had come to the conclusion that
the application of the various labour laws to such workers was
impracticable and regulation of their working and other H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A conditions by introducing amendments to the existing labour '
laws was not possible. Therefore, the Committee
recommended that the working and the employment conditions
of such unprotected workers should be regulated by a special
enactment.
B
8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons further mentions
that after holding series of meetings with the representatives
of the interests affected by the proposed legislation and after
considering all these suggestions and examining the
recommendations of the Committee, Government had decided
C to bring the Bill which seeks to regulate the employment of
mathadis, hamals and other manual workers employed in
certain employments, to make better provision for their terms
and conditions of employment, to provide for their welfare, for
health and safety measures, where such employments
D require those measures, to make provision for ensuring an
adequate supply to, and full and proper utilization of such
workers in such employments, to prevent avoidable
unemployment and for such purposes to provide for the
establishment of Boards in respect of these employments and
E (where necessary) in the different areas of the State and to
provide for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.
Ultimately, the Act came on the legal anvil vide Act No. XXX of
1969 after it received assent of the Vice President, acting on
behalf of the President on 5.6.1969. It was extended to the
F whole State of Maharashtra. It was clarified in Section 1 that it
applies to the employments specified in the Schedule and that
it shall come into force on such date as the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different
dates may be appointed for different areas, and for different
G provisions of the Act. The Act was amended from time to time
by Maharashtra Act Nos. 27 of 1972, 40 of 1974, 27 of 1977,
62of1981, 28of1987 and 27of1990. To begin with, it came
into force in Thane District in various areas. (Emphasis
supplied)
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 637
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
k
9. It will be better to see a few provisions of the Act. A
......--' Section 2, which is the definition clause, defines "Board" in sub-
Section (1), to mean a Board established under Section 6.
Some other sub-Sections of Section 2 runs as under:-

2(2) "contractor", in relation to an unprotected worker,
8
means a person who undertakes to execute any
work for an establishment by engaging such
workers on hire or otherwise, or who supplies such
worker either in groups, gangs (tollis), or as
individuals; and includes a sub-contractor, an agent,
a mukadum or a tolliwala;
c
2(3) "employer", in relation to any unprotected worker
engaged by or through contractor, means the
principal employer and in relation to any other
unprotected worker, the -person who has ultimate D
control over the affairs of the establishment, and
includes ar;iy other person to whom the affairs of
such establishment are entrusted, whether such
person is called an agent, manager or is called by
any other name prevailing in the scheduled E
employment;

2(4) "establishment" means any place or premises,
including the precincts thereof, in which or in any
part of which any scheduled employment is being
F
or is ordinarily carried on;

2(7) "principal employer" means an employer who
engages unprotected workers by or through a
contractor in any scheduled employment;
G
a '
2(11) "unprotected worker" means manual worker who
is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment;

2( 12) "worker" means a person who is engaged or to be
H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A engaged directly or through any agency, whethe~
for wages or not, to do manual work in anr'
-
scheduled employment, and includes any person
not employed by any employer or a contractor, but
working with the permission of, or under agreement
B with the employer or contractor; but does not
include the members of an employer's family;

2(13) "wages" means all remunerations expressed in
terms of money or capable of being so expressed
which would, if the terms of contract of employment,
c express or implied were, fulfilled, be payable to an
unprotected worker in respect of work done in any
scheduled employment, but does not include-

(i) the value of any house accommodation,
D supply of light, water, medical attendance; or
any other amenity or any service excluded
from the computation of wages by general or
special order of the State Government;

(ii) any contribution paid by the employer to any
E
pension fund or provident fund or under any
scheme of social insurance and the interest
which may have accrued thereon;

(iii) any travelling allowance or the value of any
F travelling concession;

(iv) any sum paid to the worker to defray special
expenses entailed on him by the nature of his
employment; or
G (v) any gratuity payable on discharge."

Some other Sections of the Act, which were referred to by
the Learned Senior Counsel during the arguments are as
under:-
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 639
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

3(1) For the purpose of ensuring an adequate supply A
and full and proper utilization of unprotected workers
in scheduled employments, and generally for
making better provision for the terms and condition
of employment of such workers, the State
Government may by means of a scheme provide for B
the registration of employers and unprotected
workers in any scheduled employment or
employments and provide for the terms and
conditions of work of registered unprotected
workers and make provision for the general welfare c
in such employments.

3(2) In particular, a scheme may provide for all or any .
of the following matters that is to say:-

(a)-(c) x x x x x x D

(d) for regulating the employment of registered
unprotected workers, and the terms and
conditions of such employment, including
rates of wages, hours of work, maternity E
benefit, overtime payment, leave with wages,
provision for gratuity and conditions as to
weekly and other holidays and pay in respect
thereof;

(e) for securing that, in respect of periods during F
which employment or full employment is not
available to registered unprotected workers
though they are available for work, such
unprotected workers will, subject to the

- ~
(f)
conditions of the scheme, receive a minimum G
wage;

for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise
controlling the employment of unprotected
workers to whom the scheme does not apply, H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A and the employment of unprotected workers
'
by employers to whom the scheme does not
apply;

(g) for the welfare of registered unprotected
workers covered by the scheme insofar as
B
satisfactory provision therefor, does not
exist, apart from the scheme;

(h) for health and safety measures in place
where the registered unprotected workers
c are engaged, insofar as satisfactory
provision therefor, is required but does not
exist, apart from the scheme;

5. If any question arises whether any scheme applies
to any class of unprotected workers or employers,
D
the matter shall be referred to the State Government '
and the decision of the State Government on the
question, which shall be taken after consulting the
Advisory Committee constituted under Section 14,
shall be final.
E
7(1) The Board shall be responsible for administering
a scheme, and shall exercise such powers and
perform such functions as may be conferred on it
by the scheme.
F
7(2) The Board may take such measures as it may
deem fit for administering the scheme.

7(3) The Board shall submit to the State Government,
as soon as may be, after the 1st of April every year,
G and not later than the 31st day of October, an annual
report on the working of the scheme during the > -
preceding year ending on the 31st day of March of
that year. Every report so received shall be laid as
soon as may be after it is received before each
H
BHUWALKA STEEL !NOUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 641
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]

House of the State Legislature, if it is in session, A
or in the session immediately following the date of
receipt of the report.

7(4) In exercise of the powers and discharge of its
functions, the Board shall be bound by such
B
directions, as the State Government may, for reason
to be stated in writing, give to it from time to time.
~
15(1) The Board may appoint such persons as it thinks
fit to be Inspectors possessing the prescribed
qualifications for the purpose of this Act or of any c
scheme and may define the limits of their
jurisdiction.

15(2) Subject to any rules made by the State Government
in this behalf, an Inspector may- D
{a) enter and search at all reasonable hours, with such
assistants as he thinks fit, any premises or place,
where unprotected workers are employed, or work
is given out to unprotected workers in any
scheduled employment, for the purpose of E
examining any register, record of wages or notices
required to be kept or exhibited under any scheme,
and require the production thereof, for inspection;

(b) examine any person whom he finds in any such F
premises or place and who, he has reasonable
cause to believe, is an unprotected worker
employed therein or an unprotected worker to whom
work is given out therein;
G
(c) require any person giving any work to an
.... unprotected worker or to a group of unprotected
"·
workers to give any information, which is in his
power to give, in respect of the names and
addresses of the persons to whom the work is
H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A given, and in respect of payments made, or to be
made, for the said work;

(d) seize or take copies of such registers, records of
wages or notices or portions thereof, as he may
consider relevant, in respect of an offence under this
B
Act or scheme, which he has reason to believe has
been committed by an employer; and

(e) exercise such other powers as may be prescribed: 'f,

c Provided that, no one shall be required under the
provisions of this section to answer any question or
make any statement tending to incriminate himself.

15(3) Every Inspector appointed under this section shall
be deemed to be public servant within the meaning
D
of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.

21. Nothing contained in this Act shall affect any rights
or privileges, which any registered unprotected
worker employed in any scheduled employment is
E entitled to, on the date on which this Act comes into
force, under any other law, contract, custom or
usage applicable to such worker, if such rights or
privileges are more favourable to him than those to
which he would be entitled under this Act and the
F scheme:

Provided that such worker will not be entitled
to receive any corresponding benefit under the
provisions of this Act and the scheme.
G 22. The State Government may, after consulting the
Advisory Committee, by notification in the Official
Gazette, and subject to such conditions and for such
....'

period as may be specified in the notification,
exempt from the operation of all or any of the
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 643
~
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

provisions of this Act or any scheme made A
thereunder, all or any class or classes of
unprotected workers employed in any scheduled
employment, or in any establishment or part of any
establishment of any scheduled employment, if in
the opinion of the State Government all such B
unprotected workers or such class or classes of
workers, are in the enjoyment of benefits which are
on the whole not less favourable to such
unprotected workers than the benefits provided by
or under this Act or any scheme framed thereunder: c

Provided that before any such notification is issued,
the State Government shall publish a notice of its
intention to issue such notification, and invite
objections and suggestions in respect thereto, and
no such notification shall be issued until the D
objections and suggestions have been considered
and a period of one month has expired from the
date of first publication of the notice in the Official
Gazette:
E
Provided further that the State Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, at any time, for
' reasons to be specified, rescind the aforesaid
notification.
F
10. It is in the backdrop of these provisions generally that
it has to be seen as to whether the interpretation put forward
by the Full Bench in two separate but concurrent judgments, is
correct or not. Though the question referred to the Full Bench

.... '\
was restricted to the correctness of the interpretation of the term
'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act as G
given in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State
of Maharashtra (cited supra), in our opinion, the scope of the
question has to be properly understood. In that case, it was held
by the Division Bench of that Court that the workers who were
working in the factory of the petitioner could not be termed as H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 'unprotected workers'. It was held specifically that the Mathadi
Act did not deal with the employees engaged on monthly basis,
as such workers were protected under the Shops and
Establishments Act and other enactments. It was further held
that it was only the casually engaged workmen, who would
B come within the purview of the Mathadi Act. The High Court
further said that where the material produced on record clearly
show that the workmen are protected workmen, more ~

particularly, with reference to the Agreement under Section 2(p)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Act in question would
c not apply. Therefore, the referred question was whether it was
only casually engaged workers, who came within the purview
of the Act. The majority judgment gave a straight answer to this
question that the meaning of the term 'unprotected worker' was
only the casual workman, was not correct, while the Learned
D
Single Judge did not stop at that and gave a broader answer .. 1

interpreting Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and held that every
manual worker engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment, irrespective of whether he is protected by other
labour legislations or not, would be termed as 'unprotected
worker', and further that the definition was not restricted to those
E
manual workers who are casually engaged. Though the
judgment of the Learned Single Judge was criticized by Shri
J.P. Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that it "1
went beyond the reference made, we feel that the Learned
Single Judge has not travelled beyond the reference. The
F reference has to be read as requiring the correct interpretation
of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term 'unprotected
worker' and, therefore, in our opinion, it would have to be

G
explained as to what is the true scope and meaning of the term
'unprotected worker' as envisaged by Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act. In that, the debate cannot be restricted to the
narrower question as to whether the term means only the
casually engaged workers. In our opinion, the true impact of the
f
...
term 'unprotected worker' has to be considered and it will have
also to be pointed out as to who can be said to be 'unprotected
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 645
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

worker'. The objection in that behalf raised by the appellant to A
the Full Bench judgment is not correct. When we see the
judgment in Kay Kay Embroideries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Cloth Market
and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. [2006 Ill LLJ 824 Born], it
is clear that the Court had posed two questions:-
B
(i) Whether the expression 'unprotected worker'

. ~
means a worker not protected by labour legislation
or whether the expression means a manual worker
who is engaged or to be engaged in any scheduled
employment as defined in Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act?
c
(ii) Whether a Mathadi worker, who has been engaged
directly by an employer, would fall outside the
purview of the Mathadi Act?
~ D
The Division Bench in this case did not agree with the
judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs.
State of Maharashtra (cited supra). The referring judgment
clearly goes on to show that it did not agree with the narrower
judgment in the case of Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs.
E
State of Maharashtra (cited supra), but it cannot be forgotten
that the two questions framed by it clearly show that the
consideration could not be restricted to the narrower question
\
as to whether the view taken in the case of Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) was
F
correct or not, instead the question which arose for
consideration on account of the two Benches not agreeing was
as to what was the true scope of the definition of the expression
'unprotected worker' in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.

- ~
Considering the clear language and the questions considered
in the referring judgment by Hon'ble F.K. Rebello and Dr. D.Y. G
Chandrachud, JJ., we feel that the Learned Single Judge did
not exceed the question referred in considering the full scope
of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and the term
'unprotected worker'. We will, therefore, proceed on the basis
that the Full Bench had to decide the true scope of the term H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
'•
A 'unprotected worker' as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi
Act and to point out as to who could be covered under that
definition.

11. Basically, the contentions raised by the parties are as
follows:
B
Legal Submissions on behalf of the A~~ellants
~ <
A. Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act cannot be
interpreted independently of Section 2(12) of the
c Mathadi Act, which is the definition of 'worker' and
conjoined reading of these two Sections in the light
of other provisions of the Act would clearly bring out
that those workers who are regularly employed and
who have the protection of other labour legislations,
D cannot be termed as 'unprotected workers'. For
that purpose, the two Sections cannot be '
interpreted merely on the basis of plain meaning of
the language of the Sections, instead the
interpretation has to be done taking into
consideration the context of the Mathadi Act, the
E Statement of Objects and Reasons and legislative
history of the Act. Shri J.P. Gama, Learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants further contended that )'

the Full Bench had erred in interpreting the said
definition in isolation and not in the context of the
F Act. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the
Mathadi Act was intended to cover only itinerant
workers doing manual works for short time periods.

B. The Learned Senior Counsel further argued that if
G the literal interpretation is accepted, as has been
done by the Full Bench, number of other provisions
in the Act like Section 15(2)(b) would be rendered
otiose and redundant, so also other anomalies
y
-
would creep in. The Learned Senior Counsel also
H urged that the Full Bench had erred in ignoring the
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 647
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]

doctrine of stare decisis, inasmuch as the provision A
had received consistent interpretation for a
considerable period and hence, that interpretation
was liable to be respected, particularly because the
rights and obligations of the parties covered by this
Act had remained settled for a long period of time. B
Therefore, even if the earlier interpretation might not
be strictly correct or where two views were possible,
the settl~d principle of law could not be unsettled.
The Learned Senior Counsel contended that the law
was settled by two judgments of the Bombay High c
Court by Hon'ble Rege, J. in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. vs.
State of Maharashtra [Misc. Petition No. 150 of
1973] pronounced on 19.4.1974 and S.B. More &
Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [Misc. Petition
No. 414 of 1973] pronounced on 24.4.1974 and
D
four other Division Bench Judgments in Lallubhai
Kevaldas & Anr. vs. The State of Maharashtra &
Ors. [Writ Petition No. 119 of 1979] pronounced on
16.1.1980, lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port
Trust [1994 I CLR 187], Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited E
supra) including this Court judgment in Maharashtra
Rajya Mathadi Transport and Central Kamgar
Union vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1995 Supp.
3 sec 28J.
F
C. The Learned Senior Counsel further relied on the
Rule of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et
Fortissima In Lege. According to the Learned
Senior Counsel, the Full Bench should have
considered how the authorities themselves G
construed and understood the law. In that behalf, the
ruling in Godawat Pan Masala Products l.P. Ltd. &
Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. [2004(7) SCC 68]
was relied upon heavily. Reference was made by
the Learned Senior Counsel to few letters to show H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A as to how the authorities themselves understood
the term 'unprotected worker'. In this behalf the
judgment in lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port
Trust [1994 I CLR 187] was heavily relied.

D. Reference was also made to Article 254 of the
B
Constitution of India and it was suggested that in
the matters falling in the Concurrent List, the Central
Legislation will supersede the State Legislation if
both cover the same field. It was suggested that
there was no need for direct conflict between the
c two enactments and the repugnancy arises even if
obedience to both laws is possible. Further, the
Learned Senior Counsel suggested that specific
contradictions between the two Statutes is not the
only criteria. It is enough if Parliament had evinced
D the intention to cover the whole field. It was also ~
suggested that the Presidential assent given to this
Act was irrelevant to those Central Acts, which were
enacted after the assent, for example, the Contract
Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
E Therefore, it was pointed out that State Act cannot
survive if the Central Act covers the same category
of workers. It was tried to be pointed out that there
was nothing on record to indicate as to what extent ,
the Presidential assent was obtained. It was,
F therefore, contended that Central labour
enactments, which firstly create and regulate the
employer-employee relationship and those which
confer the benefits to such employees, would
exclude the operation of Mathadi Act and as a
G result, those workers who enjoy the benefits under
the Central labour legislation and whose rights are . ,
regulated by the Central legislation would not be
covered by the present State legislation. Reliance
was also placed on various reports like 1963
Committee Report, the Report of the Lokhandi
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 649
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.)

Jatha Kamgar Enquiry Committee to harp uponthe A
real object of the enactment and it was suggested
that the definition read in the light of these reports
would clearly bring out the interpretation suggested
i
by the appellant. Various Sections were referred
like Section 4(a), Sections 15, 21 and 22 to show B
that the interpretation given by the Full Bench would
lead to absurdity.

12. As against this, Shri K.K. Singhvi and Smt. Indira
Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Vimal C
Chandra S. Dave, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents raised various contentions.

Legal Submissions on behalf of the respondents

A. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents o
contended that in the absence of any ambiguity, no
harm can be caused to the plain language of the
Statute. According to all the Learned Counsel,
impugned judgments of the Full Bench of the
Bombay High Court were in accordance with the E
plain language of the----Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of
the Mathadi Act. Numbers of authorities for this
proposition were relied upon. Reliance was also
placed on Sections 21 and 22 of the Mathadi Act
and Clauses 4(c), 11(3), 16(3), 16(4), 16(5), 33,
F
35(6) and 36 of the Scheme framed under the
Mathadi Act. In short, it was contended that under
Section 21, the workmen could retain the privileges
and benefits under any Act, Award or Contract, if
such privileges were better than the ones offered
by the Act and in that sense, even if the manual G
worker was protected under the vanous labour laws,
he could still be governed by the Mathadi Act.
Same argument was in respect of Section 22 of the
Mathadi Act, providing that a manual worker, who
is in receipt of better benefits from his employer H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R

A either on the date of commencement of this Act or
at any time thereafter, he could seek exemption
from all or any of the provisions of the Mathadi Act.
Reference was made to Clauses 4(c), 11 (3), 16(3),
16(4), 16(5), 33, 35(6) and 36 of the Scheme
B framed under the Mathadi Act.

B. It was further contended that the argument on behalf
of the appellant that the intention of the Legislature
should be ascertained with reference to the history
of legislation, the reports of the Committee, notes
c on the Clauses of the Bill and debates in Assembly,
was erroneous as the plain meaning of the Section
was not susceptible to any other meaning. It was,
however, further contended that the language of the
Section was clear and unequivocal and even if
D such extraneous aids of the interpretation were to
be relied upon, no other interpretation could be
obtained. It was pointed out that though in the Bill,
as originally introduced, the words "is not
adequately protected by legislation" were to be
E found and though the note on the Clauses also
mentioned about such
.......,-;:.-. non-protection
,' ,,,__ by the welfare
Legislature, the amended Bill omitted those words,
so also the necessary amendments were made in
Item 5 of the Schedule attached to the Bill.
F Therefore, the Learned Counsel argued that there
was a clear, deliberate and cautious intendment to
include all manual workers engaged in the
scheduled employment, whether protected by any
labour law or not, in the definition of "protected
G worker''. The Learned Counsel further argued that
there could be no practical difficulties in such
workers being registered with the Board and the
fear expressed by the Learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of the appellant was not realistic. It was
H pointed out that if the service conditions of a
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 651
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]

workman were better before the commencement of A
the Mathadi Act, he would still continue to be
benefited by those better conditions and as such,
there was no anomaly created by giving the plain
meaning to the Section depending upon its
language. The argument that giving the plain B
meaning would deprive the workers of the
protection under Bombay Industrial Relations Act,
1946 of raising industrial disputes before the
Labour Court and the Industrial Court, was also
termed as incorrect argument, as firstly, there was c
no vested right for selecting the forum and secondly,
the Legislature had the competence to enact
special laws for a class or section of workmen for
improving their conditions of service and such
special law would always prevail over any general
0
law covering the same field. The cases relied upon
by the appellants were distinguished on various
grounds. This was especially done in the case of
Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak Sangathana vs.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors. [2008(10) E
SC 166]. It was also pointed out that the scheme
of Security Guards was different from the scheme
of the Act, as in the scheme of the Act, a directly
recruited Security Guard was specifically excluded
from the provisions of the Security Guards Act.
F
C. As regards the doctrine of stare decisis relied upon
by the appellants, it was pointed out that in both the
judgments of Hon'ble Rege, J. in C. Jairam Pvt.
Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and S.B.
More & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited G
~ supra), the Learned Judge has called upon the
constitutionality of the certain provisions of the
Cotton Merchants Unprotected Workers (Regulation
of Employment and Welfare) Scheme, 1972 and in
that sense, the question 0f interpretation of Section H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
•
A 2(11) did not fall for consideration in those cases.
Similarly in the matter of Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr.
vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra)
decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court on 16. 1. 1980, the Division Bench was not
B called upon to decide the interpretation of Section
2( 11 ). Therefore, it could not be said that that case
depended upon the interpretation of Section 2(11 ).
Even as regards the decision in Century Textiles
& Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited
c supra), the question was limited to the extent
whether a manual worker engaged by the petitioner
therein through a contractor was an unprotected
worker although he was covered by various labour
acts. It was pointed out that the referring judgment
itself differed with the view expressed in the
D
decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs.
State of Maharashtra (cited supra). It was,
therefore, pointed out that it could not be said that
there was a breach of doctrine of stare decisis in
giving a contrary meaning of Section 2( 11) as it was
E pointed out that the doctrine of stare decisis was
not an absolute doctrine and that it was for this Court
to lay down the correct law under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India.

F D. As regards the Rule of Contemporanea Expositio
Est Optima Et Fortissima In Lege, the argument
was that there was no evidence that the law makers,
or as the case may be, the Government understood
the scheme in the particular manner. Even
G otherwise, it was pointed out that such
interpretation, if it was palpably correct, could not
be accepted. To the same effect, was the argument
by Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents.
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 653
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
• i

13. It is on the basis of these conflicting arguments that A
we have to proceed to decide the true interpretations of the
Section. In the referring judgment by the Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court, consisting of Hon'ble F.K. Rebello and Dr.
D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ. In the case of Kay Kay Embroideries
Pvt. Ltd. vs. Cloth Market and Shops Board, Mumbai & Ors. B
(cited supra), the Division Bench made reference to paras 31
and 41 of the judgments. The Division Bench accepted the
-'r
contentions raised on behalf of the Board that the Division
Bench in the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs.
State of Maharashtra (cited supra) adopted a meaning, which c
could be attributed in common parlance to the expression
"unprotected worker", totally ignoring the plain meaning of the
expression as defined in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.
Relying on Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, wherein the
expression "worker" was defined, the Bench further held that
t D
when the Legislature uses the 'means and includes' formula,
the intention of the legislature is to provide an exhaustive
definition,· and in such a case, the inclusive part of the definition
brings within the fold of the expression objects or activities
which would ordinarily not fall within the purview of the definition.
E
Carrying the logic further, the Bench held that by the inclusive
part, the definition included a person who is not employed by
any employer or a contractor, but who works with the permission
'\
or under agreement with the employer or contractor. On the
same logic, the Bench went on to hold that:-
F
"Once the Act defines the expression 'unprotected worker',
the definition in the Act provides a statutory dictionary
which the Court is under the bounden duty to apply in
construing the provisions of the Act. It is not open to the
Court to adopt a meaning of the expression 'unprotected G
worker' at variance with what has been legislated by the
competent legislature."

It was pointed out further that if the legislature intended that
the benefit of Act could not be availa!:'le to workers who were
H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A otherwise governed by some other industrial legislation, it was
open to the legislature to legislate accordingly and it was,
therefore, that the Division Bench did not agree with the
decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra (cited supra). It was also pointed out by the
B Division Bench that the notes on Clauses appended to the Bill
did not override express statutory provisions. A reference was
then made to Section 22 of the Mathadi Act and the same logic
was used as was relied and argued by the Learned Counsel
for the respondents before us.
c 14. On these conflicting claims, we have to interpret
Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act and also the scope of the
definition in the Section. We have already quoted the provisions
of Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the Mathadi Act in the earlier
part of the judgment. There can be no dispute that the term
D "worker" is used in the definition of "unprotected worker" in
Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore, while considering
the Section 2(11), the scope of the term "worker", which is
separately defined by Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act, would
have to be taken into consideration. The definition of the term
E "worker" is an inclusive definition. It includes a worker, who is
engaged by the employer directly or through any agency and it
is not necessary that such worker gets the wages or not. The
term "wages" is also defined vide Section 2(13) of the Mathadi
Act. Therefore, even if such person does not earn the wages,
F as contemplated in Section 2(13), such person who is engaged
to do manual work in any scheduled employment, would be a
worker. Further, even if such worker is not employed in the strict
sense of the term by an employer or a contractor, but is working
with the permission or under the agreement with the employer
G or contractor, even then such worker would be a "worker'' within
the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Mathadi Act. The only
exception is that such worker should not be a member of
employer's family. As per the plain meaning, when such worker
is engaged or is to be engaged in the scheduled employment,
H he becomes the unprotected worker. It has been correctly held
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 655
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
j in the judgment of the Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble A
Deshmukh, J.) that these two definitions ("worker" and
"unprotected worker") given in Sections 2(11) and 2(12) of the
Mathadi Act would have to be read together for realizing the
scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. Therefore,
insofar as the language of Section 2(11) is concerned, it is B
plain, unambiguous and clear. It means that every worker, who
• is doing manual work and is engaged or to be engaged in any
scheduled employment, would be covered by that definition and
-t
would become an unprotected worker. The question is whether
we should accept this plain language. The appellants take C,I
strong exception to this approach.

15. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants contended in no uncertain terms that
the reliance on the plain meaning of the Section, as it appears,
would not only be hazardous, but would also lead to absurdity. D
i According to him, while interpreting Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act, it cannot be done bereft of the context of the
legislation. Our attention was invited to Statement of Objects
and Reasons, as also the legislative history of the legislation.
According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the acceptance of E
such plain meaning would result in rendering some other
provisions of the Act, otiose. Further, such interpretation would
also hit doctrine of stare decisis, as the interpretation of this
doctrine prior to the impugned Full Bench Judgment and more
particularly given in various judgments of the Bombay High F
Court including judgment in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd.
vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) has remained intact for
more than 25 years, which is a long period. The further
contention is that such interpretation would also be violative of
the doctrine of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optima Et G

- 'f
Fortissima In Lege, since the relevant authorities have
consistently understood the meaning of that definition in a
particular way and now, there would be no justification to disturb
that understanding. It was also suggested by Shri Cama that
the provisions of State Act cannot survive if the Central Act H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
•
A covers the same category of workers and in this case, such
workers who were covered by the other Central Acts could not
have been brought under the cover of the definition in Section
2( 11) of the Mathadi Act, it being a State Act. The Learned
Senior Counsel, therefore, suggested that those workers, who
B enjoy the benefits under the Central labour legislation and whose
rights were regulated by the Central legislations, have to be held
outside the definition in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. 'I"

16. The respondents, however, relied on the principle that
where the language of the Statute is clear and unequivocal,
c there would be no need to go to the extraneous aids of the
interpretation and the plain meaning of the language has to be
accepted as the correct interpretation. In fact, according to Shri
Singhvi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, it was not necessary to interpret the provision of
D Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act, since the language of that
Section was extremely clear, which clearly expressed the
deliberate and the cautious intention of the legislature to include
all manual workers engaged in scheduled employment, whether
protected by any labour law or not, in the definition of
E "unprotected worker". Shri Singhvi also dispelled the argument
that the number of other provisions in the Act would be rendered
otiose by acceptance of the clear and unequivocal meaning
displayed by the language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.

F 17. As regards the argument on the principle of stare
decisis, the Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that there will
be no question of allowing a totally wrong interpretation to
remain on the legislative scene, particularly in view of the clear
cut meaning, which could be attached because of the plain and
G
unequivocal language of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. At
any rate, the Learned Senior Counsel contended that the
doctrine of stare decisis was not an absolute doctrine.
¥ -
18. Even as regards the rule of Contemporanea Expositio
Est Optima Et Forlissima In Lege, the Learned Senior Counsel
H argued that there was no evidence that the law makers, or as
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 657
., ;. STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

the case may be, the Government, understood the scheme in A
a particular manner.

19. We have already pointed out that the plain meaning
of the language is almost a rule and it is only by way of an
exception that the external aids of interpretation can be used. B
In the case of Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla & Ors.
[2003(1) SCC 692), this Court has reiterated that where the
-r language of the Statue is clear and unambiguous, the external
aids for interpretation should be avoided. In Cable Corporation
of India vs. Addi. Commissioner of Labour [2008 (7) SCC
680), this Court observed in Para 16 that when the language
c
is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no
question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks
for itself. There can be no dispute that the language of Section
2( 11) of the Mathadi Act is not capable of any other meaning
- J since it is clear and unambiguous. Some debate went on about D
the use of the word "means", which is to be found in the
concerned Section. It was contended by Shri Singhvi, Learned
Senior Counsel for the respondents that when a definition of
the word begins with "means", it is indicative of the fact that the
meaning of the word is restricted, that is to say, it would not E
mean anything else, but what has been indicated in the
definition itself. In support of this proposition, he relied on the
decision in Feroz N. Dotivala vs. P.M. Wadhwani [2003(1)
SCC 433). The Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that
in the decision in P. Kasilingam & Ors. vs. P.S.G. College of F
Technology & Ors. [AIR 1995 SC 1395), it has been held by
•
this Court t~iat the use of the IJl.!Ord "means" indicates that the
definition is a hard and fast definition and no other meaning
can be assigned to the expression than that is put down in the
definition. We have already referred to the decision in Bhaiji G
'1' vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla & Ors. (cited supra). All
these three judgments indicate that, firstly, where the language
of the provision is plain and unambiguous, than that is the only
avenue available while interpreting the same. We may also say
as we have already expressed that once the language of the H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

~
A Section is absolutely clear, there is hardly any scope for
interpretation. This position is then further crystallized by the
user of the word "means", which then positively rules aside any
other meaning than the one which is dependent upon the plain
and unambiguous language of the provision. One more
8 decision of this Court, which was heavily relied upon by the
respondents was Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini
[2005(12) sec 778], wherein in para 21, it was observed:-
~
"The golden rule of construction is that when the words of
the legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be
c given to them. The basic principle on which this rule is
based is that since the words must have spoken as clearly
to legislatures, as to judges, it may be safely presumed
that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. The
legislative intent of the enactment may be gathered from
D several sources which are, from the statute itself, from the
preamble to the statute, from the Statement of Objects and
~
-
Reasons, from the legislative debates, reports of
committees and commissions which preceded the
legislation and finally from all legitimate and admissible ...
E sources from where they may be allowed. Reference may
be had to legislative history and latest legislation also. But,
the primary rule of construction would be to ascertain the
plain language used in the enactment which advances
the purpose and object of the legislation ............ " "
F
(Emphasis supplied)

20. However, Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the
.
appellants submitted that in this case, unless the context is taken
into account, it would lead to absurd and unintended result. The
G Learned Senior Counsel urged that the definition cannot and
should not be mechanically applied. He has relied on the )'

decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Asstt. Commercial
Tax Officer & Ors. [1994 (2) SCC 434]. About the principles
to be borne in mind while interpreting a definition, the Learned
H Senior Counsel has relied on the decision in K. V. Muthu vs.
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 659
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

Angamuthu Ammal [1997(2) SCC 53], wherein in para 11, this A
Court has observed that the interpretation placed on a definition
;..
should not only be repugnant to the context, but it should also
be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose, which
is sought to be served by the Act. This Court further held that a
construction which would defeat or is likely to defeat the B
purpose of the Act, has to be ignored and not accepted. The
"I
Learned Senior Counsel also relied on the decision in Gujarat
Steel Tubes Ltd. & Ors. vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
SaQha & Ors. [1980(2) SCC 593] and contended that the
statutory construction, which fulfills the mandate of the statute, c
must find favour with the judges, except where the words and
the context rebel against such flexibility. This Court, in this case
observed:-

"We would prefer to be liberal rather than lexical when
~ reading the meaning of industrial legislation which D
develops from day to day in the growing economy of India."

Once it is held that the meaning of the Section is clear on
the basis of the unambiguous language used, it should ordinarily
be end of the matter. However, Shri Cama and his other E
colleagues Shri C.U. Singh, Shri Sudhir Talsania and Shri S.S.
Naganand, Learned Senior Counsel and Shri Manish Kumar,
~ Shri Gopal Singh, Ms. Pragya Baghel, Shri Debmalya
Banerjee, Shri Animesh Sinha, Smt. Manik Karanjawala, Ms.
Nandini Gore, Shri Raghvendra S. Srivatsav, Shri T.R. Venkat F

- Subramanium, Shri Abhijit P. Medh, Shri P.V. Dinesh, Ms.
Sindhu T.P. and Shri P.S. Sudheer, Learned Counsel argued
that the legislative history of the statute would militate against
the language and to accept the meaning from the plain language
would be completely out of context. Shri Cama and his
- l' colleagues also heavily relied upon the history, which led to the
G
introduction of the Bill, as also the Statement of Objects and
Reasons for introducing the Bill in the legislature by the then
Hon'ble Labour Minister. We were also taken through the
debates, as also the Statement of Objects and Reason.s
H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A presented to the State legislature on 19. 12. 1968 by the then
Hon'ble Labour Minister. Our attention was invited to the basic
definition of the "unprotected worker", which was as follows:-

"2(11) 'Unprotected worker' has been defined to mean a
manual worker, who but for the provisions of this Act, is
B
not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and
benefits of the labour force in the State."
'+
21. Relying heavily on the Report of the "Mathadi Labour
Enquiry Committee, Greater Bombay, 1963", Shri Cama,
c Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to para 2 thereof,
which refers to "such labourers", who are deprived of regular
wage-scales, permanency, earned leave, bonus, provident fund,
gratuity, medical benefits, compensation, pension etc. It was
argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel appearing
D on behalf of the appellants that in Chapter 6 thereof, under the
~
heading "Employer and Employee relationship", there is
expression "the real difficulty is that there is no 'employer' as
such". It was also pointed out that the difficulty, which was felt
was that the employment of the worker was only through the
E contractor and technically, there was no direct relationship of
employer and employee, as between the Mills of Factories and
the Mathadi workers. Similar was the case with the merchants,
traders and other concerns as they engage the labour through
Mukadam or Toliwala and such Mukadam or Toliwala engaged
F his men or the workers with him and paid wages to them and,
therefore, technically, there was no direct relationship of the
employer and employee, as between the merchants or
concerns and the workers. It was also argued that if the direct
relationship was established, such benefits would flow to the
-
Mathadi workers. From this, the Learned Senior Counsel
G
argued that where there is a direct relationship in case of the
I
monthly workers, there would be no question of applying this
broad definition to such workers. It was also pointed out that
the Committee considered that there was a positive reluctance
to appoint these workers as the direct employees and only a
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON &661
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

few merchants expressed their willingness to accept the workers A

. as their direct employees, and there was also reluctance on the
part of the workers to be employed directly. This was obviously
with a view to argue that what was contemplated by the
Committee was not for the direct workers and, therefore, the
directly appointed workers would be outside the definition of B
.... "unprotected worker". Shri Singh also carried on his argument
further relying on the para 13 under the head "Adjudication" and
"(
pointed out the following observations:-

"13. The labour laws in force are not applicable to the
Mathadi workers and thus they are without any
c
remedy at law. To obtain amelioration of the
conditions of their work and wages, they are
inevitably led to organize 'Morchas' or stage
'Strikes'. To avoid such exigencies as also to enable
them to obtain the other benefits, it is necessary to D
' provide for them a remedy at law."

22. Our attention was also invited to some portions of the
Report of the "Lokhandi Jatha Kamgar Enquiry Committee,
December, 1965" and its working. We were also taken through E
para 13 of Chapter IV thereof titled "Application of labour laws".
-
23. We were also taken through the Report of the
'(
"Committee for Unprotected Labour, 1967" and more
particularly, through Chapter II thereof titled "Conditions existing
in the Avocations", as also Chapter IV titled "Reasons, F
Conclusions and Recommendations and draft outline of the
legislation". The contents, which were heavily relied upon are:-

"The persons engaged in the avocations like hamals,
mathadis, casual workers employed in Docks, Lokhandi G
~-
Jatha workers, Salt Pan workers mostly work outside fixed
premises in open space. Most of the persons are engaged
on piece rate system. In a number of cases they are not
employed directly but are either engaged through
Mukadams or Tolliwalas as and when there is work. The H
..

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A persons in a number of cases, work for different persons
on one and the same day. In view of the peculiar nature of
work and the system of payment, the application of the
various labour laws to such workers has become difficult.
The rickshaw pullers who are not self employed are also
B pulling the rickshaw taken on hire. The question of
regulation of the working and other conditions of such
't
persons, therefore, is not possible by introducing
amendments to the existing labour laws. The object can
be achieved if a special legislation is prepared for the
c purpose by incorporating beneficial provisions of the
important labour enactments applicable to similar workers
employed in regular establishments and factories."

From this, the argument was tried to be developed by Shri
Cama and Shri Singh that the objective was very clear and ...
D under the same what was contemplated was only the cases of
those workers who were not directly engaged and as such, the
term "unprotected worker" should be interpreted to exclude all
the directly appointed workers employed in the factories, even
if they are working in the scheduled employments.
E
24. We were also taken through the Objects and Reasons
and Preamble and a very strong argument was advanced that r
if the definition is read in that light, there would be no question
of accepting the literal interpretation. In our opinion, in view of
the clear and settled law of interpretation, it would really not be
F
necessary to go into these contentions, particularly, because
the law is very clear that where the language is clear and admits
of no doubts, it is futile to look for the meaning of the provision
on the basis of these external aids. It is possible where the
plain meaning rungs counter to the objects or creates absurdity 1
G or doubts by attributing that plain language. In our considered
opinion, it is very difficult to find out any such absurdity or
contradiction if the plain language of the Section 2(11) is
accepted and acted upon for the purposes of interpretation. It
must, at this juncture, be noted that inspite of Section 2(11 ),
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON &663
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
' which included the words "but for the provisions of this Act is A
not adequately protected by legislation for welfare and benefits
of the labour force in the State", these precise words were
removed by the legislature and the definition was made limited
as it has been finally legislated upon. It is to be noted that when
the Bill came to be passed and received the assent of the Vice B
President on 5.6.1969 and was first published in Maharashtra
Government Gazette Extraordinary Part IV on 13.6.2009, the
aforementioned words were omitted. Therefore, this would be
a clear pointer to the legislative intent that the legislature being
conscious of the fact and being armed with all the Committee c
Reports and also being armed with the factual data,
deliberately avoided those words. What the appellants are
asking was to read in that definition, these precise words, which
were consciously and deliberately omitted from the definition.
That would amount to supplying the casus omissus and we do
D
not think that it is possible, particularly, in this case. The law of
supplying the casus omissus by the Courts is extremely clear
and settled that though this Court may supply the casus
omissus, it would be in the rarest of the rare cases and thus
supplying of this casus omissus would be extremely necessary
due to the inadvertent omission on the part of the legislature. E
But, that is certainly not the case here. [See Decision in State
\ of Jharkhand & Anr. vs. Govind Singh (2005 (10) SCC 437)].
Reliance was also placed on the decision in Ramesh Mehta
vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. [2004 (5) SCC 409 (Paras
27 and 28)], wherein it was held that the definition is not to be F
read in isolation and it must be read iii the context of the
phrase which would define it. It should not be vague or
ambiguous and the definition of the words must be given a
meaningful application; where the context makes the definition
\ given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the same G
meaning cannot be assigned. We must point out here that this
ratio will not apply for the simple reason that the definition given
in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act is extremely clear and there
is no vagueness or ambiguity about it. We have already pointed
out that even if it is read in the context, we cannot ignore the H
---
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A fact that the legislature had deliberately deleted the words "but
for the provisions of this Act is not adequately protected by
legislation for welfare and benefits of the labour force in the
State". The other decision in UP. State Electricity Board vs.
Shiv Mohan Singh & Anr. [2004(8) SCC 402 (Para 11 )] would
B be of no consequence in the present controversy. The omission
of the words as proposed e_arlier from the final definition is a
deliberate and conscious act on the part of the legislature, only
with the objective to provide protection to all the labourers or 't
workers, who were the manual workers and were engaged or
c to be engaged in any scheduled employment. Therefore, there
was a specific act on the part of the legislature to enlarge the
scope of the definition and once we accept this, all the
arguments regarding the objects and reasons, the Committee
Reports, the legislative history being contrary to the expressed
language, are relegated to the background and are liable to be
D
ignored.
"
25. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants
relied on decision in Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2003(4) SCC
E 200], in which observation in para 16 was relied upon, which
is as follows:-

"16 ............ If certain provisions of law, construed in one
f
way, would make them consistent with the Constitution and
F another interpretation would render them unconstitutional,
the Court would lean in favour of the former construction."

The case is clearly not applicable, since there is no
constitutional matter involved. We would comment regarding
Article 254 of the Constitution of India, in the later part of the
G judgment. To the same effect is the reading in the decision in
The State of M.P. & Ors. vs. Mis. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel
and Co. &Anr. [1972 (1) SCC 209], relied upon by the Learned
Senior Counsel. We do not see any such problem about two
interpretations. We have already stated that there may not be
H two interpretations. Therefore, contention of the Learned Senior
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 665
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
~
Counsel based upon this decision is also incorrect. One more A
decision was relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel in
R.D. Goyal & Anr. vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. [2003 (1) SCC
81 (Paras 33 and 34)]. This decision is also of no
consequence, since the Paras relied upon in this decision deal
with the words "Notes and Clauses" while interpreting the B
provision. That is not the case here.

~ 26. We were also taken through the Preamble of the
Mathadi Act, which is as under:-

"An Act for regulating the employment of unprotected c
manual workers employed in certain employments in the
State of Maharashtra, to make provision for their adequate
supply and proper and full utilization in such employments,
and for matters connected therewith.
D
! WHEREAS, it is expedient to regulate the employment of
unprotected manual workers, such as, Mathadi, Hamal
etc., engaged in certain employments, to make better
provision for their terms and conditions of employment, to
provide for their welfare, and for health and safety E
measures where such employments require these
measures; to make provision for ensuring an adequate
supply to, and full and proper utilization of, such workers
~
in such employments to protect avoidable unemployment;
for these and similar purposes, to provide for the
F
establishment of Boards in respect of these employments
and (where necessary) in the different areas of the State;
and to provide for purposes connected with the matters
aforesaid; It is hereby enacted in the Twentieth Year of the
Republic of India as follows:- ................ "
G
~ Great stress was led on the words "such as" and it was
tried to be suggested that the Preamble carves out a class of
the unprotected manual workers. Further, it was stressed that '
the object of the law is to provide for the welfare, health and
safety measures, where such employments require those H
/

_,
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 {ADDL.) S.C.R.

A measures. From this, it was suggested that it is only where the
other legislations are unable to provide for the welfare and the
better conditions, then alone this Act (Mathadi Act) would be
brought into and, therefore, necessarily the unprotected
workmen would be such workmen, who are deprived of the
B better conditions of service and further, therefore, if the workers
were adequately protected, there would be no question of
applying the provisions of the Mathadi Act to them and they -+
cannot be covered under Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. The
argument is clearly incorrect for the reason that the mention of
c "unprotected manual workers" is clearly in the wider sense and
even the Preamble of the Mathadi Act displays the intentions
of the State Government to make better provision for the
unprotected manual workers. Merely because some workmen
are manual workers and not casual workers, that by itself, would
not make any different. It is to be noted that in the Preamble, ~
0
terminology of "casual workers" is not to be found. Therefore,
even on this basis, the definition cannot be restricted. The
argument is, therefore, rejected.

27. Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel for the
E appellants referred to the Reports of the three Committees in
1963, 1965 and 1967. We have already referred to those
Reports and we find nothing contradictory in those Reports in
f
view of our finding on the plain language of the Section.

F 28. We were also taken through the decision in Printers
(Mysore) Ltd. & Anr. vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors.
(cited supra), more particularly, Para 18 therein providing the
principles for interpreting the definitions, as also the decision
in Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. vs. State of Bihar & Anr.
G [2007(1) SCC 467]. We have examined this decision. Para 30
makes a reference to 3 decisions. They are Mukesh K. Tripathi
vs. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC [2004(8) SCC 387],
Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi (cited supra) and
State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical Association [2002 ( 1)
SCC 589]. In the first mentioned decision, the word "include"
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 667
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

; was used, which would make all the difference and thereby, it A
was held that the definition may deserve a broader meaning
and, therefore, it was necessary to keep in view the scheme
of the object and purport of the statute. That is not the case
here. We have already referred to the second mentioned case
of Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand Singhvi (cited supra). B
Expressions in Para 27 cannot, however, be read in isolation.
Again, it is not that every definition has to be read in the context
+ of the phrase, which would define it. We have again pointed
out that even the context does not require us to restrict the
meaning of Section 2(11). The third mentioned case of State c
of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical Association (cited supra)
is of no consequence, as the phraseology therein was entirely
different. As regards decision in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. & Anr.
vs. Asstt. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. (cited supra), we do
not think that the case is helpful to the appellants. Therein, the
0
i controversy was about the definition of "goods" in Section
8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act and the controversy was
as to whether the word "goods" could be read in a different
manner. Such is not the controversy here.

29. We also find no absurdity, inconsistency or any E
contradiction with the other provisions of the Act. Shri Singhvi,
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents alongwith his
colleagues Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel, Ms.
\ Lata Desai, Ms. Pallavi Divekar and Shri Vimal Chandra S.
Dave, Shri Nitin S. Tambwekar, Shri B.S. Sai, Shri K. Rajeev, F
Ms. Bharathi, Ms. Mehak G. Sethi, Shri Naveen R. Nath, Shri
Arun R. Pendekar, Shri Sanjay Kharde, Ms. Asha Gopalan,
Shri Vishnu Sharma, Shri Shrish Kumar Misra and Shri Rajesh
Kumar, Learned Counsel invited our attention to Section 21 of
the Mathadi Act and pointed out that there was absolutely no G
inconsistency because where a directly appointed worker was
~ having better rights or privileges, then those rights or privileges
remains unaffected and in that case, such worker would have
the choice for those more favourable rights and privi(eges under
other beneficial legislations, the only rider being that such H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A worker would not be entitled to receive any corresponding
benefit under the provisions of the Mathadi Act and the scheme.
According to the Learned Senior Counsel, this provision was
enough to repel the arguments of the appellants that the directly
employed workers were enjoying the better benefits and they
B would be deprived of the same in case they are included in the
wider definition under Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.

30. We were also taken through Section 22 of the Mathadi
Act, which provides for the exemptions. The Section provides
that the State Government may exempt from the operation of
C all or any of the provisions of the Act or any scheme, all or any
of the classes of unprotected workers employed in any
scheduled employment or the establishment or part of any
establishment, if in the opinion of the State Government, all
such unprotected workers are in the enjoyment of benefits, which
D are, on the whole, not less favourable to such unprotected ~
workers than the benefits provided by or under the Mathadi Act,
of course, subject to certain conditions and after the
consultation with Advisory Committee. If this is the position,
then there would be no question of accepting the argument that
E by the acceptance of the plain meaning of the wider definition
given out in Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act, there would be
creations of contradictions. A Statement of Objects and
Reasons for introducing the Bill is of course an external aid, /
which should be of no consequence if the language is clear.
F However, even if we read the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, it does not further the cause of the appellants. We
have very carefully gone through the Statement of Objects and
Reasons and find nothing therein to support the contention
raised herein. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the
G appellants, while relying on the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, firstly urged that it was because the workers in
various employments were not receiving adequate protection
and benefits within the ambit of existing labour legislation that
this Bill was introduced alongwith Statement of Objects &
H Reasons. Our attention was also invited to read clause 2. From
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 669
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.)

this, it was pointed out that the adequacy of the protection was A
the main issue. Now, if inspite of this, the legislature went on
to delete those words, which we have already quoted, the
intention of the legislature must be loud and clear and we cannot
persuade ourselves to hold that there is anything contradictory
to the definition in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. In B
our opinion, even if that was so, when the legislature
consciously deletes certain words, then there will be no question
.+
of relying and insisting upon those words.

31. We were taken through some alleged inconsistencies,
for example, Section 15 of the Mathadi Act. It was expressed c
that Section 15(2)(b) would become redundant if we accept the
interpretation put forward by the respondents. Sub-Section (1)
of Section 15 provides for the appointment of Inspectors,
possessing prescribed qualifications for the purposes of the
J Mathadi Act or of any schema. Sub-Section (2) of Section 15 D
and more particularly, clause (a) thereof defines the powers of
the Inspector. Clause (b), on which great stress was led by Shri
Cama runs as under:-

"15(2)(b) examine any person whom he finds in any E
such premises or place and who, he has
reasonable cause to believe, is an unprotected
worker employed therein or an unpr9tected worker
to whom work is given out therein."

According to Shri Cama, when all the persons working in F
a scheduled industry, doing manual work, become the
unprotected workers, then there is no question of the Inspector
examining any such person, because everybody would be an
unprotected worker. The argument is clearly wrong. What is
required is that every unprotected worker has to be registered G
with the Board. If the Inspector suspects that any such worker,
though an unprotected worker, is either not registered or does
not get the protection of the Board and is engaged by the
employer, then he can examine such a person. We do not think
that the Section would becomt: unworkable, as has been H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A argued. The argument is, therefore, clearly incorrect.

32. Shri S.S. Naganand, Learned Senior Counsel also
referred to Sections 17G, 18, 19 and 20 of the Mathadi Act.
Section 17G provides that the provisions of Bombay Industrial
Relations Act, 1946 would be applicable in case of trial of
B offences under this Act. Similarly, Section 18 provides that
provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 shall mutatis
mutandis apply to registered unprotected workers and they shall
be deemed to be workmen within the meaning of that Act.
Section 19 makes the similar provision regarding the Payment
C of Wages Act, 1936 to the workers, while Section 20 provides
the application of Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. We do not see
any relevance of these Sections, particularly, to arrive at the
correct meaning of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. In all these
Sections, the words used are "registered unprotected workers".
D There is a provision for creation of the Boards under Section
6 of the Mathadi Act and every unprotected worker has to
register himself with the Board. Therefore, the reliance on these
provisions would be no consequence. The terminology of
"registered unprotected workers" in Sections 18, 19 and 20 of
E the Mathadi Act was brought into force by Maharashtra Act No.
40 of 1974 and under that, these words deemed always to have
been substituted for the original terminology of "unprotected
workers''. We do not, therefore, see any reason to take any
different view in the light of these Sections.
F
33. Shri Sudhir Talsania, Learned Senior Counsel arguing
on behalf of the appellants also argued about the nature of
Sections 2(11) and 2( 12) of the Mathadi Act. He contended that
while Section 2(12) is a general provision, Section 2(11) is a
specific provision. We have no quarrel with that. We would only
G observe that so long as that language of Section 2(11) of the
Mathadi Act is clear enough, there will not be any question of
cutting the scope of the term "unprotected workman". He further
argued that this interpretation would lead to absurd results,
whereby Sections 2(11) and 2(12) would be identical. We have
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 671
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
already explained that such is not the possibility. This is true A
that the Sections have to be read together. Section 2(12)
specifies the worker, which in turn is used in Section 2(11)
further. Therefore, they would not be identical under any
circumstances.
B
34. It was argued by Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants that as per Sections 3(13) and 3(14)
of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, all the employees are
-+ covered and any reduction from those employees has to be only
after the notice of change is given. Our attention was also
invited to Section 44 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act.
c
We have no difficulty with the provisions of the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, as that Act operates in different spheres
altogether. We do not think that there is any relevance of those
provisions, particularly, while interpreting the terms of the
Mathadi Act and more particularly of Section 2(11) of the D

- ,.~ Mathadi Act. All the Learned Counsel for the appellants
expres~d their apprehension about the working of Section 3
of the Mathadi Act and posed a question as to who will decide

- as to whether an industry has or has not adequate employees,
whether it would be Board or employer or employee union. In E
our view, such argument is clearly incorrect for the simple
reason that such question does not come within the scope of
the Mathadi Act. Once a workman is engaged to do the manual
work, he automatically becomes an unprotected workman and
would have to be registered with the Board. In our opinion, such F
argument has to be rejected. Our attention was invited to the

- decision in Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure
Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors. [2007(8) SCC 705],
particularly, paras 79, 80 and 81 thereof. The term "at any time"
in Section 50(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram G

- ~
Nivesh Adhiniyam·(No. 23of1973) had fallen for consideration.
Hon'ble Sinha, J. had held that the term will have to be
interpreted in a particular manner, otherwise it would lead to
manifest injustice and absurdity, which is not contemplated by
the statute. We have absolutely no quarrel with the proposition, H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A however, we have already held that the interpretation that we
propose to give, does not make any of the provision absurd
and does not lead to manifest the injustice or the absurdity.

35. Similarly, reliance was placed by Shri C.U. Singh,
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants on the decision in
8
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut (2007 (3)
SCC 700]. The provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and
more particularly, Sections 147, 145 (d) and 149 fell for +
consideration therein. There also, the Court held that the golden
C rule of interpretation is that the statutes are to be interpreted
according to grammatical and ordinary sense of the word in
grammatical or literal meaning unmindful of consequence of
such interpretation. It was only when such grammatical and
literal interpretation leads to unjust results which the legislature

D
never intended that the said rule has to give place to the "rule
of legislative intent". We have already pointed out that in this
case, the golden rule of interpretation would not lead to any
., -
injustice. Therefore, this ruling is more helpful to the

-
respondents than the appellants. Another ruling, which was
relied upon was Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs. Bombay
E Environmental Action Group & Ors. [2006(3) SCC 434].
Reliance was placed on the observations made in para 176.
Hon'ble Sinha, J. therein had quoted paras 1392, 1477 and
1480 of Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. 44(1)
(Reissue). Those paras are as under:-
F
"1392. Common-sense construction rule: It is a rule
of the common law, which may be referred to as the
common-sense construction rule, that when
considering, in relation to the facts of the instant
-
G
case, which of the opposing constructions of the
enactment would give effect to the legislative
intention, the Court should presume that the
legislator intended common sense to be used in
• -
construing the enactment.

H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 673
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

1477. Nature of presumption against absurdity: It is A
presumed that Parliament intends that the Court,
when considering, in relation to the facts of the
instant case, which of the opposing construction of
an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning,
should find against a construction which produces B
an absurd result, since this is unlikely to have been
intended by Parliament. Here 'absurd' means
+ contrary to sense and reason, so in this context the
term 'absurd' is used to include a result which is
unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, c
anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial
or productive of a disproportionate counter-
mischief.

1480. Presumption against anomalous or illogical
,,.. J. result: It is presumed that Parliament intends that D
the Court, when considering, in relation to the facts
of the instant case, which opposing constructions
of an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning,
should find against a construction that creates an
anomaly or otherwise produces an irrational or E
illogical result. The presumption may be applicable
where on one construction a benefit is not available
in like cases, or a detriment is not imposed in like
cases, or the decision would turn on an immaterial
distinction or an anomaly would be created in legal F
doctrine. Where each of the constructions
~·
contended for involves some anomaly then, insofar
as the Court uses anomaly as a test, it has to
balance the effect of each construction and

- I
determine which anomaly is greater. It may be
possible to avoid the anomaly by the exercise of a
discretion. It may be, however, that the anomaly is
G

clearly intended, when effect must be given to the
intention. The Court will pay little attention to a
proclaimed anomaly if it is purely hypothetical, and H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A unlikely to arise in practice."

It will be seen that the absurdity which the appellants are
referring again and again has to be such that it should be
contrary to the sense and reason and, therefore, should include
B
a result, which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient,
anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or productive
of a disproportionate counter-mischief. We do not think that
such absurdity could be arrived at if the literal interpretation is
+
given to the term. We, therefore, reject the argument of Shri C.U.
Singh in this behalf. Once we accept the literal construction,
c there will be no further question of holding otherwise on the
basis of the intent of the legislature. We have already pointed
out that there would arise no absurdity of any kind if the literal
interpretation is given.

D 36. That takes us to the next argument regarding stare
decisis. Shri Cama, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants ' "":'

urged that under this rule, where a particular enactment has
received a consistent interpretation by Courts of law for a
considerable period of time, that interpretation must be
E respected because the rights and obligations by parties
covered by such interpretation have remained settled thereby
-
during the long period of time involved. It was urged by him that
if the settled interpretation is upset, then it would do a greater
injustice to all the parties concerned. The Learned Senior I

F counsel went to the extent of saying that the rule of stare decisis
should be honoured even in case where the earlier
interpretation, though consistently upheld for a long time, may
.,
not strictly be correct or may produce two possible views. Our
attention was invited to the decisions in Mishri Lal (Dead) by
Lrs. vs. Dhirendera Nath (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. [1999 (4) SCC
G
11], Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical
Biology & Ors. [2002 (5) SCC 111 ], Union of India & Anr. vs.
Azadi Bachao Ando/an & Anr. [2004 (10) SCC 1) and State
-
of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors.
[2005 (8) SCC 534). It was urged by the Learned Senior
H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 675
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

Counsel that there was a consistent line of judgments starting A
from year 1974 right upto the present judgment of the Full Bench
~ in 2006, covering period of 32 years, wherein the Bombay High
~
Court has taken a consistent view in interpretation of the term
"unprotected workers" to mean only casual workers, or as the
case may be, the workers, who did not enjoy the protection of B
the other labour welfare legislations. It was pointed out that firstly,
~ the challenge to the constitutional validity was rejected by
Hon'ble Rege, J. in his two judgments cited supra, solely on the
ground that the said Act applied to a special class of workmen,
who needed special protection and classification and, therefore, c
such persons were entitled to the special treatment. The
reliance was placed on the judgments passed by Hon'ble Rege,
J. in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra)
on 19.4.1974 and in S.B. More & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
,I. & Ors. (cited supra) on 24.4.1974 and four other Division Bench D
Judgments in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. vs. The State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra), lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs.
Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), Century Textiles & Industries
~ Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) including this Court
judgment in Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and
E
Central Kamgar Union vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited
supra). Very heavy reliance was placed on the decision in lrkar
Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), where the
Division Bench has specifically rejected the employers'
arguments under Article 254 of the Constitution of India solely
on the ground that in the docks, the expression "mathadis" F
would be limited to only such workers doing loading and
unloading operations as were not protected by legislation under
the Dock Workers' Act, 1948.
,,,. . 37. Heavy reliance was placed on paras 34, 35 and 36 of G
that decision. On the other hand, Shri Singhvi, Learned Senior
Counsel for the respondents urged that the rule of stare decisis
was not and could not be viewed as an absolute rule. Reliance
was also placed on the decision in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana
(KV), Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [2008 (1) SCC H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 494). So also Smt. Indira Jaising, Learned Senior Counsel for
the respondents repelled this argument relying on the decisions
in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation vs. State
of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) and Danial Latifi & Anr. ~
vs. Union of India (2001 (7) SCC 740]. Our attention was also
B invited to treatise by Justice G.P. Singh, (11th Edition). It was
urged by Shri Singhvi that in the aforementioned judgments of
the Bombay High Court, excepting the judgment in Century
;.
Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited
supra), this question has not fallen for consideration at all. The
c Full Bench and more particularly, the Learned Single Judge
(Hon'ble Deshmukh, J.) has rejected this argument that this
question was not squarely before Hon'ble Rege, J. in his two
judgments in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra
(cited supra) and S.8. More & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra
& Ors. (cited supra) nor was it before the Division Benches in
D
Judgments in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. vs. The State of ~

Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra), lrkar Sahu's & Anr. vs.
Bombay ~ort Trust (cited supra), Century Textiles & Industries
Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) including this Court
judgment in Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport and ~

E Central Kamgar Union vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited
supra). The Learned Single Judge noted the argument that it
was expressed in Lallubhai Kevaldas & Anr. vs. The State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) that the Act did not apply to
the manual workers in the scheduled employment, who were
F protected by the other labour legislations and the said judgment
was followed thereafter In the case of Century Textiles &
Industries Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and,
therefore, on principle of stare decisis, the settled position of
law should not be disturbed. The Learned Judge has also noted
G the decision in State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi .....
Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited supra). The Learned Single Judge
then, relying on the judgment of this Court in Mis. Good Year
India Ltd. vs. State of Haryana [AIR 1990 SC 781], commented
that the precedent is an authority only for what it actually decides
H and not for what may remotely or logically follow from it. The
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 6(7
STEEL LABOUR BD. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

Learned Single Judge then went on to hold that what is binding A
is the ratio decidendi of the judgment. The Learned Judge
noted that this question did not fall for consideration either in
the two judgments by Hon'ble Rege, J. in C. Jairam Pvt. Ltd.
vs. State of Maharashtra (cited supra) and S.B. More & Ors.
vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) or even in the B
judgment in La//ubhai Keva/das & Anr. vs. The State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra). In our view, the Learned
~ Judge was absolutely correct in so holding. Close examination
" of judgments by Hon'ble Rege, J., as also judgment in Lallubhai
Kevaldas & Anr. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited c
supra) will show that the question about the correct
interpretation and scope of the Section 2(11) of the Mathadi
Act did not fall for consideration in those cases.

38. This Court, in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV),
Mumbai vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (cited supra) has D
> j
specifically quoted from the decision in Quinn vs. Leathern
[1901 Appeal Cases 495] as follows:-

... "Before discussing Allen vs. Flood [1898 Appeal Cases
1] and what was decided therein, there are two
observations of a general character, which I wish to make;
E

and one is to repeat what I have very often said before -
that every judgment must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the
generality of the expressions which may be found there are F

-
not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are
governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case
in which such expressions are to be found. The other is
that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.
I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that
G
may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of
t reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical
code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law
is not always lugical at all." (Emphasis supplied)
H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A The Court therein again referred to the decision in Ambica
Quarry Worl<s vs. State of Gujarat [1987 (1) SCC 213) and
upheld the observations therein to the effect that:-

" 18. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the
B background of the facts of that case. It has been
said long time ago that a case is only an authority
for what it actually decides and not what logically
follows from it."

The Court further relied upon the decisions in Bhavnagar
C University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [2003 (2) SCC 111),
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. N.R. Vairamani [2004 (8)
SCC 579) and finally, the decision in British Railways Board
vs. Herrington [All ER 761) and has quoted the following
observations therefrom:-
D \ .
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or
a judgment as though they were words in a legislative
enactment, and it is to be re~embered that judicial

E
utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a
particular case.

11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different
-
fact may make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by
blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper."
F
Now, when we examine all the Bombay High Court's
judgments on the basis of this ratio, it is clear that excepting
the decision in Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. vs. State of
Maharashtra (cited supra), such position could not be obtained.
-
G There can be no dispute about the importance attached by this
Court in the above mentioned cases, as relied upon by the
appellants, which favour the consistency of law. Further, it is to
be seen, particularly, from the decision in State of Gujarat vs.
Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (cited supra). In
H paras 111 and 112, this Court observed:-
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 679
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

... "111 ................. However, according to Justice A
Frankfurter, the doctrine of stare decisis is not 'an
imprisonment of reason' (Advanced Law Lexicon,
P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd Edn., 2005, Vol. 4, P
4456). The underlying logic of the doctrine is to
maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The B
guiding philosophy is that a view which has held the
field for a long time should not be disturbed only
because another view is possible.

112. The trend of judicial opinion, in our view, is that stare C
decisis is not a dogmatic rule allergic to logic and
reason; it is a flexible principle of law operating in
the province of precedents providing room to
collaborate with the demands of changing times
dictated by social needs, State policy and judicial
conscience." D

Again, in para 113, this Court observed:-

"113. According to Professor Lloyd, concepts are good
servants but bad masters. Rules, which are E
originally designed to fit social needs, develop into
concepts, which then proceed to take on a life of
"' their own to the detriment of legal development. The
resulting 'jurisprudence of concepts' produces a
slot-machine approach to law, whereby new points
posing questions of social policy are decided, not F
by reference to the underlying sfJcial situation, but
by reference to the meaning and definition of the
legal concepts involved. This formalistic a priori
approach confines the law in a straitjacket instead
of permitting it to expand to meet the new needs G
and requirements of changing society (Salmond on
Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. At P. 187). In such cases,
the Courts should examine not only the existing laws
and legal concepts, but also the broader underlying
' H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A issues of policy ...................... ."

In para 114, quoting from the Salmond on Jurisprudence,
12th Edn., the Court saw the need of the Judge looking at
existing laws, the practical social results of any decision he
makes and the requirements of fairness and justice. In para 116
8
again, the Court observed:-

"116. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command of the
Constitution or jurisprudence. A careful study of our
legal system will discern that any deviation from the
c straight path of stare decisis in our past history has
occurred for articulable reasons, and only when the
Supreme Court has felt obliged to bring its opinions
in line with new ascertained facts, circumstances
and experiences. (Precedent in Indian Law, A.
D Laxminath, 2nd Edn. 2005, P. 8)" -"

In para 118, this Court observed that:-

"118. The doctrine of stare decisis is generally to be
adhered to, because well-settled principles of law
E founded on a series of authoritative
pronouncements ought to be followed. Yet, the
demands of the changed facts and circumstances,
dictated by forceful factors supported by logic, amply
justify the need for a fresh look."
F
Tested on the basis of this logic in the celebrated decision
of State of Gujarat vs. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat
& Ors. (cited supra), we have no hesitation, but to hold that the
application of doctrine of stare decisis cannot help the
G appellants in this case. We must express here that while
rejecting the arguments of appellants, we have in our minds,
those thousands of workmen who are otherwise exploited by
Toliwalas, Mukadams and at times, the employers. The
enactment is a beneficial enactment, providing the protection
H to such workers, who do not have the honest representation and
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 681
; STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.)

it is with this lofty idea that a progressive State like State of A
Maharashtra has brought about this legislation. Viewed from
these angles, it will have to be held that the definition would
have to be all the more broad, engulfing maximum area to the
advantage of a workman. It is with this idea that we reject the
argument of the stare decisis, though very ably put by Shri B
Cama, Shri C.U. Singh, Learned Senior Counsel and other
-" Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants.

39. The other argument raised was on t~e basis of maxim
of Contemporanea Expositio Est Optim~·. Et Fortissima In
Lege, shortly stated, Contemporanea Expositio. According to C
the Black's Law Dictionary, this is the docttine that the best
meaning of a statute or document is the one given by those who
enacted it or signed it, and that the meaning publicly given by
i contemporary or long professional usage is presumed to be
the true one, even if the language may have a popular or an D
etymological meaning that is very different. Shri Cama, Learned
Senior Counsel for the appellants argued that in the
Committee's Reports, right from 1963 clearly only those
workers were viewed, who did not have the protection of the
other labour laws and the Committee had identified only those E
manual workers who were engaged in loading and unloading
, operations. The reliance was made on a letter No. (c) 20206
dated 7.9.1992, written by one Shri G.K. Walawalkar, Desk
Officer, informing that in an establishment till the workers doing
Mathadi type work are on their muster roll as direct workers F
and they are getting total protection and benefits under the
various labour laws, till then such establishment shall not be
included in the Mathadi Act or the schemes thereunder. Two
other letters were also referred to by the Learned Senior
~ Counsel. First Letter was dated 10.5.1990 addressed to the G
Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association,
authored by one Divisional Officer, informing to the Chairman,
Western India Corrugated Box Manufacturers' Association that
the provisions of Mathadi Act are not applicable to the directly
employed workers (employed no permanent basis) by the H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A company. Another letter was dated 3.10.1991 addressed to the
Secretary, Mumbai Timber Merchants Association Ltd.,
specifying that the direct labourers of the employer doing
loading/unloading work would not be covered by the said Act.
Though these two letters were never procured, they were
B produced before us. Further, a reference is made to the letter
of Mathadi Board (Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board) dated
17.11.1983, wherein the Mathadi Board understood and
applied the Act only to that special class of workers doing "-
loading and unloading operations in scheduled employments,
c who were in the regular employments of an employer and,
therefore, were not protected by other applicable labour
legislations. It was also urged that only after the impugned
judgment was passed, the Mathadi Boards have started asking
the employers to register them under the Act even if they are
D engaging regular full time workers. It was urged that in lrkar
Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Porl Trust (cited supra), the ~
Mathadi Board had taken such a position and they could not
now turn back from their stance. From this, the Learned Senior
Counsel urged that since the State Government itself
E understood the provision in a particular manner, such
understanding should be honoured by the Courts.

40. The argument is clearly erroneous for the simple
reason that it is not the task of the State Government, more >
particularly, the Executive Branch to interpret the law; that is the
F task of the Courts. Even if the State Government understood
the Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and correct
interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts. Therefore, how
the State Government officials understood the Act, is really
irrelevant. The Learned Senior Counsel, in his address, relied
G on the decision in Godawat Pan Masala Products l.P. Ltd. &
Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. [2004(7) sec 68) and more
particularly, para 32 therein. There, Hon'ble Srikrishna, J.
accepted the meaning of the concerned provision as it was
understood by the State authorities. However, the Learned
H Judge was careful enough to say that:-
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 683
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

"While this may not be really conclusive, it certainly A
indicates the manner of the State authority viewing its
power and the Rules under which it was exercising the
power. The Court can certainly take into·account this
situation on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio.
B
(Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, this cannot be viewed to be an absolute
doctrine. There are number of authorities, which speak about
the powers of the Court, vis-a-vis, this doctrine. It has been held
in Clyde Navigation Trustees vs. Laird [1883 (8) Appeal C
Cases 658], Assheton Smith vs. Owen [1906 (1) Ch 179],
Goldsmiths' Co. vs. Wyatt (1907 (1) KB 95], Senior Electric
Inspector vs. Laxminarayan Chopra [AIR 1962 SC 159], Raja
Ram Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar[AIR 1964 SC 828], J.K. Cotton
Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India [AIR 1988 D
1
SC 191], Doypack Systems Ltd. vs. Union of India (AIR 1988
SC 782] that even if the person who dealt with the Act
understood it in a particular manner, that does not prevent the
Court in giving to the Court, its true construction. It is pointed
out in the decision in Doypack Systems Ltd. vs. Union of India E
(cited supra) that the doctrine is confined to the construction of
ambiguous language used in very old statutes where indeed
.., the language itself have had a rather different meaning in those
·days. The Learned author Justice Shri G.P. Singh, in his
celebrated treatise quoted that:- F
"Subject to use made of contemporary official statements
and statutory instruments the principle of contemporanea
expositio is not applicable to a modern statute."

Same subject has been dealt with in Punjab Traders vs. G
~State of Punjab [1991 (1) SCC 86]. Considering this settled
position, we do not think we are in a position to accept the
contention raised. Same logic applies that even if the Mathadi
Board's stand was somewhat contradictory in the case of lrkar
Sahu's & Anr. vs. Bombay Port Tn.st (cited supra), it did not H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A really create a bar against it from changing its stance for a
correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act.

41. The next argument was based on Article 254 of the
Constitution of India. It was suggested that the said Article
prescribes that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any
8
Central legislation, whether made before or after a State
legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both cover
the same field. An exception to this lies in sub-Article (2), which
~
preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has
received the assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that
c this challenge is in the nature of a challenge to the constitutional
validity of the provision of the State Act. Such was not the
challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act was
constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of
the Act has already been upheld. Article 254 does not provide
D a guide for the interpretation of a State statute. The appellants
are also not certain about the proposal of the assent of the Vice I.
President, which was received on 5.6.1969, since the said
proposal could not be located by them. Therefore, all the
arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential assent
E under Article 254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from
the fact that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be
used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this
question was never before the Full Bench and in our opinion,
the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument on the ground that )

F this was not the case of the appellants. Therefore, reliance
placed on the decisions in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. vs. National
Textile Corporation Ltd. [2002 (8) SCC 182) and Thirumuruga
Kirupa Nanda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical
Educational and Charitable Trust vs. State of Tamil Nadu &
G Ors. [1996 (3) sec
15] is of no consequence. The argument
is thus rejected.
.,
42. Thus, in our considered opinion, the Full Bench was
absolutely correct in coming to the conclusions that it did.

H
BHUWALKA STEEL INDUS. LTD. v. BOMBAY IRON & 685
STEEL LABOUR BO. & ANR. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
1 43. Before parting with the judgment, we must refer to the A
fact that this legislation, which came way back in 1969, have
in its view, those poor workmen, who were neither organized
to be in a position to bargain with the employers nor did they
have the compelling bargaining power. They were mostly
dependent upon the Toliwalas and the Mukadams. They were B
not certain that they would get the work everyday. They were
also not certain that they would work only for one employer in
,. a day. Everyday was a challenge to these poor workmen. It was
with this idea that the Board was created under Section 6 of
the Mathadi Act. Deep thoughts have gone into, creating the c
framework of the Boards, of the schemes etc. With these lofty
ideas that the Act was brought into existence. In these days
when Noble Laureate Professor Mohd. Yunus of Bangladesh
is advocating the theory of social business as against the
business to earn maximum profits, it would be better if the
0
employers could realize their social obligations, more
1
particularly, to the have-nots of the society, the workers who are
all contemplated to be the inflicted workers in the Act. Again,
before parting, we must appreciate the valuable contributions
made on behalf of the appellants and the respondents, more
particularly, Shri J.P. Cama, Shri C.U. Singh~ Shri Sudhir E
Talsania, Shri K.K. Singhvi and Ms. Indira Jaising, Learned
Senior Counsel. In the result, all the appeals are dismissed and
under the circumstances, there shall be no orders as to the
~
costs.
F
SLP (C) .... CC No. 4065 of 2007

And

SLP (C) .... CC No. 4046 of 2007

Permission to file Special Leave Petition in these two
.,,_ cases is not granted. Dismissed.
N.J. Matters dismissed.
H