Holding

A dying declaration, when found reliable, can form the sole basis of conviction without any corroboration.

Summary

The appellant Bijoy Das was convicted under Section 302 IPC for shooting and causing the death of his step‑nephew Ajay Das, who died ten days after being wounded. While in hospital, the deceased gave a dying declaration to the attending doctor and to three witnesses, identifying the appellant as his assailant; his wife also witnessed the shooting. The trial court and the Calcutta High Court upheld the conviction based on these statements. The appellant appealed, contending that the dying declarations were not reliable and required corroboration. The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration, if found reliable, need not be corroborated and can alone sustain a conviction. Finding the declarations consistent, credible and free of any motive to lie, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the life sentence.

Issues considered

Whether the statements made by the deceased constitute a reliable dying declaration admissible as sole evidence for conviction.
Whether a dying declaration requires corroboration by other evidence under Indian law.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Dying declarationSection 302 IPCConviction without corroborationEvidence ActHomicideReliability of testimonyCriminal law

Judgment

-f-
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 86

A BIJOY DAS
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
(Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 2008) l

JANUARY 28, 2008 ~
B ~
I,.
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.) r

Penal Code:
s. 302 - Victim suffering fire arm injury - His wife
c witnessing the incident - Victim disclosing to witnesses and
doctor the name of accused as his assailant - Statement of
victim recorded by 1.0. in hospital disclosing accused as the
assailant - Conviction uls 302 and sentence of imprisonment
awarded by trial court - Affirmed by High Court - HELD: If a
D dying declaration is found to be reliable, there is no need for Im
corroboration by any witness and conviction can be sustained
on its basis alone - There is no reason to doubt veracity of ,..
dying declarations - Trial Court and High Court rightly held ;..
that accused had fired the shot which resulted in death of victim
E - Evidence Act, 1872 - Dying declaration.
The appellant was prosecuted u/s 302 IPC and ss.25/
.........
'II
27 of Arms Act. The prosecution case was that the
husband of PW-4 was shot at by the appellant. The victim
was taken to hospital. The victim disclosed to the doctor,
F PW-14, as also to PWs 6,8 and 9 that it was the appellant "f
who had shot at him. The Investigating Officer also
recorded the statement of the victim wherein he named
the appellant as his assailant. After a few days the victim
succumbed to his injuries. The trial court relying upon
G the evidence led by the prosecution, convicted the ~
appellant u/s 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonment
for life. The High Court affirmed the conviction and the
""
sentence.
It was contended for the appellant that the evidence
H 86

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I

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BIJOY DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 87

of PW-4 lacked credence and the alleged statements A
before PWs 6,8,9 and 14 could not be treated as dying
declarations.
f?ismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 If a dying declaration is found to be reliable 8
y· then there is no need for corroboration by any witness,
and conviction can be sustained on its basis alone. There
is no reason to doubt the veracity of the dying
declarations especially since there is consistency
amongst them. There is also no reason why the doctor or c
the other witnesses should make a false statement about
the dying declaration. There is no allegation of enmity
between the accused and these persons. [para 11 and 7]
(93-G; 90-C]
1111(
Muthu Kutty v. State (2005] 9 SCC 113; Narain Singh D
vs. State of Haryana 2004(2) SCR 115 ; Babula/ v. State of
.... -1 MP [2003] 12 sec 490; Ravi vs. State of T.N. [2004] 10 sec
776 - relied on.
1.2 The evidence of PWs 6,8 and 9 clearly shows that
the dec~ased immediately prior to his death had disclosed E
to them that he had suffered injuries at the hands of the
appellant. Additionally, in the bed-head ticket, PW-14
categorically noted the statement of the deceased that he
..... had been assaulted by the accused. The evidence of PW-
.,..
4 was to the effect that she was waiting for her husband .F
standing in front of their house. She stated that the
deceased was coming by a cycle. She also could note
• the appellant following the deceased and firing shot at
him. When the evidence of PWs 4,6,8 and 9 is analyzed,
the inevitable conclusion, as was rightly observed by the G
lmi"' >--
trial court and the High Court, is that the appellant had
fired the shot which resulted in the death of the deceased.
[para 12] [93-H; 94-A-C]
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal
t
No. 188 of 2008. H
~ t--

88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 2 S.C.R.
"1

A From the final Order and Judgment dated 7.7.2006 of the
High Court of Calcutta at Calcutta in C.R.A. No. 230/2001.
Rana Mukherjee, D. Bharat Kumar, Anand, lndrani and ~

Abhijit Sengupta for the Appellant.

B Avijit Bhattacharjee for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by -.
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a
c Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, upholding the conviction
and sentence of the appellant who was found guilty of offence
punishable under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short 'IPC') and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for life.
D
3. Prosecution case in a nutshell is as follows:
On 28.9.1993, between 6.45 p.m. and 7.00 p.m. Sisir Kr. ~

Das @Ajoy (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was shot
by the present appellant in front of his house at College Para
E and immediately thereafter Ajay was shifted to hospital where
after ten days he succumbed to his injuries. One Satya Ranjan
Das (PW 1), cousin brother of Ajay, getting information from
one local boy about the occurrence, came to learn from injured
Ajay at hospital that he was shot at by his step uncle Bijoy Das.
F The appellant immediately thereafter lodged the written ~

complaint at Raijung P.S.
On the basis of the written complaint of Satya Ranjan Das
which was received by the local P.S. at about 19.50 hours of ....
28.9.1993 S. I. S. Pradhan of Raijung P.S. took up the <
G investigation and in course of investigation, he visited the place ~ ~

of occurrence, made seizure in respect of a bicycle used by the
)
victim Ajay, visited hospital and recorded statement of Ajay and \
other witnesses of the occurrence, collected declaration given
by Ajay to the attending doctor and S.I. Pradhan also collected
.'
)

H the post mortem report and finally, submitted charge sheet
•
~ --

BIJOY DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 89
,_ [PASAYAT, J.]

against the present appellant both under Section 302 IPC as A
well as under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959 (in short 'Arms
Act'). The learned Sessions Judge after framing charge under
Section 302 IPC as well as under Section 25/27 of the Arms
Act explained the same to the appellant and the appellant
pleaded not guilty to both the charges and claimed for trial. B
Y' Prosecution, during trial examined 16 witnesses including
PW.1 the FIR maker, PW.4 wife of the deceased who was an
eyewitness of the occurrence and PW.6, PW.8 and PW.9. who
came to learn from deceased Ajoy that he was shot at by the
appellant. Prosecution also examined PW.14 doctor Jiban c
Krishana Bhaduri who conducted operation of Ajoy and who
also recorded a declaration of Ajay disclosing the name of the
appellant as his assailant, PW.15 Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh,
conducted post-mortem examination and PW.16 was the
investigating officer. Apart from oral evidence, prosecution also D
produced before the Trial Court the written complaint of PW.1,
~ bed head ticket of Ajoy Das consisting declaration of Ajoy
recorded by PW.14, post-mortem report and several seizure
lists.
The learned Trial Court, on perusal of prosecution evidence E
both oral and documentary and after considering submissions
of both the sides, found the present appellant guilty of the offence
under Section 302 IPC and he was convicted accordingly.
,. However, the Trial Court did not find any material to hold the
F
-I appellant guilty for the offence under Section 25/27 of the Arms
Act.
4. The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of PW4
the wife of the victim and also relied on the evidence of PWs 6,
8 and 9 along with PW1. It is to be noted that the deceased
).. G
during his treatment in the hospital had categorically stated that
the appellant has assaulted him. The Trial Court did not find any
. substance in the plea that at the behest of PW1 the false case
has been foisted.
5. In appeal the High Court, as noted above, dismissed H
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
1

A the appeal.
6. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the evidence of PW4 clearly lacks credence: The
alleged statement before PWs 6, 8, 9 and 14 cannot be treated
as a dying declaration. Learned counsel of the respondent-State
8 on the other hand supported the judgment ..,

7. We see no reason to doubt the veracity of the dying
declarations especially since there is consistency between them.
We see no reason why the doctor or the other witnesses should
c make a false statement about the dying declaration. There is
no allegation of enmity between the accused and these persons.

As observed by this Court in Narain Singh v. State of
Haryana AIR vide para 7: (SCC p. 267, para 7)
"A dying declaration made by a person on the verge of his
D
death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment a
person is most unlikely to make any untrue statement. The
shadow of impending death is by itself guarantee of the
truth of the statement of the deceased regarding the
circumstances leading to his death. But at the same time
E the dying declaration like any other evidence has to be
tested on the touchstone of credibility to be acceptable. It
is more so, as the accused does not get an opportunity of ·
questioning veracity of the statement by cross-
examination. The dying declaration if found reliable can
F form the base of conviction."
8 .. In Babula/ v. State of M.P (2003 (12) SCC 490) this
Court observed vide in para 7 of the said decision as under: 1
(SCC p. 494) ~
G "A person who is facing imminent death, with even a
shadow of continuing in this world practically non-existent,
every motive of falsehood is obliterated. The mind gets
altered by most powerful ethical reasons to speak only the
truth. Great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words
H of a dying person because a person on the verge of death
BIJOY DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 91
[PASAYAT, J.]

is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate A .
an innocent person. The maxim is 'a man will not meet his
Maker with a lie in his mouth' (nemo moriturus praesumitur
mentin). Mathew Arnold said, 'truth sits on the lips of a
dying man'. The general principle on which the species of ·
evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made B
in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and
when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive
to falsehood is silenced and mind induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak the truth; situation so
solemn that law considers the same as creating an c
obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive
oath administered in a court of justice."
9. In Raviv. State of TN. ((2004 (10) SCC 776) this Court
observed that: (SCC p. 777, para 3)
0
"If the truthfulness of the dying declaration cannot be
doubted, the same alone can form the basis of conviction
of an accused and the same does not require any
corroboration, whatsoever, in law."
10. In Muthu Kuttyv. State (2005 (9) SCC 113) vide para E
15 this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 120-21)
"15. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight,
it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of
cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting
the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the F
reason the court also insists that the dying declaration
should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of
the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard
that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of
either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. G
The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was
in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe
and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that
the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it
can base its conviction without any further corroboration. H
-~

92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the
dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction
unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration
is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in
several judgments the principles governing dying
B declaration, which could be summed up as under as
indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992 (2) SCC
474) : (SCC pp. 480-81, paras 18-19) (emphasis
supplied)
(i ) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying
c declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
(See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976 (3) SCC 104)
(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true
and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. (See State of UP v. Ram Sagar Yadav
D
and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1985 (1) SCC 552)
(iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased
E had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants
and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K.
Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976 (3)
sec 618)
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not
F be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See "'
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974 (4) SCC 264)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never
make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it
is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of
G
M.P.(1981Supp. sec 25) -"' ~

(v1) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot
.form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State
of U.P.(1981 (2) sec 654)
H
~ BIJOY DAS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 93
[PASAYAT, J.]

) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain A
the details as to the, occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
(See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati
Naidu (1980 Supp. sec 455)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the B
statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v.
State of Bihar (1980 Supp. SCC 769))
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether deceased
was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration c
look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness
said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to
,..
make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot
prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P (1988 Supp.
sec 152; D
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version
as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. (See State of UP v. Madan Mohan
(1989 (3J sec 390 )
(x1) Where there are more than one statement in the nature E
of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be
preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration
..... could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. (See Mohan/al Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra (1982 (1) SCC 700)" F
11. A perusal of the various decisions of this Court, some
of which have been referred to above, shows that if a dying
declaration is found to be reliable then there is no need for
corroboration by any witness, and conviction can be sustained
G
on its basis alone.
___.., ... 12. The evidence of PWs. 6, 8 and 9 clearly shows that
the deceased immediately prior to his death had disclosed to
PWs. 6, 8 and 9 that he had suffered injuries at the hands of the
appellant. Additionally, in the bed-head ticket which was H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A exhibited, PW-14 categorically noted the statement of the
deceased that he had been assaulted by the accused. The
evidence of PW4 was to the effect that she was waiting for her
husband standing in front of their house. She stated that the
deceased was coming by a bicycle. She also could note that
B the appellant as following the deceased and fired shot at the
deceased. When the evidence of PWs 4, 6, 8, and 9 is analyzed,
the inevitable conclusion, as was rightly observed by the Trial
. Court and the High Court, is that the appellant had fired the shot "
which resulted in the death of the deceased.
C . 13. That being so, there is no merit in this appeal and the
same Is dismissed.
R.P. Appeal dismissed.