Holding

The High Court was not justified in overturning the acquittal; the trial court's view was reasonable and the evidence did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Summary

The appellants were charged with murder under IPC sections 302 and 149. The trial court acquitted them, rejecting the testimony of five eyewitnesses and finding the identification parades perfunctory. The High Court reversed the acquittal, relying on the two eye‑witnesses and the identification parades, and convicted the appellants. On appeal under Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, the Supreme Court examined whether the appellate court could overturn a plausible trial‑court finding. It held that when the trial court’s appreciation of evidence is reasonable, the appellate court must be cautious and may not disturb the acquittal unless the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found the identification parades vitiated by mixing known persons with witnesses and that the eye‑witnesses, strangers to the accused and observing the crime in poor light, could not be relied upon. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the order of acquittal restored.

Issues considered

Whether an appellate court may overturn an acquittal when the trial court's view of the evidence is reasonable and plausible.
Whether the identification parades conducted were valid given procedural irregularities and mixing of persons known to the accused with the witnesses.
Whether the testimony of eye‑witnesses who were strangers to the accused and observed the crime in poor lighting is reliable enough to sustain a conviction.
Whether the conviction was established beyond reasonable doubt in light of the evidentiary deficiencies.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 9
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 149, s. 302
Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970s. 2

Subjects

murderidentification paradeeyewitness testimonyreasonable doubtappellate jurisdictionacquittalcriminal procedureevidentiary standards

Judgment

BOLLAVARAM PEDDA NARSI REDDY AND ORS. A
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

MAY .7, 1991
B
[KULDIP SINGH AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.]

Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)
Act, 1970: Section 2.

Indian Penal Code 1860: Sections 302 and 149.
,.L
c
Criminal Law-Murder-Identification of accused-Circums-
tances showing that eye-witnesses did not have the opportunity to
identify the accused-Rejection of testimony of witnesses and acquittal
by trial court-Appeal against acquittal by the State-Power of appel-
late court to reappraise and evaluate evidence-Reversal of acquittal
D
order and conviction of accused by appellate court held not justified.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 9.
.>:
Test Identification Parades-Mixing of persons known to accused
with witnesses-Effect of.
E
The appellants (A-1 to A-3 and A-5-6), along witb,Co-accused
(A-4), were prosecuted under sections 302/149 of the Indian Penal
Code. Test identification parades were conducted by the Magistrates in

•
which A-6 was identified by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 and A-1, 2, 3, and 5 were
identified by PWs 1 and 2. The trial court held that the identification
parade was perfunctory and was of no assistance to the prosecution. It F
.... also rejected the testimony of PWs 1 to 5 by holding that the evidence of
PWs 3, 4, and 5 was untrust-wortby and that it was unsafe to accept the
testimony of other two eye-witnesses, PWs 1 and 2 for recording a
conviction. Accordingly the trial court acquitted all the accused
persons. Against the order of acquittal, the State preferred an appeal
before the High Court. The High Court accepted the testimony of PWs G
1 and 2, corroborated by the evidence of test identification parade and

" the testimony of PW s 3 and 4 to fmd the appellants guilty. Accordingly
the High Court reversed the order of acquittal and convicted the appel-
lants. Since A-4 was not identified by the PWs 1 to 4, be was given the
benefit of doubt and the High Court confirmed bis acquittal.
H

723
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A In appeal to this court under section 2 of the Supreme Court
(Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970, it was con-
tended on behalf of the appellants that PWs (I and 2) were strangers to
the assailants and in the circumstances of the case they did not have the .,,
opportunity to identify the assaillants and consequently their testimony
was not free from doubt; the trial court was right in rejeeting the
B testimony of these witnesses but the High Court erred in reversing the
order of acquittal and convicting the appellants by accepting the
testimony of these witnesses.

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of conviction and J.
sentence, this Court,
c HELD: I. It is open to Supreme Court to re-examine the evidence
for the purpose of satisfying itself whether the High Court was justified
in reversing the order of acquittal in the facts and circumstances of the
case. In an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court is empowered
to evaluate the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion. But where
D the view taken by the trial court on an appreciation of the evidence
is also a plausible view, the Appellate Court shall be slow to inter-
fere with it even when a different view is possible on a reappraisal
of the evidence. [728F-G)

I. I Even when two evenly balanced views of the evidence are
E possible one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable
doubt. [73IF)

2. The evidence given by the witnesses before the Court is the
substantive evidence. In a case where the witness is a stranger to the
accused and he identifies the accused person before the court for the
F • first time, the court will not ordinarily accept that identification as
conclusive. It is to lend assurance to the testimony of the witnesses that
evidence in the form of an earlier identification is tendered. If the
-
accused persons are got identified by the witness soon after their arrest
and such identification does not suffer from any infirmity that circums-
tance lends corroboration to the evidence given by the witness before
G the Court. But in a case where the evidence before the court is itself
shaky, the identification before the magistrate would be of no assistance
to the prosecution. [7290-E)

2. I The credibility of the evidence relating to the identification
depends largely on the opportunity the witness had to observe the
H assailants when the crime was committed and memorize the impression.
B.P.N. REDDY v. STAIB OF A.P. [FATIUMA BEEVI ,J.] 725

In the instant case at the scene or the crime when no natural light was
available and the street light was at a distance it is unlikely that the eye A
witnesses by momentary glance or the assailants who surrounded the
victim had a lasting impression and the chance or identifying the as-
sailants without mistake. Therefore the testimony of PWs 1 and 2 is
unsafe to be acted upon. The .overall view of the evidence taken by
the Trial Court is reasonable and plausible. The High Court was not B
justified in interfering with the order of acquittal when the identity and
involvement of the appellant was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. [731A·B, E-F-G, 730H]
1.
3. Value of identification parade depends on the effectiveness and
the precautions taken against the identifying witness having an oppor·
tunity of seeing the persons to be Identified before they are paraded c
with others and also against the identifying witnes8 being provided. by
the investigating authority with other unfair aid or assistance so as to
facilitate the identification or the accused concerned. When persons
who have already known the accused persons to be identified are mixed
up with the witnesses the test Identification is clearly vitiated and is D
futile. In the instant case the magistrates in conducting the test identifi·
cation parade have committed a grave error because in the case of
Accused No. 6 be had mixed up along with PWs land 2 a person known
to the accused. Similarly, in the identification of the other accused,
PW-4 who claimed acquitance with Accused Nos. 2, 3 and S was mixed
up with PWs land 2. [731C-EJ E

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 194 of 1979.
)

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.7.1978 of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Cr!. A. No. 576 of 1977. F

K. Madhava Reddy, and G. Narasimhulu for the Appellants.

B. Parthasarthi for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G

FATHIMA BEEVI, J. 1The appellants are Bollavaram Pedda
Narsi Reddy (A· 1), Bollavaram Chinna Narsi Reddy (A-2), Kavala·
kuntla Rama Subba Reddy (A-3), Duddula Venkata Subba Reddy
(A-5) and Mala Prakasam (A-6) before this Court. These appellants
along with accused No. 4 Duddela Ramana Reddy, were tried for the H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

murder of one Chandrasekhara Reddy on the night of August 15,
I\
1974. The trial court acquitted all the accused. On appeal.by the State,
the High Court convicted these appellants under sections 302 read
with 149, I.P.C., and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life y
and also imposed short-term imprisonment for minor offence to run
concurrently.
B
Chandrasekhara Reddy, the deceased, and the accused were
residents of village Jeereddy Kotharpalli. In 1970. Accused No. 3 was
elected as a Sarpanch of the village with active support of the
deceased. However, differences arose between them as they supported
rival groups in the election in the neighbouring village. 10 days before l.
the incident, the deceased is stated to have openly declared that he
c would get Accused-3 removed by moving a no confidence motion. This
according to the prosecution is the motive for the crime.

On the date of occurrence, Chandrasekhara Reddy met PW- I
(Guddeti Balaveera Reddy) and PW-2 (Donthireddi Subba Reddy) in
D the hotal of Subbamma (PW-8) in the neighbouring village Proddatur.
The deceased along with the two witnesses attended a cinema show at
Anwar Talkies. They came out of the theatre 10 minutes earlier
around 9.30 P.M. and were walking along the road towards the bus
stand. When they reached near the old telephone exchange about 50
metres away from Anwar Talkies, there was an explosion of crackers.
E The accused persons suddenly surrounded the deceased. They were
armed with daggers. They attacked him after one of them pushing
aside PW-1. PW- I fell on the barbed wire fence of the transformer and
received scratches on his thigh. The deceased was stabbed indiscri-
minately and simultaneously by all the assailants who retreated in two -\
different directions and the deceased die(! on the spot instantaneously.
F Besides PWs I and 2, who witnessed the occurrence, PW-3 Donth-
ireddi Narayana Reddy, and PW-4 Poreddi Subba Reddy. had also
seen the attack. These witnesses were passing along the road. PW-5,
Mekkamalla Balireddi, reached the scene attracted by the crowd and
had seen the accused persons running away. The street light besides
the electric light at a petrol bunk and the light in the bunk on the side
G of the road were burning at the time of the occurrence. The assailants ;:,
had been identified by the witnesses in that light. The assailants were
strangers to the PWs I and 2 but A-2, 3 and 5 were known to PWs 3
and 4 and 5 who had also acquaintance with the deceased. PW-5
informed PW-7 (Polagiri Siva Reddy), the brother of the deceased,
about the occurrence, while PWs 3 and 4 left the place after seeing the
H deceased lying at the scene. This in short is the prosecution case.
B.P.N. REDDY v. STATE OF A.P. [FATHIMA BEEVI ,J.I 727

The Town Police Station is situated about two furlongs away
A
from the place of occurrence. PW-1 along with PW-2 went to the
police station and lodged the first information report. A crime was
registered against six unidentified persons. PW-16 (Sri S. Khasim Sab,
"' Sub Inspector of Police), recorded the statement Ex. P-1. The Circle
Inspector visited the scene. PW-2 was referred to the Medical Officer
at 4 A.M. The inquest on the dead body was held on the next morning. B
The post-mortem examination revealed that deceased had sustained 54
injuries all except one being incised wounds. At the time of the
inquest, the statements of PWs-2 and 7 were recorded. PW-7 suspected
the involvement of Accused 2, 3 and 5. On 17 .8.1974, the police dogs
J.
were pressed into service. It is stated that the sniffer went to the village
!!It of the deceased and thereafter to the houses of Accused 2 and 3.
Statements of PWs 3, 4 and 5 were recorded on 18.8.1974. Accused c
No. 6 was arrested on 25.9.1974. A test identification parade was
conducted by PW-9 (Sri G.V. Raghavaiah, Judicial Second Class
Magistrate) on 31.10.1974. A-6 was identified by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 at
the parade as recorded in Ex. P-2 proceeding. The other accused
'
.r
persons were arrested on 1.11.1974. PW-10 (Sri D. Sreeramulu, Judi- D
cial Second Class Magistrate), conducted the test identification parade
).; in which as per Ex. P-3 proceeding, PWs 1, and 2 identified accused 1,
2, 3 and 5. The investigation was completed and the charge was laid
against the six persons.

. The learned sessions judge analysed the prosecution evidence E
meticulously and discarded the testimony of PWs 1 to 5. He considered
PWs 3, 4 and 5 as chance witnesses, found their conduct in not disclos-
y
ing the involvement of the accused persons known to them until their
> statements were recorded on 18.8.1974 as suspicious and strange when
they had acquaintance with the deceased. PWs 3 and 4 when examined
by PWs 9 and 10 for the purpose of test identification parade had given F
statement which vary with their earlier statement and their evidence
before court was contradictory to their prior statements. It was, doubt-
ful whether they could have seen the occurrence or identified any of
the assailants. Their evidence was, therefore, rejected as untrust-
worthy. The testimony of the two eye witnesses PWs 1 and 2 who
f claimed that they were in the company of the deceased at the time of G
the occurrence was also not accepted by the trial court for various
reasons. They were strangers to the accused persons. Their evidence
regarding the identification of the assailants as the accused did not
impress the trial court which pointed out that the prosecution had no
consistent case regarding the source of light at the scene that these
witnesses even if present at the scene when the assailants mounted the H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 2 S.C.R.

attack on the deceased could not have remained there to observe and
A
memorize the features of the assailants and identify them after a long
lapse of time. Pw-1 rushed to the police station in utter confusion even
without his dhoti. The witnesses were frightened and ran away. In this '.-
situation in the meagre light available, they could not have identified
the assailants as the accused. The learned judge on a consideration of
B the medical evidence was also of the view that the occurrence could
not have happened at the time mentioned by these witnesses and, said
there were several suspicious features which render their version
doubtful. The learned judge also pointed out that the identification
parade was perfunctory and was of no assistance to the prosecution.
l.
The learned sessions judge analysed the entire evidence and consi-
c dered it unsafe to accept the testimony of the two witnesses to record a -.
conviction. In that view of the matter, he acquitted all the accused
persons.

The High Court considered the reasoning as perverse and on a
reappraisal of the evidence, took a contrary view. In the opinion of the ~-

D High Court, PWs 1 to 4 are truthful witnesses and their evidence could
be accepted. In its view, there was no serious infirmity in the prosecu-
tion evidence. Accordingly, the High Court accepted the testimony of
PWs 1 and 2, corroborated by the evidence of test identification
parade and the testimony of PWs 3. and 4 to find the appellants guilty.
Since accused No. 4 was not identified by PWs 1 to 4, he was given the
E benefit of doubt and his acquittal was confirmed.

The learned counsel for the appellants has taken us through the
entire evidence in the case. The appeal is one under Section 2 of the
Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, ..\
1970. It is, no doubt, open to this Court to reexamine the evidence for
F the purpose of satisfying itself whether the High Court was justified in
reversing the order of acquittal in the facts and circumstances of the
case. It is well-settled proposition of law that in an appeal against
acquittal, the Appellate Court is empowered to evaluate the evidence
and arrive at its own conclusion. It is equally settled law that where the
view taken by the trial court or an appreciation of the evidence is also a
,G plausible view, .the Appellate Court shall be slow to interfere with it ":
even when a different view is possible on a reappraisal of the evidence.
The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that the High Court
in reversing the order of acquittal in this case had departed from these
established principles and had thus erred grievously in convicting the
appellants. It was submitted that the conviction recorded by the High
H Court essentially rests on the testimony of PWs 1 and 2. When the
B.P.N. REDDY v. STATE OF A.P. IFATHIMA BEEVI ,J.J 729

serious infirmities in the evidence of the other two eye witnesses PWs 3
and 4 had been brought to the notice of the High Court, it has
A
_, eschewed that evidence and has placed reliance only on the testimony
of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the appellants are
guilty of the offence. The appellants' learned counsel, therefore, con-
tended that if the view taken by the trial court on the testimony of PWs
1 and 2 cannot be characterised as perverse or wholly unreasonable, B
there is no justification for the High Court to accept that evidence as
the basis of a conviction even if in its opinion the evidence of these two
witnesses could have been relied on. The main plank of the argument
of the learned counsel is that the witnesses being strangers to the
assailants when there are circumstances to show that they did not have
the opportunity to identify the assailants, their evidence involving
these appellants is not free from doubt and, therefore, the trial court c
had taken the reasonable view that it is unsafe for the court to accept
that evidence to convict the accused persons. We see considerable
force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants.

The evidence given by the witnesses before the court is the sub- D
stantive evidence. In a case where the \\.ritness is a stranger to the
accused and he identifies the accused person before the court for the
first time, the .court will not ordinarily accept that identification as
conclusive. It is to lend assurance to the testimony of the witnesses
that evidence in the form of an earlier identification is tendered. If the
accused persons are got identified by the witness soon after their arrest E
and such identification does not suffer from any infirmity that cir-
r
cumstance lends corroboration to the evidence given by the witness
.I before the court. But in a case where the evidence before the court is
itself shaky, the identification before the magistrate would be of no
assistance to the prosecution.
F
In the present case, the appellants are admittedly persons with
whom the two witnesses had no previous acquaintance. The occur-
rence happened on a dark night. When the crime was committed dur-
ing the hours of darkness and the assailants are utter strangers to the
witnesses, the identification of the accused persons assumes great

" importance. The prevailing light is a matter of crucial significance. The
necessity to have the suspects identified by the witnesses soonafter
their arrest also arises. According to the prosecution, the attack on the
G

deceased was sudden and simultaneous and the assailants slipped away
in no time. Both PWs 1 and 2 had deposed that they were attracted by
the explosion and when they turned back, the assailants surrounded
the deceased and inflicted the stab injuries. PW-1 was pushed aside. H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1991] 2 S.C.R. ~

He fell on the fence of the barbed wire of the transformer, received
A
.
scratches. His dhoti stuck to the wire. He left it there and ran to the
police station in utter confusion. His statement Ex. P-1 does not dis-
v
close that PW-2 accompanied him, though PWs 1 and 2 stated before
court that they went together. The possibility of the companions of the
deceased having been scattered and gone in different directions cannot '
B be ruled out. Even in Ex. P-1 statement what PW-1 said is that six
persons attacked the deceased; they were villagers; they were wearing
dhoti and kurta. One was about 45 years of age and of dark comp-
lexion, another was 30 years of age lean and yet another was also a
lean person. These may be the vague impression the witness had on
seeing the assailants suddenly. It is not however in evidence that the
description given by PW-1 in Ex. P-1 fits in with the description of any
c one of the appellants. When the .magistrates recorded the statements
of the witnesses, they could not give any characteristic feature of any
one of the assailants. The entire case depends on the identification of
the appellants and the identification is founded solely on the test
identification parades. .IN;
D Therefore, in the absence of cogent evidence that PWs 1 and 2 by .,,.
reason of the visibility of the light at the place of occurrence and ""'
proximity to the assailants had a clear vision of the action of each one
of the accused persons in order that their features could get impressed
in their mind to enable them to recollect the same and identify the
assailants even after a long lapse of time, it would be hazardous to
E draw the inference that the appallants are the real assailants. There is
no whisper in Ex. P-1 that there was some source of light at the scene.
The omission cannot be ignored as insignificant. When the lnvestigat-
1
ing Officer has visited the scene, he made reference to the street lights,
petrol bunk light etc. Whether the street lights and the petrol bunk/
light had been burning at the time of the occurrence and the spot
F where the incidence happened was so located as to receive the light
emanating from these sources are required to be made out by the
prosecution. When this significant fact is left out in the earliest record.
the improvement in the course of the investigation and trial could be of
no avail. The fact that there had been no proof regarding the identity
of the assailants until 18.8. 1974 would suggest that even persons who ct
G collected at the scene in the course of the incidence or soon thereafter
were not in a position to identify any one of the assailants. Since the
Investigating Officer arrived at the scene the same night and the
inquest was held in the next morning, it would have been possible for
the investigating agency to collec\ information regarding the identity
of the assailants earlier to 18.8.1974, if they had been really identified
H by any one of the witnesses examined in the case. When no natural
B.P.N. REDDY v. STATE OF A.P. (FATIUMA BEEVI ,J.] 731

light was available and the street light was at a distance it is unlikely
A
that the eye witnesses by momentary glance of the assailants who
surrounded the victim had a lasting impression and the chance of
identifying the assailants without mistake. The credihility of the
evidence relating to the identification depends largely on the oppor-
tunity the witness had to observe the assailants when the crime was
committed and memorize the impression. This aspect of the matter B
had been stressed by the trial court in appreciating the evidence of
PWs 1 and 2. Tlie High Court has ignored the inherent infirmity and
failed to deal effectively with every important circumstance in the
evidence which weighed with the trial court to disbelieve the prosecu-
tion case.
We have noticed that the magistrates in conducting the test c
identification parade have committed a grave error. In the case of
Accused No. 6 PW-9 had mixed up along with PWs 1 and 2 a person,
Gulati who knew the accused. Similarly, in the identification of the
other accused, PW-4 who claimed acquaintance with Accused Nos. 2,
3 and 5 was mixed up with PWs 1 and 2. When persons who have
D
already known the accused persons to be identified are mixed up with
the witnesses, the test identification is clearly vitiated and is futile.
Value of identification parade depends on the effectiveness and the
precautions taken against the identifying witness having an opportu-
nity of seeing the persons to be identified before they are paraded with
others and also against the identifying witness being provided by the
investigating authority with other unfair aid or assistance so as to E
facilitate the identification of the accused concerned. Therefore, the
evidence of the earlier identification in this case is unacceptable. The
' testimony of PWs I and 2 before court is also unsafe to be acted upon.
Thus we do not consider that the view taken by the learned
sessions judge on the whole was ·erroneous. The overall view of the F
evidence taken by the learned sessions judge is reasonable and plausi-
ble, while it is true that some of the reasons given if taken individually
do not appear to be substantial. Even when two evenly balanced views
of the evidence are possible one must necessarily concede the exis-
tence of a reasonable doubt. Thus on a careful and anxious considera-

f tion of the evidence in the light of the reasoning adopted by the trial
court as well as the High Court, we are of the opinion that the High
Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal when
G

the identity and involvement of the appellants had not been estab-
lished beyond reasonable doubt. We accordinly allow the appeal, set
aside the conviction and sentence and maintain the order of acquittal.
The bail bonds of the appellants shall stand cancelled. H
TNA Appeal allowed.