Holding

A remand order under Section 37(1)(c) is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, which were absent here, so the remand was set aside and the appeal must be decided on its merits.

Summary

The dispute arose from a slum redevelopment project where the respondent, Samir Narain Bhojwani, alleged default by the appellant, Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited, leading to arbitration and an award in favour of the respondent. The appellant challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the High Court Single Judge set aside the award on grounds of perversity and patent illegality. The appellant then appealed the Single Judge's decision under Section 37(1)(c), and the Division Bench of the High Court remanded the matter back to the Single Judge, claiming the lower court had not addressed several issues. The Supreme Court examined whether an appellate court under Section 37 can remand a Section 34 petition and held that such power is only exercisable in exceptional circumstances, which were not present. Consequently, the remand order was set aside and the appeal was directed to be heard on its merits, with the interim relief continued.

Issues considered

The power of an appellate court under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to remand a petition under Section 34 to the lower court
The scope and constraints of the appellate court's jurisdiction under Section 37 compared to Section 34
Whether provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 apply to proceedings under Sections 34 and 37
What constitutes 'exceptional circumstances' justifying a remand order under Section 37(1)(c)
Whether the detailed judgment of the Single Judge precludes the need for a remand

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 19(1), s. 34, s. 37
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Constitution of Indias. Article 136

Subjects

Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Order of remand under Section 37Illegality or perversity of awardObject of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996Consequences of routine remand ordersArticle 136 of the Constitution of IndiaBulky pleadingsTime-consuming submissionsArbitrationCost-effective dispute resolutionExceptional cases of remand under Section 37

Judgment

[2024] 7 S.C.R. 136 : 2024 INSC 478

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation
Private Limited
v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani
(Civil Appeal No. 7247 of 2024)
08 July 2024
[Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
In the instant case, issue revolves around the power of the
Appellate Court dealing with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to pass an order of
remand to Section 34 Court.

Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 and s.37 – An
award was passed by the Tribunal – Appellant filed a petition
u/s. 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge
the award – The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the
petition u/s. 34 and proceeded to set aside the award on various
grounds, such as perversity, patent illegality, etc. – Appeal by
the respondent u/s. 37 of the Arbitration Act challenging the
judgment of the single Judge of the High Court –The Division
Bench of the High Court passed an order of remand to the
single Judge on the ground that the single Judge of the High
Court did not consider several issues – Correctness:
Held: In the facts of the case in hand, while deciding the petition
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the Single Judge has made
a very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the
Bar, the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal and the issue of
illegality or perversity of the award – Detailed reasons while dealing
with the alleged patent illegalities associated with the directions
issued under the arbitral award have been recorded – Considering
the nature of the findings recorded by the Single Judge, the job
of the Appellate Court was to scrutinise the said findings and to
decide, one way or the other, on merits – In this case, the finding
of the Appellate Bench that the impugned judgment of the Single
Judge does not address several issues raised by the parties cannot

* Author
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 137

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

be sustained at all – As far as the power of the Appellate Court
under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand is concerned,
the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when
exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable –
Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration:
a) Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act is made without consideration of merits; b) Without service of
notice to the respondent in a petition under Section 34, interference
is made with the award; and c) Decision in proceedings under
Section 34 is rendered when one or more contesting parties are
dead, and their legal representatives have not been brought on
record – In the facts of the case, the remand was completely
unwarranted – The reason is that the Single Judge has elaborately
dealt with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition –
This Court should benefit from reasoned judgment rendered by
the Court under Section 37 – In the instant case, this Court does
not have the benefit of a decision of the Appellate Court dealing
with all the issues dealt with by the Single Judge while deciding
the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act – Therefore,
the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court
is set aside and the Divison Bench of the High Court is directed
to decide the appeal on merits after considering the arbitral award
and the decision under section 34. [Paras 17, 18, 20 ]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34 and s.37 –
Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal u/s.
37 against the judgment in a petition u/s. 34:
Held: The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal
under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section
34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing
with a petition under Section 34 – It is the duty of the Appellate
Court to consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined
to the grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under
Section 34 – The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under
Section 37 is to decide whether the jurisdiction under Section
34 has been exercised rightly or wrongly – While doing so, the
Appellate Court can exercise the same power and jurisdiction that
Section 34 Court possesses with the same constraints. [Para 16]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s. 34, s.37 and s.19 –
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Applicability of the provisions
138 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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of CPC to the proceedings before the Arbitrator and the Court
under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act:
Held: The provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable
to the proceedings before the learned Arbitrator and the Court
under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act – The legislature’s
intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which
provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of
the CPC – That is why the provisions of the CPC have not been
made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)
(c). [Para 18]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Object of:
Held: The object of the Arbitration Act is to provide an arbitral
procedure that is fair, efficient, and capable of meeting the needs
of specific arbitration – The object is to ensure that the arbitral
proceedings and proceedings filed for challenging the award
are concluded expeditiously – The proceedings have to be cost-
effective – The supervisory role of the Courts is very restricted –
Moreover, one cannot ignore that arbitration is one of the modes
of Alternative Disputes Redressal Mechanism provided in Section
89 of the CPC. [Para 19]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.37 – Consequences
of passing routinely order of remand:
Held: If the Courts dealing with appeals under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act start routinely passing the orders of remand,
the arbitral procedure will cease to be efficient – It will cease to
be cost-effective – Such orders will delay the conclusion of the
proceedings, thereby defeating the very object of the Arbitration
Act – Therefore, an order of remand by Section 37 Court can be
made only in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable.
[Para 19]
Constitution of India – Art.136 – Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 – s. 34 and s.37:
Held: An order of remand by Section 37 Court can be made only
in exceptional cases where remand is unavoidable – The scope
of interference in a petition under Section 34 is very narrow – The
jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower –
Looking to the objects of the Arbitration Act and the limited scope
available to the Courts to interfere with the award of the Arbitral
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 139

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

Tribunal, this Court, while dealing with the decisions under Sections
34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, in its jurisdiction under Article 136
of the Constitution of India, has to be circumspect – By their own
volition, the parties choose to go before the Arbitral Tribunal instead
of availing remedy before the traditional civil courts – Therefore,
the Courts must be very conservative when dealing with arbitral
awards and confine themselves to the grounds strictly available
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. [Para 19]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Bulky pleadings –
Time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy awards
– Bar to show restraint:
Held: The arbitral proceedings have become synonymous with
very bulky pleadings and evidence and very long, time-consuming
submissions, leading to very lengthy awards – Moreover, there is
a tendency to rely upon a large number of precedents, relevant
or irrelevant – The result of all this is that there are very long
hearings before the Courts in Sections 34 and 37 proceedings –
In many cases, the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are
being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of
the CPC – When members of the bar take up so many grounds
in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section
34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not
available in law and waste the Court’s time – The members of the
Bar should show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible
grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under
Section 37 – Brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the
proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective – Arbitration
must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost-effective
dispute resolution. [Para 23]

Case Law Cited
MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited [2019] 3 SCR 1023 : (2019)
4 SCC 163; UHL Power Company Limited v. State of Himachal
Pradesh [2022] 1 SCR 1 : (2022) 4 SCC 116; Konkan Railway
Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking [2023]
11 SCR 215 : (2023) 9 SCC 85 – relied on.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908.
140 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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List of Keywords
Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section
37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Order of remand
passed under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996; Illegality or perversity of the award; Object of Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996; Consequences of passing routinely
order of remand; Article 136 of the Constitution of India; Bulky
pleadings; Time-consuming submissions, leading to very lengthy
awards; Arbitration; Cost-effective dispute resolution; Exceptional
cases of remand under section 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.7247 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in CA No.30 of 2023
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 7248 and 7249 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
A.M. Singhvi, Ramesh Singh, Mukul Rohatgi, C. U. Singh, Ritin
Rai, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Mohit D. Ram, Atman Mehta,
Anand Pai, Vipul Patel, Ms. Monisha Handa, Rajul Shrivastav, Rachit
Bharwada, Anubhav Sharma, Mahesh Agarwal, Parimal K. Shroff,
Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Anirudh Bhatia, Devansh Srivastava,
Ms. Vidisha Swarup, E. C. Agrawala, R. Gopalakrishnan, Murtaza
Kanchwalla, S. M. Algaus, Palash Moolchandani, Ms. Ekta Basin,
Ms. Anushree Prashit Kapadia, Nishant Chothani, Ms. Ruchi Krishna
Chauhan, Murtaza Kachwalla, Parimal Shroff, Victor Das, Anup Jain,
Advs. for the appearing parties.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. The application for permission to file special leave petition is allowed.
Leave granted.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 141

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

FACTUAL ASPECTS
2. These appeals take exception to the same judgment and order dated
7th July 2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.
Therefore, the same are being decided together. We are setting out
a few factual aspects necessary for deciding the appeals.
3. On 31st March 1993, the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development
Authority (MHADA) executed a lease agreement in respect of the
subject property in favour of Andheri Kamgar Nagar Co-operative
Housing Society Limited (for short, ‘the Society’). It is stated to be
a society of slum dwellers. The Society, by the agreement dated 6th
October 1996, appointed M/s. Aurora Properties and Investments (for
short, ‘M/s. Aurora’) as the property developer to implement a slum
rehabilitation scheme. M/s. Aurora was to construct 237 rehabilitation
tenements for slum dwellers and 40 tenements for project-affected
persons (PAPs) free of cost and develop the property using the
available Floor Space Index (FSI) and dispose of the same. It appears
that M/s. Aurora could not discharge its obligations. Therefore, by the
agreement dated 22nd September 1999 (described as an agreement
for the grant of sub-development rights), the society appointed Bombay
Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited (the appellant) as
the developer. Apart from taking over the obligations of M/s. Aurora
under the development agreement dated 6th October 1996, the
appellant corporation agreed to hand over 15,000 square feet of built-
up area in the redeveloped property to M/s.Aurora against M/s. Aurora
paying the cost of construction at Rs.600 per square foot. After that,
the appellant started the development of the property. On 10th March
2003, an agreement was executed by and between the appellant
and one Samir Narain Bhojwani (the respondent), under which the
appellant retained 45% of the total available FSI and permitted the
respondent to construct the free sale area by allotting him FSI to the
extent of the remaining 55%. According to the appellant’s case, the
respondent was appointed as a contractor to carry out the construction
activities of the said building on the site. On 3rd July 2004, a deed
of confirmation was executed to register the agreement dated 10th
March 2003. Thereafter, on 11th September 2009, there was a letter/
tripartite agreement executed, to which M/s. Aurora, the appellant
and the respondent were parties under which it was agreed that the
appellant would provide 22,500 square feet of constructed area to
142 [2024] 7 S.C.R.

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M/s. Aurora instead of 15,000 square feet, which was agreed to be
allotted under the agreement dated 22nd September 1999.
4. The dispute began on 22nd March 2012 when the respondent,
by his letter, alleged default against the appellant as set out in
the said letter. After the letter was sent, there was a prolonged
correspondence, exchange of drafts of the sale agreements, etc.
Ultimately, the respondent filed a petition before the High Court
under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for
short, ‘the Arbitration Act’). An Arbitrator was appointed. The arbitral
proceedings concluded in the form of an award made by the Arbitral
Tribunal on 7th September 2018 in favour of the respondent (the
claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal). Most of the claims made by the
respondent were granted. The counter-claim made by the appellant
was rejected. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award. By the
judgment dated 13th September 2019, the learned Single Judge of the
High Court allowed the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
and proceeded to set aside the award on various grounds, such as
perversity, patent illegality, etc. The respondent filed an appeal under
Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to challenge the judgment of the
learned Single Judge. By the impugned judgment, which set aside
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench of the
High Court passed an order of remand to the learned Single Judge
on the ground that the learned Single Judge did not consider several
issues. The Division Bench referred to an application made by the
third parties. It directed that the interim arrangements made earlier
by making an appointment of the Court Receiver shall continue for
four weeks with a liberty to the parties to seek appropriate interim
orders in the restored petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act. Both the parties to the appeal under Section 37 have preferred
these cross-appeals.
SUBMISSIONS
5. We have heard the learned senior counsel appearing for the parties in
these appeals. The learned senior counsel representing the appellant
submitted that an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
is essentially a continuation of the proceedings under Section 34.
The scope of interference in an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) is
narrower than what is available under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act. Reliance was placed on various decisions of this Court in
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 143

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

support of the said submissions. Another contention is that while
deciding the appeal under Section 37(1)(c), the Court can either set
aside the award or affirm the award but cannot remand the petition
under Section 34 for a fresh hearing. The submission is that the
provisions of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for
short, ‘the CPC’) concerning remand do not apply to an appeal
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act as the provisions of the
CPC do not apply to such an appeal. Inviting our attention to the
findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, the learned senior
counsel submitted that while allowing the petition under Section
34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge, by a detailed
judgment, has dealt with all the issues canvassed by the parties.
Pointing out the findings recorded by the Division Bench in the
impugned judgment, he submitted that it cannot be said that the
reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge are not elaborate.
The reasons are very detailed and more than elaborate. In short,
the submission is that the remand order is wholly unwarranted,
and the Division Bench ought to have decided the appeal under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act on merits.
6. The appellant was the respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal. Even
the claimant Samir Narain Bhojwani (described in this judgment
as the respondent) has filed the Civil Appeal arising out of Special
Leave Petition (C) No.20359 of 2023. The intervenor before the
Division Bench in the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
has preferred a Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (C)
Diary No.40494 of 2023. The plea by the respondent is naturally for
restoration of the award of the Arbitral Tribunal. We have heard the
detailed submissions of the learned senior counsel representing the
respondent (the claimant) and the intervenors. We are not referring
to the submissions made by them relating to the merits of the Award,
considering the limited scope of these appeals.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
7. After considering the submissions made across the Bar, we find that
the issue revolves around the power of the Appellate Court dealing
with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to pass
an order of remand to Section 34 Court. Before we address the issue
regarding the power of the Appellate Court, we will need to refer
to the award made by the Arbitral Tribunal. There are six different
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parts of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal. The operative part of the
award of the Arbitral Tribunal reads thus:
“.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
203. In view of the foregoing discussion, the following
Award is made:
I
(a) It is declared that the Development Agreement dated
10th March 2003 is valid, subsisting and binding upon
the Claimant and the Respondent;
(b) It is declared that the Claimant is entitled to retain
possession of 15 Flats in Wing A (earmarked for the
Respondent) and 0.63 Flat in Wing B (earmarked for
the Respondent), till the Respondent complies with
all the directions being given in this Award;
(c) The Respondent is directed to construct at its own
cost 107 PAP tenements (or any higher number as
may be specified by SRA) at Shiv Shakti Nagar,
Kandivali, relatable to the Andheri Kamgar Nagar
CHS Scheme and handover the same to SRA within
2 months from the date of this Award;
(d) The Respondent is further directed to obtain from SRA
a certificate of discharge of the Respondent from its
obligation of constructing 107 (or any higher number
of) PAP tenements relatable to Andheri Kamgar Nagar
CHS Scheme, and handing over the same to SRA,
within 3 months from the date of this Award;
(e) The Respondent is directed to obtain further
Commencement Certificate for construction of 6th to
22nd floors of Wing C (further CC for Wing C) on the
basis of sanctioned building plans dated 21st October
2010, within 4 months from the date of this Award;
(f) In case SRA requires the Respondent to comply with
any condition under any Letter of Intent or under
any Regulation or Circular, including payment of any
premium, before issuance of further CC for Wing C,
the Respondent shall comply with such condition or
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 145

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

direction with utmost expedition and within one month
from the date of receipt of such communication;
(g) Once the Respondent obtains further CC for Wing
C as aforesaid, the Claimant shall at its own cost
construct 6th to 22nd floors of Wing C as per the
sanctioned building plans dated 2ist October 2010,
within 18 months from the date of receiving further
CC for Wing C and after completion of construction
of Wing C, give intimation thereof to the Respondent
for applying to SRA for Occupation Certificate (OC)
for Wing C;
(h) The Respondent shall obtain from SRA OC for
Wing C, within 2 months from the date of receipt
of intimation from the Claimant as per the above
direction;
(i) In case SRA requires the Respondent to comply with
any condition under any Letter of Intent or under
any Regulation or Circular, including payment of
any premium, before issuance of OC for Wing C,
the Respondent shall comply with such condition or
direction with utmost expedition and within one month
from the date of receipt of such communication;
II
(j) The Respondent shall pay the Claimant Rs.67,00,000/-
(Rupees Sixty Seven lakhs) along with Rs.26,00,000/-
(Rupees Twenty Six Lakhs) being interest @ 18%
p.a. from 19th July, 2016 till the date of this Award
and further interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of this
Award till the date of payment / realization, within 3
months from the date of this Award;
(k) The Respondent shall also pay the Claimant
Rs.53,00,00,000/(Rupees Fifty Three Crores) as
compensation for the period from 19th July 2016 till
the date of this Award, being compensation for the
delay on the part of the Respondent in not obtaining
further CC for Wing C, within 4 months from the date
of this Award;
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(l) The Respondent shall further pay the Claimant
Rs.50,00,00,000/(Rupees Fifty Crores) as
compensation for delay in obtaining further CC
for Wing C for the period of 24 months from the
date of this Award till issuance of OC for Wing C,
within 4 months from the date of issuance of OC
for Wing C;
III
(m) The Respondent is directed to remove all
encroachments from 9.15 mtr wide road to the
South Side of the property under the said project; (n)
The Respondent is also directed to obtain at its own
cost, all necessary permissions for separate Lease
and/or Assignment from MHADA in respect of the
free sale component area in favour of the Andheri
Kamgar Nagar Society, and, thereafter, in favour of
the purchasers of the Apartments or their Association
under the Indenture of Lease dated 31st March 1993
from MHADA;
(o) The Respondent is further directed to pay Stamp
Duty on the Indenture of Lease dated 31st March
1993 executed by MHADA and on the Development
Agreement for Development dated 6th October 1996
between Andheri Kamgar Nagar CHS and Aurora
Properties & Investments and also on the Agreement
for Sub Development dated
22nd September 1999 between Aurora Properties &
Investments and the Respondent;
IV
(p) Till the OC is received for Wing C, neither the Claimant
nor the Respondent shall sell, or in any other manner
dispose of, encumber, or create any third party rights
in any flat or any parking space in Wing C;
(q) Till the OC is received for Wing C and till the
Respondent complies with the other directions given
in Part II of the operative portion of this Award, the
Respondent and the persons claiming through the
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 147

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

Respondent shall not sell/ re-sell or in any other
manner dispose of or encumber or create any third
party rights in any of the 15 flats in Wing A (earmarked
for the Respondent) and the parking spaces related
thereto;
V
(r) It is declared that the Letters of Allotment purportedly
issued by the Respondent in respect of 31 flats in
Wings A and B (earmarked for the Respondent) are
sham, bogus, illegal and null and void ab-initio and
not binding on the Claimant;
(s) It is further declared that the Agreements for Sale of
15 flats in Wing A (earmarked for the Respondent)
purportedly executed by the Respondent in favor
of the Managing Director and Directors of the
Respondent Company and their family members are
also sham and null and void ab-initio and not binding
on the Claimant;
(t) In case, within 4 months from the date of this Award,
the Respondent does not pay the Claimant the
aforesaid amount of Rs.54.03 crores or does not
surrender 3.63 flats in Wing B ( out of those earmarked
for the Respondent), the Claimant shall be entitled
to sell 0.63 flat in Wing
B (Flat No.4 on the pt floor) and 3 flats in Wing B,
out of the following 9 flats:-
● 2 Flats purportedly transferred by the Respondent
to Mr. Kiran H.Hemani - M.D. of the Respondent,
● 7 flats purportedly transferred by the Respondent
to Mr. Priyank K. Hemani - Director of the
Respondent;
(u) The Respondent and the persons claiming through
the Respondent are hereby restrained from selling/
reselling, or in any other manner disposing of or
encumbering or parting with possession of or creating
any third party rights, in the flats in Wing B purportedly
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transferred to Mr. Kiran H. Hemani and Mr. Priyank K.
Hemai till identification and intimation of 3 flats out of
those 9 flats in Wing B is conveyed by the Respondent
to the Claimant for the purpose of being available for
sale by the Claimant for recovery Rs.54.03 crores as
directed in (h), (i) & (r) hereinabove and explained
in detail para 199 hereinabove;
(v) In case the Respondent does not obtain further CC
for Wing C within 4 months from the date of this
Award, the Claimant shall be entitled to sell the 15
flats in Wing A (earmarked for the Respondent) and
adjust the sale proceeds thereof against the loss of
profit from Wing C;
(w) In case the Respondent obtains further CC for Wing
C and also obtains OC for Wing C within the time
limits stipulated in this Award, but the Respondent
does not pay the Claimant Rs. 50 crores, as directed
in (j) above within 4 months from the date of obtaining
OC for Wing C, or does not surrender 3.37 flats to
the Claimant and the parking spaces related thereto,
within the said period, the Claimant shall be entitled
to sell off 3.37 flats earmarked for the Respondent
in Wing C and the parking spaces related thereto;
VI
(x) The Respondent shall pay the Claimant costs of this
proceeding quantified at Rs.1,50,00,000/- (Rupees
One Crore Fifty Lakhs), within 4 months from the
date of this Award. The Respondent shall bear its
own costs for this proceeding.
205. The claims made by the Claimant for the other
reliefs not granted in this Award are hereby rejected.
All the Counter Claims made by the Respondent are
also rejected.
206. It is clarified that this Award does not deal with
any of the 5 flats in Wing A, 3 flats in Wing B and
4 flats in Wing C, earmarked for Aurora Properties
& Investments, for which orders of injunction were
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 149

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

passed by the Bombay High Court on 3rd and 17th
December 2013 in Notice of Motion 147 of 2013,
and which injunction orders have been restored by
the Supreme Court by judgment and order dated
2ist August 2018 in Civil Appeal No. 7079 of 2018.
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”
8. While deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the
learned Single Judge has made an in-depth discussion on the factual
aspects and the submissions of the learned counsel representing
the parties. Paragraphs 1 to 35 of his judgment deal with the factual
aspects and details about the directions issued by the Arbitral Tribunal
under the award. Paragraphs 36 to 125, spanning over 45 pages,
record the submissions made by the parties, and paragraphs 126
to 194, covering 37 pages, are the reasons recorded by the learned
Single Judge. There is a discussion about the oral and documentary
evidence adduced by the parties. From paragraphs 140 onwards,
the learned Single Judge discussed the issue of jurisdiction of the
Arbitral Tribunal to pass the award against the third parties who were
not parties to the arbitral proceedings. The learned Single Judge
referred to the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that 31 agreements/
allotment letters for the sale of flats were sham and bogus and were
not binding on the respondent. The learned Single Judge found that
no persons shown as purchasers under the agreement were parties
to the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal. The learned Single
Judge also noted that these 31 flats were mortgaged in favour of
various Banks and Financial Institutions. Therefore, the learned Single
Judge held that even the Banks and Financial Institutions would be
affected by the finding of the Arbitral Tribunal that 31 flats under the
sale agreements were sham, bogus, null, and void. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge held that the Arbitral Tribunal had exceeded its
jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge also held that the respondent
before the Arbitral Tribunal (the appellant herein) was entitled to sell
the said 31 flats, and the purchasers thereof were neither parties to
the agreement containing the arbitration clause nor claiming under
the said agreement.
9. The learned Single Judge also referred to that part of the arbitral
award, which provided that there would be a charge over the flats
held by the appellant herein. The learned Single Judge held that
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the charge on the properties could be either created by operation of
law or by agreement of the parties, and in this case, there was no
such agreement. Therefore, the learned Single Judge held that the
direction to create the charge was ex-facie without the jurisdiction.
Thereafter, the learned Single Judge referred to the reliefs granted
by the Arbitral Tribunal in clauses (c) to (l), (m) to (q), (t), (u) and
(v) of paragraph 203 of the award. According to the learned Single
Judge, some of the reliefs could have been granted only in the
execution of the award. Further, the learned Single Judge held that
under clauses (c) to (l) and (m) to (q) of paragraph 203 of the award,
the appellant herein was directed to carry out various acts to obtain
multiple permissions from the authorities within the prescribed time
and based on such compliance, further directions were issued for the
execution of multiple documents, etc. The authorities from whom the
appellant was directed to obtain various permissions were admittedly
not parties before the arbitral proceedings. The learned Single Judge
also noted that the directions issued in the abovementioned clauses
required continuous supervision by the Court. Therefore, in view of
the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, such reliefs ought
not to have been granted by the Arbitral Tribunal.
10. The learned Single Judge also held that though specific performance
was sought in the claim made before the Arbitral Tribunal based
on the Letter of Intent dated 7th March 2012, the Arbitral Tribunal
granted specific performance based on the Letter of Intent of 2010.
The learned Single Judge also held that the learned Arbitrator or
the Court could not supervise whether the appellant can shift 107
PAPs in its other properties as directed under the award. Further, it
was observed that the direction to construct the 6th to 22nd floors
could be implemented only upon completing the entire chain of
events, such as obtaining permissions, shifting of PAPs, etc. The
learned Single Judge held that the grant of specific performance in
the present case would be hit by Section 14 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963, as the enforcement of such a contract involves continuous
supervision by the Court. On perusing the material on record, the
learned Single Judge also held that the respondent herein had not
proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations. The
learned Single Judge held that since the relief of specific performance
is discretionary, the conduct of the respondent ought to have been
taken into consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 151

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

11. The learned Single Judge dealt with the award of damages in the
sum of Rs.53 crores for the period from 19th July 2016 till the date
of the award on account of the alleged delay by the respondent.
The learned Single Judge held that the evidence on record had
been completely overlooked while granting the relief of damages
in the sum of Rs.53 crores. The learned Single Judge recorded
that the Arbitral Tribunal referred to only a part of the depositions
of the witnesses and ignored the rest. Further, the learned Single
Judge held that the delay on the part of the appellant in completing
other projects was neither pleaded nor proved. Moreover, the
learned Single Judge held that even assuming that there was a
delay in completion of other projects on the part of the appellant,
that would be no ground for grant of relief for specific performance.
The learned Single Judge recorded something about the approach
of the Arbitral Tribunal in paragraph 168. The learned Single Judge
objected to the learned Arbitrator relying on the news report of
some other developer’s project in the Times of India. The learned
Single Judge noted that the news article was published after the
arguments were concluded. Moreover, the learned Single Judge
found that relying upon the material, not forming part of the record,
amounts to a breach of the principles of natural justice. A clear
finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is that the learned
Arbitrator has applied different yardsticks to the evidence adduced
by both parties. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal did not treat the
parties as equals.
12. The learned Judge held that while dealing with the per square
feet rate of the flats for awarding a claim for damages, the Arbitral
Tribunal completely ignored the evidence on record, which showed
that the respondent had sold the flats at much lower rates. The
learned Single Judge also discussed the finding recorded while
rejecting the counterclaim. The learned Single Judge held that
though the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the building did not
have a load-bearing capacity of 22 floors, the respondent neither
pleaded nor proved the load-bearing capacity of the building. The
learned Single Judge also held that awarding payment of interest
on interest-free deposit was contrary to the terms of the contract,
which shows patent illegality. However, the learned Single Judge
rejected the allegation of bias made by the appellant against the
learned Arbitrator.
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13. We have referred to only material findings of the learned Single Judge
by way of illustration to emphasise that there is a very elaborate
consideration of the merits of the challenge to the award in the
judgment of the learned Single Judge.
14. Now, we turn to the judgment of the Division Bench in the appeal
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. The approach of the Division
Bench is reflected in paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment, which
reads thus:
“4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties,
we were of the opinion that the impugned order is
required to be set aside and the matter needs to be
remanded to the learned Single Judge for de novo
consideration. We had put it to the counsel for the
parties that the appeal can be remanded, without
detailed reasons, by consent, keeping all contentions
open. The Appellant was ready but the Respondent was
not ready. Therefore, we are required to give elaborate
reason why remand is necessary. In this context, we
have briefly referred to the core facts of the case, the rival
contentions, the award and the impugned order. The factual
backdrop leading to the dispute is narrated in detail in the
Award and by the learned Single Judge. The summary of
the factual position is as follows.
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”
(emphasis added)
In paragraphs 42 and 43, the Division Bench held thus:
“42. Even otherwise, question would arise as to
whether such a detailed factual enquiry can be made
to set aside the award. To reach such a conclusion
that it suffers from perversity, the Award had to be
carefully analyzed to rule out other possibilities. It is
not enough to merely state a conclusion. Further, when
such a conclusion can be reached under Section 34 of the
Act is a debatable issue that also needs to be addressed.
43. In the impugned order in paragraphs 161 and 162
reference is made to the principle of law governing the
discretion to be used for grant of specific performance.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 153

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

In paragraph 163, it is stated that ‘perusal of the record’
will indicate that the Appellant has not proved that he
was ready and willing. When the Appellant sought to
argue that the Appellant was ready and willing, the
same was dealt with in paragraph 164. The submission
of the Appellant that unless the Respondent would
have fully satisfied the Appellant that he had made
appropriate provision for shifting 107 PAPs to some
other plot the Appellant was not required to proceed
with the construction of building, was not accepted.
However, there is no discussion as to why this stand
of the Appellant was rejected.
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. … ..”
(emphasis added)
In the impugned judgment, certain findings recorded by the learned
Single Judge have been criticised. Ultimately, in paragraphs 61 and
62 of the impugned judgment, the Division Bench held thus:
“61. Considering that the impugned order has not
addressed several issues raised by both parties before
setting aside the Award, for the above reasons we are
inclined to set aside the impugned order to remand the
proceedings to the learned Single Judge. Further under
the Award itself. question now will remain for damages.
62. Since we are of the opinion that the petition filed by
the Respondent needs to be reconsidered, we refrain from
going deeper into the controversy and in our discussion,
which have only highlighted as to why the impugned order
is unreasoned and therefore needs to be set aside for
reconsideration.
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”
Thus, eventually, an order of remand was passed directing the
learned Single Judge to hear the petition under Section 34 afresh.
15. We need not dwell on the limited scope of the interference in the
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. That position is very
well settled. However, as far as the appeal under Section 37(1)(c)
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of the Arbitration Act is concerned, in the case of MMTC Limited v.
Vedanta Limited 1, in paragraph 14, this Court held thus:
“14. As far as interference with an order made under
Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot
be disputed that such interference under Section 37
cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down under
Section 34. In other words, the court cannot undertake
an independent assessment of the merits of the award,
and must only ascertain that the exercise of power
by the court under Section 34 has not exceeded the
scope of the provision. Thus, it is evident that in case
an arbitral award has been confirmed by the court under
Section 34 and by the court in an appeal under Section
37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to
disturb such concurrent findings.”
(emphasis added)
In another decision of this Court in the case of UHL Power Company
Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh 2, in paragraph 16, it was
held thus:
“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when
it comes to the scope of an appeal under Section 37 of
the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an appellate court
in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set
aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. In MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4
SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293] , the reasons for vesting
such a limited jurisdiction on the High Court in exercise of
powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been
explained in the following words : (SCC pp. 166-67, para 11)
“11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the
position is well-settled by now that the Court
does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and
may interfere on merits on the limited ground

1 [2019] 3 SCR 1023 : (2019) 4 SCC 163
2 [2022] 1 SCR 1 : (2022) 4 SCC 116
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 155

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provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the
award is against the public policy of India. As per
the legal position clarified through decisions of
this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996
Act in 2015, a violation of Indian public policy,
in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental
policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest
of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the
existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award.
Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental
policy of Indian law” would cover compliance
with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a
judicial approach, compliance with the principles
of natural justice, and Wednesbury [Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] reasonableness.
Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been
held to mean contravention of the substantive
law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and
contravention of the terms of the contract.”
(emphasis added)
In the decision of this Court in the case of Konkan Railway
Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking 3, in
paragraph 18, it was held thus:
“18. At the outset, we may state that the jurisdiction
of the court under Section 37 of the Act, as clarified
by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 : (2019) 2 SCC
(Civ) 293], is akin to the jurisdiction of the court under
Section 34 of the Act. [Id, SCC p. 167, para 14:“14. As
far as interference with an order made under Section 34,
as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed
that such interference under Section 37 cannot travel
beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34. In
other words, the court cannot undertake an independent
assessment of the merits of the award, and must only
ascertain that the exercise of power by the court under

3 [2023] 11 SCR 215 : (2023) 9 SCC 85
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Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.”]
Scope of interference by a court in an appeal under
Section 37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting
aside or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted
and subject to the same grounds as the challenge
under Section 34 of the Act.”
(emphasis added)
16. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under
Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is
more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a
petition under Section 34. It is the duty of the Appellate Court to
consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined to the
grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under Section 34.
The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is to
decide whether the jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised
rightly or wrongly. While doing so, the Appellate Court can exercise
the same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses
with the same constraints.
17. In the facts of the case in hand, while deciding the petition under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge has made a
very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar,
the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal and the issue of illegality
or perversity of the award. Detailed reasons while dealing with the
alleged patent illegalities associated with the directions issued under
the arbitral award have been recorded. Considering the nature of the
findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, the job of the Appellate
Court was to scrutinise the said findings and to decide, one way or
the other, on merits. In this case, the finding of the Appellate Bench
that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not
address several issues raised by the parties cannot be sustained at all.
18. The provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the
proceedings before the learned Arbitrator and the Court under
Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The legislature’s intention
is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that
an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC. That
is why the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to
the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). We are not even
suggesting that because the provisions of the CPC are not applicable,
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 157

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the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37(1)(c)
is powerless to pass an order of remand. The remedy of an appeal
will not be effective unless there is a power of remand vesting in
the appellate authority. In the Arbitration Act, there is no statutory
embargo on the power of the Appellate Court under Section 37(1)(c)
to pass an order of remand. However, looking at the scheme of the
Arbitration Act, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand
only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand
unavoidable. There may be exceptional cases where remand in an
appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act may be warranted.
Some of the exceptional cases can be stated by way of illustration:
a. Summary disposal of a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration
Act is made without consideration of merits;
b. Without service of notice to the respondent in a petition under
Section 34, interference is made with the award; and
c. Decision in proceedings under Section 34 is rendered when
one or more contesting parties are dead, and their legal
representatives have not been brought on record.
19. Some of the objectives mentioned in the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Arbitration Act are very relevant which are as follows:
“4. The main objectives of the Bill are as under:-
(i) to comprehensively cover international commercial
arbitration and conciliation as also domestic arbitration
and conciliation;
(ii) to make provision for an arbitral procedure which
is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs
of the specific arbitration;
(iii) to provide that the arbitral tribunal gives reasons for
its arbitral award;
(iv) to ensure that the arbitral tribunal remains within the
limits of its jurisdiction;
(v) to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the
arbitral process;
…………………………………”
(emphasis added)
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While coming out with the 2015 Amendment Bill, the legislature has
noted in the objects and reasons that a lot of delay is involved in
concluding the arbitral proceedings. In paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
objects and reasons of the Bill, the Legislature has stated thus:
“6. It is proposed to introduce the Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Bill, 2015, to replace the Arbitration and
Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, which inter
alia, provides for the following, namely—
(i) to amend the definition of “Court” to provide that in
the case of international commercial arbitrations, the
Court should be the High Court;
(ii) to ensure that an Indian Court can exercise jurisdiction
to grant interim measures, etc., even where the seat
of the arbitration is outside India;
(iii) an application for appointment of an arbitrator shall
be disposed of by the High Court or Supreme Court,
as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible
and an endeavour should be made to dispose of the
matter within a period of sixty days;
(iv) to provide that while considering any application
for appointment of arbitrator, the High Court or the
Supreme Court shall examine the existence of a
prima facie arbitration agreement and not other
issues;
(v) to provide that the arbitral tribunal shall make
its award within a period of twelve months from
the date it enters upon the reference and that the
parties may, however, extend such period up to
six months, beyond which period any extension
can only be granted by the Court, on sufficient
cause;
(vi) to provide that a model fee Schedule on the basis of
which High Courts may frame rules for the purpose
of determination of fees of arbitral tribunal, where
a High Court appoints arbitrator in terms of Section
11 of the Act;
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 159

Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited v.
Samir Narain Bhojwani

(vii) to provide that the parties to dispute may at any
stage agree in writing that their dispute be resolved
through fast track procedure and the award in such
cases shall be made within a period of six months;
(viii) to provide for neutrality of arbitrators, when a person is
approached in connection with possible appointment
as an arbitrator;
(ix) to provide that application to challenge the award
is to be disposed of by the Court within one year.
7. The amendments proposed in the Bill will ensure that
arbitration process becomes more user friendly, cost
effective and lead to expeditious disposal of cases.”
(emphasis added)
The object of the Arbitration Act is to provide an arbitral procedure
that is fair, efficient, and capable of meeting the needs of specific
arbitration. The object is to ensure that the arbitral proceedings
and proceedings filed for challenging the award are concluded
expeditiously. The proceedings have to be cost-effective. The
supervisory role of the Courts is very restricted. Moreover, we cannot
ignore that arbitration is one of the modes of Alternative Disputes
Redressal Mechanism provided in Section 89 of the CPC. If the
Courts dealing with appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act
start routinely passing the orders of remand, the arbitral procedure
will cease to be efficient. It will cease to be cost-effective. Such
orders will delay the conclusion of the proceedings, thereby defeating
the very object of the Arbitration Act. Therefore, an order of remand
by Section 37 Court can be made only in exceptional cases where
remand is unavoidable. As observed earlier, the scope of interference
in a petition under Section 34 is very narrow. The jurisdiction under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is narrower. Looking to the objects
of the Arbitration Act and the limited scope available to the Courts
to interfere with the award of the Arbitral Tribunal, this Court, while
dealing with the decisions under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration
Act, in its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
has to be circumspect. By their own volition, the parties choose to
go before the Arbitral Tribunal instead of availing remedy before the
traditional civil courts. Therefore, the Courts must be very conservative
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when dealing with arbitral awards and confine themselves to the
grounds strictly available under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
20. In the facts of the case, the remand was completely unwarranted.
The reason is that the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt
with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition. This Court
should benefit from reasoned judgment rendered by the Court under
Section 37. In this case, we do not have the benefit of a decision
of the Appellate Court dealing with all the issues dealt with by the
learned Single Judge while deciding the petition under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act. Therefore, it will not be appropriate for this Court
to look at the arbitral award and the findings recorded by the Section
34 Court and exercise the jurisdiction of the Section 37 Court. If
we do something which Section 37 Court was required to do, it will
be unjust to the parties as the unsuccessful party before us will be
deprived of one forum of challenge. Therefore, we have no option
but to set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and
request the Division Bench to decide the appeals on merits after
considering the arbitral award and the decision of Section 34 Court.
21. Before we part with the judgment, we must record some serious
concerns based on our judicial experience. Case after case, we
find that the arbitral proceedings have become synonymous with
very bulky pleadings and evidence and very long, time-consuming
submissions, leading to very lengthy awards. Moreover, there is a
tendency to rely upon a large number of precedents, relevant or
irrelevant. The result of all this is that we have very long hearings
before the Courts in Sections 34 and 37 proceedings.
22. By way of illustration, we are referring to the factual aspects of the
present case. The award runs into 139 pages. The petition under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act runs into 93 pages and incorporates
151 grounds. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dealing
with the petition under Section 34 consists of 101 pages. One of the
contributing factors is that more than 35 decisions were relied upon
by the parties before the learned Single Judge. On the same point,
multiple judgments have been cited, taking similar views. As per the
practice in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, a memorandum
of appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act does not contain
the facts but only the grounds of challenge. In the memorandum
of appeal preferred by the respondent consisting of 46 pages, 164
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 161

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Samir Narain Bhojwani

grounds have been incorporated. Considering the narrow scope of
interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act, we
cannot comprehend how there could be 151 grounds in a petition
under Section 34 and 164 grounds in an appeal under Section 37.
It is not surprising that this appeal has a synopsis running into 45
pages, and it contains as many as 54 grounds of challenge.
23. In many cases, the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being
treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC.
When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under
Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency
to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste
the Court’s time. The time of our Courts is precious, considering the
huge pendency. This is happening in a large number of cases. All this
makes the arbitral procedure inefficient and unfair. It is high time that
the members of the Bar show restraint by incorporating only legally
permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals
under Section 37. Everyone associated with the arbitral proceedings
must remember that brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and
the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective. All that
we say is that all the stakeholders need to introspect. Otherwise,
the very object of adopting the UNCITRAL model will be frustrated.
We are not called upon to consider whether the arbitral proceedings
are cost-effective. In an appropriate case, the issue will have to be
considered. Arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective,
and cost-effective dispute resolution.
24. As we are directing the rehearing of the appeal under Section 37
of the Arbitration Act, it is necessary to extend the interim relief that
was operative during the pendency of these appeals.
25. Accordingly, we pass the following order:
a. The impugned judgment dated 7th July 2023 in Commercial
Appeal no.31 of 2023 is, hereby, set aside, and Commercial
Appeal no.30 of 2023 is restored to the file of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay;
b. The restored appeal shall be placed before the roster Bench on
29th July 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The parties to the appeal before
this Court shall be under an obligation to appear before the
concerned Bench on that day, and no fresh notice shall be
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served to the parties. The High Court will permit the appellants
to file an amended memorandum of appeal containing only
the relevant and permissible grounds. The concerned Division
Bench shall fix a schedule for hearing of the appeal;
c. The Registry of this Court shall forward a copy of this judgment
to the Prothonotary and Senior Master of the High Court of
Bombay, who shall ensure that the appeal is listed before the
roster Bench as directed above;
d. The interim relief, granted by this Court on 11th August 2023,
shall continue to operate till the disposal of the remanded appeal;
e. We make it clear that we have made no adjudication on the
merits of the arbitral award and the judgment of the learned
Single Judge and all the issues arising in the remanded appeal
are left open to be decided by the High Court; and
f. The appeals are, accordingly, partly allowed with no orders as
to costs.

Result of the case: Appeals partly allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan