Holding

An application under Section 29A(5) for extension of the arbitrator’s mandate is maintainable even after the award is rendered beyond the expiry of the mandate, and such an award is ineffective and unenforceable.

Summary

The appellant, C. Velusamy, and the respondent, K Indhera, entered into three sale agreements that later gave rise to arbitration. A sole arbitrator was appointed, and pleadings were completed on 20‑08‑2022, starting the 12‑month period for award under s.29A(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The parties jointly extended the period to 20‑02‑2024, but the arbitrator finally issued an award on 11‑05‑2024, after his mandate had expired. The respondent filed a s.34 petition to set aside the award, while the appellant filed a s.29A(5) application seeking extension of the arbitrator’s mandate. The Madras High Court dismissed the s.29A application and allowed the s.34 petition. The Supreme Court held that s.29A(5) applications are maintainable even after an award is rendered beyond the expiry of the mandate, that such an award is non‑est and unenforceable, and that the court retains full power to extend the mandate, impose conditions, reduce fees, or substitute arbitrators. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court was directed to proceed with the s.29A application in accordance with the Supreme Court’s principles.

Issues considered

Whether an application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to extend the arbitrator’s mandate is maintainable after an award has been rendered beyond the expiry of the mandate.
Whether an award made after the arbitrator’s mandate has expired is enforceable under the Act.
Whether the court may exercise its powers under Sections 29A(4), 29A(6)‑(8) to extend the mandate, substitute arbitrators, reduce fees or impose costs in such circumstances.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Act, 1940s. 28
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 11, s. 14, s. 2(1)(e), s. 29A(1), s. 29A(3), s. 29A(4), s. 29A(5), s. 29A(6), s. 29A(7), s. 29A(8), s. 29A(9), s. 34, s. 36, s. 42

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether a Court can entertain an application u/s.29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to extend the mandate of the arbitrator(s) for making the award even after an ‘award’ is rendered, though after the expiry of the statutory limit of eighteen- Act, 1996 – s.29A, 29A(5) – Disputes between the parties, sole arbitrator appointed – Pleadings were completed on 20.08.2022 which was the commencement of the period of twelve months provided u/s.29A(1) for making the Award – Before the conclusion of twelve

Subjects

Section 29A(5)extension of arbitrator mandatearbitral award unenforceableArbitration and Conciliation Act 1996award after expiry of mandates.34 challengecourt's power to substitute arbitratorsarbitration timelinespublic policy

Judgment

[2026] 2 S.C.R. 295 : 2026 INSC 112

C. Velusamy
v.
K Indhera
(Civil Appeal No. 696 of 2026)
03 February 2026
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and
Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether a Court can entertain an application u/s.29A(5) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to extend the mandate of
the arbitrator(s) for making the award even after an ‘award’ is
rendered, though after the expiry of the statutory limit of eighteen-
month period.

Headnotes†
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.29A, 29A(5) –
Disputes between the parties, sole arbitrator appointed –
Pleadings were completed on 20.08.2022 which was the
commencement of the period of twelve months provided
u/s.29A(1) for making the Award – Before the conclusion
of twelve months, parties filed a joint memo u/s.29A(3) and
extended the mandate of the arbitrator by a further period
of six months, ending on 20.02.2024 – Matter was reserved
for final award on 09.09.2023 – Arbitrator finally passed the
award on 11.05.2024 – In the meantime, the mandate of the
arbitrator had terminated on 20.02.2024 – Respondent filed
application u/s.34 for setting aside the award on the ground
that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal expired and arbitral
proceedings stood terminated before passing of the award –
Appellant filed application u/s.29A seeking extension of the
mandate of the tribunal – High Court dismissed the application
u/s.29A as not maintainable whereas, s.34 petition filed by the
respondent was allowed – Challenge to:
Held: Provisions of the Act, particularly s.29A, must not be
interpreted to infer a threshold bar for an application u/s.29A(5) for
extension of the mandate of the arbitrator even when an award is
passed, though after the expiry of the mandate – Court can entertain
an application u/s.29A(5) and pass appropriate orders u/s.29A(4)
296 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator even after the award
is rendered in the meanwhile – Thus, an application u/s.29A(5) for
extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable even after
the expiry of the time u/ss.29A(1) and (3) and even after rendering
of an award during that time – Such an award is ineffective and
unenforceable – But the power of the court to consider extension
is not impaired by such an indiscretion of the arbitrator – While
considering the application, the Court will examine if there is
sufficient cause for extending the mandate, and in the process, it
may impose such terms and conditions as the situation demands –
It will also take into account other factors such as reduction of the
fee of the arbitrator under proviso to s.29A(4) and also impose
costs on parties if the fact situation so demands – Substitution is
an option for the Court as the provision itself says, “it shall be open
for the Court to substitute”, and it will be exercised carefully – If
the mandate is extended, the arbitral tribunal will pick up from
where it was left, and seamlessly continue the proceeding from
the stage at which the mandate had expired, and conclude within
the time granted – Appeal against the judgment in Application No.
5993 of 2024 passed by the High Court is allowed – Application is
restored to its original number – High Court will proceed with the
said application and dispose it of as per the principles laid down
in the present judgment. [Paras 2, 20, 21, 23, 24]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.29A – Interpretation:
Held: Sub-section (1) of s.29A mandates that the award shall be
made within 12 months of the completion of pleadings before the
Arbitral Tribunal – While sub-section (2) incentivises expeditious
making of the Award, proviso to sub-section (4) and sub-section
(8) authorises the Court to impose penalty for delay in making the
award – Sub-section (3) enables parties, by consent, to extend
the period of 12 months for making the award by a further period
not exceeding 6 months – If the award is not made within the
stipulated period of 12 months or the extended period of 6 months,
the mandate of the arbitrator(s) shall terminate – This termination
is subject to the power of the Court to extend the period – The
‘Court’ u/s.29A shall be the Civil Court of ordinary original jurisdiction
in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its original
civil jurisdiction u/s.2(1)(e), and shall not be the High Court or the
Supreme Court u/s.11(6) of the Act – s.42 of the Act relating to
jurisdiction for applications will also not apply to s.11 of the Act –
There is no statutory prescribed time limit for the Court to exercise
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 297

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

the power u/s.29A(4) for extending the period, except for its own
discretion – Court can exercise the power before or after the
expiry of the period u/sub-sections 29A(1) or (3) – Further, there
is no prescription of an outer limit for extending the time for the
conclusion of arbitral proceedings – Given this power, the Court
will exercise it with circumspection, balancing the remedy with the
rights of other stakeholders – The power of the Court to extend the
time u/sub-section (4) may be exercised on an application by any
of the parties – Once such an application for extension of time is
pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal
of such application u/sub-section (9) – The Court shall endeavour
to dispose of such an application within 60 days – Delay in the
delivery of an arbitral award, by itself, is not sufficient to set aside
that award – It is only when the effect of the undue delay in the
delivery of an arbitral award is explicit and adversely reflects on the
findings therein, such delay and, more so, if it remains unexplained,
can be construed to result in the award being in conflict with the
public policy of India – Under s.29A(6), while exercising the power
of extension, it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or
all the arbitrators – This is a discretionary power that the Court
would exercise in the facts and circumstances of the case – Upon
substitution, the reconstituted tribunal shall be deemed to be in
continuation of the previously appointed tribunal as per s.29A(7)
and shall continue from the stage already reached and on the basis
of evidence already on record – The newly appointed arbitrators
shall be deemed to have received the evidence and materials –
Vesting of the power of substitution, u/s.29A(6), is on the “Court”
and this Court is the “Court” as defined in s.2(1)(e) – The text, as
well as the context for identifying the Court in s.29A(6), as well
as in s.29A(4), is the Court in s.2(1)(e) – The expression ‘Court’
in other provisions must be guided by the meaning given in s.2(1)
(e). [Paras 13 I-X]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Arbitration Act,
1940 – Timelines for commencement, conduct, conclusion
and termination of arbitral proceedings under both the
Acts – Need for the prescription of timelines for making the
award; recommendation of the law commission – International
perspective on the validity of the arbitral award rendered after
the stipulated statutory time limit – Discussed. [Paras 7-10]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.29A, (4), (6) – “if an
award is not made”:
298 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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Held: s.29A does not, in terms, bar an application for extension
of the mandate of an arbitrator in the event of the delivery of an
award – There is no such prescription anywhere in the section – In
the first place, if an award is made after expiry of the mandate, then
there is no doubt about the fact that such an award is non est – A
better expression would be to hold that such an award would be
unenforceable u/s.36 – Such an award need not be challenged
u/s.34 – A unilateral act or the indiscretion of the arbitrator in making
such an award will have no bearing on the power and jurisdiction
vested in the Court u/s.29A – It cannot be that the Parliament has
never intended that the act of an arbitrator in delivering an award
when the mandate had expired would denude the power and
jurisdiction vested in the Court – This power and jurisdiction stand
on its own footing and is uninfluenced by the act of the arbitrator in
passing an award without mandate – Further, the expression, “if an
award is not made” in sub-section (4) is employed in the context of
enabling the Court to extend the mandate of the arbitrator – The
context in which the phrase is used makes it clear that the sub-
section is not addressing a situation where an arbitral award has
been rendered after the mandate of the arbitrator has expired, but
rather to declare that the Court can extend the period before or
after the expiry of the mandate – ss.29A(4), (6) make it evident
that the intention of the Parliament is to safeguard the conduct
and conclusion of arbitral proceedings. [Paras 15, 16, 18]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss.29A(4), 29A(5),
29A (6), 29A(8) – Empowerments thereunder, in the nature of
instruments in s.29A, enable the courts to deploy them as and
when the factual matrix demands – Stated. [Para 20]

Interpretation of Statutes – Statute providing legal remedies
for the resolution of disputes – Duty of constitutional court:
Held: While interpreting an enactment providing legal remedies for
the resolution of disputes, a constitutional court has the obligation
to ensure that the provision is: (a) accessible, (b) affordable, (c)
expeditious and (d) cohesive – Accessibility requires the remedy
to be easily available – Affordability is an aspect that is related to
the cost of availing the remedy, it must be at a reasonable price –
Expeditious nature of a remedy is concerned with the quick disposal
and abhors unreasonable delays – Yet another facet of effective
remedy is in its cohesiveness. [Para 22]
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 299

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

Case Law Cited
Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. [2024]
9 SCR 473 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494; Ajay Protech Private
Limited v. General Manager and Anr. [2024] 11 SCR 850 : 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3381; Lancor Holdings Ltd v. Prem Kumar Menon
& Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2319; Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela
Chowgule, 2026 INSC 92 – relied on.
Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors., 2025 INSC 1409 :
[2025] 12 SCR 408; NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025
INSC 54 : [2025] 1 SCR 610; State of West Bengal v. Associated
Contractors [2014] 10 SCR 426 : (2015) 1 SCC 32 – referred to.
Suryadev Alloys & Power Private Ltd. v. Sh. Govindaraja Textiles Pvt.
Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7858; Ayyasamy v. A. Shanmugavel,
2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4338; RKEC Projects Limited v. Cochin
Port Trust, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 4192 – referred to.
Oakland Metal Co Ltd. v. D. Benaim & Co. Ld. [1953] 2 QB 261;
Alphamix Ltd v District Council of Rivière du Rempart (Mauritius)
[2023] UKPC 20, at para 26; Ting Kang Chung John v. Teo
Hee Lai Building Constructions Pte Ltd. [2010] SGHC 20, at
para 41 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
‘Part II: The Process of an Arbitration, Chapter 6: Establishing the
Procedural Framework’, in Jeffrey Maurice Waincymer, Procedure
and Evidence in International Arbitration (2012), p. 418; ‘9. Award’,
in Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and
Hunter on International Arbitration (Seventh Edition) (2023), at
para.9.169; Fadri Lenggenhager, ‘Chapter 17, Part II: Commentary
on the ICC Rules, Article 31 [Time limit for the final award]’, in
Manuel Arroyo (ed), Arbitration in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s
Guide (Second Edition) (2018). pp. 2447; The Law Commission’s
176th Report @ 2.21.5.

List of Acts
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Arbitration Act, 1940.

List of Keywords
Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996;
Application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
300 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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Act, 1996; Extension of mandate of the arbitrator(s) for making the
award even after an ‘award’ is rendered, though after the expiry
of the statutory limit of eighteen-month period; Extension of the
mandate of arbitrator even after award is rendered in the meanwhile;
Application u/s.29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable
even after the expiry of the time u/ss.29A(1) and (3) and even
after rendering of an award during that time; Sufficient cause
for extending the mandate; Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 696 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.01.2025 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in AN No. 5993 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Mrs. V Mohana, Sr. Adv., B Ragunath, Pranav V Shankar, Mrs. N
C Kavitha, Mrs. Nimisha Thomas, Vijay Kumar, Ms. Runjhun Garg.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
M. Vijayan, M. Harish Kumar, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari,
Ms. Anne Mathew, Bharat Sood, Jai Govind M J, Jashan Vir Singh.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Contents*

I. Question of Law ..................................................................... 2
II. Facts ...................................................................................... 3
III. Judgment of High Court ....................................................... 5
IV. Submission ........................................................................... 6
V. Timelines for commencement, conduct, conclusion and
termination of arbitral proceedings ............................................ 7
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 301

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

VI. Timelines under the 1940 Act .............................................. 8
VII. Timelines under the 1996 Act ............................................. 9
VIII. The felt need for the prescription of timelines for making
the award and the recommendation of the law commission .... 10
IX. Introduction of Section 29A & its interpretation: .................. 12
X. International perspective on the validity of the arbitral
award rendered after the stipulated statutory time limit. ........... 14
XI. Conclusions .......................................................................... 18

1. Leave granted.

I. Question of Law
The following question of law has arisen for our consideration.
Whether a Court can entertain an application under Section 29A(5)
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to extend the mandate
of the arbitrator(s) for making the award even after an ‘award’ is
rendered, though after the expiry of the statutory limit of eighteen-
month period?
2. We have considered the text as well as the context in which Parliament
introduced Section 29A to the Act, empowering the Court to extend
the mandate of the arbitrator. The power and the jurisdiction of the
Court are not impaired by the indiscretion of the arbitrator in rendering
an ‘award’ without a mandate, particularly when such an award does
not partake the character of a decree and is unenforceable under
Section 36. We have also explained the important role that the Court
plays while balancing the twin interests - of securing the remedy of
resolution of disputes through arbitration and ensuring integrity in
its conduct. Though, the questions that we are required to consider
had not arisen for consideration in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Berger Paints India Ltd.1, we approve the observations made therein
that the Court can entertain an application under Section 29A(5)

1 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494.
302 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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and pass appropriate orders under Section 29A(4) for extension of
the mandate of the arbitrator even after the award is rendered in
the meanwhile.

II. Facts
3. The contractual relationship between the appellant and the respondent
is governed by three agreements to sell2. As disputes arose, the
appellant filed an application under Section 11 of the Act and the High
Court, by its order dated 19.04.2022,3 appointed a sole arbitrator.
The arbitrator issued notice on 04.05.2022 and convened the first
meeting on 28.05.2022, and the pleadings were completed on
20.08.2022, which date marked the commencement of the period
of twelve months provided under Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act
for the making the Award. Before the conclusion of twelve months,
parties filed a joint memo under Section 29A(3) and extended the
mandate of the arbitrator by a further period of six months, ending
on 20.02.2024. Arguments concluded, and the matter was reserved
for final award on 09.09.2023.
3.1 Events that unfolded thereafter are indicative of myriad instances
when real life fails to keep pace with human discipline for
timelines. Despite the award being indicated to be almost
ready, the proceedings were reopened on the representation
of the parties. On the basis of emails from the respondent that
settlement discussions are ongoing and are expected to be
finalised by 15.11.2023, the matter was adjourned to 07.01.2024
and thereafter to 27.01.2024. However, when it was reported that
the discussions did not fructify into a settlement, the arbitrator
reserved the matter for award on 30.01.2024. Notwithstanding
the reservation, discussions continued until March 2024, when
a tripartite agreement was entered into between the appellant,
the respondent, and a third party, M/s G Square Realtors Private
Limited, which agreement was, however, not placed before
the arbitrator. We are informed that the matter was adjourned
to 27.04.2024 and thereafter to 04.05.2024, and the arbitrator
finally passed the award on 11.05.2024, which was later stamped
and issued to the parties on 25.06.2024. In the meantime, as

2 Agreements to sell dated 19.12.2015, 31.07.2018 and 24.03.2021.
3 Order dated 19.04.2022 in Arb.O.P.(Com.Div) No.2 of 2022.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 303

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

indicated earlier, the mandate of the arbitrator had terminated
on 20.02.2024.
3.2 Aggrieved by the award dated 11.05.2024, the respondent filed
an application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act for setting aside
the award on the ground that the mandate of the arbitral tribunal
expired and arbitral proceedings stood terminated before passing
of the award. On the other hand, on 12.11.2024, the appellant
filed an application under Section 29A of the Act seeking an
extension of the mandate of the tribunal.
4. The High Court, by order dated 24.01.2025, impugned before us
dismissed the application under Section 29A as not maintainable.
On the other hand, the Section 34 petition filed by the respondent
was allowed by the High Court on 14.02.2025, relying on the order
dated 24.01.2025.

III. Judgment of High Court
5. Rejecting reliance of respondent on the judgment of this Court in
Rohan Builders (Supra), the High Court held that the said precedent
only settles the issue about the timing of an application for extension
of time and holds that it can be made even after the expiry of the
initial twelve months or the extended six months period. The High
Court felt that the Supreme Court was neither dealing with a situation
where the award had already been passed, nor has laid down any
principle permitting extension of the mandate after making of the
award.
5.1 The High Court also distinguished the judgment of this Court
in Ajay Protech Private Limited v. General Manager and Anr.4
by holding that, in that case award had not been passed, and
the Court was only concerned with sufficient cause for the
extension of time.
5.2 The High Court followed the decision rendered by the coordinate
bench in Suryadev Alloys & Power Private Ltd. v. Sh. Govindaraja
Textiles Pvt. Ltd.5 which held that under the 1996 Act, unlike
the Arbitration Act, 1940, there is no provision empowering

4 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3381.
5 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7858.
304 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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the Court to enlarge time after the award is made, and that an
award passed after expiry of the arbitrator’s mandate is a nullity.
Apart from the decision of the coordinate bench in Suryadev
Alloys (supra), the High Court also referred to and relied on
the decision in Ayyasamy v. A. Shanmugavel6, which held that
the Court cannot exercise power to extend the mandate after
the award is delivered.
5.3 Referring to the decision of the Kerala High Court in RKEC
Projects Limited v. Cochin Port Trust7, which had taken the
view that extension can be granted even after the award was
passed, the High Court, without much discussion, held that it
does not lay down correct law, as it reads into Section 29A a
power which the provision does not confer.
5.4 In conclusion, the High Court held that if an award is passed
subsequent to the expiry of the mandate of the arbitrator, it is
a nullity and the application for extension of the mandate of
the arbitrator is not maintainable.

IV. Submission
6. Appearing for appellant, Mrs. V Mohana, learned senior counsel
relied on the decision in Rohan Builders (supra), to contend that an
application under Section 29A is maintainable even after expiry of
the prescribed period of 12 months or the extended 6 months, as
the Court has power to extend the mandate either before or after
expiry of the period under Sections 29A(1) and 29A(3). On the other
hand, Mr. M. Vijayan, learned counsel assisted by Mr. P.S. Sudheer,
AOR distinguished Rohan Builders (supra) and relied on the decision
of the Madras High Court in Suryadev Alloys (supra) to argue that
time cannot be extended after passing of the award as the 1996 Act
contains no provision allowing post-award extension.

V. Timelines for commencement, conduct, conclusion and
termination of arbitral proceedings
7. Access to justice constitutes the very foundation of democratic
governance, serving as the linchpin of a fair and equitable society.

6 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4338.
7 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 4192.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 305

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

Our Constitution, in its wisdom, establishes a comprehensive
judicial architecture, encompassing the Supreme Court, the High
Courts, and District Courts for public and ordinary civil/criminal
remedies to safeguard this inalienable right. It is imperative that
these judicial remedies are effective. In fact, the effectiveness of
judicial remedies is a constitutional mission, and it is always a work
in progress for the Supreme Court to ensure that the remedies are
impartial, readily accessible, financially viable, swiftly administered,
and comprehensively tailored. Beyond the realm of public law and
ordinary civil/criminal remedies, as indicated hereinabove, parties
to a dispute may elect to resolve their differences through mutually
agreed procedures, crystallised in the form of contractual agreements.
It is permissible in law to have such alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms through contract. Section 28 of the Contract Act protects
these alternative dispute resolution agreements through arbitration
between contesting parties, fostering an environment conducive to
expeditious and amicable dispute resolution.
7.1 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 provides a simple,
efficient, cost-effective, confidential, and fair dispute resolution
remedy by empowering the parties to choose their arbitrators and
also the procedure for the conduct of the arbitral proceedings.
7.2 Efficiency in the conduct of arbitral proceedings is integral to
the effectiveness of the dispute resolution remedy through
arbitration. Efficiency is inextricably connected with the
expeditious conclusion of arbitral proceedings. While the statute
incorporates party autonomy even with respect to the conduct
and conclusion of arbitral proceedings, there is a statutory
recognition of the power of the Court to step in wherever it
is necessary to ensure that the process of resolution of the
dispute is taken to its logical end, if, according to the Court,
the circumstances so warrant.

VI. Timelines under the 1940 Act
8. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the First Schedule prescribed that
an arbitral award shall be made within four months from the date
of reference or from the date on which the arbitrator was called
upon to act by notice, subject to any extension granted thereafter.
Section 28 of the 1940 Act empowered the Court to enlarge the time
306 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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for making the award, regardless of whether the prescribed period
for making the award had expired or not or whether the award had
already been made or not. Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,
is extracted below for ready reference
“Section 28- Power to Court only to enlarge time for
making award.
(1) The Court may, if it thinks fit, whether the time for
making the award has expired or not and whether the
award has been made or not, enlarge from time to time
for making the award.
(2) Any provision in an arbitration agreement whereby the
arbitrators or umpire may, except with the consent of all
the parties to the agreement, enlarge the time for making
the award, shall be void and of no effect.”
(emphasis supplied)

VII. Timelines under the 1996 Act
9. Party autonomy, coupled with minimal intervention of judicial
authorities, has been the guiding principle for the 1996 Act. This
is perhaps the reason for not provisioning a statutory timeline for
delivering awards and prescribing consequences of not delivering
them on time.
9.1 In the event of failure of an arbitrator to act without undue
delay, recourse was provided under Section 14 of the Act of
1996 to dual remedies-by approaching the arbitrator first and
then the Court8. Section 14(1)(a) states that the mandate of
an arbitrator would stand terminated if he either becomes de
jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or, for other
reasons, fails to act without undue delay. Section 14(2) states
that, if a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds
referred to in Section 14(1)(a), a party may, unless otherwise
agreed with by the parties, apply to the Court to decide on the
termination of the arbitrator’s mandate.

8 Lancor Holdings Ltd v. Prem Kumar Menon & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2319.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 307

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

On the other hand, Section 34 of the 1996 Act does not postulate
delay in the delivery of the arbitral award as a ground in itself, to set
it aside, except, as explained in the Lancor Holdings (supra), where
the negative effect of the delay in the arbitral award is explicit and
adversely reflects on the findings of the award.

VIII. The felt need for the prescription of timelines for making
the award and the recommendation of the law commission
10. The absence of a statutory time limit under the Act of 1996 had
resulted in arbitrations remaining pending for several years, even
without Court intervention, thereby defeating the very object of
arbitration as a speedy dispute resolution mechanism. Accordingly,
the Law Commission proposed the introduction of a structured
timeline, with limited extensions by party consent and supervisory
control by the Court thereafter, not with a view to terminating arbitral
proceedings, but to compel their timely progress. The emphasis
was on continuation of the arbitration, even pending applications for
extension, so that procedural delays do not result in wastage of time,
costs, or evidence already led. The legislative intent, therefore, was
to ensure that an arbitral award is ultimately passed, with judicial
intervention operating as a facilitative and corrective mechanism to
curb delay, rather than as a means to abort the arbitral process.
The relevant extract from the 176th Report of the Law Commission
of India is extracted below:
“2.21.1 (…)But the omission of the provision for extension of
time and therefore the absence of any time limit has given
rise to another problem, namely, that awards are getting
delayed before the arbitral tribunal even under the 1996
Act. One view is that this is on account of the absence of
a provision as to time limit for passing an award.
xx xx xx
2.21.3 (…)The time limit can be more realistic subject to
extension only by the court. Delays ranging from five years
to even fourteen years in a single arbitration have come
to the Commission’s notice. The Supreme Court of India
has also referred to these delays of the arbitral tribunal.
The point here is that these delays are occurring even
in cases where there is no court intervention during the
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arbitral process. The removal of the time limit is having
its own adverse consequences. There can be a provision
for early disposal of the applications for extension, if that
is one of the reasons for omitting a provision prescribing
a time limit, say one month. Parties can be permitted
to extend time by one year. Pending the application for
extension, we propose to allow the arbitration proceedings
to continue.(…)
xx xx xx
2.21.4 It is, therefore, proposed to implement the
recommendation made in the 76th Report of the Law
Commission with the modification that an award must be
passed at least within one year of the arbitrators entering on
the reference. The initial period will be one year. Thereafter,
parties can, by consent, extend the period upto a maximum
of another one year. Beyond the one year plus the period
agreed to by mutual consent, the court will have to grant
extension. Applications for extension are to be disposed
of within one month. While granting extension, the court
may impose costs and also indicate the future procedure
to be followed by the tribunal . There will, therefore, be a
further proviso, that further extension beyond the period
stated above should be granted by the Court. We are
not inclined to suggest a cap on the power of extension
as recommended by the Law Commission earlier. There
may be cases where the court feels that more than 24
months is necessary. It can be left to the court to fix an
upper limit. It must be provided that beyond 24 months,
neither the parties by consent, nor the arbitral tribunal could
extend the period. The court’s order will be necessary in
this regard. But in order to see that delay in disposal of
extension applications does not hamper arbitration, we
propose to allow arbitration to continue pending disposal
of the application.
2.21.5 One other important aspect here is that if there is
a delay beyond the initial one year and the period agreed
to by the parties (with an upper of another one year) and
also any period of extension granted by the Court, there
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C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

is no point in terminating the arbitration proceedings. We
propose it as they should be continued till award is passed.
Such a termination may indeed result in waste of time and
money for the parties after lot of evidence is led. In fact,
if the proceedings were to terminate and the claimant is
to file a separate suit, it will even become necessary to
exclude the period spent in arbitration proceedings, if he
was not at fault, by amending sec. 43(5) to cover such a
situation. But the Commission is of the view that there is
a better solution to the problem.
The Commission, therefore, proposes to see that an
arbitral award is ultimately passed even if the above said
delays have taken place. In order that there is no further
delay, the Commission proposes that after the period of
initial one year and the further period agreed to by the
parties (subject to a maximum of one year) is over, the
arbitration proceedings will nearly stand suspended and
will get revived as soon as any party to the proceedings
files an application in the Court for extension of time. In
case none of the parties files an application, even then
the arbitral tribunal may seek an extension from the Court.
From the moment the application is filed, the arbitration
proceedings can be continued. When the Court takes
up the application for extension, it shall grant extension
subject to any order as to costs and it shall fix up the
time schedule for the future procedure before the arbitral
tribunal. It will initially pass an order granting extension of
time and fixing the time frame before the arbitral tribunal
and will continue to pass further orders till time the award
is passed. This procedure will ensure that ultimately an
award is passed.”
(emphasis supplied)

IX. Introduction of Section 29A & its interpretation:
11. It is in the above-referred background that the Arbitration Act was
amended with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015 to effectively deal
with delays in arbitral proceedings by inserting Section 29A. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons records that practical difficulties
310 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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had arisen, necessitating amendments to make arbitration more
user-friendly, cost-effective, and expeditious. Accordingly, provision
was made requiring the arbitral tribunal to render the award within
twelve months from the date it enters upon the reference, with
liberty to the parties to extend the period by a further six months,
any extension thereafter being permissible only by order of the Court
on sufficient cause being shown. Thereafter, the Act of 1996 was
further amended w.e.f. 30-8-2019 to provide, inter alia, that, where
an application seeking extension of time under sub-section (5) of
Section 29A is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator shall continue
until such application is finally decided.
11.1 Section 29A of the 1996 Act as amended is extracted below
for ready reference;
“Section 29A: Time limit for arbitral award.
(1) The award in matters other than international
commercial arbitration shall be made by the arbitral
tribunal within a period of twelve months from the
date of completion of pleadings under sub-section
(4) of section 23.
Provided that the award in the matter of international
commercial arbitration may be made as expeditiously
as possible and endeavour may be made to dispose
off the matter within a period of twelve months from
the date of completion of pleadings under sub-section
(4) of section 23.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six months
from the date the arbitral tribunal enters upon the
reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to
receive such amount of additional fees as the parties
may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the period
specified in sub-section (1) for making award for a
further period not exceeding six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period specified
in sub-section (1) or the extended period specified
under sub-section (3), the mandate of the arbitrator(s)
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C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or
after the expiry of the period so specified, extended
the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this
sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings
have been delayed for the reasons attributable to
the arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of
fees of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent.
for each month of such delay:
[Provided further that where an application under sub-
section (5) is pending, the mandate of the arbitrator
shall continue till the disposal of the said application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an
opportunity of being heard before the fees is reduced.]
(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-section
(4) may be on the application of any of the parties
and may be granted only for sufficient cause and
on such terms and conditions as may be imposed
by the Court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-
section (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute
one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the
arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings
shall continue from the stage already reached and
on the basis of the evidence and material already
on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this
section shall be deemed to have received the said
evidence and material.
(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed under
this section, the arbitral tribunal thus reconstituted
shall be deemed to be in continuation of the previously
appointed arbitral tribunal.
(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual or
exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this
section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5) shall be
disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible,
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and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the matter
within a period of sixty days from the date of service
of notice on the opposite party.”

X. International perspective on the validity of the arbitral award
rendered after the stipulated statutory time limit.
12. It is well recognized that a fixed time limit for the rendering of an
arbitral award may foreclose the mandate of a tribunal if breached.
However, such limits are not intended to frustrate the arbitral process.
In appropriate cases, Courts have retroactively extended timelines
and even upheld awards rendered outside agreed deadlines where
it was necessary to preserve justice and prevent the arbitration from
being defeated by technical non-compliance.
12.1 Under the earlier English Arbitration Act, 1950, Section 27
expressly empowered the Court to enlarge the time for making
an award “whether that time has expired or not.” Interpreting
this provision, the English Court of Appeal in Oakland Metal
Co Ltd. v. D. Benaim & Co. Ld.9 confirmed that the expiry of
a contractual time limit does not automatically extinguish the
Court’s jurisdiction to enlarge time. The Court recognised that it
retained a wide discretion to extend time even after the agreed
deadline had passed, thereby preventing the arbitration from
failing solely by effluxion of time.
12.2 Similar language has been retained in the current English
Arbitration Act 1996. Section 50(4) provides that the Court’s
power to extend the time for making an award “may be
exercised whether or not the time previously fixed has expired.”
The statutory scheme, therefore, makes it clear that an agreed
deadline for making an arbitral award does not automatically
and irreversibly invalidate an award rendered late. Rather, the
Act preserves a retrospective judicial power to extend time,
where the statutory conditions are met.
12.3 Although English case law directly applying section 50(4)
remains limited, leading commentaries have recognized that,
where an arbitral tribunal fails to comply with an agreed time

9 [1953] 2 QB 261.
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C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

limit, recourse to the Court may be the only practical solution.
For example, Jeffrey Waincymer observes in Procedure and
Evidence in International Arbitration that difficulties arise where
an arbitrator is removed or replaced for failure to comply with
a time limit, and the deadline has already expired. In such
circumstances, Courts may step in and even retroactively
extend the mandate:
“If a time limit is imposed and an application is made
to remove an arbitrator for failing to comply with the
time limit, a problem arises in terms of the powers of
a truncated or replacement tribunal to subsequently
render an award. If there is no power to extend, how
can a truncated tribunal or a replacement arbitrator
meet the deadline that has expired? Some lex arbitri
allow for extensions in such circumstances. The
functus officio problem has led Belgian law to adopt
a more practical solution to the effect that after six
months has elapsed, the parties may apply to the
court to set a time limit for rendering of the award.
Section 50(4) of the English Arbitration Act 1996
allows a court to extend the time even if the time
previously fixed has expired.10
(emphasis supplied)

12.4 In Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, it is noted
that Courts in many jurisdictions have been reluctant to
invalidate an award solely on the basis that it was rendered late:
“It is important that a fixed time limit for rendering the
award should not enable one of the parties to frustrate
the arbitration. This might happen if a fixed limit were
to run from the date of the appointment of the arbitral
tribunal, rather than, for example, that of the end of
the hearings. If a court has no power to intervene on
the application of one party alone and the time limit
can be extended only by agreement of the parties,
a party might frustrate the proceedings simply by

10 ‘Part II: The Process of an Arbitration, Chapter 6: Establishing the Procedural Framework’, in Jeffrey
Maurice Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration (2012), p. 418.
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refusing to agree to any extension of time. However,
the courts of many countries would be reluctant to
invalidate a late award in such a case. For example,
in New York, it was held that an untimely award was
not a nullity, even though the issue of timeliness was
properly raised: the court stated that, without a finding
of prejudice, there was no justification for denying
confirmation of the award.”11
(emphasis supplied)

12.5 Commentaries on institutional rules such as ICC Rules
acknowledge similar powers. Article 31(1) of the Rules sets
a six-month limit from the signing of the terms of reference
for the rendering of the final award. Under Article 31(2), a
Court may render an extension of the time limit and revive the
mandate of a tribunal that is deemed functus officio. In doing
so, a Court may retroactively revive the tribunal’s mandate,
and even render an award passed beyond the time limit valid.12
12.6 A recent decision of the Privy Council further illustrates this
pragmatic approach. In Alphamix Ltd v District Council of
Rivière du Rempart (Mauritius)13, the Privy Council upheld an
arbitral award that had been annulled by the Mauritian Courts
on the basis that it was issued three days after the agreed
deadline. The applicable Mauritian Civil Procedure Code
provided that an arbitrator’s mandate would lapse after six
months unless extended, and that an award rendered outside
the mandate was liable to annulment. Although the award was
formally issued three days late, the Privy Council found that
the parties had tacitly and unequivocally agreed to permit the
short delay, particularly in light of the arbitrator’s illness and the
absence of objection from either party. That tacit agreement
was held to have extended the arbitrator’s mandate, with the
result that the award remained valid.

11 ‘9. Award’, in Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, et al., Redfern and Hunter on International
Arbitration (Seventh Edition) (2023), at para.9.169.
12 Fadri Lenggenhager, ‘Chapter 17, Part II: Commentary on the ICC Rules, Article 31 [Time limit for the
final award]’, in Manuel Arroyo (ed), Arbitration in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide (Second Edition)
(2018). pp. 2447.
13 [2023] UKPC 20, at para 26.
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C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

12.7 By contrast, there are also authorities demonstrating that
Courts may annul late awards where delay is substantial
and unjustified. Under Singapore law, the High Court in Ting
Kang Chung John v Teo Hee Lai Building Constructions Pte
Ltd.14 set aside an award that had been issued well beyond
the agreed deadline. The arbitration concerned a modest
construction dispute conducted under the Arbitration Rules
of the Singapore Institute of Architects, which required the
arbitrator to issue an award within 60 days of the close of the
hearing. The arbitrator issued the award more than a year
after that deadline.
12.8 When the award was challenged, the arbitrator sought belatedly
to apply for an extension of time. The Court refused his
application, noting that where parties had agreed to specify
a deadline for the award to be issued, the principle of party
autonomy meant that the Court should not lightly override
this agreement. The Court noted that an extension would be
granted only to (i) prevent substantial injustice, (ii) where there
was no prejudice to the opposing party, and (iii) where there
were very good reasons to justify the delay. One crucial factor
in refusing the application was the failure by the arbitrator to
apply for an extension until after his award was challenged.

XI. Conclusions
13. Section 29A, as explained in recent decisions of this Court in Rohan
Builders (supra), Lancor Holdings (supra) and Jagdeep Chowgule v.
Sheela Chowgule15 can be formulated as under:
(I) Sub-section (1) of Section 29A mandates that the award shall
be made within 12 months of the completion of pleadings
before the Arbitral Tribunal16. While sub-section (2) incentivises
expeditious making of the Award, proviso to sub-section (4)

14 [2010] SGHC 20, at para. 41.
15 2026 INSC 92.
16 Explained, in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt Ltd v. Berger Paints India Limited, 2024 SC Online SC 2494, as
“Prior to the enactment of Section 29A of the A & C Act did not specify a time limit for making an arbitral
award. This was deliberate, given the fact that the First Schedule and Section 28 of the Arbitration
Act, 1940 led to litigation and delay. Section 29A, as quoted above, was inserted by Act 3 of 2016 with
retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 aimed to
ensure that arbitration proceedings are completed without unnecessary adjournments and delay.”
316 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

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and sub-section (8)authorises the Court to impose penalty for
delay in making the award.
(II) Sub-section (3) enables parties, by consent, to extend the
period of 12 months for making the award by a further period
not exceeding 6 months.
(III) If the award is not made within the stipulated period of 12
months or the extended period of 6 months, the mandate of
the arbitrator(s) shall terminate17.
(IV) This termination is subject to the power of the Court to extend
the period18.
(V) The ‘Court’ under Section 29A shall be the Civil Court of
ordinary original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High
Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction under Section
2(1)(e), and shall not be the High Court or the Supreme Court
under Section 11(6) of the Act. Section 42 of the Act relating
to jurisdiction for applications will also not apply to Section
11 of the Act19.
(VI) There is no statutory prescribed time limit for the Court to
exercise the power under Section 29A(4) for extending the
period, except for its own discretion. The Court can exercise
the power before or after the expiry of the period under sub-

17 Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act.
18 The Law Commission’s 176th Report @ 2.21.5 explains the purpose and object of vesting of this power
as follows: “One other important aspect here is that if there is a delay beyond the initial one year and
the period agreed to by the parties (with an upper of another one year) and also any period of extension
granted by the Court, there is no point in terminating the arbitration proceedings. We propose it as they
should be continued till award is passed. Such a termination may indeed result in waste of time and
money for the parties after lot of evidence is led. In fact, if the proceedings were to terminate and the
claimant is to file a separate suit, it will even become necessary to exclude the period spent in arbitration
proceedings, if he was not at fault, by amending sec. 43(5) to cover such a situation. But the Commission
is of the view that there is a better solution to the problem. The Commission, therefore, proposes to
see that an arbitral award is ultimately passed even if the above said delays have taken place. In order
that there is no further delay, the Commission proposes that after the period of initial one year and
the further period agreed to by the parties (subject to a maximum of one year) is over, the arbitration
proceedings will nearly stand suspended and will get revived as soon as any party to the proceedings
files an application in the Court for extension of time. In case none of the parties files an application, even
then the arbitral tribunal may seek an extension from the Court. From the moment the application is filed,
the arbitration proceedings can be continued. When the Court takes up the application for extension, it
shall grant extension subject to any order as to costs and it shall fix up the time schedule for the future
procedure before the arbitral tribunal. It will initially pass an order granting extension of time and fixing
the time frame before the arbitral tribunal and will continue to pass further orders till time the award is
passed. This procedure will ensure that ultimately an award is passed.”
19 State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors (2015) 1 SCC 32.
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 317

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

sections 29A(1) or (3)20. Further, there is no prescription of an
outer limit for extending the time for the conclusion of arbitral
proceedings. Given this power, the Court will exercise it with
circumspection, balancing the remedy with the rights of other
stakeholders.
(VII) The power of the Court to extend the time under sub-section
(4) may be exercised on an application by any of the parties.
Once such an application for extension of time is pending, the
mandate of the arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of such
application under sub-section (9). The Court shall endeavour
to dispose of such an application within 60 days21.
(VIII) Delay in the delivery of an arbitral award, by itself, is not
sufficient to set aside that award. It is only when the effect of
the undue delay in the delivery of an arbitral award is explicit
and adversely reflects on the findings therein, such delay and,
more so, if it remains unexplained, can be construed to result
in the award being in conflict with the public policy of India.22
(IX) Under Section 29A(6), while exercising the power of extension,
it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all the
arbitrators. This is a discretionary power that the Court would
exercise in the facts and circumstances of the case. Upon
substitution, the reconstituted tribunal shall be deemed to
be in continuation of the previously appointed tribunal as per
Section 29A(7) and shall continue from the stage already
reached and on the basis of evidence already on record. The
newly appointed arbitrators shall be deemed to have received
the evidence and materials.
(X) Vesting of the power of substitution, under Section 29A(6),
is on the “Court” and this Court is the “Court” as defined in
Section 2(1)(e). The text, as well as the context for identifying
the Court in Section 29A(6), as well as in Section 29A(4), is
the Court in Section 2(1)(e). The expression ‘Court’ in other
provisions must be guided by the meaning given in Section
2(1)(e) 23.

20 Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act.
21 Section 29A(9) of the 1996 Act.
22 Lancor Holdings (supra).
23 Jagdeep Chowgule (supra).
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14. Section 29A of the Act does not, in terms, bar an application for
extension of the mandate of an arbitrator in the event of the delivery
of an award. There is no such prescription anywhere in the section.
In the first place, if an award is made after expiry of the mandate,
then there is no doubt about the fact that such an award is non
est. A better expression would be to hold that such an award would
be unenforceable under Section 36. Such an award need not be
challenged under Section 34.
15. Naturally, a unilateral act or the indiscretion of the arbitrator in making
such an award will have no bearing on the power and jurisdiction
vested in the Court under Section 29A. We have more hesitation in
concluding that the Parliament has never intended that the act of
an arbitrator in delivering an award when the mandate had expired
would denude the power and jurisdiction vested in the Court. This
power and jurisdiction stand on its own footing and is uninfluenced
by the act of the arbitrator in passing an award without mandate.
16. Secondly, the expression, “if an award is not made” in sub-section
(4) is employed in the context of enabling the Court to extend the
mandate of the arbitrator. The context in which the phrase is used
makes it clear that the sub-section is not addressing a situation
where an arbitral award has been rendered after the mandate of
the arbitrator has expired, but rather to declare that the Court can
extend the period before or after the expiry of the mandate. This is
clearly explained in Rohan Builders (supra).
17. Rohan Builders (supra) also clarifies the context in which the
expression ‘terminates’ has been used in the section. It is explained
that it is transitory and is subject to the exercise of power by the Court.
“14. Accordingly, the termination of the arbitral mandate is
conditional upon the non-filing of an extension application
and cannot be treated as termination stricto sensu. The
word “terminate” in the contextual form does not reflect
termination as if the proceedings have come to a legal
and final end, and cannot continue even on filing of an
application for extension of time. Therefore, termination
under Section 29A(4) is not set in stone or absolutistic in
character.
20. Lastly, Section 29A(6) does not support the narrow
interpretation of the expression “terminate”. It states
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 319

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

that the court - while deciding an extension application
under Section 29A(4) - may substitute one or all the
arbitrators. Section 29A(7) states that if a new arbitrator(s)
is appointed, the reconstituted Arbitral Tribunal shall be
deemed to be in continuation of the previously appointed
Arbitral Tribunal. This obliterates the need to file a fresh
application under Section 11 of the A & C Act for the
appointment of an arbitrator. In the event of substitution of
arbitrator(s), the arbitral proceedings will commence from
the stage already reached. Evidence or material already on
record is deemed to be received by the newly constituted
tribunal. The aforesaid deeming provisions underscore the
legislative intent to effectuate efficiency and expediency
in the arbitral process. This intent is also demonstrated in
Sections 29A(8) and 29A(9). The court in terms of Section
29A(8) has the power to impose actual or exemplary costs
upon the parties. Lastly, Section 29A(9) stipulates that an
application for extension under sub-section (5) must be
disposed of expeditiously, with the endeavour of doing so
within sixty days from the date of filing.”
18. Intention of the Parliament to secure the arbitral proceedings and
to ensure that they are taken to their logical conclusion of a binding
award is evident from provisions such as, enabling Courts to exercise
the power of extension before or after the expiry of the 18 month
period [Section 29A(4)], declaring continuation of the proceedings
till the application for extension is pending [proviso to 29A(4)],
declaring that upon extension, the existing proceedings would
continue uninterruptedly [Section 29A(6) & (7)]. These provisions
make it evident that the intention of the Parliament is to safeguard
the conduct and conclusion of arbitral proceedings.
19. Though the fact situation that has arisen in our case was not available
in Rohan Builders (supra) in the sense that the arbitrator had not
passed an award after expiry of the mandate, the following observation
in Rohan Builders is relevant for our consideration;
“21. …The power to extend time period for making of
the award vests with the court, and not with the Arbitral
Tribunal. Therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal may not pronounce
the award till an application under Section 29A(5) of the
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A & C Act is sub-judice before the court. In a given case,
where an award is pronounced during the pendency of an
application for extension of period of the Arbitral Tribunal,
the court must still decide the application under sub-section
(5), and may even, where an award has been pronounced,
invoke, when required and justified, sub-sections (6) to
(8), or the first and third proviso to Section 29A(4) of the
A & C Act.”
(emphasis supplied)

20. Vesting of power and jurisdiction in the Court, in our opinion, is a
complete answer to any apprehension that extension of time, even
in cases where an ‘award’ is passed, could introduce a culture of
indiscipline, as arbitrator(s) and/or counsels could become indifferent
to the mandatory timelines. This apprehension is not true. There is
no automatic extension of time. The Court will and must exercise
its discretion only after evaluating the facts and circumstances
after close scrutiny. Section 29A, in terms, enables the court to
adopt distinct measures to ensure dynamic and efficient conduct
of arbitral proceedings with integrity and expedition. The following
empowerments are in the nature of instruments in the toolkit of
Section 29A, enabling the courts to deploy them as and when the
factual matrix demands:
i. Court has the power to extend the time before or after the expiry
of the statutorily stipulated period. [Section 29A(4)]
ii. Court is empowered to take measures to reduce the fee of the
arbitrators if the Court is of the opinion that the proceedings
are delayed for the reasons attributable to the Arbitrators.
[Proviso to Section 29A(4)]
iii. Court can grant an extension of the time period upon a
finding that there is sufficient cause for such extension.
[Section 29A(5)]
iv. Court, while extending the mandate even when there is sufficient
cause, is empowered to impose such terms and conditions as it
thinks fit for efficiency and integrity of the arbitral proceedings.
[Section 29A(5)]
[2026] 2 S.C.R. 321

C. Velusamy v. K Indhera

v. Courts are specifically empowered to substitute any one or all
the arbitrators, if in the opinion of the Court the facts demand.
This is a discretion that the Court would exercise with caution
and circumspection24. [Section 29A(6)]
vi. The Court is empowered not only to grant costs but also to
impose exemplary and actual costs upon any of the parties, if
the situation so demands. [Section 29A(8)]
21. In view of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that provisions
of the Act, particularly Section 29A, must not be interpreted to infer
a threshold bar for an application under Section 29A(5) for extension
of the mandate of the arbitrator even when an award is passed,
though after the expiry of the mandate.
22. While interpreting an enactment providing legal remedies for the
resolution of disputes, a constitutional court has the obligation
to ensure that the provision is: (a) accessible, (b) affordable,
(c) expeditious and (d) cohesive. Accessibility requires the remedy
to be easily available25. Affordability is an aspect that is related to
the cost of availing the remedy, it must be at a reasonable price.
Expeditious nature of a remedy is concerned with the quick disposal
and abhors unreasonable delays. Yet another facet of effective
remedy is in its cohesiveness.
23. In conclusion, we hold that an application under Section 29A(5)
for extension of the mandate of the arbitrator is maintainable even
after the expiry of the time under Sections 29A(1) and (3) and even
after rendering of an award during that time. Such an award is
ineffective and unenforceable. But the power of the court to consider
extension is not impaired by such an indiscretion of the arbitrator.
While considering the application, the Court will examine if there is
sufficient cause for extending the mandate, and in the process, it
may impose such terms and conditions as the situation demands.

24 It is clarified that Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. M/s Bharat Textiles & Ors. 2025 INSC 1409 does not mandate
the substitution of an arbitrator as an inevitable consequence when the court is considering extension
of mandate that had already expired as was argued. In fact, it is clear that the judgment proceeds to
substitute the arbitrator as the situation “warranted”. The court held “in view of the statutory scheme and
undisputed factual position, we are satisfied that the case warranted the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 29A(6) of the Act”. This quotation is sufficient to conclude that the power of substitution would be
exercised as such by the Court as a discretion and in the facts and circumstances of the case.
25 NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 INSC 54.
322 [2026] 2 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

The Court will also take into account other factors such as reduction
of the fee of the arbitrator under proviso to Section 29A(4) and also
impose costs on parties if the fact situation so demands. Substitution
is an option for the Court as the provision itself says, “it shall be
open for the Court to substitute”, and it will be exercised carefully. If
the mandate is extended, the arbitral tribunal will pick up the thread
from where it was left, and seamlessly continue the proceeding from
the stage at which the mandate had expired, and conclude within
the time granted.
24. In view of the above, the appeal against the judgment and order
dated 24.01.2025 in Application No. 5993 of 2024 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Madras is allowed. The Application No.
5993 of 2024 is restored to its original number and the High Court
will proceed with the said application and dispose it of as per the
principles laid down in our judgment.

Result of the case: A ppeal against the judgment in Application
No. 5993 of 2024 is allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey