CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSIONversusD.D.A. & ANR.

                 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 617 : 2024 INSC 513

                  Central Information Commission
                                 v.
                            D.D.A. & Anr.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 2230 of 2012)
                                10 July 2024
           [Vikram Nath* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]

                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the power of general superintendence direction, and
       management of the Central Information Commission’s affairs under
       Section 12(4) of the Right to Information Act 2005, includes the
       authority to constitute benches of the CIC and frame Regulations
       for the effective management and allocation of work within the
       Commission, including the issuance of orders and the formation
       of committees.

                                 Headnotes†
       Right to Information Act, 2005 – Constitution and Powers of
       the CIC – Section 12 of the RTI Act:
       Held: Section 12 of the RTI Act outlines the constitution and
       powers of the CIC – The CIC consists of the Central Information
       Commissioner itself and a specified number of Information
       Commissioners, not exceeding ten – Section 12(4) of the RTI
       Act grants the CIC the general superintendence, direction, and
       management of the Commission’s affairs – This provision implies
       that the CIC has comprehensive authority to oversee and direct its
       functioning – This provision allows the CIC to implement measures
       that ensure smooth and efficient functioning of the Commission,
       including the formation of benches of the Commission. [Para 13]
       Right to Information Act, 2005 – Powers and responsibilities
       of the State Information Commissioners – Section 12 of the
       RTI Act – Legislative intent to provide broad authority to
       ensure effective function of the Commissions:
       Held: Section 15 of the RTI Act mirrors Section 12, but applies
       to the State Information Commissions – It establishes the
       State Information Commissions, and outlines the powers and
       responsibilities of the State Chief Information Commissioner

* Author
618                                                              [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


       and State Information Commissioners – Both, Sections 12 and
       15 of the RTI Act use a similar language, emphasizing the
       wide-ranging powers of the CIC and the State Chief Information
       Commissioners to manage their respective commissions’ affairs
       autonomously, and without external interference – This language
       clearly suggests that the legislative intent was to provide these
       officials with broad authority to ensure their commissions function
       effectively. [Para 14]
       Interpretation of RTI Act – General superintendence implies the
       ability to constitute Benches – Absence of an explicit provision
       does not negate the CIC’s authority to constitute Benches:
       Held : The general superintendence, direction, and management
       powers vested in the CIC imply a wide-ranging authority to organize
       the internal functioning of the Commission, including the ability to
       constitute benches – This interpretation aligns with the purpose
       and objective of the RTI Act, which aims to facilitate the efficient
       disposal of cases and the effective implementation of the right to
       information – The absence of an explicit provision for Benches
       does not negate the CIC’s authority to constitute them, as such
       powers are implicitly included within the scope of the CIC’s
       general superintendence and management responsibilities – The
       broad language of the RTI Act indicates an intention to grant the
       CIC comprehensive authority to ensure the effective and efficient
       functioning of the Commission – The RTI Act’s broad language
       suggests that the legislative intent was to provide the CIC with
       the necessary authority to implement measures that ensure the
       Commission’s effective operation – The interpretation of the High
       Court was based on a restrictive reading of the RTI Act, focusing
       on the absence of explicit provisions for Benches with the RTI
       Act and a broader interpretation of the RTI Act is warranted.
       [Paras 16 and 17]
       Object of the RTI Act – Purposive interpretation of RTI
       Act – Formation of Benches allows efficient allocation of work:
       Held: The RTI Act should be interpreted purposively, taking into
       account the broader objectives of the legislation – The purpose
       of the RTI Act is to promote transparency and accountability in
       the functioning of public authorities, ensuring citizens’ right to
       information – To achieve these objectives effectively, it is essential
       that the Central Information Commission operates efficiently and
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                            619

            Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


     without undue procedural constraints – The principle of purposive
     interpretation supports the view that the CIC’s powers under Section
     12(4) of the RTI Act include all necessary measures to manage
     and direct the Commission’s affairs effectively – This includes
     the ability to form benches to handle the increasing volume of
     cases – The formation of Benches allows for the efficient allocation
     of work and ensures the timely disposal of cases, which is crucial
     for upholding the right to information. [Para 18]
     Legislative intent – Interpretation of “superintendence,
     direction, and control” – The Central Information Commission
     (Management) Regulations, 2007 are tools to ensure the
     efficient administration and operation of the Commission:
     Held: The legislative intent, as reflected by the broad language
     of these provisions, was to provide the officials with necessary
     authority to ensure that their Commissions function effectively
     and efficiently – These provisions explicitly use the words
     “superintendence, direction and management” of the affairs of
     the Commission – Reliance placed on the Judgment in Election
     Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 34 :
     (2000) 8 SCC 216 : 2000 INSC 423 and in Union of India v.
     Association for Democratic Reforms [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5
     SCC 294 : 2002 INSC 253, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
     has interpreted the words “superintendence, direction, and control”
     occurring in Article 324 (1) of the Constitution in respect of the
     Election Commission – The use of the words “superintendence,
     direction and management” in Sections 12(4) and 15(4) of the RTI
     Act clearly provides the CIC an ambit of power wide enough to
     frame its own Regulations and to delegate its power to a committee
     formed by it – The Central Information Commission, utilizing these
     broad powers, has enacted The Central Information Commission
     (Management) Regulations, 2007 – While the RTI Act does not
     explicitly grant the CIC the authority to frame Regulations, the
     overarching powers granted under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act
     inherently include the ability to manage the Commission’s affairs
     effectively – These Regulations are essential tools for ensuring
     the efficient administration and operation of the Commission –
     Focusing narrowly on the nomenclature and the absence of
     an explicit provision for Regulation-making within the RTI Act
     would undermine the broader purpose and intent of the same –
     The nomenclature used to describe these Regulations should
     not detract from their necessity and their role in facilitating the
620                                                              [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


       Commission’s functioning – A purposive interpretation of Section
       12(4) of the RTI Act reveals that the powers of “superintendence,
       direction and management” are intended to be comprehensive,
       enabling the CIC to adopt measures, including the framing of
       Regulations, that ensure transparency, accountability, and efficient
       handling of its responsibilities. [Paras 19 to 22]
       Interpretation of Regulations – Use of the term “Regulations”
       should not detract from their function:
       Held: The use of the term “Regulations” should not detract from
       their function, which is akin to any other administrative orders
       or circulars that an authority like the CIC might promulgate to
       ensure the smooth operation of its duties – The essence of these
       regulations lies in their role in facilitating the internal management
       and procedural operations of the Commission, a necessity clearly
       envisioned by the broad powers of superintendence, direction,
       and management granted under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act –
       By focusing on the terminology, the objections fail to appreciate
       the functional equivalence of these regulations to other forms of
       administrative guidance – The regulations were crafted to address
       the practical needs of the Commission, providing structure and
       clarity to its operations, in any administrative context – Therefore,
       raising objections based solely on the label “Regulations” is an
       exercise in semantics rather than a substantive argument. [Para 23]
       RTI Act – Autonomy of the Central Information Commission –
       Principle of non-interference:
       Held: The autonomy of the Central Information Commission is
       of paramount importance to its effective functioning – Any undue
       interference in its administrative functions, such as the power to
       constitute benches, would significantly impede its ability to handle
       the large volume of cases efficiently and expeditiously – The
       CIC must be allowed to operate independently and exercise its
       powers of superintendence, direction, and management without
       external constraints – The principle of non-interference is crucial
       for maintaining the integrity and efficacy of the CIC – Allowing the
       Commission to function autonomously ensures that it can fulfil its
       role in promoting transparency and accountability, which are the
       cornerstones of the RTI Act – The ability to form benches and
       allocate work among Information Commissioners is essential for
       the CIC to manage its workload effectively and uphold the citizens’
       right to information. [Para 24]
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         621

            Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


                             Case Law Cited
     Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar [2000] Supp. 3
     SCR 34 : (2000) 8 SCC 216 : 2000 INSC 423; Union of India v.
     Association for Democratic Reforms [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002)
     5 SCC 294 : 2002 INSC 253 – relied on.

                               List of Acts
     The Right to Information Act, 2005; The Central Information
     Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007; Constitution of
     India.

                            List of Keywords
     Powers of Chief Information Commissioner to constitute Benches;
     Purposive Interpretation of RTI Act; Autonomy of Central
     Information Commission.

                           Case Arising From

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2230 of 2012
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.05.2010 of the High Court
     of Delhi at New Delhi in WPC No. 12714 of 2009

                        Appearances for Parties

     R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, K M Nataraj, A.S.G.,
     Yashraj Singh Bundela, Vinayak Sharma, Ms. Sneha Kalita, Shaurya
     Rai, Chitvan Singhal, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav,
     Kartikey Aggarwal, Ms. Ameya Vikrma Thanvi, Mukesh Kumar Singh,
     Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Ms. Binu Tamta, Nitin Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
     Respondent-in-person.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment
     Vikram Nath, J.
1.   The autonomy and independence of administrative bodies are
     fundamental to their ability to perform their designated functions
     effectively. These institutions are established to carry out specialized
622                                                           [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                               Digital Supreme Court Reports


       tasks that require a level of impartiality and expertise, which can
       only be achieved if they are free from undue interference. Ensuring
       their independence is essential for maintaining the integrity and
       efficacy of the administrative system. Interfering in the functioning
       of these bodies can be detrimental, as it undermines their ability
       to operate efficiently and impartially. Such interference can stem
       from restrictive interpretations of their powers or direct interventions
       that impede their operational autonomy. Administrative bodies
       must have the freedom to establish and implement internal
       procedures and regulations that best suit their unique mandates and
       operational needs. The principle of non-interference is not merely
       an administrative convenience but a cornerstone for upholding the
       rule of law and ensuring that these bodies can serve the public
       interest effectively. When these institutions are allowed to function
       without external pressures, they can make decisions based on
       expertise and objective criteria, which enhances their credibility
       and public trust.
2.     The present appeal challenges the judgment and order dated
       21.05.2010, passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition
       (C) No. 12714 of 2009. The High Court, by the impugned order,
       quashed the Central Information Commission (Management)
       Regulations, 20071 framed by the Chief Information Commissioner2
       and held that the CIC has no power to constitute Benches of the
       Commission. This appeal is confined to the issue of the validity of the
       Regulations and the powers of the CIC under Section 12(4) of the
       Right to Information Act, 2005.3
3.     The matter originates from an application filed by one Mr. Sarbjeet
       Roy, proforma Respondent No.2, under Section 18 read with Section
       19 of the RTI Act, seeking information concerning the ongoing
       modification of the Master Plan of Delhi for the year 2021.4 The
       applicant also sought directions to the Delhi Development Authority5
       to fulfil its obligations under Section 4 of the RTI Act, which mandates
       proactive disclosure of information by public authorities.


1    In short, “the Regulations”
2    In short, “CIC”
3    In short, “the RTI Act”
4    In short, “MPD 2021”
5    In short, “DDA”
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                       623

             Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


4.   On 22.09.2009, the CIC issued an order directing the constitution of
     a Committee to inquire into the matter of compliance with Section 4
     of the RTI Act by the DDA and to submit a report to the Commission.
     The Committee comprised Ms. Sujata Chaturvedi, Director, Ministry
     of Urban Development; Shri Dunu Roy, Hazards Centre, Delhi; and
     Shri Pankaj KP Shreyaskar, Joint Registrar, CIC.
5.   Aggrieved by this order, the Contesting Respondent authority-DDA
     filed a Writ Petition (C) No. 12714/2009 before the Delhi High
     Court. During the proceedings before the Delhi High Court, the
     DDA specifically challenged the summoning of its Vice-Chairman
     by the CIC, arguing that such authority is vested solely with the
     High Court. The DDA underscored those certain powers, such as
     summoning high-ranking officials and conducting detailed inquiries,
     were traditionally within the domain of Supreme Court and High Court
     having plenary powers. They argued that the CIC, as an administrative
     body, should not exercise such powers as it would blur the lines
     between administrative and judicial functions. However, the High Court
     expanded its examination beyond this specific challenge. It delved
     into the broader issue of the CIC’s authority under Section 12(4) of
     the RTI Act, ultimately questioning and declaring the Regulations
     framed by the CIC as ultra vires.
6.   The High Court framed the following questions to determine the
     issues at hand:
     "I.    Whether the Central Information Commission has the authority,
            under the RTI Act and the Rules made thereunder, to appoint a
            committee comprising individuals other than the Commission’s
            members to investigate the implementation of obligations
            imposed on a public authority, such as the DDA, by Section 4
            of the RTI Act?
     II.    Whether the Chief Information Commissioner possessed
            the power to enact the Central Information Commission
            (Management) Regulations, 2007 under Section 12(4) of the
            RTI Act, particularly concerning the provisions in Chapter IV,
            which address ‘registration, abatement, or return of appeals’?”
     III.   Whether the Central Information Commission had the authority
            to mandate the appearance of the Vice-Chairman, DDA, in its
            proceedings?”
624                                                           [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


7.     The High Court, after examining the matter at length, came to the
       following conclusions on the aforementioned three questions:
       a)    Regarding the first question, the High Court concluded that the
             CIC does not have such power. The Court held that the CIC’s
             authority is confined to the provisions explicitly stated in the
             RTI Act, which do not include the power to delegate its inquiry
             responsibilities to a committee.
       b)    On the second question, the High Court found that the CIC
             exceeded its jurisdiction. The Court determined that Section
             12(4) of the RTI Act does not confer legislative power on the
             CIC to frame such Regulations, especially those that go beyond
             procedural management and touch upon substantive matters.
       c)    As for the third question, the High Court concluded that such
             powers are reserved for a judicial authority, specifically the
             Supreme Court or the High Court. The Court held that the
             CIC does not possess the jurisdiction to summon high-ranking
             officials such as the Vice-Chairman of the DDA, thereby
             overstepping its statutory limits.
8.     We have heard Learned Attorney General of India, Mr. R
       Venkataramani, appearing for the appellant, Mr. Nitin Mishra, learned
       counsel for DDA which is the Respondent No. 1 and have perused
       the submissions of Mr. Sarbajit Roy, Respondent No. 2.
9.     The arguments of the Attorney General on behalf of the appellant
       are briefly summarized hereunder:
       I.    The Central Information Commission (CIC), under the authority
             granted by Section 12(4) of the RTI Act, framed the Central
             Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007,
             to manage the affairs of the CIC effectively. Section 12(4)
             of the RTI Act confers upon the CIC the power of ‘general
             superintendence, direction, and management of the affairs of
             the CIC’. This broad authority allows the CIC to take necessary
             actions for the efficient functioning of the Commission, including
             the formation of benches for the allocation of work among
             Information Commissioners.
       II.   The absence of an explicit provision for the formation of benches
             in the RTI Act does not negate the CIC’s authority to do so. The
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                             625

             Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


            power to form benches is inherently included within the CIC’s
            general superintendence and management responsibilities. The
            broad language of Section 12(4) of the RTI Act indicates that
            the CIC has comprehensive authority to organize the internal
            functioning of the Commission, which necessarily includes the
            ability to form benches for the efficient handling of cases.
     III.   The ability to form benches is essential for the efficient
            disposal of the large volume of cases handled by the CIC.
            The Commission registers nearly 20,000 cases annually and
            deals with approximately 1,500 cases monthly. Hearing cases
            collectively by all the Information Commissioners and the CIC
            together would be cumbersome and would adversely affect the
            expeditious and effective disposal of cases. The formation of
            benches allows for the efficient allocation of work and ensures
            the timely handling of cases, which is crucial for upholding the
            right to information.
     IV.    The distinction between rule-making power conferred upon the
            Central Government and regulation-making power conferred on
            statutory bodies like the CIC supports the Commission’s authority
            to frame Regulations for internal management and functional
            allocation. The regulation-making power deals with matters of
            internal management, functional allocation, and measures in
            aid of discharge of functions. This distinction validates the CIC’s
            approach and underscores its authority to manage its affairs
            autonomously without impinging on the rule-making powers of
            the Central Government.
     V.     The principle of non-interference is crucial for maintaining the
            integrity and efficacy of the CIC. Any undue interference in
            its administrative functions, such as the power to constitute
            benches, would significantly impede its ability to handle the
            large volume of cases efficiently and expeditiously. Allowing
            the Commission to function independently and exercise its
            powers of superintendence, direction, and management without
            external constraints is essential for fulfilling its role in promoting
            transparency and accountability.
     VI.    The practical necessity of forming benches is further underscored
            by the large volume of cases the CIC handles. The Commission
            deals with a substantial number of cases each month, and
626                                                            [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                        Digital Supreme Court Reports


              having all Information Commissioners and the CIC hear cases
              collectively would be impractical and counterproductive. The
              formation of benches allows for better case management,
              timely disposal, and effective implementation of the RTI Act’s
              objectives, ensuring that the right to information is upheld in
              both letter and spirit.
10. On behalf of the respondent no.1-DDA, learned counsel stated that
    he has no instructions to address on the issue of Regulations being
    declared as ultra vires. However, respondent no.2 although was not
    present at the time of hearing, he has filed written submissions which
    are summarised hereunder:
       I.     The respondents underscored that certain powers, such as
              summoning high-ranking officials and conducting detailed
              inquiries, were traditionally within the domain of judicial
              authorities. They argued that the CIC, as an administrative
              body, should not exercise such powers as it would blur the lines
              between administrative and judicial functions. The respondent
              contended that the High Court was correct in quashing the
              CIC’s order and Regulations to maintain the distinction between
              administrative and judicial roles.
       II.    The respondent highlighted a contradiction between the
              appellant’s assurances and the Central Government’s official
              stance. They noted that the Department of Personnel and
              Training (DoPT) had consistently stated that orders passed by
              single benches of the CIC were void due to the lack of provisions
              in the RTI Act authorizing the CIC to constitute separate
              benches. This position had been conveyed to the CIC and was
              published on the DoPT website. The respondent referenced
              the DoPT’s correspondence and legal opinions obtained from
              the Ministry of Law and Justice. These opinions confirmed that
              the RTI Act did not empower the CIC to constitute benches.
              They cited specific letters and internal notes from the DoPT,
              which reinforced the view that the CIC should function as a full
              commission rather than through benches.
       III.   The respondents maintained that neither the RTI Act nor the rules
              made thereunder provided for the formation of benches by the
              CIC. They emphasized that the absence of explicit provisions
              for benches indicated that the legislature did not intend to grant
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                          627

            Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


           such powers to the CIC. As such, the CIC’s action in constituting
           benches exceeded the scope of its statutory authority.
     IV.   The respondents contended that the CIC had overstepped its
           jurisdiction by delegating its inquiry powers to a committee
           comprising non-members. They argued that only the CIC itself
           or its members had the statutory authority to conduct inquiries
           under the RTI Act. The formation of such a committee, according
           to the respondent, violated the provisions of the RTI Act and
           undermined the statutory framework.
     V.    The respondents supported the High Court’s reasoning that
           the CIC’s Regulations exceeded the powers conferred by
           the RTI Act. They endorsed the High Court’s interpretation
           that the broad powers of superintendence, direction, and
           management did not encompass the authority to frame
           Regulations for constituting benches or forming committees of
           non-members. The respondents agreed with the High Court’s
           view that Regulation 22 was ultra vires the RTI Act and the
           rules made thereunder.
     VI.   The respondents highlighted the potential negative impact of
           the CIC’s actions on the functioning of public authorities. They
           argued that summoning high-ranking officials, such as the
           Vice-Chairman of the DDA, and constituting committees of non-
           members could create an undue burden on public authorities
           and disrupt their functioning. The respondents maintained that
           such actions were not envisaged by the RTI Act and should be
           curtailed to ensure the smooth operation of public authorities.
     VII. The respondents described the CIC’s current system as
          dysfunctional, highlighting issues like the establishment of
          multiple registries, arbitrary procedures, and a significant backlog
          of cases. They argued that the CIC’s actions under the guise
          of autonomy had led to inefficiencies and delays, undermining
          the RTI Act’s objectives.
11. The CIC has approached this Court by way of the present appeal
    against the High Court’s judgment. The appellant, while not
    challenging the quashing of the order dated 22.9.2009, seeks to
    challenge the High Court’s judgment regarding the Regulations and
    the scope of the powers vested in the CIC under Section 12(4) of the
628                                                        [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


       RTI Act. The CIC maintains that the Regulations were framed within
       the scope of its statutory authority to ensure effective management
       and functioning of the Commission and that the ability to constitute
       Committees is an integral part of this mandate.
12. Having considered the respective submissions, the primary issue to
    be considered is whether the CIC, under the provisions of Section
    12(4) of the RTI Act, has the authority to constitute benches of
    the CIC and frame Regulations for the effective management and
    allocation of work within the Commission, including the issuance of
    orders and the formation of committees.
13. At the outset, it is pertinent to elaborate on the relevant provisions
    of the RTI Act apropos the present issue. Section 12 of the RTI
    Act outlines the constitution and powers of the CIC. The Central
    Government is mandated to establish the CIC, which consists of
    the CIC and a specified number of Information Commissioners, not
    exceeding ten, as deemed necessary. Crucially, Section 12(4) of
    the RTI Act grants CIC the general superintendence, direction, and
    management of the Commission’s affairs. This provision implies
    that the CIC has comprehensive authority to oversee and direct the
    functioning. This broad section allows the CIC to implement measures
    that ensure smooth and efficient functioning of the Commission,
    including the formation of benches of the Commission, including
    making decisions necessary for its effective operation.
14. Section 15 of the RTI Act mirrors the provisions of Section 12 but
    applies to the State Information Commissions. It similarly establishes
    the State Information Commissions and outlines the powers and
    responsibilities of the State Chief Information Commissioner and State
    Information Commissioners. Both Sections 12 and 15 of the RTI Act
    use similar language, emphasizing the wide-ranging powers of the
    CIC and the State Chief Information Commissioners to manage their
    respective commissions’ affairs autonomously and without external
    interference. This language clearly suggests that the legislative intent
    was to provide these officials with broad authority to ensure their
    commissions function effectively.
15. The High Court of Delhi, in its impugned judgment dated 21.05.2010,
    quashed the Regulations framed by the CIC. The Court specifically
    took issue with Regulation 22, which dealt with the constitution of
    Benches within the Commission. The High Court held that the RTI
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                       629

            Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


     Act did not explicitly provide for the formation of benches by the
     CIC. According to the Court, the statutory framework and rules made
     under the RTI Act did not contain any provision allowing for Single
     or Division Benches of Information Commissioners.
16. In our opinion, the High Court’s interpretation was based on a
    restrictive reading of the RTI Act, focusing on the absence of explicit
    provisions for benches within the RTI Act. The High Court noted
    that Regulation 22 exceeded the limits of the powers prescribed
    under the RTI Act and rules. It emphasized that the RTI Act required
    orders to be pronounced in open proceedings, while Regulation
    22 permitted orders to be placed on the website or communicated
    to parties, deviating from the statutory requirement. This Court
    believes that a broader interpretation of the RTI Act is warranted.
    The general superintendence, direction, and management powers
    vested in the CIC imply a wide-ranging authority to organize the
    internal functioning of the Commission, including the ability to
    constitute benches. This interpretation aligns with the purpose
    and objective of the RTI Act, which aims to facilitate the efficient
    disposal of cases and the effective implementation of the right to
    information.
17. The absence of an explicit provision for Benches does not negate
    the CIC’s authority to constitute them, as such powers are implicitly
    included within the scope of the CIC’s general superintendence and
    management responsibilities. The broad language of the RTI Act
    indicates an intention to grant the CIC comprehensive authority to
    ensure the effective and efficient functioning of the Commission. The
    Delhi High Court’s narrow reading of the provisions overlooked the
    inherent powers of the CIC to manage the affairs of the Commission.
    The RTI Act’s broad language suggests that the legislative intent
    was to provide the CIC with the necessary authority to implement
    measures that ensure the Commission’s effective operation.
18. In the present case, the RTI Act should be interpreted purposively,
    taking into account the broader objectives of the legislation. The
    purpose of the RTI Act is to promote transparency and accountability
    in the functioning of public authorities, ensuring citizens’ right to
    information. To achieve these objectives effectively, it is essential
    that the Central Information Commission operates efficiently and
    without undue procedural constraints. The principle of purposive
630                                                         [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                           Digital Supreme Court Reports


       interpretation supports the view that the CIC’s powers under Section
       12(4) of the RTI Act include all necessary measures to manage and
       direct the Commission’s affairs effectively. This includes the ability
       to form benches to handle the increasing volume of cases. The
       formation of Benches allows for the efficient allocation of work and
       ensures the timely disposal of cases, which is crucial for upholding
       the right to information.
19. Furthermore, the High Court’s reliance on the absence of explicit
    provisions for Benches overlooks the broad language of Sections
    12(4) and 15(4) of the RTI Act, which grants the CIC and State Chief
    Information Commissioners wide-ranging powers to manage their
    respective Commissions’ affairs. The legislative intent, as reflected
    by the broad language of these provisions, was to provide these
    officials with the necessary authority to ensure that their Commissions
    function effectively and efficiently. These provisions explicitly use the
    words “superintendence, direction and management” of the affairs
    of the Commission. There have been various landmark judgements
    of this Court which have interpreted the words “superintendence,
    direction, and control” occurring in Article 324 (1) of the Constitution
    in respect of the Election Commission.
20. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Election Commission of India
    v. Ashok Kumar,6 has recognized the wide ambit of the powers given
    to the Election Commission for the superintendence, direction, and
    control of the Election process.
            “…13. Article 324 of the Constitution contemplates
            constitution of the Election Commission in which shall
            vest the superintendence, direction and control of the
            preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of,
            all elections to Parliament and to the legislature of every
            State and of elections to the offices of President and
            Vice-President held under the Constitution. The words
            “superintendence, direction and control” have a wide
            connotation so as to include therein such powers which
            though not specifically provided but are necessary to be
            exercised for effectively accomplishing the task of holding
            the elections to their completion…”


6   [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 34 : (2000) 8 SCC 216
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                            631

              Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


21. Similarly, in Union of India Vs. Association for Democratic
    Reforms,7 this Court has held that Article 324 allows the Election
    Commission to operate in areas of laws which are not explicitly
    mentioned in the legislation.
                                          ***
            “26. The aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench
            unreservedly lays down that in democracy the little man
            — voter — has overwhelming importance on the point and
            the little-large Indian (voter) should not be hijacked from
            the course of free and fair elections by subtle perversion
            of discretion of casting votes. In a continual participative
            operation of periodical election, the voter does a social
            audit of his candidate and for such audit he must be well
            informed about the past of his candidate. Further, Article
            324 operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation and
            the words “superintendence, direction and control” as
            well as “conduct of all elections” are the broadest terms.
            The silence of statute has no exclusionary effect except
            where it flows from necessary implication. Therefore, in
            our view, it would be difficult to accept the contention
            raised by Mr Salve, learned Solicitor-General and Mr
            Ashwani Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
            behalf of the intervenor that if there is no provision in the
            Act or the Rules, the High Court ought not to have issued
            such directions to the Election Commission. It is settled
            that the power of the Commission is plenary in character
            in exercise thereof. In statutory provisions or rules, it is
            known that every contingency could not be foreseen or
            anticipated with precision, therefore, the Commission can
            cope with a situation where the field is unoccupied by
            issuing necessary orders.”
22. Therefore, the use of the words “superintendence, direction and
    management” in Sections 12(4) and 15(4) of the RTI Act clearly
    provides the CIC an ambit of power wide enough to frame its own
    Regulations and to delegate its power to a committee formed by it.
    The Central Information Commission, utilizing these broad powers,


7   [2002] 3 SCR 696 : (2002) 5 SCC 294
632                                                          [2024] 7 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


       has enacted ‘The Central Information Commission (Management)
       Regulations, 2007.’ While the RTI Act does not explicitly grant CIC
       the authority to frame Regulations, the overarching powers granted
       under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act inherently include the ability to
       manage the Commission’s affairs effectively. These Regulations are
       essential tools for ensuring the efficient administration and operation
       of the Commission, addressing various procedural and managerial
       aspects necessary for fulfilling its mandate. Focusing narrowly
       on the nomenclature and the absence of an explicit provision for
       Regulation-making within the RTI Act would undermine the broader
       purpose and intent of the same. The nomenclature used to describe
       these Regulations should not detract from their necessity and
       their role in facilitating the Commission’s functioning. A purposive
       interpretation of Section 12(4) of the RTI Act reveals that the powers
       of “superintendence, direction and management” are intended to be
       comprehensive, enabling the CIC to adopt measures, including the
       framing of Regulations, that ensure transparency, accountability, and
       efficient handling of its responsibilities. Thus, the creation of these
       Regulations is not only justified but crucial for the CIC to manage
       its workload and operational demands effectively, thereby serving
       the core objectives of the RTI Act.
23. At this juncture, it is necessary to elucidate that under Section 12(4)
    of the RTI Act, the CIC has the authority to issue various forms of
    administrative guidelines, directives and instructions essential for
    the effective management of its affairs. The ‘Central Information
    Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007,’ framed by the CIC,
    could have been pronounced as ‘Circulars,’ ‘By-laws,’ or any other
    similar administrative orders. The primary objections have been raised
    due to the word “Regulations,” which respondents argue, confers the
    gravity of a separate legislation. However, this interpretation misses
    the substantive purpose behind these measures. The use of the term
    “Regulations” should not detract from their function, which is akin to
    any other administrative orders or circulars that an authority like the
    CIC might promulgate to ensure the smooth operation of its duties.
    The essence of these regulations lies in their role in facilitating the
    internal management and procedural operations of the Commission, a
    necessity clearly envisioned by the broad powers of superintendence,
    direction, and management granted under Section 12(4) of the RTI
    Act. By focusing on the terminology, the objections fail to appreciate
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         633

               Central Information Commission v. D.D.A. & Anr.


     the functional equivalence of these regulations to other forms of
     administrative guidance. The regulations were crafted to address the
     practical needs of the Commission, providing structure and clarity
     to its operations, in any administrative context. Therefore, raising
     objections based solely on the label “Regulations” is an exercise in
     semantics rather than a substantive argument.
24. We believe that the autonomy of the Central Information Commission
    is of paramount importance to its effective functioning. Any undue
    interference in its administrative functions, such as the power to
    constitute benches, would significantly impede its ability to handle
    the large volume of cases efficiently and expeditiously. The CIC
    must be allowed to operate independently and exercise its powers
    of superintendence, direction, and management without external
    constraints. The principle of non-interference is crucial for maintaining
    the integrity and efficacy of the CIC. Allowing the Commission to
    function autonomously ensures that it can fulfil its role in promoting
    transparency and accountability, which are the cornerstones of
    the RTI Act. The ability to form benches and allocate work among
    Information Commissioners is essential for the CIC to manage its
    workload effectively and uphold the citizens’ right to information.
25. The appeal is accordingly allowed, and the judgment of the Delhi
    High Court, is set aside. The Chief Information Commissioner’s
    powers to frame Regulations pertaining to constitution of Benches
    of the Commission are upheld as such powers are within the ambit
    of Section 12(4) of the RTI Act.
26. There shall be no order as to costs.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Vidhi Thaker, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by: Kanu Agrawal, Adv.)