CHAUHARYA TRIPATHI & ORS.versusL.L.C. OF INDIA & ORS.

                        [2015]4S.C.R.186



A                 CHAUHARYA TRIPATHI & ORS.

                                 v.

                      L.l.C. OF INDIA & ORS.
B              Civil Appeal Nos. 5690-5691 of 2010

                         MARCH 11, 2015

          (DIPAK MISRA AND PRAFULLA C. PANT, JJ.]
c          Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - ss. 10(1), 2(s), 2(a)-
    Reference made under - Persons aggrieved working as
    Development Officers in UC - Adjudicability by the tribunal
    - Held: Development Officers working in UC are not workmen
o   u/s. 2(s)oftheAct-Thus, the/abourcourthasnojurisdiction
    to deal with the /is in question.
      Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. R. Suresh 2008
      (5) SCR 208: (2008) 11 SCC 319- per incuricffn.
E     Mukesh K. Tripathi vs. Senior Divisional Manager, UC
      & Ors. 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 127: (2004) 8 SCC 387;
      S.K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra &Anr. 1983 (3) SCR
      799: (1983) 4 SCC 214; Workmen vs. Indian Standards
      Institution 1976 (2) SCR 138: (1975) 2 SCC 847; H.R.
F
      Adhyanthya & Ors. Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Ors. (1995)
      5 SCC 737; May &Baker (India) Ltd. vs. Workmen AIR
      1967 SC 678; Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs.
      Workmen 1964 SCR 560: AIR 1964 SC 472; Burmah
G     Shell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. vs.
      Burmah Shell Management Staff Association 1971 (2)
      SCR 758: (1970) 3 SCC 378; M. Venugopa/ vs. UC of
      India 1994 (1) SCR 433: (1994) 2 SCC 323; Ambica
      Quarryh Works etc. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1987 SC
H
                                186
, CHAUHARYA TRIPATHI &ORS. v. L.l.C. OF INDIA             187


1073: 1987 (1) SCR562; AR. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak           A
1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; Punjab
Land Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v.
Labour Court 1990 (3) SCR 111: (1990) 3 SCC 682;
State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4
SCC 139; Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of          B
Maharashtra (2011) 1SCC694: 2010 (15) SCR 201 -
referred to.

                Case Law Reference
                                                           c
2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 127       referred to      Para 5

2008 (5) SCR 208              referred to      Para 5

1983 (3) SCR 799              referred to      Para 7
                                                           D
1976 (2) SCR 138              referred to      Para 7

(1995) 5 sec 737              referred to      Para 8

AIR 1967 SC 678               referred to      Para 8      E
1964 SCR 560                  referred to      Para 8

1971 (2) SCR758               referred to      Para 8

1994 (1) SCR 433 .            referred to      Para 12     F
1987 (1) SCR 562              referred to      Para 15

1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 1         referred to      Para 16

1990 (3) SCR 111              referred to      Para 16    G

(1991) 4 sec 139              per incuriam     Para 16

2010 (15) SCR 201             referred to      Para 16
                                                           H
188         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A           CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
      5690-5691 of 2010.

             From the Judgment and Order dated 18.04.2007 of the
      High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. W. P. No.
B     21164 of 1998 and dated 23.09.2008 in Civil Misc. Review
      Application No. 12736 of 2007 in Civil Misc. W. P. No. 21164
      of1998

                                  WITH

C     C.A.Nos.6547-6549of2010

         S. P. Singh, Keshav Choudhary, Vimal Chandra S.
  Dave, G. Prakash, Beena Prakash, Priyanka Prakash for the
D Appellants.

             Kailash Vasdev, Shreyans Singhvi, Umrao Singh R.,
      S. Rajappa for the Respondents.

             The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
          DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. In these appeals, the seminal
  question that emerges for consideration is whether the High
  Court of Allahabad in Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.21164 ·
  of 1998 has justifiably overturned the award passed by the
F Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
  Kanpur (for short, 'the Tribunal') on the foundation that the
  aggrieved persons, at whose instance a :reference was made
  under Sections 10(1) and 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
  1947 (for brevity, 'the Act'), was not adjudicable by the 2 tribunal,
G for the aggrieved persons were working as Development
  Officers in the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) and hence,
  they could be treated as workmen under the schematic context
  of the Act and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction
H to deal with the /is in question.
   CHAUHARYA TRIPATHI &ORS. v. L.l.C. OF INDIA                    189
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

        2. Regard being had to the aforesaid issue, we are not A
required to state the facts in detail. Suffice it to state that
the Central Gov.ernment had made a reference, vide
notification MO E-17012/35/89-iB(B) dated 4.12.1989, of
the following dispute for adjudication:
                                                                   8
  Whether the action of the management of UC of India in
  imposing penalty of reduction of salary of Shri R.C.
  Dubey, C. Tripathi, Nankoo Singh, D.K. Shukla and N.K.
  Misra, Development Offices by three steps in their time
  scale of pay is justified? If not, to what relief the workman    C
  concerned are entitled?"

        3. Be it noted, such a reference was made as the
concerned development officers were visited with the
punishment of reduction of salary by three steps after D
conducting an enquiry in a disciplinary proceeding in respect
of certain charges levelled against them and finding them guilty
of the charges. It is apt to note here that the principal charge
that was levelled against the officers was that they had claimed
inflated incentive bonus to which they were not entitled to.     E

        4. ~efore the tribunal, a plea was advanced by the UC
that the proceeding before it was not maintainable as the
Development Officers could not be put in the compartment of
workmen under the Act. Apart from the said issue of F
maintainability, justification was given as regards the
punishment imposed by the UC. The tribunal negatived the
plea of maintainability and answered the other issues in favour
of the Development Officers and resultantly, it directed G
restitution of pay-scale and payment of the arrears that was
due to them.

        5. The aforesaid award compelled the UC to file the
writ petition before the High Court and the High Court, as we      H
190         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A find, relying on the decision in Mukesh K. Tripathi vs. Senior
  Divisional Manager, L/C & Ors. 1 expressed the view that
  the development officers were not workmen and, therefore,
  the tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the tis and
  consequently, it unsettled the award passed by the tribunal. At
B this juncture, it is seemly to note, after the said decision was
  renderetl on 18.04.2007, an application for review, being Civil
  Miscellaneous Review Application No.12736 of 2007, was filed
  stating, inter alia, that the order warranted a review in view of ·
C the subsequent pronouncement of this Court in Life Insurance
  Corporation oflndia vs. R. Suresh 2 . The High Court declined
  to entertain the application for review. Hence, the present
  appeal by special leave.

             6. We have heard. Mr. S.P. Singh, learned senior
0
      counsel and Mr. G. Prakash, learned counsel for the appellants
      and Mr. Kailash Vasdev, learned senior counsel, assisted by
      Mr. S. Rajappa, learned counsel for the respondents.

          7. Keeping in view the question posed at the beginning,
E we are obligated to make a survey of the authorities that have
  been pronounced by this Court specifically pertaining to the
  Development Officers working in LIC. A three-Judge Bench of
  this Court in S.K. Verma vs. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. 3 ,
F adverted to the definition of 'workman' as originally defined
  under Section 2( s) of the Act and the substantial amendment
  that was brought in 1956 in respect of the definition of
  'workman' and referred to the decision in Workmen vs. Indian
  Standards lnstitution 4 and dwelled upon the hierarchy of
G officers working in LIC, the duties performed by such officers
  and eventually held thus :

        "A perusal of the above extracted terms and conditions of

H   1. (2004) 8 sec 387
    2. (2008) 11 sec 319
    3. (198:>: 4 sec 214
    4. (191 •1 2 sec 847
   CHAUHARYA TRIPATHI &ORS. v. L.l.C. OF INDIA                 191
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

   appointment shows that a development officer is to be a A
   whole time employee of the Life Insurance Corporation of
   India. that his operations are to be restricted to a defined
   area and that he is liable to be transferred. He has no
   authority whatsoever to bind the Corporation in anyway. His
   principal duty appears to be to organise and develop the B
   business of the Corporation in the area allotted to him and
   for that purpose to recruit active and reliable agents, to train
   them to canvass new business and to render post-sale
   services to policy-holders. He is expected to assist and C
   inspire the agents. Even so he has not the authority to
   appoint agents or to take disciplinary action against them.
   He does not even supervise the work of the agents though
   he is required to train them and assist them. He is to be the
   'friend, philosopher and guide' of the agents working within  o
   his jurisdiction and no more. He is expected to stimulate
   and excite the agents to work, while exercising no
   administrative control over them. The agents are not his
   subordinates. In fact, it is admitted that he has no
   subordinate staff working under him. It is thus clear that the E
   development officer cannot by any stretch of imagination
   be said to be engaged in any administrative or managerial
   work. He is a workman within the meaning of s.2(s) of the
   Industrial, DisputesAct."
                                                                 F
       8. It is submitted by Mr. Kailash Vasdev, learned senior
counsel, that the said decision was considered by the
Constitution Bench in H.R. Adhyanthya & Ors. vs. Sandoz
(India) Ltd. & Ors. 5 , as the larger Bench was addressing the
controversy, whether the medical representatives as they are G
commonly known would be workmen according to the definition
of workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. The larger Bench
analyzing the purport of the said dictionary clause and various
other aspects wherein the meaning has been attributed and H
5. (1995) 5 sec 737
192         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A     ascribed to workmen and further taking note of the authorities
      in May & Baker (India) Ltd. vs. Workmen 6 ; Western India
      Match Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen 7 ; and Burmah Shell Oil
      Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. vs. Burmah
      Shell Management Staff Association 8 and analysing the
B     scheme of the Act ruled thus:

         "13. In S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, the was whether
         Development Officers of the Life Insurance Corporation
         of India (LIC) were workmen. The dispute arose on
c        account of the dismissal of the appellant Development
         Officer w.e.f. 8-2-1969. The Court noticed that the change
         in the definition of workman brought about by the
        Amending Act 36of1956 which, as stated above, added
        to the originally enacted definition, two more categories
D
        of employees, viz., those doing 'supervisory' and
         'technical' work. The three-Judge Bench of this Court did
        not refer to the earlier decisions in May & Baker1,
        WIMCO and Burmah Shell cases. The Bench only
E        referred to the decision of this Court in Workmen v. Indian
        Standards Institutions where while considering whether
        ISi was an 'industry' or not, it was held that since the ID
        Act was a legislation intended to bring about peace and
        harmony between management and labour in an
F       'industry', the test must be so applied as to give the widest
        possible connotation to the term 'industry' and, therefore,
        a broad and liberal and not a rigid and doctrinaire
        approach should be adopted to determine whether a
        particular concern was an industry or not. The Court,
G       therefore, held that to decide the question whether the
        Development Officers in the LIC were workmen or not, it
        should adopt a pragmatic and not a pedantic approach
        and consider the broad question as to on which side of
        the line the workman fell, viz., labour or management,
H
    6. AIR 1967 SC 678
    7.AIR 1' ;4 SC 472
    8. (19, ~; 3 sec 378
CHAUHARYA TRI PATH I & ORS. v. L.l.C. OF INDIA                 193
            [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

and then to con~ider whether there were any good reasons        A
for moving them over from one side to the other. The Court
then noticed that the LIC Staff Regulations classified the
staff into four categories, viz., (i) Officers, (ii)
Development Officers, (iii) Supervisors and Clerical Staff,
and (iv) Subordinate Staff. The Court pointed out that          B
Development Officers were classified separately both
from Officers on the one hand and Supervisors and
Clerical Staff on the other and that they as well as Class
Ill and Class IV staff other than Superintendents were
placed on par inasmuch as their appointing and
                                                                c
disciplinary authority was the Divisional Manager
whereas that of Officers was Zonal Manager. The Court
also referred to their scales of pay and pointed out that
the appellation 'Development Officer' was no more than          D
a glorified designation. The Court then referred to the
nature of duties of the Development Officers and pointed
out that a Development Officer was to be a whole-time
employee and that his operations were to be restricted
to a defined area and that he was liable to be transferred.     E
He had no authority whatsoever to bind the Corporation
in any way. His principal duty appeared to be to organise
and develop the business of the Corporation in the area
allotted to him, and for that purpose, to recruit active and
reliable agents, to train them, to canvass new business         F
and to render post- sale services to policyholders. He
was expected to assist and inspire the agents. Even so,
he had not the authority either to appoint them or to take
disciplinary action against them. He did not even
                                                               G
supervise the work of the agents though he was required
to train them and assist them. He was to be a friend,
philosopher and guide of the agents working within his
jurisdiction and no more. He was expected to "stimulate
and excite" the agents to work while exercising no              H
194        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A      administrative control over them. The agents were not
       his subordinates. He had no subordinate staff working
       under him'. The Court, therefore, held that it was clear
       that the Development Officer could not by any stretch of
       imagination be said to be engaged in any administrative
B      or managerial work and, therefore, he was a workman
       within the meaning of the ID Act. Accordingly, the order
       of the Industrial Tribunal and the judgment of the High
       Court holding that he was not a workman were set aside.
       As has been pointed out above, this decision did not
c      refer to the earlier three decisions in May & Baker!,
       WIMC02 and Burmah Shell3 cases. and obviously
       proceeded on the basis that if an employee did not come
       within the four exceptions to the definition, he should be
D      held to be a workman. This basis was in terms
       considered and rejected in Buramah Shell case3 by a
       Coordinate Bench of three Judges. Further no finding is
       given by the Court whether the Development Officer was
       doing clerical or technical work. He was admittedly not
E      doing manual work. We may have, therefore, to treat this
       decision as per incuriam."

         9. We have quoted in extenso as the Constitution
  Bench has declared the pronouncement in S.K. Venna's case
F as perincuriam.At this juncture, it is condign to note the position
  in Mukesh K. Tripathi (supra) which has been rendered by
  the three-Judge Bench that has been placed reliance upon by
  the High Court while deciding the writ petition. In Mukesh K.
  Tripathi's case, the question arose whether the appellant, who
G was appointed as Apprentice Development Officer, could
  be treated as a workman. While dealing with the said question,
  the three-Judge Bench referred to earlier decisions and the
  Constitution Bench decision in H.R. Adhyanthya (supra) and
H opined that:-
    CHAUHARYA TRI PATH I & ORS. v. L.l.C. OF INDIA                 195
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

   "21. Once the ratio of May and Baker (supra) and other           A
   decisions following the same had been reiterated despite
   observations made to the effect that S.K. Verma (supra)
   and other decisions following the same were rendered
   on the facts of that case, we are of the opinion that this
   Court had approved the reasonings of May and Baker               B
   (supra) and subsequent decisions in preference to S.K.
   Verma (supra).

   22. The Constitution Bench further took notice of the
   subsequent amendment in the definition of 'workman' and          c
   held that even the Legislature impliedly did not accept
   the said interpretation of this Court in S.K. Verma (supra)
   and other decisions.

   23. It may be true, as has been submitted by Ms. Jaisingh,       D
   that S.K. Verma (supra) has not been expre.ssly overruled
•• in H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) but once the said decision
   has been held to have been rendered per incuriam, it
   cannot be said to have laid down a good law. This Court
                                                                    E
   is bound by the decision of the Constitution Bench."

        10.     We respectfully agree with the aforesaid
 exposition of law. There can be no cavil over the proposition
 that once a judgment has been declared per incuriam, it does
 not have the precedential value.                                   F

        11.     After so stating, the three-Judge Bench did not
 accept the stand of the appellant therein that he was a workman
 and accordingly declined to interfere.
                                                                    G
        12. As has been stated earlier, the decision that was
 pressed into service in the application filed for review is the
 judgment in R. Suresh. In the said case, the question that was
 posed in the beginning of the judgment reads thus:
                                                                    H
196          SUPREMECOURTREPORTS                      [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A        "2. Whether jurisdiction of the Industrial Courts are ousted
         in regard to an order of dismissal passed by Life
         Insurance Corporation of India, a corporation constituted
         and incorporated under the Life Insurance Corporation
         Act, 1956, is the question involved in this appeal which
B        arises out of a judgment and order dated 3.2.2006
         passed by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court at
         Ernakulam."

  The facts that were the subject matter of the tis in the said
C case were that the respondent was appointed as a
  Development Officer of the LIC and a departmental proceeding
  was initiated against him and eventually he was found guilty in
  respect of certain charges and was dismissed from service
  by the disciplinary authority.As an industrial dispute was raised
0
  by him, the appropriate Government referred the dispute for
  adjudication by the industrial tribunal. The tribunal passed an
  award on 06.02.1993 and reduced the punishment imposed
  by the employer. The said order was assail.ed before the High
E Court in the writ petition. Before the High Court, the decision
  in M. Venugopalvs. L/C of/ndia9 was cited. The High Court
  opined that the said decision was not applicable and placed
  reliance on the authority in S.K. Verma (supra). Thereafter the
  Court referred to the jurisdiction of the industrial tribunal in
F interfering with the quantum o~ punishment and after referring
  to various provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act,
  1956, opined that it is a State and on that basis ruled, thus :
         "35. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Court being wide
G        and it having been conferred with the power to interfere
         with the quantum of punishment, tt could go into the nature
         of charges, so as to arrive at a conclusion as to whether
         the respondent had misused his position or his acts are
         in breach of trust conferred upon him by his employer.
H     9. (1994) 2 sec 323
   CHAUHARYA TRI PATH I & ORS. v. L.1.C. OF INDIA                   197
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

   36. It may be true that quantum of loss may not be of             A
   much relevance as has been held in Suresh Pathrella
   Vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce [(2006) 10 SCC 572],
   but there again a question arose as to whether he was
   in the position of a trust or not."
                                                                     B
        13. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the
two-Judge Bench referred to the decision in S.K. Verma
(supra) and also stated that they were not unmindful of the
principle stated in Mukesh K. Tripathi (supra). Dealing with
the decision in Mukesh K. Tripathi (supra), the Court said           C
that there the question was whether the Apprentice
Development Officer would be a 'workman' within the meaning
of the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Act and observed that it
was not dealing with the case that pertains to an apprentice.
                                                                     D
       14. Mr. Singh, learned ser;iorcounsel appearing for the
appellant built the plinth of his ar~1ument on the basis of the
aforesaid authority with the hope that an enormous structure
would come into existence but as we find on a studied and
                                                                E
anxious reading of the judgment, we notice that there is no
reference to the Constitution Bench decision in H.R.
Adhyanthya (supra) and the two-Judge Bench, though has
referred to S.K. Verma and Mukesh K. Tripathi (supra) but·
has not taken note of what the three-Judge Bench has said in F
Mukesh K. Tripathi (supra) with regard to the precedent and
how S.K. Verma's case is no more a binding precedent.

.        15. In our considered opinion, the decision in R. Suresh
(supra) cannot be regarded as the precedent for the G
proposition that a Development Officer in UC is a 'workman'.
In fact, the judgment does not say so but Mr. Vasdev, learned
senior counsel would submit that inferring such a ratio, cases
are being decided by the High Courts and other authorities.
Though such an apprehension should not be there, yet to clarify . H
198           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     the position, we may quote few lines from Ambica Quarry
      Works etc. v. State of Gujarat10 :

         "It has been said long time ago that a case is only an
         authority for what it actually decides, and not what
B        logically follows from it. (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v.
         Leathern, 1901 AC495)."

            In view of the aforesaid, any kind of interference is not
      permissible but, a pregnant one, it has dealt with the cases of
c     Development Officers of UC.

          16. As we find, the said judgment has been rendered
  in ignorance of the ratio laid down by the Constitution Bench
  in H.R. Adhyanthya (supra) and also the principle stated by
D the three-Judge Bench in Mukesh K. Tripathi (supra) that
  the decision in S.K. Verma (supra) is not a precedent, and
  hence, we are compelled to hold that the pronouncement in R.
  Suresh (supra) is per incuriam. We say so on the basis of
  the decisions rendered in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak11 ,
E Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v.
      Labour Court12 , State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals
      Ltd. 13 and Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. state of
      Maharashtra 14 •

F             17. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and
      hold that the development officers working in the UC are not
      'workmen' under Section 2(s) of the Act and accordingly we
      do not find any flaw in the judgment rendered by the High Court.

G            18. Ex consequenti, the appeals, being sans merit,
      stand dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of
      the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

      Nidhi Jain                                     Appeals dismissed.

H     10. AIR 1987 SC 1073
      11. (1988) 2 sec 602
      12. (1990) 3 sec 682
      13. (1991) 4 sec 139