Holding

The Court held that the credible oral testimony of PW‑2, corroborated by the genealogical chart, satisfied the requirements of Section 50, establishing a valid marital relationship, and that the defendants failed to rebut the presumption, leading to dismissal of the appeal.

Summary

The suit concerned the partition of ancestral lands belonging to the deceased Dasabovi, who had two wives – the plaintiffs' mother (first wife) and Chowdamma (second wife). The plaintiffs claimed that their mother was lawfully married to Dasabovi and therefore entitled to a share of the property, while the defendants denied any such marriage and relied on revenue records showing only the second wife's name. The High Court, relying on the oral testimony of PW‑2 (Hanumanthappa) and a genealogical chart, held that a valid marital relationship existed and set aside the trial court’s dismissal. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether PW‑2’s testimony satisfied Section 50 of the Evidence Act and whether the presumption of marriage could be drawn in the absence of documentary proof. The Court found PW‑2’s evidence credible, corroborated by the genealogical chart, and concluded that the defendants failed to rebut the presumption, also noting the adverse inference from the second wife’s refusal to testify. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the decree in favour of the plaintiffs upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the oral testimony of PW‑2 can establish a valid marital relationship between the plaintiffs' mother and the deceased under Section 50 of the Evidence Act.
Whether such a relationship can be presumed to be a valid marriage in the absence of documentary evidence.
Whether the burden of proof was discharged by the plaintiffs and whether the defendants' failure to testify attracted an adverse presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act.
Whether revenue records can be relied upon as proof of title to the suit properties.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXVI, Rule 1
Evidence Act, 1872s. 114(g), s. 50

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the respondents succeeded in establishing a valid marital relationship between their mother and the deceased primarily on the basis of the oral testimony of P.W.2; and whether the relationship between the deceased and the presumed to be a valid marital union, in the absence of formal documentary proof. Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.50 – Proof of relationship – Presumption of marriage – Appellant no.1-second wife of deceased, exerted her influence, and got the names of herself and

Subjects

PartitionValid marital relationshipOral testimonyPresumed to be a valid marital unionAbsence of formal documentary proofRevenue recordsJoint possession of the suit schedule propertiesLong-standing familiarityCommunity-level proximityAcquaintance with the familial relationsSpecial means of knowledgeProlonged cohabitationPresumption in favour of a valid wedlockBurden of proofRevenue records hold presumptive valueAbstention from the witness boxPersonal knowledgeLegitimacy of the relationshipConclusive proofCorroborative evidenceInterested witnessExerted influenceChange in revenue entries

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1532 : 2025 INSC 1038

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another
v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 11330 of 2011)
25 August 2025
[Sanjay Karol and Prashant Kumar Mishra,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the respondents succeeded in establishing a
valid marital relationship between their mother and the deceased
primarily on the basis of the oral testimony of P.W.2; and whether
the relationship between the deceased and the respondents’ mother
can be presumed to be a valid marital union, in the absence of
formal documentary proof.

Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.50 – Proof of relationship – Presumption
of marriage – Appellant no.1-second wife of deceased, exerted
her influence, and got the names of herself and her children
entered in the revenue records – On basis thereof, the
appellants-second wife and her son declined to acknowledge
the respondents-children of first wife of the deceased as
being in joint possession of the suit schedule properties –
Respondents sought partition of suit property – Appellant’s
case that the appellant no.1 is the only wife of the deceased,
and thus, the respondents have no right, title, or interest over
the suit schedule properties; that they denied the marriage
of the deceased with the respondent’s mother and claimed
that they inherited the properties pursuant to a partition
effected between the deceased and his brother – Trial Court
dismissed the suit – High Court decreed the suit in favour
of the respondents relying on the evidence of P.W.2 which
established the relationship of the respondents’ mother with
the deceased – Correctness:
Held: Testimony of P.W.2 being that of a person residing in the
same village and having a long-standing familiarity with both the
respondents and the appellants, coupled with his awareness of the
events pertaining to the relationship between the deceased and the

* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1533

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

respondents’ mother, cannot be dismissed as mere hearsay – On
the contrary, it reflects a narration of events personally witnessed
or known to him directly – Such evidence, being rooted in personal
knowledge, falls within the ambit of s.50 – Thus, in the absence
of contemporaneous documentary evidence, the evidence of
P.W.2 assumes evidentiary significance in establishing the nature
of the relationship between the deceased and the respondents’
mother – His evidence is consistent with s.50 and is being rooted
in personal knowledge and long-standing acquaintance with
both the respondents and appellants – P.W.2’s testimony was
unimpeached in the cross-examination and warrants an inference
in favour of the subsistence of a valid marital relationship between
the deceased and the respondent’s mother – Though genealogical
tree, by itself, does not constitute conclusive proof, it operates
as corroborative evidence and, when read along with the oral
testimony of P.W.2, it supports the inference of a valid marital
relation between the deceased and the respondents’ mother – As
regards the presumption of marriage, plaintiffs have discharged
the burden of proof placed upon them – They have sufficiently
established that the deceased lived with their mother, as husband
and wife – Appellants failed to discharge their onus to disprove
the factum of a valid marriage between the respondents’ mother
and the deceased – Furthermore, reliance on the revenue records
is of no avail, as such records only hold presumptive value and
don’t confer title – Appellant no.1, though physically present in the
court during the trial, abstained from stepping into the witness box
to rebut the respondents’ assertions as also wilfully bypassed the
statutory remedy available to those pleading physical incapacity –
In the absence of cogent medical evidence to support her alleged
incapacity, her abstention from the witness box constitutes
deliberate circumvention of the evidentiary burden resting upon
her – Adverse presumption u/s.114(g) of the Evidence Act is
inevitable – Court of law cannot offer refuge to studied silence where
a duty to disclose exists – Respondents anchored their claim in
measured and unwavering testimony of P.W.2, an account rooted in
personal knowledge and long-standing familiarity, which withstood
the rigours of cross-examination – His evidence, unshaken and
consistent, found further corroboration in the genealogical chart
presented by the respondents – It, thus, stands established that
the respondents have discharged the evidentiary burden imposed
upon them by law – In contrast, the appellants, bereft of probative
material or candour, resorted solely to denials – When measured
1534 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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against the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, the
scales unambiguously tilt in favour of the respondents – Impugned
judgment does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.
[Paras 25, 30-32, 42, 48, 49, 55-57, 59, 60]

Case Law Cited
Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan Misra and Ors. [1959] Supp. 1
SCR 814 : AIR 1959 SC 914; State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh
and Ors. [1983] 2 SCR 808 : (1983) 3 SCC 118; Badri Prasad v.
Dy. Director of Consolidation and Ors. [1979] 1 SCR 1 : (1978) 3
SCC 527; Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh [2006] Supp. 1 SCR 659 :
(2006) 5 SCC 558; Addagada Raghavamma and Anr. v. Addagada
Chenchamma and Anr. [1964] 2 SCR 933 : 1963 SCC OnLine
SC 37; Suraj Bhan and Ors. v. Financial Commissioner and Ors.
[2007] 5 SCR 155 : (2007) 6 SCC 186; Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao
and Anr. [1999] 1 SCR 1168 : (1999) 3 SCC 573 – referred to.
Andrahennedige Dinohamy and Anr. v. Wijetunge Liyanapatabendige
Balahamy and Ors., 1927 SCC OnLine PC 51; Mohabbat Ali Khan
(Plaintiff) v. Mahomed Ibrahim Khan and Ors. (Defendants), 1929
SCC OnLine PC 21 – referred to.

List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Partition; Valid marital relationship; Oral testimony; Presumed to
be a valid marital union; Absence of formal documentary proof;
Revenue records; Joint possession of the suit schedule properties;
Long-standing familiarity; Community-level proximity; Acquaintance
with the familial relations; Special means of knowledge; Prolonged
cohabitation; Presumption in favour of a valid wedlock; Burden of
proof; Revenue records hold presumptive value; Abstention from the
witness box; Personal knowledge; Legitimacy of the relationship;
Conclusive proof; Corroborative evidence; Interested witness;
Exerted influence; Change in revenue entries.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11330 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2010 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 935 of 2005
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1535

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., S.J. Amith, Ms. Aishwarya Kumar, Dr.
Mrs. Vipin Gupta.
Advs. for the Respondents:
G V Chandrashekar, Sr. Adv., N K Verma, Ms. Apeksha D, Ms.
Anjana Chandrashekar.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

1. This Appeal calls in question the impugned order dated 28.10.2010
passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular
First Appeal No.935 of 2005, whereby the High Court allowed the
said appeal filed by the plaintiffs and set aside the judgment of the
learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) Holalkere, dated 24.03.2005
in O.S No.102/2001, consequently decreed the suit for partition filed
by the plaintiffs.
2. The defendants in O.S.No.102/2001 are the appellants herein, and
the plaintiffs are respondents. The parties shall be referred to as per
their position before the Trial Court for convenience.
The genealogical chart germane to the present dispute is as under:

THIMMABOVI VELLAPPA

DASABOVI @ DASAPPA VENKATAPPA
(Elder Son) (Younger Son)

BHEEMAKKA @ SATHYAKKA CHOWDAMMA
(Second Wife)
(First Wife)
Defendant No.1/
Appellant No.1

VENKATAPPA SIDAMMA BALACHANDRAPPA
Palintiff No.1/ Palintiff No.2/ Defendant No.2/
Respondent No.1 Respondent No.2 Appellant No.2
1536 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The case of the plaintiffs is that their grandfather, namely Thimmabovi
Vellappa, had two sons: Dasabovi @ Dasappa and Venkatappa.
Dasabovi had two wives. The first wife, Bheemakka @ Sathyakka,
is the mother of the plaintiffs. The second wife, Chowdamma, is
defendant No.1, and their son is defendant No.2. Dasabovi died
about five years prior to the filing of the suit, leaving behind plaintiff
Nos.1 and 2 and defendant Nos.1 and 2. The suit schedule lands
bearing Survey Nos.39/1B, 149, 41/lP, 37/1, 37/lA, and 29/9, and
the house bearing No.38, situated in Devigere and Kallahally village,
Hosadurga Taluk.
4. About five years prior to the filing of the suit, during the lifetime of
Dasabovi’s father, the properties were divided between the father
of the plaintiffs and his brother, Venkatappa. As a consequence, the
suit schedule lands and the house property fell into the share of
Dasabovi. After the partition, the plaintiffs became the manager of
the joint family properties, and both the plaintiffs and the defendants
were cultivating the suit schedule properties.
5. During the lifetime of Dasabovi, another property bearing No. 37/1
of Kallahally Village, Hosadurga, was purchased out of joint family
funds and in the name of the joint family. However, the said property
was registered in the name of defendant No.1 (Chowdamma).
6. After the birth of plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 to the first wife of Dasabovi,
he fell in love with defendant No.1 (Chowdamma) and entered into
a relationship with her. After some time, she was brought into his
house and began living with him as his wife. In view of the second
wife entering the house, the first wife and her children were driven
out. Consequently, Bheemakka, the first wife, along with the plaintiffs,
went to her paternal home at Antharagange Village.
7. Even though the first wife and her children left the house of Dasabovi,
he continued to visit them on several occasions. After the death
of Dasabovi, the plaintiffs also visited their father’s residence at
Galirangaiahnahatti Village, as they were in joint possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule properties.
8. It is alleged that defendant No.1, who was a Panchayat member,
exerted her influence, and got the names of herself and her children
entered in the revenue records. Based on the change in the revenue
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1537

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

entries, the defendants declined to acknowledge the plaintiffs as
being in joint possession of the suit schedule properties. Hence,
the plaintiffs were compelled to demand their share in the family
properties. Having been denied the same, the plaintiffs have filed
O.S.No.102/2001 seeking partition of the suit schedule property to
the extent of half share, along with other consequential reliefs.
9. The defendants contended that the defendant No.1 is the only wife
of the deceased Dasabovi, and hence, the plaintiffs have no right,
title, or interest over the suit schedule properties. They denied the
marriage of Dasabovi with the plaintiffs’ mother and claimed that they
inherited the properties pursuant to a partition effected between the
deceased Dasabovi and his brother Venkatappa.
10. The Trial Court, on framing six issues, dismissed the suit of the
plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed a Regular
First Appeal being Regular First Appeal No.935/2005 before the
High Court. The High Court, after relying on the evidence of
P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), which established the relationship of the
plaintiffs’ mother with the deceased Dasabovi and observing that the
defendants’ reliance was based solely on denial, further noted that
defendant No.1 had deliberately chosen not to enter the witness box.
11. Considering the above, the High Court set aside the judgment of
the Trial Court in O.S. No.102/2001 and decreed the suit in favour
of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved thereby, the present Appeal has been
preferred by the defendants.

SUBMISSIONS
12. The learned counsel for the defendants/appellants submitted that the
High Court clearly erred in setting aside a well-reasoned judgment and
decree rendered by the Trial Court. It is contended that the plaintiffs/
respondents were admittedly not residing in the village where the suit
schedule property is situated. Hence, their claim that they were in
joint possession of the suit schedule property is unsustainable. It is
further contended that the plaintiffs/respondents have miserably failed
to adduce cogent and reliable evidence to prove that the plaintiffs’
mother was married to Dasabovi. Mere submission of genealogical
tree is not a proof of factum of marriage. It is strenuously urged that
the High Court was wholly unjustified in drawing adverse inference
for defendant no.1’s failure to depose as she was medically unfit
1538 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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due to arthritis. It is also argued that the plaintiffs failed to discharge
the burden of proving existence of a valid marriage between their
mother and Dasabovi. It is further argued that the High Court failed to
appreciate that the revenue records are in the name of the defendants
and despite challenge by the plaintiffs, the higher revenue authorities
dismissed their claim holding that they have failed to prove that they
are the legal heirs of deceased Dasabovi.
13. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents has
argued that the Trial Court recorded a perverse finding in respect
of the marriage of plaintiffs’ mother with Dasabovi despite there
being sufficient evidence on record. In such a view of the matter,
the High Court has rightly set aside the judgment of the Trial Court
which does not warrant interference in this Appeal. According to the
learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents, a reading of plaintiffs’
evidence, particularly the evidence of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), would
clearly prove that the plaintiffs’ mother was married to Dasabovi.
Defendant No.1 has not entered the witness box to disapprove the
said fact. The High Court has rightly concluded that the plaintiffs’
mother was married to Dasabovi. It is further argued that the revenue
records are neither proof of title nor the said could be used to prove
the factum of marriage. The plaintiffs having successfully discharged
their burden of proof, the onus shifted on the defendants which was
not discharged by them. Therefore, the finding regarding marriage
is unimpeachable. The learned counsel for the respondents would
pray for dismissal of this Appeal.

ANALYSIS
14. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused
the material available on record.
15. The case of the defendants is that one Thimmabovi Vellappa
had two sons, namely Dasabovi and Venkatappa. A partition was
effected in the year 1962-1963 and Items Nos. 1 to 3 fell to the
share of Dasabovi. It is further stated that Items Nos. 4 to 6 were
subsequently purchased by Dasabovi through registered sale deeds.
The defendants contend that the deceased Dasabovi never married
the mother of the plaintiffs, and that defendant No.1, Chowdamma,
is the only wife of the deceased Dasabovi. The defendants further
submitted that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the suit
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1539

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

schedule properties, and denied that the plaintiffs and defendants
were residing together in Galirangaiahnahatti or Kallahalli jointly.
16. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that their mother was the
first wife of the deceased Dasabovi. They stated that, after he married
a younger woman, their mother was forced to leave the matrimonial
home and reside at her parental house. It is admitted by both parties
that the properties standing in the name of the deceased Dasabovi
were ancestral in nature.
17. The principal issue that arises for our consideration is whether the
plaintiffs have succeeded in establishing a valid marital relationship
between their mother, Bheemakka @ Sathyakka, and the deceased
Dasabovi, primarily on the basis of the oral testimony of P.W.2
(Hanumanthappa).
18. The High Court, while considering the issue of valid marital relationship
between the plaintiffs’ mother and the deceased Dasabovi, relied
on the evidence of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa). The witness stated in
his evidence that he knows the families of both the plaintiffs and
the defendants. He further stated in his evidence that deceased
Dasabovi married the plaintiffs’ mother, Bheemakka, and through her,
begot plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. Later, the deceased Dasabovi married
defendant no.1, which led to the plaintiffs’ mother being ousted
from the matrimonial home. Thereafter, she resided in her parental
home in Antharagange village. The witness further deposed that
the deceased Dasabovi would regularly visit the plaintiffs and their
mother at Antharagange village. P.W.2 also stated that even after
the death of the deceased, the plaintiffs used to visit their father’s
village to attend the agricultural operations regularly.
19. It is observed that, both P.W.1 (Venkatappa) and D.W.1
(Balachandrappa) being interested witnesses, their evidence cannot
be relied upon to establish the relation between the deceased
Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother. Further, D.W.3 (Thimmappa),
who is the son of the sister of the father of Dasabovi, supports the
claim of the defendants. However, he has no knowledge of any
marriage between the deceased Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother.
D.W.4 (V. Thimmappa), who is the son of Dasabovi’s brother, has
also deposed on similar lines with D.W.3.
20. In the present case, there is a paucity of documentary and
contemporaneous material to conclusively establish the marital
1540 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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relationship between the deceased Dasabovi and the mother of the
plaintiffs. In such circumstances, the best possible evidence assumes
crucial significance. The testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa) is
the sole evidence adduced in support of the existence of such a
relationship. Accordingly, the evidentiary value of the testimony of
the P.W.2 must be examined in light of the principles laid down under
Section 50 of the Indian Evidence Act 18721.

PROOF OF RELATIONSHIP
21. Section 50 of the Evidence Act makes provision regarding “Opinion
on relationship, when relevant”. The said provision is reproduced
hereunder for ready reference:
“50. Opinion on relationship, when relevant.––When the
Court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one
person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, as
to the existence of such relationship, or any person who,
as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means
of knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact:
Provided that such opinion shall not be sufficient to prove
a marriage in proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act,
1869 (4 of 1869), or in prosecution under sections 494,
495, 497 or 498 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
Illustrations
(a) The question is, whether A and B, were married.
The fact that they were usually received and treated by
their friends as husband and wife, is relevant.
(b) The question is, whether A was the legitimate son of B.
The fact that A was always treated as such by members
of the family, is relevant.”
22. The principle underlying Section 50 of the Evidence Act has been
explained by this Court in Dolgobinda Paricha v. Nimai Charan
Misra and Ors.2, wherein this Court observed thus:

1 For short, “the Evidence Act”
2 AIR 1959 SC 914.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1541

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

“(6)….when the court has to form an opinion as to the
relationship of one person to another the opinion expressed
by conduct as to the existence of such relationship of
any person who has special means of knowledge on the
subject of that relationship is a relevant fact. The two
illustrations appended to the section clearly bring out the
true scope and effect of the section. It appears to us that
the essential requirements of the section are — (1) there
must be a case where the court has to form an opinion as
to the relationship of one person to another; (2) in such a
case, the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence
of such relationship is a relevant fact; (3) but the person
whose opinion expressed by conduct is relevant must be
a person who as a member of the family or otherwise
has special means of knowledge on the particular subject
of relationship; in other words, the person must fulfil the
condition laid down in the latter part of the section. If the
person fulfils that condition, then what is relevant is his
opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion means something
more than mere retailing of gossip or of hearsay; it means
judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting
from what one thinks on a particular question. Now, the
“belief” or conviction may manifest itself in conduct or
behaviour which indicates the existence of the belief or
opinion. …”
23. P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), aged 75 years and a resident of
Antharagange village, Bhadravati Taluk, in his evidence dated
08.02.2005 affirmed having personal knowledge of the relationship
between the deceased Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother. He stated
that he was acquainted with both the plaintiffs’ mother and defendant
No.1. He unequivocally stated that the deceased Dasabovi married
the plaintiffs’ mother, Bheemakka, 57 years ago at Antharagange
village, in accordance with the prevailing customs of their community.
24. P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa) further asserted that the plaintiffs’ mother
was the first wife of the deceased Dasabovi, and that the deceased
Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother resided at Galirangaiahnahatti,
where the plaintiffs were born. He stated that the deceased Dasabovi
later brought defendant No. 1 into the household, and at her instance,
the plaintiffs were ousted, compelling them to reside at Antharagange
1542 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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village. P.W.2 also testified that the deceased Dasabovi visited the
Antharagange village on several occasions. Even after his demise,
the plaintiffs continued to visit the deceased’s village to attend
agricultural operations.
25. The testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), being that of a person
residing in the same village and having a long-standing familiarity with
both the plaintiffs and the defendants, coupled with his awareness
of the events pertaining to the relationship between the deceased
Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother, cannot be dismissed as mere
hearsay. On the contrary, it reflects a narration of events personally
witnessed or known to him directly. Such evidence, being rooted
in personal knowledge, falls within the ambit of Section 50 of the
Evidence Act.

PROOF OF PEDIGREE
26. At this juncture, it is appropriate to refer to the genealogical tree
Ex.P-7, which has been produced by the plaintiffs. The genealogical
tree outlines the plaintiffs’ descent from the deceased Dasabovi
through his first wife, Bheemakka. It also reflects the second branch
of the family, namely, the first defendant Chowdamma, the second
wife and the second defendant (son born through the second wife).
27. This Court in State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh and Ors.3
emphasized:
“194. Before, however, opening this chapter it may be
necessary to restate the norms and the principles governing
the proof of a pedigree by oral evidence in the light of which
the said evidence would have to be examined by us. It
is true that in considering the oral evidence regarding a
pedigree a purely mathematical approach cannot be made
because where a long line of descent has to be proved
spreading over a century, it is obvious that the witnesses
who are examined to depose to the genealogy would have
to depend on their special means of knowledge which
may have come to them through their ancestors but, at
the same time, there is a great risk and a serious danger

3 (1983) 3 SCC 118
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1543

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

involved in relying solely on the evidence of witnesses
given from pure memory because the witnesses who are
interested normally have a tendency to draw more from
their imagination or turn and twist the facts which they
may have heard from their ancestors in order to help
the parties for whom they are deposing. The court must,
therefore safeguard that the evidence of such witnesses
may not be accepted as is based purely on imagination
or an imaginary or illusory source of information rather
than special means of knowledge as required by law. The
oral testimony of the witnesses on this matter is bound
to be hearsay and their evidence is admissible as an
exception to the general rule where hearsay evidence is
not admissible. …
195. In order to appreciate the evidence of such witnesses,
the following principles should be kept in mind:
“(1) The relationship or the connection however close
it may be, which the witness bears to the persons
whose pedigree is sought to be deposed by him.
(2) The nature and character of the special means
of knowledge through which the witness has come
to know about the pedigree.
(3) The interested nature of the witness concerned.
(4) The precaution which must be taken to rule out
any false statement made by the witness post litem
motam or one which is derived not by means of special
knowledge but purely from his imagination, and
(5) The evidence of the witness must be substantially
corroborated as far as time and memory admit.”
28. Although in the present dispute, P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa) does not
expressly affirm or refer to the genealogical chart marked as Ex.P.7,
his testimony neither deviates from nor contradicts the familial
relationships outlined therein. On the contrary, his account is broadly
consistent with the structure depicted in the chart. P.W.2 stated with
familiarity regarding the plaintiffs’ descent and inter se relationships
within the family.
1544 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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29. Though P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa) is not a blood relative of either
party, he demonstrated long-standing familiarity with both the
plaintiffs and deceased Dasabovi. His belonging to the same village
as the plaintiffs reflects community-level proximity and sustained
acquaintance with the familial relations in issue. This satisfies the
statutory requirement of “special means of knowledge” under Section
50 of the Evidence Act. The specificity of his statements, particularly
in identifying the relationship of plaintiffs’ mother with the deceased
Dasabovi, indicates that he speaks from personal observation and
not speculative knowledge.
30. There is no material on record to suggest that P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa)
is an interested witness. His deposition is free from embellishment and
stood the cross-examination. There is no indication that his testimony
was tailored to suit the litigation or introduced as an afterthought (Post
litem motam). The narrative appears to be rooted in long-standing
village familiarity and reflects natural continuity.
31. Thus, in the totality of circumstances, and particularly in the absence
of contemporaneous documentary evidence, the evidence of P.W.2
assumes evidentiary significance in establishing the nature of the
relationship between the deceased Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’
mother. His evidence is consistent with Section 50 of the Evidence
Act and is being rooted in personal knowledge and long-standing
acquaintance with both the plaintiffs and defendants.
32. It is further fortified by the fact that P.W.2’s testimony was unimpeached
in the cross-examination and warrants an inference in favour of the
subsistence of a valid marital relationship between the deceased
Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ regular
visit to the deceased’s village, even after his demise, corroborates
the factum of cultivation of the suit lands by the plaintiffs.
33. Though Ex.P-7, by itself, does not constitute conclusive proof, it
operates as corroborative evidence and, when read along with the
oral testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), it supports the inference
of a valid marital relation between the deceased Dasabovi and the
plaintiffs’ mother.

PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
34. At this juncture, it becomes imperative to address the question as
to whether the relationship between the deceased Dasabovi and
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1545

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

the plaintiffs’ mother can be presumed to be a valid marital union,
in the absence of formal documentary proof.
35. It would be beneficial to refer to Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of
Consolidation and Ors.4 wherein this Court held as follows:
“…. A strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock where
the partners have lived together for a long spell as husband
and wife. Although the presumption is rebuttable, a heavy
burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the relationship of
legal origin. Law leans in favour of legitimacy and frowns
upon bastardy. …”
36. Similarly, in Andrahennedige Dinohamy and Anr. v. Wijetunge
Liyanapatabendige Balahamy and Ors.5, wherein the Privy Council
observed that:
“….where a man and woman are proved to have lived
together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the
contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together
in consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of
concubinage”.
37. In Mohabbat Ali Khan (Plaintiff) v. Mahomed Ibrahim Khan and
Ors. (Defendants)6, the Privy Council observed that:
“… The law presumes in favour of marriage and against
concubinage when a man and a woman have cohabited
continuously for a number of years. …’’
38. The foregoing authorities indicate that the legal position enunciates
a presumption in favour of a marriage where a man and woman
have engaged in prolonged and continuous cohabitation. Such a
presumption, though rebuttable in nature, can only be displaced
by unimpeachable evidence. Any circumstance that weakens this
presumption ought not to be ignored by the Court. The burden lies
heavily on the party seeking to question the cohabitation and to
deprive the relationship of legal sanctity.

4 (1978) 3 SCC 527
5 1927 SCC OnLine PC 51
6 1929 SCC OnLine PC 21
1546 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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39. It can be elicited from the evidence of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa) that
the deceased Dasabovi was regularly visiting the plaintiffs’ mother and
plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 at Antharagange village. A reasonable presumption
can, therefore, be drawn that the deceased Dasabovi maintained the
relationship with the plaintiffs’ mother even after marrying defendant
No.1. This, in turn, gives rise to a presumption that the deceased
Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother have lived as husband and wife.
40. Such prolonged cohabitation, coupled with the testimony of P.W.2
(Hanumanthappa), attracts a strong presumption in favour of a valid
wedlock. Although the presumption is rebuttable, the onus lies on
defendant No. 1 to disprove the legitimacy of the relationship. In
the present case, defendant No. 1, except for mere denial, has
not substantiated any material, oral or documentary, to rebut the
presumption of a valid marriage between the deceased Dasabovi
and the plaintiffs’ mother.
41. It is a well-settled principle that the burden of proof lies upon the
party who asserts a fact. In the present case, the plaintiffs have
positively asserted that the deceased Dasabovi had a valid marital
relationship with their mother. This assertion is supported by the oral
testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), the consistent conduct of the
deceased Dasabovi in regularly visiting the plaintiffs’ residence, and
the absence of any contrary material from defendant No.1.
42. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs
have discharged the burden of proof placed upon them. They have
sufficiently established that the deceased Dasabovi lived with their
mother, Bheemakka @ Sathyakka, as husband and wife.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND ONUS OF PROOF
43. This Court in Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh7 observed thus:
“19. There is another aspect of the matter which should
be borne in mind. A distinction exists between burden of
proof and onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus
probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage of a
case. The question of onus of proof has greater force,
where the question is, which party is to begin. Burden
of proof is used in three ways: (i) to indicate the duty of

7 (2006) 5 SCC 558
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1547

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

bringing forward evidence in support of a proposition at
the beginning or later; (ii) to make that of establishing a
proposition as against all counter-evidence; and (iii) an
indiscriminate use in which it may mean either or both of
the others. The elementary rule in Section 101 is inflexible.
In terms of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the
plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes out a
case which entitles him to a relief, the onus shifts to the
defendant to prove those circumstances, if any, which
would disentitle the plaintiff to the same.”
44. Also, in Addagada Raghavamma and Anr. v. Addagada
Chenchamma and Anr.8, this Court observed as follows:
“12. … There is an essential distinction between burden
of proof and onus of proof : burden of proof lies upon the
person who has to prove a fact and it never shifts, but
the onus of proof shifts. …Such considerations, having
regard to the circumstances of a particular case, may shift
the onus of proof. Such a shifting of onus is a continuous
process in the evaluation of evidence. …”
45. As it is seen that the plaintiffs have successfully discharged their
burden of proof regarding the factum of marriage, the onus now
shifts to the defendants to rebut the same.
46. The defendants, except for denying the marriage between the
deceased Dasabovi and the plaintiffs’ mother, have not produced
any oral or documentary evidence to challenge the legal sanctity
of the said marriage. The contention that the plaintiffs’ mother did
not belong to the same caste as the deceased Dasabovi, is wholly
bereft of any proof or material. In the absence of the same, the said
assertion collapses merely into speculation.
47. The defendants have produced a genealogical chart marked as Ex.D-
2, which refers only to themselves and the deceased Dasabovi, while
omitting the plaintiffs and their mother. In contrast, Ex-P-7, produced
by the plaintiffs, includes both the plaintiffs and the defendants,
presenting a more consistent family structure. The defendants’
failure to justify the exclusion of the plaintiffs in Ex.D-2 undermines
the credibility of their denial.

8 1963 SCC OnLine SC 37
1548 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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48. It is also noted that it is not the case of the defendants that the plaintiffs
were born from a marriage between the first wife, Bheemakka, and
any other man. In view of the same, it can be conclusively held that
the defendants failed to discharge their onus to disprove the factum
of a valid marriage between the plaintiffs’ mother and the deceased
Dasabovi.

REVENUE RECORDS NOT PROOF OF TITLE
49. In the absence of any substantive rebuttal, the defendants seek refuge
in the revenue records. However, their reliance on the revenue records
(Ex.P1-P6) is of no avail, as such records only hold presumptive
value and don’t confer title. This Court in Suraj Bhan and Ors. v.
Financial Commissioner and Ors.9 observed thus:
“9. … It is well settled that an entry in revenue records
does not confer title on a person whose name appears in
record-of-rights. It is settled law that entries in the revenue
records or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose” i.e.
payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred
on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property
is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil
court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh, (1993) 4 SCC
403). …”

PARTIES FAILURE TO ENTER WITNESS BOX: CONSEQUENCES
50. The failure of the defendants to substantiate their claims through
documentary evidence is eclipsed by a more consequential omission.
In a case where the principal controversy turns on matters lying
within her exclusive personal knowledge, the silence of defendant
No.1, her absence from the witness box, is not a procedural lapse
but a calculated withdrawal from scrutiny.
51. The conspicuous silence of defendant no.1 strikes not merely as
omission but as deliberate evasion. Defendant No. 1, who lies at
the heart of the controversy, chose not to step into the witness
box and depose regarding the relationship between the plaintiffs’
mother and her husband. Her testimony bore direct relevance not
only to the status of plaintiffs’ mother but also her own position.
The only justification advanced was that defendant No.1, being an

9 (2007) 6 SCC 186
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1549

Chowdamma (D) by LR and Another v.
Venkatappa (D) by LRs and Another

octogenarian and suffering from arthritis, was unable to attend the
Court proceedings.
52. However, this defence is conclusively dismantled by the record
itself. The deposition of D.W.1 (Balachandrappa) clearly indicates
that defendant No. 1 was physically present in the Court during the
examination of D.W.2 (G.V. Venkatappa), D.W.3 (Thimmappa) and
D.W.4 (V. Thimmappa). It further emerges that defendant No.1 was
also present in the Court when the evidence of P.W.1 (Venkatappa)
was being recorded. If defendant No.1 was capable of attending the
Court on multiple occasions, no explanation remains for her failure
to offer her own testimony, except for calculated restraint.
53. This inference is inescapable. This is not a case of medical inability but
of deliberate silence. In civil proceedings, particularly where the facts
lie exclusively within the personal knowledge of the party, the refusal
to enter the witness box carries grave evidentiary consequences.
54. This principle is neither novel nor uncertain. This Court in Vidhyadhar
v. Manikrao and Anr.10 held thus:
“17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in the
witness-box and states his own case on oath and does
not offer himself to be cross-examined by the other side,
a presumption would arise that the case set up by him is
not correct …. ”
55. The present case is a compelling invocation of the above principle.
Defendant No.1, though physically present in the Court during the
trial, abstained from stepping into the witness box to rebut the
plaintiffs’ assertions — assertions that strike at the very core of the
dispute. In the absence of cogent medical evidence to support her
alleged incapacity, her abstention from the witness box constitutes
deliberate circumvention of the evidentiary burden resting upon her.
56. In the present factual matrix, the adverse presumption under Section
114(g) of the Evidence Act is inevitable.
57. This Court cannot overlook that defendant No. 1, while central to the
controversy, chose not only to abstain from entering the witness box
but also wilfully bypassed the statutory remedy available to those
pleading physical incapacity.

10 (1999) 3 SCC 573
1550 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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58. Order XXVI, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, permits
the recording of evidence through a commission in cases of age or
infirmity. Yet, no application was filed invoking the said provision, nor
was any explanation tendered for its non-invocation. In a dispute
where the foundational facts lie squarely within her exclusive
knowledge, such omission assumes critical significance. Her refusal to
depose, despite the existence of a procedural safeguard specifically
tailored to her alleged condition, cannot be dismissed as inadvertent.
Rather, it reflects a conscious evasion from the evidentiary process,
compounded by her unexplained failure to avail an accessible legal
alternative, is not a neutral act. It constitutes wilful shielding from
judicial scrutiny.
59. A Court of law cannot offer refuge to studied silence where a duty
to disclose exists. The plaintiffs anchored their claim in measured
and unwavering testimony of P.W.2 (Hanumanthappa), an account
rooted in personal knowledge and long-standing familiarity, which
withstood the rigours of cross-examination. His evidence, unshaken
and consistent, found further corroboration in the genealogical
chart presented by the plaintiffs. It, therefore, stands established
that the plaintiffs have discharged the evidentiary burden imposed
upon them by law. In contrast, the defendants, bereft of probative
material or candour, resorted solely to denials. When measured
against the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, the scales
unambiguously tilt in favour of the plaintiffs.
60. It is our firm opinion the impugned judgment dated 28.10.2010
passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Regular First Appeal
No.935/2005 does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever so as to
warrant interference by this Court.
61. Hence, the present Appeal fails and is dismissed as being devoid
of merit.
No order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain