Holding

The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s conduct constituted culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part II of Section 304 IPC, not murder under Section 302, and accordingly reduced the conviction.

Summary

Chunni Bai was convicted of murdering her two young daughters after the trial court and High Court upheld a Section 302 IPC conviction. She claimed she acted under the influence of an invisible power, asserting unsoundness of mind under Section 84 IPC. The Supreme Court examined the eyewitness testimony, medical autopsy reports, the absence of motive, and the appellant’s erratic behavior, noting the lack of conclusive medical evidence of insanity. It held that while the prosecution proved the actus reus, the intention to cause death was not established beyond reasonable doubt, warranting a conviction for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Part II of Section 304 IPC. Consequently, the conviction was reduced and the appellant, having served the requisite time, was ordered to be released. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant was suffering from unsound mind or mental incapacity at the time of the offence, invoking Section 84 IPC.
Whether the prosecution proved the requisite intention (mens rea) to cause death beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether the offence should be classified as murder under Section 302 IPC or as culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.
Whether the benefit of doubt can be extended to the accused on the basis of alleged mental disorder.
Whether the trial court erred in not utilizing Section 165 of the Evidence Act to probe the appellant’s motive and mental state based on statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162, s. 313
Evidence Act, 1872s. 105, s. 165
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 299, s. 300, s. 302, s. 304, s. 84

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the accused at the time of commission of crime was incapable of making conscious and informed decision or was suffering from certain mental incapacity or unsoundness of mind; Whether a benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as regards proof of intention – ss.84, 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.161, 313 – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.105, 165 – Appellant killed her minor daughters – Appellant denied her guilt in a statement recorded u/s.313 of CrPC and claimed that she had

Subjects

MurderCulpable homicide not amounting to murderIntentionMens reaActus reusMotiveStar witnessCrime committed by motherSection 313 CrPCInfluence of some invisible powerBeyond reasonable doubtLegal insanityMedical insanityBurden of proofGeneral exceptions of IPCStandard of proofPreponderance of probabilityReasonable doubtRustic personsMental disorders/illnessDirect evidenceLack of motive

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1816 : 2025 INSC 577

Chunni Bai
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 2265 of 2025)
28 April 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and
Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the accused at the time of commission of crime was
incapable of making conscious and informed decision or was
suffering from certain mental incapacity or unsoundness of mind;
Whether a benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused as
regards proof of intention and mens rea.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.84, 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II – Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.161, 313 – Evidence Act, 1872 –
ss.105, 165 – Appellant killed her minor daughters – Appellant
denied her guilt in a statement recorded u/s.313 of CrPC and
claimed that she had no knowledge of what had happened
and how it happened and that she was under the influence
of some invisible power – Trial Court convicted appellant for
offence punishable u/s.302 of IPC – The High Court upheld
the conviction of the appellant u/s.302 of the IPC – Appellant’s
plea that the appellant was not in a proper mental condition
at the time of commission of the offence:
Held: No infirmity in the finding given by the Trial Court as well
as the High Court that the appellant had assaulted both of her
daughters, which caused grievous injuries, thereby causing their
death – In the peculiar facts and circumstances as revealed in the
present case, and also keeping in mind that the incident happened
in a rural setting and the appellant not being highly educated, the
possibility of confusing her unstable mental condition or temporary
lapse of judgmental power bordering on temporary insanity cannot
be completely ruled out which the appellant attributed as coming
under the influence of invisible power, for the purpose of giving a

* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1817

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

benefit of doubt about the non-existence of “intention” – Appellant
had a cordial relationship with all the family members including
her children, which clearly indicates absence of any ill feelings
on the part of the appellant to provide any basis for any motive
to commit the crime which will prove the presence of “intention”
to commit the act – The statement of the father-in-law (PW-5)
of the appellant recorded that 15 days prior to the incident, the
appellant was babbling nonsense, saying that she is Mata, Budi
Dai etc. – Further, it was also mentioned that the appellant was
taken to the Psychiatrist at Government Hospital, Durg where
she was given medicine and was advised to follow up – Under
the circumstances, in view of the plea taken by the appellant, a
reasonable doubt can be said to have arisen as regards existence
of intention, thus of mens rea for causing death in the present
case as – (i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was
shouting that she is killing her children; (ii) Post the incident,
the appellant, on being asked the reason behind her act, kept
on crying and repeating that she has killed her children – This
is corroborated by other prosecution witnesses as well; (iii) The
appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even after being
left alone in the house by PW-1; (iv) Complete absence of motive
behind the commission of crime in background of the fact that the
appellant loved her children very much, as also acknowledged
by the prosecution witness; (v) The nature of relation between
the accused and the deceased i.e., of a mother and child; (vi)
Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any such
motivating factor – However, in the absence of any conclusive
medical evidence with regards to the mental condition of the
appellant, it may not be enough to extend the benefit of exception
as encapsulated in s.84 IPC so as to acquit the appellant in the
present case – Nevertheless, the circumstances are enough to
cast a shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the
appellant to commit the crime in the present case – Thus, in the
present case “intention of causing death” cannot be said to have
proved – Therefore, the conviction of the appellant converted to
under Part II of s.304 IPC is from that of s.302 IPC. [Paras 16,
36, 43, 53, 57, 58, 60]
Penal Code, 1860 – Murder and Culpable homicide not
amounting to murder – Difference between – Discussed.
[Paras 18-21]
1818 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Evidence Act, 1872 – s.105 – Burden of Proof to prove existence
of circumstances which would attract any of the pleaded
exceptions is on accused. [Paras 28-31]
Penal Code, 1860 – s.84 – Legal insanity vis-à-vis medical
insanity – Discussed. [Para 33]
Criminal Law – Rustic person – Not aware of various mental
disorders/illness – Discussed. [Para 36]

Evidence – Grave offences – Direct evidence available –
Absence of proof of motive or intention:
Held: In cases where direct evidence is available that links the
accused to the offence, absence of proof of motive or intention
does not preclude conviction of the accused – However, in cases
where the plea taken by the accused is such that it raises a
concern about the mental stability of the accused, the existence
or lack of motive assumes great significance – This is especially
true in cases involving grave offences such as murder, where a
complete absence of any kind of motive which ordinarily impels
a person to commit such a crime may lend credence to the plea
of insanity, as in the present case, where a mother has taken the
life of her own children of tender age apparently in absence of
any motive. [Para 39]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.161, 162 – Evidence
Act, 1872 – s.165 – Court to put questions to witnesses to
elicit the truth:
Held: Even though the statements recorded u/s.161 of CrPC
cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo
placed u/s.162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court
u/s.165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on
the statement u/s.161 CrPC to any witness or party at any stage
to secure the ends of justice – Trial Court ought to have taken
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of the case and the
statement of PW-5 recorded u/s.161 CrPC to put right questions
to the parties and witnesses to ascertain the motive or intention of
the appellant in committing the crime. [Paras 54, 56, 64]

Case Law Cited
Rampal Singh v. State of U.P. [2012] 7 SCR 160 : (2012) 8 SCC
289; State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya [1977] 1 SCR 601 :
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1819

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

(1976) 4 SCC 382; Raghunandan v. State of U.P. [1974] 3 SCR
92 : (1974) 4 SCC 186; Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[2010] 4 SCR 103 : (2010) 6 SCC 1 – relied on.
Satyavir Singh Rathi, Assistant Commissioner of Police v. State
[2011] 6 SCR 138 : AIR 2011 SC 1748; Munshi Ram v. Delhi
Admn. [1968] 2 SCR 455 : AIR 1968 SC 702; State of U.P. v.
Mohd. Musheer Khan, AIR 1977 SC 2226; James Martin v. State
of Kerala [2003] Supp. 6 SCR 910 : (2004) 2 SCC 203; Dahyabhai
Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat [1964] 7 SCR 361 : AIR
1964 SC 1563 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Evidence
Act, 1872.

List of Keywords
Murder; Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; Intention;
Mens rea; Actus reus; Motive; Star witness; Crime committed by
mother; Section 313 CrPC; Influence of some invisible power;
Beyond reasonable doubt; Legal insanity; Medical insanity;
Burden of proof; General exceptions of IPC; Standard of proof;
Preponderance of probability; Reasonable doubt; Rustic persons;
Mental disorders/illness; Direct evidence; Lack of motive.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2265 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2023 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 1035 of 2016

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
S. Mahendran.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Avdhesh Singh, A.A.G., Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav,
Ms. Akansha Singh, Gopinath Mr, Prashant Singh.
1820 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.

Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been preferred against judgment and order
dated 21.11.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1035 of 2016
whereby, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence imposed
upon the present appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’).
3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 05.06.2015 at about
9 AM in the village of Bharadkala, District Bemetara, State of
Chhattisgarh, the appellant, namely Chunni Bai, assaulted her two
daughters, namely Kumari Yogita Sahu, aged 5 years and Kumari
Nisha Sahu, aged 3 years with an iron crowbar leading to grievous
injuries thereby causing the death of both the daughters. The incident
was witnessed by Sonam Sahu (PW-1), who is the sister-in-law of
the appellant who also lived in the same house.
4. On the same day of occurrence, a complaint was lodged before the
Saja Police Station by Laxman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), a neighbour
of the appellant, on the basis of which an FIR No. 126/15 was
registered under Section 302 IPC. On completion of the investigation,
the appellant was put on trial.
5. According to the star witness, Sonam Sahu (PW-1), in the morning
at around 9 am on the fateful date, while she was doing household
chores, she heard the appellant shouting in her room that she was
killing her daughters, on hearing of which she went inside the room
where PW-1 saw both the children on the bed, soaked in blood,
and saw the appellant hitting the younger child Nisha with an iron
crowbar. PW-1 then snatched the crowbar from the appellant and
rushed out to inform her uncle who stayed next door. Thereafter,
she informed her brother and niece of the incident. Other relatives
were also informed.
6. The testimony of the eyewitness PW-1 was corroborated by other
witnesses, most of whom were relatives and who lived nearby
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1821

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

and came to the house soon after the incident. They also saw the
appellant crying and shouting that she had killed her children. The
injured children were taken to the hospital but were declared dead.
7. According to the testimony of the doctor present on duty on the day
of the incident, Dr. G.S. Thakur (PW-18), both the girls had died
before reaching the hospital. PW-18 described the injuries found
during the autopsy of the elder daughter, Yogita Sahu, as follows:
“… There was a crushed wound in the right temporal part
of the head, which measured 10 centimeters in length and
was up to the skull bone. A crushed wound is present 0.5
cm below the said wound. Its length was 2.0 centimeters
and its depth was up to the skull bone. The body’s right
occipito-parietal bone of the head was broken and had
sunk into the brain, which measured 16.0 cm in length
and 8.0 cm in width. The entire body of the dead body
had turned pale.
4. All the injuries found on the dead body were caused by
hard and blunt objects and before death. While examining
the skull and spinal cord of the dead body, I found that a
piece of bone was stuck in the occipital part of the brain
and bleeding was present in the occipital part of the brain.
A long hair-line fracture, was present in the skull of the
body. Which was present from the occipital bone to the
fatal bone.
…………………………..”
PW-18 gave his opinion about the cause of death in the following
words:
“In my opinion, the cause of death was bleeding in the
stomach and stoppage of heart and respiratory rhythm due
to injury in the organic part of the brain which is a result
of hitting the head with a hard and blunt object. Nature: In
my opinion the nature of death was homicidal….”
8. Similarly, with respect to the autopsy of younger daughter, Nisha
Sahu, PW-18 noted the following injuries:
“…There was a visible injury with blood all around the
left eye of the dead body. Whose measurement was 40
1822 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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X 30 centimetres. The left occipital portion of the head
contained a crushed injury measuring 3.0 X 30 cm. The
caudal portion of the said injury contained a crushed
injury measuring 30 X 2.0 cm in length with a depth up
to the skull. A congested bruise of blood was present in
the left scapular area. It measured 9.0 X 20 cm in length,
extending from the central part to the outer part. The above
mentioned wounds were inflicted with a hard and blunt
object and were inflicted before death…”
The cause of death of Nisha Sahu was opined to be due to cardiac
and respiratory arrest due to bleeding in the brain and injuries to
organs of the brain and the said injuries were caused by hitting the
head with a hard and blunt object and it was homicidal in nature.
9. Based on the memorandum statement of the appellant vide Ex.
P/10, the crime weapon i.e., the iron pounder was seized vide Ex.
P/4 and the FSL report vide Ex. P/31 which confirmed the presence
of human blood on the seized weapon.
10. To support the case of the prosecution, as many as 20 witnesses were
examined. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to
as ‘CrPC’), wherein the appellant denied guilt and claimed that she
had no knowledge of what had happened and how it happened and
that she was under the influence of some invisible power. However,
no defence witness was produced before the court.
11. The Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bemetara, in Sessions Trial
No. 76/2015, upon appreciation of evidence and after hearing of
parties concluded that based on the postmortem reports proved by
the doctor (PW-18), the deaths of both daughters were due to serious
injuries on their heads. Further, it was held that the author of the
crime was the appellant, supported by the eye-witness Sonam Sahu
(PW-1) which was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses. The
Trial Court, thereafter, vide judgment dated 29.06.2016, convicted the
appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and
sentenced the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of
Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo additional
rigorous imprisonment for 1 month.
12. In the appeal against the above order, the High Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1035 of 2016 vide order dated 21.11.2023, upheld
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1823

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC. The
plea taken by the appellant before the High Court was that the
prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and
that the appellant was not in proper mental condition at the time of
commission of the offence.
13. The High Court relied on the medical opinion of Dr. G.S. Thakur (PW-
18) and the postmortem reports which stated that the cause of death
was cardiorespiratory arrest caused by intracerebral haemorrhage
and injury to vital parts of brain, as a result of the head being hit by
a hard and blunt object, thereby concluding that the nature of death
was homicidal. Further, the High Court took into consideration the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, seizure of the crime weapon
and its FSL report to observe that the appellant had assaulted her
daughters with an iron pounder causing grievous injuries leading to
their death. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

ANALYSIS BY THIS COURT
14. Since the death of the two girls was not denied and was proved
on the basis of the evidence on record, the first issue that is to be
addressed is whether the death was caused by the appellant. For
this, we have to revisit the testimonies of the prosecution witness,
more importantly, Sonam Sahu (PW-1) who is the sole eyewitness
of the incident. PW-1 has specifically stated in her testimony that
when she rushed towards the room upon hearing the scream of the
appellant, she saw the appellant hitting her younger daughter Nisha
with an iron pounder while the elder daughter, Yogita was lying in
bed unconscious, soaked in blood. It is to be noted that as per
PW-1’s testimony, no other person was present in the house at that
time other than appellant and her two daughters. This testimony of
PW-1 finds corroboration from the statements of other prosecution
witnesses such as Sanat Kumar (PW-16), who is the cousin brother
of the appellant’s husband. As per PW-16, he was informed about
the incident by Sonam Sahu (PW-1) who came crying to his house,
which is adjacent to the house of the appellant. When PW-16 reached
the place of occurrence, he saw that the appellant was crying and
saying that she had killed Nisha and Babli (Yogita) and repeated this
statement upon being asked the reason behind killing them. Then,
PW-16 went to the room of the appellant and saw both daughters
lying unconscious on bed, soaked in blood.
1824 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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15. Similarly, the contemporaneous testimonies of Rekha Sahu (PW-2),
Laxman Prasad Mishra (PW-3), Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6), Manuwa
(PW-9), Namdev (PW-10), Harish Kumar Sahu (PW-11) and Kaushilya
Bai (PW-15) also corroborate the testimony of Sonam Sahu (PW-1)
that the daughters were bleeding, lying unconscious and that the
appellant was crying and saying that she had killed her children.
16. Further, as per the testimony of the investigating officer K.M. Mishra
(PW-19), the crime weapon i.e., the iron pounder was seized based on
the memorandum statement of the appellant, although the witnesses
to the recording of such memorandum statement i.e., Ram Kumar
Verma (PW-6) and Bhuniram Sahu (PW-8) denied that any such
statement had been given by the appellant in their presence. The
FSL report confirmed the presence of human blood on the seized
iron pounder. Therefore, considering the above evidence including
the post mortem report discussed above, we are of the opinion that
there is no infirmity in the finding given by the Trial Court as well as
the High Court that the appellant had assaulted both of her daughters,
which caused grievous injuries, thereby causing their death.
17. Once homicide is proved being committed by the appellant, the next
consideration will be whether such homicide was “culpable homicide”
within the meaning of Section 299 IPC. If it is found to be “culpable
homicide”, further consideration will be whether it is “culpable homicide
not amounting to murder” which is punishable under Section 304
IPC or “murder” as defined under Section 300 IPC, punishable under
Section 302 IPC, under which the appellant has been convicted and
punished by the Trial Court which was upheld by the High Court.
18. The difference between “murder” and “culpable homicide not
amounting to murder” has been succinctly explained by this Court
in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 in
the following words:
“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicide”
is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable
homicide” but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, “culpable
homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder”, is
“culpable homicide not amounting to murder”. For the
purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity
of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1825

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

may be called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”.
This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is
defined in Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be
termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This
is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then,
there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is
the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment
provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments
provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this
degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.”
19. The difference was further elucidated in Rampal Singh v. State of
U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289 in the following words:
“18. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of
U.P. [(2007) 14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915] noticed
that academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable
homicide not amounting to murder” had vividly been
brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya [(1976) 4 SCC 382 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659] where
it was observed as under: (Vineet Kumar case [(2007)
14 SCC 660 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 915], SCC pp. 665-66,
para 16)
“16. … that the safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of Sections 299 and 300 IPC is to keep
in focus the key words used in various clauses of the
said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of
Sections 299 and 300 IPC and drawing support from the
decisions of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR
1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818] and Rajwant Singh v. State
of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1874 : 1966 Cri LJ 1509] , speaking
for the Court, R.S. Sarkaria, J. neatly brought out the points
of distinction between the two offences, which have been
time and again reiterated. Having done so, the Court said
that wherever the court is confronted with the question
whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’, on the facts of a case, it [would] be
convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages.
The question to be considered at the first stage would be,
whether the accused has done an act by doing which he
1826 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal
connection between the act of the accused and the death,
leads to the second stage for considering whether that act
of the accused amounts to ‘culpable homicide’ as defined
in Section 299. … If the answer to this question is in the
negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not
amounting to murder’, punishable under the First or the
Second Part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on
whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is
applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the
case comes within any of the Exceptions enumerated in
Section 300, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide
not amounting to murder’, punishable under the First Part
of Section 304 IPC. It was, however, clarified that these
were only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of the
court and not cast-iron imperative.”
20. This Court in the aforesaid case of Rampal Singh (supra) further
explained the difference between these two offences from the
perspective of the punitive provisions of Sections 302 and 304 IPC
by grading the offences in three categories as follows:
“21. Sections 302 and 304 of the Code are primarily
the punitive provisions. They declare what punishment a
person would be liable to be awarded, if he commits either
of the offences. An analysis of these two sections must
be done having regard to what is common to the offences
and what is special to each one of them. The offence of
culpable homicide is thus an offence which may or may
not be murder. If it is murder, then it is culpable homicide
amounting to murder, for which punishment is prescribed
in Section 302 of the Code. Section 304 deals with cases
not covered by Section 302 and it divides the offence into
two distinct classes, that is, (a) those in which the death
is intentionally caused; and (b) those in which the death is
caused unintentionally but knowingly. In the former case the
sentence of imprisonment is compulsory and the maximum
sentence admissible is imprisonment for life. In the latter
case, imprisonment is only optional, and the maximum
sentence only extends to imprisonment for 10 years.
The first clause of Section 304 includes only those cases
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1827

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

in which offence is really “murder”, but mitigated by the
presence of circumstances recognised in the Exceptions
to Section 300 of the Code, the second clause deals only
with the cases in which the accused has no intention of
injuring anyone in particular. In this regard, we may also
refer to the judgment of this Court in Fatta v. Emperor [AIR
1931 Lah 63] , 1151. C. 476 (Refer: Penal Law of India by
Dr Hari Singh Gour, Vol. 3, 2009.)”
21. From the above extracts, it can be understood that one of the criteria
to determine, in any given case, as to whether the act amounts
to “murder” or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” is the
presence or absence of intention of the offender. If the “intention”
to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death or the knowledge, which obviously has to be a conscious
one, that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and
commits such act “without any excuse” for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury, comes out aloud and clear in the
case, it would be most appropriate to categorise it as a case of
“murder” under Section 300 IPC in which event, penal provision
of Section 302 IPC would be attracted. On the other hand, if the
“intention” in causing the death or to causing such bodily injury is
not so clear, the case will fall under the less stringent category of
“culpable homicide not amounting to murder” as punishable under
Section 304 IPC.
22. In the case at hand, it can be said to have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant had caused the death of her
two children and thus committed culpable homicide.
The evidence on record clearly shows that the appellant had caused
the death of her children by hitting them with an iron crowbar on
their heads.
The crucial question however is, whether she had the intention
to cause death of her children or had the intention to cause such
bodily injury which was likely to cause death or whether she had the
conscious knowledge that it was imminently dangerous that in all
probability, it would cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death and committed the act without any excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death or such injury?
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23. When a person performs an act, he is attributed with the intention to
cause the natural consequences that follows from the act performed.
There may be situations when the person makes the intention for
performing an act known clearly by oral declaration or otherwise.
However, it can be illusive when intention is not clearly spelt out or
discernible, and the same has to be gathered from the surrounding
facts and circumstances and the acts of the accused.
24. In the present case, once the factum of homicide being committed
by the appellant is proved beyond reasonable doubt and considering
the nature of the injuries received by the minor victims at the hands
of the appellants with iron crowbar on the basis of the medical and
other evidence brought on record, it can be stated that the intention
to commit homicide can certainly be inferred as had been done by
the Trial Court and the High Court.
However, we have certain reservations about such a conclusion
being drawn by the courts below in respect of proof of “intention”
or the conscious knowledge of what she was doing in the light of
the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the case. In our
opinion, it cannot be conclusively held in the present case that the
intention of the appellant or conscious knowledge of what she was
doing, a component of mens rea, has been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
25. It is well settled that in any criminal case, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt in order
to secure conviction of the accused, that is to say that no reasonable
doubt can be said to have arisen in the judicial mind of the court
after appreciating the evidence presented, and the outcome reached
by the prosecution is the only possible outcome in the given facts
and circumstances of the case.
This legal position is necessary for both the ingredients of “actus reus”
and “mens rea”, though “mens rea” can sometimes be inferred from
the nature of “actus reus”, and as far as “mens rea” is concerned,
intention or guilty knowledge is certainly the most important facet.
26. The case of the appellant, as evident from the records, is the claim
of innocence and denial of the charges and the appellant made a
specific plea while being examined under Section 313 CrPC that at
the time of occurrence, she was under the influence of some invisible
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1829

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

power. However, the appellant did not produce any witness in support
of her claim and produced only two documents.
27. The appellant by taking the said plea is seeking to bring her case
within the general exceptions as mentioned in IPC.
Some of the general exceptions which are available under the Indian
Penal Code to escape criminal liability are contained in Sections 76
to 106 of IPC as well as five “Exceptions” mentioned in Section 300
IPC, etc.
The plea taken by the appellant of being under the influence of some
invisible power can be understood to invoke Section 84 of the IPC,
which reads as follows:
“84. Act of a person of unsound mind.—Nothing is an
offence which is done by a person who, at the time of
doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable
of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what
is either wrong or contrary to law.”
28. Though in a criminal case the burden of proof to establish a case
beyond reasonable doubt is on the prosecution, however, under
Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred
as “Evidence Act”), the burden of proof to prove the existence of
such circumstances which would attract any of the above pleaded
exceptions is on the accused.
Section 105 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
“105. When a person is accused of any offence, the
burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing
the case within any of the General Exception in the
Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or within any special
exception or proviso contained in any other part of the
same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon
him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such
circumstances.”
29. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to note that the standard of
proof for the accused required by law in such cases, in invoking
any exception clause is preponderance of probability, which is also
adopted in civil cases. [See: Satyavir Singh Rathi, Assistant
Commissioner of Police v. State, AIR 2011 SC 1748; Munshi
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Ram v. Delhi Admn., AIR 1968 SC 702; State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Musheer Khan, AIR 1977 SC 2226].
This would mean that if the accused is able to raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court that there exists a possibility of existence
of such circumstances based on preponderance of probability, that
would attract the exception as mentioned under the IPC, and if the
said burden of proof is discharged by the accused, he would be
entitled to such benefit of exception.
30. It is also well settled that in order to discharge this burden of proof on
any of the exceptions pleaded, it is not imperative for the accused to
lead defence evidence. The court can also by taking into consideration
the evidence available on record, which may have been presented
by the prosecution, reach a conclusion that an exception is attracted
in a given case, as observed by this Court in the case of James
Martin v. State of Kerala, (2004) 2 SCC 203:
“13…. Under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(in short “the Evidence Act”), the burden of proof is on
the accused, who sets up the plea of self-defence, and,
in the absence of proof, it is not possible for the court to
presume the truth of the plea of self-defence. The court
shall presume the absence of such circumstances. It is for
the accused to place necessary material on record either by
himself adducing positive evidence or by eliciting necessary
facts from the witnesses examined for the prosecution. An
accused taking the plea of the right of private defence is
not necessarily required to call evidence; he can establish
his plea by reference to circumstances transpiring from the
prosecution evidence itself. The question in such a case
would be a question of assessing the true effect of the
prosecution evidence, and not a question of the accused
discharging any burden.”
31. To understand what exactly the burden of proof under Section
105 of the Evidence Act is, we may refer to the landmark case of
Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964
SC 1563, wherein it was observed that:
“7. The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea
of insanity may be stated in the following propositions : (1)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1831

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the accused had committed the offence with the requisite
mens rea, and the burden of proving that always rests on
the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.
(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was
not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense
laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code : the
accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the
relevant evidence oral, documentary or circumstantial, but
the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests
upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused
was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane
at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed
before the court by the accused or by the prosecution may
raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as regards
one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including
mens rea of the accused and in that case the court would
be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the
general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was
not discharged.”
32. In the light of the above legal position, we may now examine the
facts and circumstances as well as the evidence on record to
consider whether the appellant was in fact suffering from insanity
or was not in a proper state of mind during the commission of crime
for the purpose of understanding whether she had the “intention”
or whether she had knowingly and consciously committed the act
without any excuse.
33. The plea taken by the appellant during her examination by the Trial
Court is that she came under the influence of certain invisible power
when she committed the act. However, this plea does not appear
to be a legally recognised exception as is the case of sudden and
grave provocation, heat of passion, right of self-defence, etc. There
is a difference between medical insanity and legal insanity. What
Section 84 IPC provides is legal insanity as distinguished from
medical insanity. A person is said to be of unsound mind on whom
criminal liability cannot be fastened if at the time of commission of
the act, he is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that
what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. It may also
be noted that the expression “unsoundness of mind” or the word
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“insanity” has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code, though
these have been used interchangeably. In the absence of a precise
definition of these terms, insanity or unsoundness of mind has
been variously understood by courts in varying degrees of mental
disorder and the courts have applied this attribute to give the benefit
of doubt or otherwise, depending on the facts and circumstances
of the cases. However, mere odd behaviour or certain physical or
mental ailments affecting the emotions or capacity to think and act
properly have not been construed to be “unsound mind” within the
scope of Section 84 of the IPC. All kinds of insanity as are understood
are not covered under Section 84 of IPC but only such acts, when
committed by a person who was incapable of knowing the nature
of the act or that he was doing which is either wrong or contrary to
law are concerned. As a consequence, only such mental or medical
condition which affects or disturbs the faculty of the person which
renders him unable to know the nature of act committed or that he
was doing which he did not know that it was wrong or contrary to
law can be given the benefit of insanity under Section 84 IPC, and
thus escape criminal liability.
34. In the present case, it is noticed that apart from the plea taken by the
appellant during her examination under Section 313 CrPC that she
was under the influence of invisible power, no evidence has been
brought on record by the appellant which would prove that she was
of “unsound mind” within the meaning of Section 84 of IPC.
35. Nevertheless, merely because the appellant could not convey
herself in a legally understandable expression or idiom of her
mental condition to indicate the existence of legal insanity or prove
such a condition and provide evidence, in our opinion, such a plea
could not have been completely ignored by the Trial Court or by
the High Court.
36. In the peculiar facts and circumstances as revealed in the present
case, and also keeping in mind that the incident happened in a rural
setting and the appellant not being highly educated, the possibility
of confusing her unstable mental condition or temporary lapse
of judgmental power bordering on temporary insanity cannot be
completely ruled out which the appellant attributed as coming under
the influence of invisible power, for the purpose of giving a benefit
of doubt about the non-existence of “intention”.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1833

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

It is not common for rustic persons to be aware of various mental
disorders/illnesses such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, that may
temporarily impair the mental condition of an individual. More often
than not, these disorders are unrecognised and remain untreated
as it may be difficult to identify the symptoms and they do not seek
proper and timely medical intervention, resulting in such medical/
mental conditions which can be misinterpreted or confused with spells
or influence of invisible forces based on superstitions.
In the present case, we have also noted that no particulars have
been mentioned about the nature of the “invisible influence” and as
such it can be purely in the realm of speculation that this “invisible
influence” may be a symptom of such mental conditions referred to
above. However, in the light of the strange, bizarre and inexplicable
behaviour of the appellant, there is no other plausible explanation
that could be attached to her conduct in the given circumstances,
other than to infer that she was under certain impaired mental
condition which the appellant described as being under the influence
of invisible power.
37. As per the testimony of Sonam Sahu (PW-1), on hearing the shout
of the appellant, PW-1 went to the room to check, and she found
the elder daughter of the appellant soaked in blood and saw the
appellant hitting the younger daughter with the iron pounder. After the
incident too, the appellant kept on shouting and crying that she had
killed her daughters. This evidence stands substantially corroborated
by the contemporaneous testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
such as Rekha Sahu (PW- 2), Lakshman Prasad Mishra (PW-3),
Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6), Pradeep Sahu (PW-7), Bhuniram Sahu
(PW-8), Manuwa (PW-9), Namdev (PW-10) and Harish Kumar Sahu
(PW-11).
38. Further, when PW-1 left the appellant alone in the house and went
to the adjacent house of her uncle to call for help, the appellant did
not try to flee. In fact, as per the testimony of Sanat Kumar (PW-16),
when he also reached the place of incident upon being informed by
PW-1, he saw the appellant standing inside the room.
39. It is true that in cases where direct evidence is available that links
the accused to the offence, absence of proof of motive or intention
does not preclude conviction of the accused. Perhaps it is for this
reason that in the present case, the prosecution has not adduced
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any evidence to prove any motive or intention behind the commission
of crime. However, in cases where the plea taken by the accused is
such that it raises a concern about the mental stability of the accused,
the existence or lack of motive assumes great significance. This is
especially true in cases involving grave offences such as murder,
where a complete absence of any kind of motive which ordinarily
impels a person to commit such a crime may lend credence to the
plea of insanity, as in the present case, where a mother has taken
the life of her own children of tender age apparently in absence of
any motive.
40. It is to be noted that the prosecution witnesses, including the husband
of the appellant and other close relatives, as well as the residents
of the village, have all acknowledged that the appellant loved her
children very dearly. Testimonies and cross examination of prosecution
witnesses such as Sonam Sahu (PW-1), Lakshman Prasad Mishra
(PW-3), Tulsi Sahu (PW-4), Ram Kumar Verma (PW-6), Pradeep
Sahu (PW-7), Kaushilya Bai (PW-15) and Sanat Kumar (PW-16)
testify to this fact.
41. As regards the relationship between the appellant and her husband,
it was admitted by Sonam Sahu (PW-1) in her cross examination,
that her brother loved his wife and children very much.
42. Similarly, Pradeep Sahu (PW-7), husband of the appellant, denied the
suggestion that he did not want to keep his wife. He also denied that
he was unhappy because the appellant had given birth to daughters.
It was also stated by him that the appellant was an Anganwadi worker
and a day before the incident, she had gone for her duty, which
suggests that they were leading a normal domestic life.
43. None of the above witnesses has spoken ill of the appellant nor of
any strained relationship of the appellant with her husband, other
family members and children. In fact, PW-8, the father-in-law of the
appellant though was not an eyewitness and not present at the time
of the incident, refused to implicate the appellant of committing the
aforesaid offence, clearly indicating the absence of any ill feeling
towards his daughter in law, the appellant.
In this background, absence of motive assumes great importance,
which in turn would put a question mark on the presence of “intention”
to commit the said act.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1835

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

44. Thus, the inference one can safely draw on the basis of the evidence
on record is that the appellant had a cordial relationship with all
the family members including her children which clearly indicates
absence of any ill feelings on the part of the appellant to provide
any basis for any motive to commit the crime which will prove the
presence of “intention” to commit the act.
45. There is yet another notable feature of the appellant’s behaviour.
What had been consistently testified by the witnesses is that at the
time of committing the crime and soon thereafter, she was crying
and bemoaning the killing of her children. She thus clearly appears
to have been overwhelmed by remorse. This is indicative of absence
of any premeditation to commit the offence, but rather committing it
in a spur of the moment by the appellant as an impulsive act, without
realising the consequences of her act.
46. Reverting to the fundamental principles of criminal law, when a
crime takes place in which there are eye-witnesses and the factum
of homicide is proved by medical evidence, recovery of weapon of
crime etc., the mens rea and the intention may be inferable, which
of course is based on presumption.
However, presumption of the existence of intention merely based
on the act and result may not be safe in every case because the
act and consequence of the questioned act may have been brought
about by certain circumstances beyond the contemplation or control
of the accused. Thus, when the court is called upon to ascertain the
real intention or motive of the accused in committing the offence as
in the present case when the accused pleaded that she was under
the influence of invisible power indicating absence of intention, the
court ought to have looked into all the surrounding circumstances
before coming to the conclusion that the intention has been also
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
47. Motive is usually the basis for causing the “intention” to commit
any crime, but it is highly elusive and difficult to prove as it remains
hidden in the deep recesses of the mind and is not comprehensible
to others, unless disclosed by the perpetrator. Though under the
law, it is absolutely not necessary that to prove an offence, motive
is also required to be established if the intention or the mens rea
can be safely inferred from the surrounding facts. But where the
motive which can provide the basis for the intention appears to be
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totally missing, the court has to be very circumspect in drawing the
inference of the proof of the presence of intention.
48. For committing a serious crime like homicide, there could be various
motivating factors. One may commit the crime of homicide propelled
by anger or motivated by insult, humiliation or jealousy. Other
motivating factors may be to exact revenge or by way of retribution
or to hide certain crimes already committed. One may also commit
homicide to gain undue pecuniary benefit or otherwise. One may
commit such a crime out of sheer frustration and dejection with
life channelising through violent acts. One may commit such crime
because of superstitious beliefs.
There could be numerous factors, and it may not be possible to
contemplate and mention all such situations that motivates a person
to commit violent crime like homicide. While proof of motive of the
crime may strengthen the prosecution’s case in proving the guilt
of the offender, failure to prove motive is not fatal if the offence is
otherwise proved through direct and incontrovertible evidence. At
the same time, absence of any motive may benefit the accused
under certain circumstances, for the ingredient of intention which
constitutes the mens rea has also to be proved.
49. In a case like the present one where the crime is committed by a
mother, in her own house, members of the family could provide some
clues to find out the motive for committing such a crime.
Naturally, some of the questions which would arise in such a case
may be as follows:
Did she kill her own children as she was fed up with her
marital life?
Was she subjected to any kind of mental or physical
harassment at home which may have led to desperation
to commit such a crime?
Was she unhappy with her husband or the children in
any manner?
Was there any financial or any such consideration that
motivated her to commit such a crime?
Did she commit the crime at the instigation of any other
person?
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1837

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

Was it a case of propitiating some forces based on
superstitious belief?
Was it a gruesome case of human sacrifice as had been
judicially noticed in some rare cases?
Was she suffering from any psychological or mental
disorder that could have prompted her to commit such
a crime?
As noticed above, there is nothing in the evidence on record to
suggest the existence of any of the above situations. On the contrary,
the evidence on record portrays her as a loving mother having a
cordial relation with her husband and other family members, thus
leading a normal family life. There is nothing in the evidence that is
suggestive of any disturbed personal and domestic life.
There can be no doubt that failure to unravel the true motivating
factor for committing the crime cannot lead to the inference that the
appellant is innocent in the light of the evidence which may be brought
on record, yet the court should also not rush through to hold that the
intention to commit the said offence has been proved in the light of
the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the present case.
As noted above, the appellant had taken a plea that when she
committed the offence, she was under the influence of some invisible
power. However, in spite of the inability of the appellant to lead any
cogent evidence or explain her aforesaid claim, in our opinion, this
plea cannot be totally brushed aside in the peculiar facts emanating
in the present case.
50. In our view, the aforesaid plea ought to have been considered with
utmost seriousness by the Trial Court as well as the High Court in
the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case.
If there were no motivating factors at all which impelled the appellant
to commit such a gruesome crime in a domestic environment which
was otherwise normal in all respects, it is totally inexplicable and
incomprehensible how a mother who loves her children and who had
a cordial relation with her husband could resort to such a violent act
and be attributed with the “intention to cause death” of her beloved
children, except for coming under some influence or forces beyond
her control as claimed by her.
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It is generally accepted in every society, especially in Indian society
that one of the most sacred relationships amongst all human
relationships is that of a mother and child. A mother is the life giver
as well as the nurturer of a child. Since time immemorial we have
not only been hearing but also observing the essence of the lines
“पूत कपूत सुने बहुतेरे, माता सुनी न कुमाता” which means that a son can be a bad
son, but a mother can never be a bad mother. Of course, it cannot
be a legal dictum that mothers can never be an offender but that in
the present case, in complete absence of motive, a mother assaulting
her children of tender ages to death, that too when it is admitted that
there was no animosity, but only love for her children, is contrary to
lived human experiences.
51. What we have also noted is that the State did not make any serious
endeavour to try to ascertain the motive or the intention of the appellant
during the investigation, in spite of all the witnesses portraying a very
normal domestic environment in the family and the appellant to be a
normal person which indicated absence of any factor which prompted
the appellant to commit the crime. The investigating officer appears
to have been satisfied in view of the evidence of PW-1 and other
witnesses, recovery of the weapon and the medical evidence, that
the appellant had committed the murder and there was no necessity
to investigate the motive behind the said act.
52. The Trial Court in its judgment though took note of the plea taken
by the appellant that she was under the influence of invisible power
when she was examined under Section 313 CrPC, did not give any
importance to it and simply brushed it aside by observing that the
evidence of the witnesses and other surrounding circumstances and
her own admission proved that she committed the crime. The Trial
Court unfortunately did not examine the said plea in all seriousness
it deserved. In spite of being vested with enormous powers under
the law to do complete justice, the Trial Court seems to have failed
in exercising the same to reach a logical conclusion.
53. In the present case, apart from the plea taken by the appellant in
her examination under Section 313 CrPC, the fact of the possibility
of the appellant not being in a stable mental condition came up in
the statement of Santram Sahu (PW-5) recorded under Section 161
CrPC, who is the father-in-law of the appellant. It was recorded
therein that 15 days prior to the incident, the appellant was babbling
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1839

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

nonsense, saying that she is Mata, Budi Dai etc. Further, it was
also mentioned that the appellant was taken to the Psychiatrist at
Government Hospital, Durg where she was given medicine and was
advised to follow up. This statement of PW-5 made under Section 161
CrPC was sought to be produced by the appellant in her defence
before the Trial Court.
54. Even though the statements recorded under Section 161 of CrPC
cannot be used for any purposes in a trial due to the embargo placed
under Section 162 CrPC, however, the power of the Trial Court under
Section 165 Evidence Act is wide enough to put questions based on
the statement under Section 161 CrPC to any witness or party at
any stage to secure the ends of justice. For this, we may profitably
refer to the judgment of this Court in Raghunandan v. State of U.P.,
(1974) 4 SCC 186, wherein, it was observed as follows:
“14. It is true that the ban, imposed by Section 162,
Criminal Procedure Code, against the use of a statement
of a witness recorded by the police during investigation,
appears sweeping and wide. But, at the same time, we
find that the powers of the Court, under Section 165 of
the Evidence Act, to put any question to a witness, are
also couched in very wide terms authorising the Judge
“in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant
facts” to “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at
any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact
relevant or irrelevant”. The first proviso to Section 165,
Evidence Act, enacting that, despite the powers of the
Court to put any question to a witness, the judgment must
be based upon facts declared by the Act to be relevant,
only serves to emphasize the width of the power of the
Court to question a witness. The second proviso in this
section preserves the privileges of witnesses to refuse
to answer certain questions and prohibits only questions
which would be considered improper under Sections 148
and 149 of the Evidence Act. Statements of witnesses made
to the police during the investigation do not fall under any
prohibited category mentioned in Section 165, Evidence
Act. If Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, was
meant to be so wide in its sweep as the trial court thought
it to be, it would make a further inroad upon the powers of
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the Judge to put questions under Section 165, Evidence
Act. If that was the correct position, at least Section 162,
Criminal Procedure Code, would have said so explicitly.
Section 165 of the Evidence Act was already there when
Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code was enacted.
15. It is certainly quite arguable that Section 162, Criminal
Procedure Code, does amount to a prohibition against the
use even by the Court of statements mentioned there.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the prohibition of Section 162
of the Criminal Procedure Code, being to prevent unfair
use by the prosecution of statements made by witnesses
to the police during the course of investigation, while
the proviso is intended for the benefit of the defence, it
could also be urged that, in order to secure the ends of
justice, which all procedural law is meant to subserve,
the prohibition, by taking into account its purpose and the
mischief it was designed to prevent as well as its context,
must be confined in its scope to the use by parties only
to a proceeding of statements mentioned there.
16. We are inclined to accept the argument of the appellant
that the language of Section 162, Criminal Procedure
Code, though wide, is not explicit or specific enough to
extend the prohibition to the use of the wide and special
powers of the Court to question a witness, expressly and
explicitly given by Section 165 of the Indian Evidence
Act in order to secure the ends of justice. We think that a
narrow and restrictive construction put upon the prohibition
in Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, so as to confine
the ambit of it to the use of statements by witnesses by
parties only to a proceeding before the Court, would
reconcile or harmonize the two provisions considered
by us and also serve the ends of justice. Therefore, we
hold that Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, does
not impair the special powers of the Court under Section
165, Indian Evidence Act…..”
55. This power of the Court to invoke Section 165 of the Evidence Act
to examine witnesses to subserve the cause of justice and public
interest has been reiterated in Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT
of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1, wherein it was observed as follows:
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1841

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

188. It is also important to note the active role which is to be
played by a court in a criminal trial. The court must ensure
that the Prosecutor is doing his duties to the utmost level
of efficiency and fair play. This Court, in Zahira Habibulla
H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004
SCC (Cri) 999] , has noted the daunting task of a court in
a criminal trial while noting the most pertinent provisions
of the law. It is useful to reproduce the passage in full :
(SCC pp. 188-91, paras 43-49)
“43. The courts have to take a participatory role in a trial.
They are not expected to be tape recorders to record
whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311
of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer
vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of court to
elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in
the evidence-collecting process. They have to monitor the
proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something,
which is not relevant, is not unnecessarily brought into
record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it
can control the proceedings effectively so that the ultimate
objective i.e. truth is arrived at. This becomes more
necessary before the court has reasons to believe that the
prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the
requisite manner. The court cannot afford to be wishfully or
pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious
pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting
agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts
more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair
judicial system, and courts could not also play into the
hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference
or adopting an attitude of total aloofness.
44.The power of the court under Section 165 of the
Evidence Act is in a way complementary to its power
under Section 311 of the Code. The section consists
of two parts i.e. : (i) giving a discretion to the court to
examine the witness at any stage, and (ii) the mandatory
portion which compels the court to examine a witness if
his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision
of the court. Though the discretion given to the court is
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very wide, the very width requires a corresponding caution.
In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India [1991 Supp (1)
SCC 271 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 595] this Court has observed,
while considering the scope and ambit of Section 311,
that the very usage of the words such as, ‘any court’, ‘at
any stage’, or ‘any enquiry or trial or other proceedings’,
‘any person’ and ‘any such person’ clearly spells out
that the section has expressed in the widest possible
terms and do not limit the discretion of the court in any
way. However, as noted above, the very width requires
a corresponding caution that the discretionary powers
should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and
exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently
with the provisions of the Code. The second part of
the section does not allow any discretion but obligates
and binds the court to take necessary steps if the fresh
evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision
of the case, ‘essential’ to an active and alert mind and
not to one which is bent to abandon or abdicate. Object
of the section is to enable the court to arrive at the truth
irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence
has failed to produce some evidence which is necessary
for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is
exercised and the evidence is examined neither to help
the prosecution nor the defence, if the court feels that
there is necessity to act in terms of Section 311 but only
to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is
done with an object of getting the evidence in aid of a
just decision and to uphold the truth.
56. In the light of the above legal position, we are of the opinion that
the Trial Court ought to have taken into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of the case and the statement of PW-5 recorded
under Section 161 CrPC to put right questions to the parties and
witnesses to ascertain the motive or intention of the appellant in
committing the crime.
The High Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction also did not
even make any reference to it, though took into consideration the
statement made under Section 313 CrPC.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1843

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

57. Under the circumstances, in our opinion, in view of the plea taken
by the appellant that she was under the influence of some invisible
power during commission of crime, a reasonable doubt can be said
to have arisen as regards existence of intention, thus of mens rea
for causing death in the present case.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have taken into consideration the
following aspects:
(i) During the commission of crime, the appellant was shouting
that she is killing her children;

(ii) Post the incident, the appellant, on being asked the
reason behind her act, kept on crying and repeating that
she has killed her children. This is corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses as well;

(iii) The appellant did not try to flee the scene of crime even
after being left alone in the house by PW-1;

(iv) Complete absence of motive behind the commission of
crime in background of the fact that the appellant loved
her children very much, as also acknowledged by the
prosecution witness;

(v) The nature of relation between the accused and the
deceased i.e., of a mother and child.

(vi) Absence of any strained domestic relationships or any
such motivating factor discussed above in para 49.

58. However, in spite of the above discussed circumstances and other
evidence on record, in the absence of any conclusive medical
evidence with regards to the mental condition of the appellant, we
are of the opinion that it may not be enough to extend the benefit
of exception as encapsulated in Section 84 IPC so as to acquit the
appellant in the present case.
Nevertheless, in our view, the circumstances are enough to cast a
shadow of doubt about the existence of the intention of the appellant
to commit the crime in the present case. We are, thus, satisfied that
in the present case “intention of causing death” cannot be said to
have proved.
1844 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

59. Under the circumstances, applying the practical tests elucidated in
State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (supra) and Rampal Singh v.
State of U.P. (supra) it can be said that the present case falls within
the third category of “culpable homicide of the third degree” as the
act was committed by the appellant without the intention of causing
death, and the said culpable homicide would be covered under
Part II of Section 304 IPC.
60. Accordingly, we convert the conviction of the appellant under Part II
of Section 304 IPC from that of Section 302 IPC under which she
was initially convicted and sentenced by the Trial Court which was
upheld by the High Court.
61. It has been brought to our notice that the appellant has already
undergone 9 (nine) years 10 (ten) months of custody. Part II of
Section 304 IPC provides for punishment with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to 10 (ten) years or with
fine or with both.
Upon her conviction under Part II of Section 304 IPC as above, as
she has already undergone more than 9 (nine) years and 10 (ten)
months of sentence, we sentence the appellant to the period already
undertaken by her without any fine.
Accordingly, she shall be entitled to be released forthwith, which
we direct so.
62. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed as above.
63. Before we part with this appeal, we would like to make certain
observations which in our opinion the trial courts should keep in mind
while dealing with such plea taken by an accused, especially when
it relates to homicide, that the accused was under the influence of
certain invisible force or where the prosecution is also totally unable
to explain circumstances which motivated him or her to commit the
act of homicide or where the evidence on record unambiguously
show totally inexplicable but highly intriguing, strange and unusual
circumstances under which the crime was committed as happened
in the present case.
64. If such circumstances emerge in course of the trial which remain
inexplicable and bizarre as in the present case, the court, in our
opinion, even if the accused opts to remain silent, should ask such
questions to the witnesses, as may be necessary to elicit the truth
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1845

Chunni Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh

by invoking Section 165 of the Evidence Act, since the court has
to be satisfied that the offence alleged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt not only in respect of actus reas but also mens rea.
This assumes great importance when the accused pleads existence
of certain circumstances which are beyond his/her control and which
may indicate unsoundness of mind even temporarily, incapacitating
the accused to take a conscious and informed decision.
It is for the salutary reason that if the accused at the time of
commission of crime was incapable of making conscious and
informed decision or was suffering from certain mental incapacity
or unsoundness of mind even if temporarily, it may put a question
mark on the “intention” of the accused in committing such a crime,
in which event, the benefit of doubt may be extended to the accused
as regards proof of intention and mens rea, as it would determine
the nature of conviction and sentence which may be imposed.

Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan